

PREFACE.

The following pages will, it is trusted, facilitate to Sanskrit students the perusal of the original text, and to general readers an estimate, of one of the schools of Indian thought. Such interest as they may claim, will be historical, as a picture of a low stage of metaphysical culture. The system must be judged from its proper place in the history of philosophy; not hastily condemned from a modern point of view. The Indian cosmologies, imperfect in analysis, and hasty in synthesis, may be compared to the pre-Socratic schemes among the Greeks. In India the Socratic reform in method has been wanting, and speculation has lapsed into a fruitless scholasticism. By these systems, however, it is that Indian thinkers are formed, and we may well remember that in mental discipline "speculation is higher than speculative truth", and that where philosophers "have not realised truth, they, have always determined exertion" * . . .

The technical terms employed in translation are necessarily rather suggestive than reproductive of the original. The artificial groupings, or (to use Locke's expression) mixed modes, of European and of Indian thought, intersect and overlap, rather than coincide with, one another. The reader should bear this in mind, that he may avoid the misleading associations of an English terminology.

* See Sir W. Hamilton's *Discussions*, pp. 40 42.

A brief indication of the conceptions dominant in the Vaiśeṣhika system, may be useful to the uninitiated. These are the transition of souls from everlasting through new embodiments and new spheres of being; therein reaping in pleasures and pains the fruits of merits and demerits ever reproduced as seed by plant and plant by seed; the atomic aggregates which make up the object world, eternally disintegrated and reintegrated by the efficacy of works, with or without—for it is questioned—the intervention of a creator spirit. Thus in bondage to sensuous experience, painful at the best, the soul must wait its release until, the understanding purified by good works, it attains to knowledge of the modes of being. This knowledge disengages the soul from its appetent and active functions, and merges it in the absolute.

English readers will find abundant information, for further guidance, in Colebrooke's *Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindús*, the Rev. K. M. Banerjea's *Dialogues on Hindú Philosophy*, Dr. Fitzedward Hall's *Rational Refutation of Hindú Philosophy* translated from the Hindí of the Rev. Nehemiah Níla-kantha, Professor Max Muller's *Essay on Indian Logic* appended to Abp Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, and the articles on the Vaiśeṣhika and other Indian philosophies in Chambers's *Encyclopædia*. Those who read Sanskrit will find a useful epitome of the Vaiśeṣhika doctrines in the *Tattvavivartanā*, the work of an illustrious pandit of the present day, Jaya-náráyaṇa-tar-kapañchánana late professor of Hindú Philosophy in the Government Sanskrit College Calcutta, the author of the

Vivritti from which many of the comments in the following pages are reproduced

The translation of the Vāisesika Aphorisms is reprinted from the 'Pandit,' a monthly publication of the Benares Sanskrit College. It was undertaken at the instance of Mr R. T. H. Griffith, the learned principal of the Benares College, as supplementary, in however imperfect a manner, to the text books of the other Indian systems translated by the late Dr J. S. Ballantyne. The text followed is that of Dr Roer and Pandit Jaya nārāyana tarkapanchanana published in the Bibliotheca Indica.

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THE
VAIŚEŚHIKA APHORISMS
OF
KĀNADA
FIRST BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON

INTRODUCTION¹ All students who wish to shun the multitude of pains engendered in this world by birth old age death and so like, learn from revelation tradition the epics the Purāṇas and other sources, that the means of escaping them is investigation of the real nature of soul. Now, certain disciples who had in the prescribed manner studied the Vedas and their subordinate sciences, unassuming and attentive hearers, in quest of knowledge reverentially approached the great and holy sage Kāṇāda. The sage full of compassion taught them the system of the ten sections. Enunciation, definition, investigation [of the adequacy of definitions],—such is the threefold method of this system. Division is only a particular kind of enunciation, hence there is no addition [to be made]. Although description of the categories is the chief object of this treatise yet from the importance of merit as the instrumental cause of real knowledge of the categories, he in the first place promises a description of that. *Vṛtiti*

अथातो धर्मे व्याख्यास्यामः ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 Now, then, we will explain [what] merit [is]

¹ इह खलु जन्मज्जरामरणादिर्जनिततपि कृत्वापि जिह्वास्य सर्वं यवान्तेवासिनस्तद्दाननिदानमात्मतत्त्वदर्शनमाकर्णयन्ति श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणादिषु । अथ केचिदन्तेवासिनो विधिघटधीतयेदवेदाङ्गा अनसूषका सम्यक्प्रवणा मननार्थं भगवन्तं कणादमहर्षिं विधिप्रदुषेदुः । ततः परमकारुणिकः स मुनिदेशाध्यायेतन्त्र तानुपदिदेश । उद्धृष्टो सत्तमः परीक्षां घेति त्रिविधां तस्य ब्राह्मस्य प्रवृत्तिं विभागस्तु विधेयौद्धृष्टः स वेति नार्थिकम् । यदप्यत्र तन्मे यदार्थनिरूपणस्यैव प्रामुख्यं तथापि यदार्थतत्त्वज्ञाननिदानतया धर्मस्यैव प्राधान्यात् तत्किमप्यमेव प्रथमं प्रतिजानीते ॥

'Now' means after being requested by his discip
'Then' since pupils quick in hearing &c, and unenvious hav
proached Or else the word 'Now' (*atha*) has an ausp
sense Thus it is said 'The syllable *Om* and the word *atna*
these two cleft of old the throat of Brahmā and issued forth, there
fore both are of happy omen . *Upasāra*

Merit defined.

यतो ऽभ्युदयनि श्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Merit is that from which [results] attainment of
elevation and of the highest good

'It might be objected that because merit is not productive
of any result, a description of it is useless Hence he states its
characteristic shewing that to merit belongs the attainment of the
highest object of man Exaltation is paradise the highest good
is emancipation that cause from which [results] the attainment
—production—, of these is merit and therefore it is fitting that
merit should be explained inasmuch as by reason of its effecting
the highest object of man which consists of paradise and libera
tion [of the soul] it is to be acquired by those who are desirous
of enjoyment and of emancipation. V

'Exaltation is knowledge of the truth, the highest good is
final cessation of pain, that from which both [result] is merit. The
highest good is [attained] by means of exaltation. If this be

अथेति श्रियाकाङ्क्षानन्तरमाह । अत इति । यत श्रयणादिपटवो नमूषकाश्च
नोवांसि उपशेदुस्तिर्य्य । यद्वा अथशब्दो मङ्गलार्थः । तदुक्तम् ।

श्रीङ्कारश्चायश्चदश्च द्वाथेति वल्लभा पुरा ।
कण्ठे भित्त्वा विनिर्याता तेन माङ्गलिकायुभौ ॥ इति ॥

'ननु धर्मस्याकिञ्चित्कर्त्तव्येन तत्विहण्य व्यर्थमाह धर्मस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्व
दर्शनेन तत्तत्त्वणमाह । अभ्युदय स्थाने नि श्रेयस मोक्षस्तयो सिद्धिरित्यतिर्य्य कारणात्
स धर्मः तथा च स्वर्गापवर्गादपरमपुरुषार्थसाधनतया दुःखदूषणा सुसुखदूषणादयोपदेयत्वा
द्धर्मस्य व्याख्यानं युक्तमेव ॥

'अभ्युदयस्तत्त्वज्ञानं नि श्रेयसमात्यन्तिमीदृश्वनिदिति तदुभयं यत स धर्मः अभ्यु
दयद्वारात् नि श्रेयसमिति मध्यपदलापो समास षष्ठ्यमन्तत्पुरुषो वा स च धर्मो निश्च
तिनक्षणेन वदन्त एति तु निदिध्यासनादिपरोक्षार्थो धर्मो ऋष्टमय तदा विधिद्वयः ॥

is meaning the compound [*abhyudaya mēśreyas*] has an ellipse
 a central member or is a Tat purusha ablatively dependent,
 / merit is implied to be characterised by Cessation [of pain],
 out if merit to be attained by practices such as devout meditation
 &c and [synonymous with] the result of good actions done in a
 former state of being, then the compound is regular in form U

Note. Exaltation according to the Upashāra means either
 knowledge of the truth (*tattva jñāna*) or the result of good works
 done in a former birth (*adṛśita*) If it signify knowledge of the
 truth, the aphorism must be translated, 'That is merit from which
 [results] the highest good by means of exaltation' If the result
 of actions done in a former life be intended by exaltation, the
 aphorism is to be rendered as above

' The attainment of paradise by merit is with visible means,
 while the attainment of liberation is by means of knowledge of the
 truth, consequently there is a distinction V

* He proceeds to remove the doubt, What proof is there of
 [the existence of] merit and of its being the means of attaining to
 knowledge of the truth &c If you say the Veda we reply not
 so, to the authority of that is doubted and accordingly an apho-
 rism of Aksha charana says, That [Veda] is unauthoritative being
 vitiated by falsity self contradictoriness and repetition V

The Veda is autho-
 ritative

तद्वचनादायस्य प्रामाण्यम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 Authoritativeness belongs to revelation because it
 is a declaration of that

' The word that (*id*) signifies God though he has not been
 previously mentioned, it being inferred from his being universally

१ धर्मस्य स्वर्गसाधनता साक्षादेव अवयवसाधनता तु तत्प्राज्ञानद्वारेति विशेष ॥

२ ननु धर्मं तस्य तत्प्राज्ञानादिसाधनस्ये च किं मानं घेद इयं मानमिति चेत् न
 तत्प्रामाण्यस्यापि सन्दिग्धत्वात् तथा साक्षादवयवसूत्रं तदप्रामाण्यमनूतव्यापातपुनरुक्तदो-
 षेभ्य इतोत्पाशङ्का निरस्यति ॥

३ तदित्यनुपक्रान्तमपि प्रसिद्धिमिदं तद्वेग्य परामर्शति यथा तदप्रामाण्यमनूत

known just as in the aphorism of Gautama 'That is unauthoritative being vitiated by falsity self-contradictoriness and repetition by the word 'That the Veda is signified though not previously mentioned. Accordingly authoritativeness belongs to revelation—the Veda—because it was declared by him—revealed by God. Or else 'That signifies the contiguous [word] merit and accordingly authoritativeness belongs to revelation—the Veda—because it declares—expounds—merit for whatever statement sets forth a matter of certain knowledge is an authority U

' By the word 'That expressive of something already known God is signified, though not previously mentioned. And accordingly the sense is that the authoritativeness of the Veda must necessarily be admitted since it was declared by an everlasting, all-wise and all-holy Spirit V

धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवा
याना पदार्थाना साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्या तत्त्वज्ञानाच्चि-
येयसम ॥ ४ ॥

Means of attaining
the highest good

Aph 4 The highest good [result] from knowledge of the truth which springs from particular merit [and is obtained] by means of the similarity and dissimilarity of the categories substance attribute action generality particularity and cohesion

' Such knowledge of the truth depends upon the Vaiśeṣika system hence even causation of the highest good belongs to that

व्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्य इति गीतमीयसूत्रे तच्छब्देनानुपपन्नोऽपि चेद परामश्रयति । तथा च तद्वचनात् तनेश्वरेण प्रकथयनादाद्यास्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं यद्वा तदिति सन्नित्तं धर्ममेव परामश्रयति तथा च धर्मस्य वचनात् प्रतिपादनात् आद्यास्य वदस्य प्रामाण्यं यदि वाच्यं प्रामाणिकमप्ये प्रतिपादयति तत्प्रमाणमेव यत् इत्यर्थः ॥

' ईश्वरस्याप्रकान्तत्वेऽपि प्रसिद्धार्थकेन तच्छब्देन परामर्शो भवत्येव तथाच नित्यसमर्थाभिर्निरूपणप्रकृतित्वात् वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमप्यसंशयानुपपन्नमित्यर्थः ॥

' एतादृशं तत्त्वज्ञानं धर्मैकिकशास्त्राधीनमिति तस्यापि निश्चयहेतुस्य द्रव्यद्रव्यावित्तमं शास्त्रं निश्चययोगहेतुहेतुमत्त्वाच्च शास्त्रतत्त्वज्ञानयोग्योपायविभागे निश्चयसुतत्त्वज्ञानयोग्यो कार्यकारणभावः द्रव्यादिपदार्थशास्त्रयोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावः स्याज्ज्ञेय इत्यगम्यते एतेषां च सम्बन्धानां ज्ञानाच्च निश्चयार्थनामिदं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तिः । निश्चय

[system] Between the system and the highest good the connection of relation of cause to effect between the system and knowledge of the truth the connection of relation of agency to the agent between the highest good and knowledge of the truth the connection of relation of effect to cause between the categories substance &c and the system the connection of relation of matter expounded to exposition is understood to exist. It is from knowledge of these connections that in this world seekers of the the highest good apply themselves to this system. The highest good is final cessation of pain. Finality of cessation of pain is non simultaneity with antecedent non existence (potential existence) of pain in the common substratum or simultaneity with subsequent non-existence (destruction) of all particular qualities of soul which are produced at the same time and have a common substratum. Or emancipation [of the soul] is potential existence of pain terminated by cessation of all particular qualities [of the soul]. In the second aphorism of Gautama it is stated that on the successive removal of pain birth activity faults [i.e. desires and aversions] and false knowledge and on then consequent non existence emancipation ensues. Here the argument from non existence of cause to non existence of effect proves emancipation to be characterised by antecedent non existence of pain for with respect to the removal of activity consequent upon the removal of vice the removal of birth on the removal of activity and the removal of pain on the removal of birth such removal is not subsequent non existence but non production,

समाप्त्यन्तकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः । दुःखनिवृत्तेश्चात्यन्तिकत्वं समानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावा समानकालीनत्वं युगपदुत्पन्नसमानाधिकरणज्ञात्मविशेषगुणध्वंससमानकालीनत्वं वा । अशेषविषेयगुणध्वंसायाधिकरुदुःखप्रागभावो वा मुक्तिः । गीतमीयद्वितीयसूत्रं दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिध्याज्ज्ञानानुत्तराजरापाये तदनन्तराभावादपदमं इत्यत्र कारणाभावात् कार्याभावाभिधानं दुःखप्रागभाववृत्तिमेव मुक्तिं दृढयति नहि दोषापाये प्रवृत्त्यपायः प्रवृत्त्यपाये जन्मापायः जन्मापाये दुःखापाय इत्यपायो ध्वंसः किन्त्वनुत्पत्तिः सा च प्रागभावा एव । धर्मविशेषप्रसूतादिति तत्त्वज्ञानादित्यस्य विशेषणं तत्र धर्मविशेषो निवृत्ति लक्षणो धर्मः यदि तु तत्त्व ज्ञायते ज्ञेयं तत्त्वज्ञानं चास्त्वमुच्यते तदा धर्मविशेष ईश्वर नियोगप्रसादरूपो यत्कथं भूयते हीश्वरनियोगप्रसादावधिगम्य रक्षादौ महर्षिं शास्त्रं प्रणीतवानिति ॥

and non production is antecedent non-existence ' From knowledge of the truth which springs from particular merit —such is the special character of that [knowledge] and accordingly particular merit is merit differentiated by finality but if by knowledge of the truth the [Vaiśeṣika] system be intended (the truth being known by means of that system) then particular merit must be explained as characterised by the ordinance and grace of God for it is a tradition that the great saint Kanāda revealed the system in consequence of having obtained the ordinance and grace of God U

1 Particular merit is particular good works done either in this life or in a former state of existence. By special good works knowledge of the truth is produced by means of the similarity and dissimilarity of substance and the other categories. Next meditation on the soul is produced, next by means of meditation a [mental] presentation of the soul is produced, and after that by means of destruction of false knowledge &c emancipation ensues. In this place there is mention of six categories spoken of as existing but in reality non existence is also implied by the sage as another category. Accordingly there is no discrepancy in such aphorisms as the following in the second daily lesson 'From non existence of cause is non-existence of effect, and in the ninth book ['An effect has no antecedent existence] because of the non existence of ascription to it of actions and attributes V

Division of substance

एथियापस्तेजे वायुराकाश कालो दिगात्मा मन
इति द्रव्याणि ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Earth water light air, ether, time space soul and the internal organs —are the substances

1 धर्मविशेषेण ऐहिकी जन्मान्तरायां वा मुक्त्यर्थेण । मुक्त्यर्थेणैव द्रव्यादिपञ्चायानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानं जायते तत आत्ममननं अनन्तरं निदिध्यासनेनात्मसाक्षात्कारो जायते तदनन्तरं मिथ्याज्ञानादिनाशक्रमेण मोक्षो भवतीत्यर्थः । अत्र पदपठार्थकीर्तनं भाषाभिप्रायेण धस्तुता आयां अपि पठार्थान्तरतया मुनेरभिप्रेतं । अत एव द्वितीयादिके कारणाभावात् कारणाभाव इति सूत्रस्य नवमाध्याये क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् इत्यादि सूत्राणाञ्च नासङ्गतिः ॥

' The particle *iti* is expressive of limitation therefore the the meaning is that there are nine substances, neither more nor less. If it be objected What is the use of the particular *iti* when the exclusion of a lesser or greater number [of substances] is effected by the mere force of the division? this is to be determined, that it is because the particle *iti* is employed to indicate the logical subject in the construction of the aphorism and only in order to elucidate the purport of the division since gold &c, and God are included in this [enumeration] and since it is explained [in V 2 19] that darkness suspected [by some] of being additional, is a non existence. The construction without the use of compound words is to shew the importance of all [the substances], and the author of the aphorisms himself will point out their definitions when treating of their dissimilarities. U

*Note—*On the Muktivali on Bhāṣā parichchhedā 3. 'If it be objected There is a tenth substance darkness why is it not enumerated? for it is cognised by preception and substantivity belongs to it because it is possessed of colour and action and because devoid of odour it is not earth and because it possesses dark colour it is not water &c and the eye deprived of light is the organ [used] in perceiving it. We reply that it is not so, because it is illogical to imagine another substance when it is necessarily produced by non existence of light. The notion that

१ इतिकारो विधारणार्थं तेन नवेव द्रव्याणि नाधिकानि न न्यूनानीत्यर्थः । ननु विभागवत्तादेव न्यूनधिकसङ्ख्याव्यवच्छेदसिद्धौ किमितिकारेणेति चेत् उच्येतमात्रपरतया ऽपि सूत्रसम्भवे विभागतात्पर्यस्कोरणार्थमेवेतिकारामिधानात् सुवर्णादीनामीश्वरस्य चात्रैवान्तर्भागात् अन्यकारस्य चाधिकत्वेनाशङ्क्यमानस्याभासत्वव्युत्पादनादेतदध्यवसेयम् । असमासकरणं तु सर्वथा प्राधान्यप्रदर्शनाय लक्षणमेतेषां तु धैर्धर्म्यावसरे सूत्रकृदेव दर्शयिष्यति ॥

१ ननु दृश्यं द्रव्यं तत्र कुतो नोक्तं । तद्वि प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते । तस्य च रूपवत्यात् कर्मवत्याच्च द्रव्यत्वम् । तच्च गन्धगुणवत्यात् न दृष्यते । नीलरूपवत्याच्च न ललाटिकम् । तत्प्रत्यक्षे चासौक्यनिर्णये चक्षुः करणमिति चेत् । न । आश्रयवृत्तेर्ज्ञो भावनोपपत्तौ द्रव्यान्तरकल्पनाया अन्यायव्याप्त्या । रूपवत्ताप्रतीतिस्तु भस्वरूपा । कर्मवत्त्वप्रतीतिरपि विशालोकापसारणोपाधिकी भ्रान्तिरेव । स्वर्णस्य यथा तत्रत्यन्तर्भासस्तथा यत्पते ॥

it is possessed of colour is erroneous. The notion that it possesses action is also an error occasioned by the departure of light. It will be declared how it is that gold is included in light.

Darkness was affirmed to be a substance by the Sāṅkhya,
gold by the Mīmāṃsaka.

The construction without the use of compound words is designed to shew that all the substances independently of one another produce particular effects or is intended to teach that they all equally produce effects which inhere in them. Among these nine divisions of substance ether time and space do not form any class since they have only a single existence but the rest form classes. V

Qualities en timer
sted

Qualities enimerated कृपसगन्धस्पर्शः सद्गुण परिमाणानि पृथक् सयोग-
विभागैः परत्वापरत्वे ध्रुवयः सुखदुःखे इच्छादुषैः
प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 Colour taste smell and touch, numbers extensions individuality conjunction and disjunction priority and posteriority, intellections pleasure and pain desire and aversion and volitions are qualities

* By the particle *et* he implies in addition to these gravity, fluidity, viscosity, self restitution merit demerit and sound,

१ असमासकरण तु सर्वेषामितरने पश्येत् कार्ययि शेषेत्यादृक्ताप्रदर्शनाद्यै स्वसमये
तत्कार्यजनने सर्वेषां सुस्पृताज्ञापनाद्यै वा । अथ नयमु दय्यविभाजनेषु गगनस्थकानस्य
दित्यानामेकैकमात्रपुत्तित्याद्य जातिस्थ शेषाणां पुनर् जातिस्थमेवेति ॥

१ चकारेण गुह्यत्वद्वयस्यैव स्वस्वार्थमाधर्मशब्दान् समुख्येनेति ते हि प्रसिद्धगुण
भाषा एवेति कथ्यते नात्ता । गुह्यत्वञ्चामीषा यथास्थान वसणत स्थपणतश्च यद्वति
रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शानां समानकालीनरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसामानाधिकरण्य नास्तीति सूचनायै
समाप्त सख्यापरिमाणयोस्तु सामानकालीनसख्यापरिमाणसामानाधिकरण्यमुचिनायाम्
मासो यद्युपचननिर्देशश्च यद्यप्येकत्वएवमात्राधिकरणे ऐक्यान्तरं वा महत्त्वदीधत्य
समानाधिकरण महत्त्वदीधत्यान्तरं तथापि द्वित्वादीनामन्योन्य सामानाधिकरण्यं भव
त्यदीधत्यादीनाञ्च द्विजातीयपरिमाणयोः सामानाधिकरण्यमस्येयं । एतत्तत्र यद्यपि
द्विपृथक्त्रादिसमानाधिरस्य तेन सख्यायद्रूपगुह्येनेत्येव निर्दिष्टमहति तथाप्यपि यद्वात्यलस्य
संख्याता यैधर्म्यं सूचयितुमेकवचननिर्देशः । सयोगविभागयोर्द्वेयोरप्येककर्मजन्यत्वसूचनाय

for those being well known to be qualities are not expressly mentioned. He will explain in the proper place from their characteristic and from their form that these are qualities. The compound 'colour taste, smell, and touch,' is intended to point out that there is no common substratum of synchronous colours, tastes, smells, and touches. Numbers and extensions are not made a compound word and are named in the plural number, the design being to indicate that contemporaneous numbers and extensions have a common substratum. Although the common substratum of unity is not another unity and the common substratum of greatness and length, is not another greatness and length yet duality &c are the common substratum of each other and in greatness, length &c, is a common substratum for two heterogeneous extensions. Although individuality is the common substratum for the individuality of two &c and should accordingly be specified in the plural like numbers yet the singular is employed to indicate its difference from numbers on account of its being characterised by the implying of limitation. Conjunction and disjunction are expressed by [one word in] the dual to indicate that though two, they are produced by one action [or motion]. Priority and posteriority are expressed in the dual to imply that they are relative to one another and to imply that they are indifferently properties of space and time. The plural intellections is intended to expel the doctrine of the Sāṃhyanas that intellection is one

द्विवचन परत्वापरत्ययोरन्योन्याश्रयनिरूप्यतया द्विकाललिङ्गत्वाग्रयेऽसूचनाय च द्विवचन युद्धोना विद्यादिभेदेन साख्याभिमतैकमात्रबुद्धिनिराकरणसूचनाय बहुवचनं मुख्यं दुःखयोर्द्वयोरपि भोगत्वायच्छेदोक्तकार्यजनकत्वमविशेषेण चादृष्टाच्चायकत्वं मुख्यस्यापि बुद्धेनापि भाजनञ्च व्याप्यतु द्विवचन इच्छाद्वेषयोर्द्वयोरपि प्रवृत्तिं प्रति कारणत्वसूचनाय द्विवचन प्रयत्नानां जितितनियिद्धमोचराणां दशविधानां पृथगेतुत्व दशविधानाञ्च पापहेतुत्वमभिसन्धाय बहुवचनमित्युच्येयम् । यद्वा रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शानां भौतिकेन्द्रियव्यवस्थाहेतुत्वज्ञापनार्थं पाकप्रक्रियाव्यवस्थापनार्थं वा ते समस्योक्ताः सख्याया द्वित्वग्राह्यादौ जिप्रतिपत्तिरिति तच्चिरात्करणसूचनाय बहुवचनमभिधानं पृथक्त्वे तु सख्यायदुत्वेनैवास्यापि बहुवचमिति सूचनाय विधिज्ञानव्यञ्जनीयत्वसख्यातो वैधर्म्यमिति सूचनायच पृथगभिधानं परिमाणं तु दीर्घत्वदृश्यत्वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिराशाय बहुवचनं सयोगविभागयोरन्योन्याश्रयोपज्ञापनाय द्विवचनम् ॥

only on the grounds of their division into knowledge &c. The dual term pleasure and pain is used to establish [the doctrine] that they, though two produce one effect to be distinguished in fruition that they indifferently bring to pass the consequences of actions done in a former state and that even pleasure must be accounted pain. Desire and aversion are in the dual to indicate that both are causes of activity. The plural form of volitions implies that they are the cause of merit from ten kinds of lawful and prohibited objects and the cause of sin from ten kinds of objects. Or else colour taste smell, and touch are mentioned in a compound word to teach that they are the cause of the relation between the elements and the organs of sense or else to establish the effects which are produced by heat. There is a contrariety in number which consists of duality plurality &c. —it is to imply the denial of this that [number] is mentioned in the plural. Individuality is enumerated separately to denote that it is manifold by reason of the plurality of numbers, and to imply that its difference from number consists in revealing the knowledge of a limit. In the case of extension the plural is used to deny that there is any contrariety between length breadth &c. Conjunction and disjunction are in the dual to denote their mutual opposition. U

Enumeration * of actions उत्तेषणमवतेषणमाकुञ्चन प्रसारण गमनमिति क
माणि ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 Throwing upwards throwing downwards contract ing expanding and going are the actions.

1 Actions by reason of their production by substances and by quantities and from their imhesion in substances possessed of colour are known by perception. Accordingly after the enumeration of substances and qualities [Kāpāda] declared the enunciation and division of actions. U

1 कर्मणा दृश्यजन्यतया गुणजन्यतया च रूपवद्द्रव्यसमवायाच्च प्रत्यक्षतति दृश्य
स्वाभिधानानन्तर कर्मोद्वेगविभागावाह ॥

¹ *It* is before expresses limitation. Action is a class is cognised by perception so also are throwing upwards &c according to the author of the *Muktāvalī*. Going is a particular class comprising revolution evacuation dropping flaming upwards bending up and down &c V

Common element
in substance quality
& action

सदनित्य द्रव्यगत कार्य कारण सामान्यविशेषादि-
ति द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेष ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Existence transitoriness inhesion in substance effect cause and possession of generality and particularity are the common element of substances qualities and actions

² After *it* the word *pratipada* is to be supplied. The general is existence the particular is substantiality. The notion existence &c is applicable to quality and action as well as to substance in this there is no particularity. Therefore existence opposition to subsequent nor existence [or to destruction] the possession of substance as a coherent [or material] cause opposition to antecedent non existence causality and the constituting of a class contained under existence is that which is similar in substances qualities and actions. Although transitoriness inhesion in substance effect and cause are not comprehended in an eternal substance or quality or causality in an atom yet it is here meant that transitoriness is a condition of such members of the categories as

¹ इति पुर्ययदयधारणपरः । कर्मत्वजाति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा स्वमुत्पेपणत्यादिक्रमयोति मुक्तायलकारः । समनत्यञ्च जातिविशेषो भ्रमणरेचनस्यन्दनोत्थञ्चलननमनोचमनादि प्यपि ॥

² इतीत्यनन्तर प्रत्यय इत्यध्याहार्ये सामान्य तद्विशेषो द्रव्यत्यादि तद्रूपः । सदित्या दिप्रत्ययो यथा द्रव्ये तथा गुणकर्मणोरपि तत्र न कश्चिद्विशेषः । तथा च सतायत्य ध्वसप्रतियोगित्य द्रव्यसमवायिकारणस्य प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्य कारणस्य सतायत्य जातिमत्त्वञ्च द्रव्यगुणकर्मणा साधर्म्यमिति भावः । यद्यप्यनित्यत्यादिचक्र नित्ये, द्रव्ये गुणे चाख्याप्त कारणस्यञ्च यारिभावइत्यादौ तथापि ध्वसप्रतियोगिभाप्रतियुतिपटाद्यपि भाजकोपाधिमत्य द्रव्यस्य प्रागभावप्रतियोगिभाप्रतियुतिपटाद्यपिभाजकापाधिमत्य का यंत्य समवाय्यसमवाय्यन्यतरकारणतुतिपटाद्यपिभाजकापाधिमत्य कारणस्य द्रव्यादीना साधर्म्यमित्यत्र तात्पर्यम् ॥

exist in virtue of a being opposed to subsequent non existence inclusion in substance is a condition of such members of the categories as exist in virtue of substance as their coherent cause, the being an effect is a condition of such members of the categories as exist in virtue of a being opposed to antecedent non existence, and causality is a condition of such members of the categories as exist as coherent or non coherent causes V

Common element : द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भस्त्व साधर्म्यम् ॥ ६ ॥
 Instances and lies

Ap1 7 The common property of substance and quality is that they originate things of the same class

1 Terrene atoms originate a terrene aggregate of two atoms blue colour and the like in an atom produce blue colour and the like in an aggregate of two atoms Such is the origination by substance and quality of things of the same class Although this cannot be predicated of ether &c and of simple substances and of the qualities of the ether yet the meaning is that there is a similarity in the conditions of the divisions of the categories existing by reason of the origination of homogeneous things V

Cp Muktarali on Bhāṣya parichheda 14 'That which is of atomic dimension is not the cause of anything for that would originate an extension in substance originated by its own substratum [the atom] But this is impossible for one extension is productive of another extension exceeding that which belongs to things of its own class as from a great thing a greater is originated and so consequently that which would be pro

1 पार्थिव्या परमाण्व्य पार्थिवद्रव्यरूपमारभन्ते परमाणुनोत्पत्त्यादिरज्ज्व द्रव्यकादि गते नीलरूपादिफमारभन्ते इति द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भस्त्व यद्यपि तादनादाद्यन्या यद्यपि न तु यो चाद्यापिस्तथापि सजातीयारम्भकदृष्टिपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्यस्य साधर्म्ये तात्पर्यम् ॥

2 अणुपरिमाणु न तु कस्यापि कारणम् । सति स्थायव्यवस्थद्रव्यपरिमाणुारम्भक भवेत् । तच्च न सम्भवंति । परिमाणस्य स्वसमानजातीयोत्पत्तिपरिमाणजनकत्वात् । महदारव्यस्य महत्तरत्ययत्नः । अणुजन्यस्याणुतरत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च । एवं परममद्वयपरिमाणमती न्दिपसामान्य विज्ञेयाश्चेति बोध्यम् ॥

duced from an atom would be smaller than an atom. The same is to be understood to be the case with respect to infinitely great extension, and generality transcending sense, and particularity.

Explanation of the foregoing aphorism **द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तर्भासन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरम् ॥ १० ॥**

Aph 10 Substances originate another substance, and qualities another quality.

'He elucidates what was said before. The sense is obvious. V

Actions do not originate actions. **कर्म कर्मसाध्यं न विद्यते ॥ ११ ॥**

Aph 11 An action cannot be effected by an action.

'The meaning is that there is no proof that one action can be effected by another, as there is that substances and qualities are originated by things of the same class. It is here intended to be said that if one action produced another, it would produce it after being itself produced, as in the case of sound. Now, as the former action produced a disjunction from conjunct substances, from what would the second action produce a disjunction? For disjunction is preceded by conjunction and there is not another conjunction produced in the same substratum, but if [by the subsequent action] there is no production of disjunction, the definition of action is violated. U

The characteristic of action is that it is the immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction.

Difference of substances, qualities, and actions. **न द्रव्य कार्ये कारणञ्च बधति ॥ १२ ॥**

Aph 12 A substance is not destroyed either by its effect or by its cause.

'पूर्वोक्तमेव स्पष्टयति । सुगमम् ॥

'सृजातीयारब्धद्रव्यगुणयोरिव कर्मसाध्ये कर्मणि प्रमाणं नास्तीत्यर्थः । इदमत्राहु-
त्सम् । कर्म यदि कर्म जनयेत् स्यात्सत्यनन्तरमेव जनयेत् शब्दवत् । तथा च पूर्वकर्मण्येव
यावत् संयोगादित्येभ्यो विभागे घटिते द्वितीय कर्म येन सह विभागे जनयेत् विभागस्य
संयोगपूर्वकत्वात् संयोगान्तरस्य च तत्राधिकृत्योऽनुत्पत्तत्वात् विभागाजनने तु कर्म
संश्लेष्यते ॥

' The meaning is that between two substances which have entered into the relation of effect and cause there is not the relation of destroyer and destroyed, inasmuch as the destruction of a substance is due to the destruction of its substratum, and the destruction of its originative conjunction. U.

C. continued

उभयया गुणाः ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 Qualities [are destroyed] in both [the above] manners

* [Qualities] are destroyed by their effects, and are destroyed by their causes First sounds &c, [in a series] are destroyed by their effects, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last sound but one destroys the last U

Continued

कार्यविरोधि कर्म ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 An action is opposed to its effect

' He declares that an action is destroyed by its own effect The sense is that an action is subject to opposition, i. e. destruction, wrought by its effect which consists of a subsequent conjunction V

Characteristic
substance

of क्रियागुणयुक्त समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम् ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 The definition of substance is that it is possessed of actions and qualities and is a coherent cause.

' Possessed of actions and qualities because actions and qualities exist in it In this place the word characteristic (lak-

कार्यकारणभावापघोर्द्वयोर्वध्यघातकभावो नास्तीत्यर्थः । आद्यवनाशारम्भरूपयोगनाशाभ्यामेव द्रव्यनाशमिति भावः ॥

कार्यवध्या कारणवध्याश्चेत्यर्थः । आद्याशब्दादीनां कार्यप्रध्यत्वपरमस्य ॥ कारणवध्यत्वमुपान्त्येन शब्देन शून्यत्वस्य नाशतः ॥

स्वकार्यमेव कर्मणो नाशकमित्याह । कार्येणोत्तरसंयोगक्षयेण कृतो यो विरोधो नाशस्तद्वत् कर्मत्वार्थः ॥

क्रियाश्च गुणाश्च घटान्तेऽस्मिन्निति क्रियागुणयुक्तं अत्र सर्वशब्दश्चिदन्वयवन् सामानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकव्यतिरेकलिङ्गविशेषवचनश्च सत्यतेऽनेनेति व्युत्पत्तिः

śhanā) denotes a sign and a particular distinctive property excluding objects of the same and of different classes according to the force of the etymology. It is discerned (*lalshyite*) by means of this. Accordingly by means of action it is discerned that such and such a thing is a substance and by the possession of qualities substance is discerned as excluded from things of the same and of different classes. The five categories quality &c, [quality, action generality, particularity, and imhesion] belong to the same class by reason of the notion of existence, while non-existence is of a different class. Substance, then is different from quality &c, because it possesses qualities. That which is not different from [quality &c] does not possess qualities as quality &c. And although there is not possession of qualities in a compound substance during its first moment yet opposition to absolute non-existence of qualities is meant to be stated for absolute non existence of qualities is opposed also to antecedent and subsequent non existence of qualities. In like manner the being a coherent cause is a characteristic of the category substance distinguishing it from the [other] six categories. U

Characteristic of quality **द्रव्यान्वयगुणवत्त्वं सयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनमेव इति गुणलक्षणम् ॥ १६ ॥**

Aph 16 That it has substance as a substratum that it is without qualities and that it is not a cause of conjunctions and disjunctions being unconcerned with them is the definition of quality

¹ Having substance as a substratum because its character

वत्त्वात् तत्र क्रियया कर्मणा द्रव्यमिदमिति सत्यते गुणवत्त्वेन च समानासमानजातीययो व्यावृत्त द्रव्य सत्यते तत्र समानजातीया भावत्वेन गुणादय एव असमानजातीयस्य भाव तेन द्रव्य गुणादिभ्यो भिन्न गुणवत्त्वात् यत्र गुणदिभ्यो भिद्यते तत्र गुणवत् यथा गुणादीति । गुणवत्त्व यदप्य द्रव्येणैव व्यर्थानि नास्ति तथापि गुणात्यन्ताभावविरोधिमत्त्व विप्रक्षितं गुणप्रागभावाप्यस्योपरि गुणात्यन्ताभावविरोधित्वात् एव समवायिकारण स्वमपि पदपदार्थभेदकमेव द्रव्यपदार्थस्य लक्षणम् ॥

¹ द्रव्यमाश्रयितुं शीलमस्येति द्रव्याश्रयो इत्येव च यद्ये इति गतमस आह अगुणयानिति तथापि कर्मण्यतिव्याप्तिरित्यत आह सयोगविभागेष्वकारणम् ॥

is to inhere in substance But this would apply to substance also, accordingly it is said to be without qualities But this is predicable also of action therefore it is stated not to be a cause of conjunctions and disjunctions U

Characteristic of action. एकद्रव्यमगुण संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षारणमिति कर्म लक्षणम् ॥ १७ ॥

Aph 17 That it abides in one substance is without qualities and is the absolute cause of conjunctions and disjunctions is the definition of action.

* That which has one substance for its substratum abides in one substance No action has more than one substratum as compound substances and conjunctions and other qualities have more than one substratum V

Similarity of the first three categories द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्वय कारण सामान्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

Aph 18 Substance is the common cause of substance quality, and actions.

* The meaning is that substance quality and action exist in one substance as their coherent cause. A common property of the three is their forming a class existing in substance as a coherent cause U

Continued. तथा गुणः ॥ १९ ॥

Aph 19 Likewise quality (is the common cause of substances, qualities and actions)

* A common property of the three is their forming a class existing in quality as a non-coherent cause. Of substances the non-coherent cause is conjunction Of qualities which are effects

* एक द्रव्यमाश्रयो यस्य तदेकद्रव्य संयोगादिगुणाश्चानेकाश्रिताः तथा किमपि कर्म नानेकाश्रितम् ॥

* एकस्मिन्नेव द्रव्ये समवायिकारणे द्रव्यगुणकर्मोऽपि वर्तन्ते इत्यर्थं द्रव्यमप्यपि कारणकृत्यजातिमन्त्र चयाणा साधर्म्यम् ॥

* गुणासमवायिकारणकृत्यजातिमन्त्र चित्तसाधर्म्यं द्रव्याणां संयोगे प्रमयापि

such as colour taste smell touch number, extension individuality &c the non inherent cause is homogeneous causative qualities Of the qualities of the soul such as intellections &c the non inherent cause is conjunction with the internal organ The non comherent cause of the qualities of terrene atoms is conjunction with fire The non-comherent cause of actions is slight contact with fire, a blow, gravity, fluidity self restitution conjunction with soul influenced by actions done in a former state conjunction with soul exerting volition &c Sometimes even a single quality originates the three substance quality and action as for instance, conjunction with a ball of cotton possessed of impetus produces action [i e motion] in another ball of cotton and originates a substance consisting of an aggregate of two balls of cotton and the extension of that aggregate Sometimes a single quality originates a substance and a quality e g conjunction which may be described as aggregatiqu independent of impetus with a ball of cotton originates a substance consisting of an aggregate of two balls of cotton and the extension of that substance. U

Effects of action **सयोगाश्रिभागवेगानां कर्म समानम् ॥ २० ॥**

Aph 90 Action is the common [cause] of conjunctions disjunctions and impetus

1 The action [motion] which is produced in a bow &c produces disjunction of the arrow from the bow and conjunction elsewhere, and impetus in the arrow V

कारण कार्यगुणानां रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वादीनां सजातीयकारणगुणसमवायिकारणकत्वं बुद्ध्यादीनामात्मगुणानां मनः सयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वं पार्थिवपरमाणुगुणानामग्निसंयोगासमवायिकारणकत्वं कर्मणा तु यत्त्रादिनोदनाभिघातगुणत्वं द्रव्यत्वसंस्कारादृष्ट्यदात्मसंयोगप्रत्ययवृत्तात्मसंयोगाद्यसमवायिकारणकत्वं यथापय स्वयम्भूदनीयम् । क्वचिदेकस्यापि गुणस्य त्रयाणां द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां मारम्भकत्वं तद्वया वेगयत्तूलपिण्डसंयोगस्तूलपिण्डान्तरे कर्म कारति द्वितूलकञ्च द्रव्यमारभते तत्परिमाणञ्च । क्वचिदेको गुणो द्रव्यगुणाधारभते यथा तूलपिण्डसंयोग एव वेगानपेक्षप्रचयाप्यो द्वितूलक द्रव्य तत्परिमाणञ्चारभते ॥

1 व्यतिरेकात् द्रव्योत्पत्तिमये कर्मणो भावात् यत् कर्मवयवारम्भकसंयोग जन

'D as m laney be
tween act on and
substance

न द्रव्याणां कर्म ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 21 : Action is not [a cause] of substances.

Continued

व्यतिरेकात् ॥ २२ ॥

Aph 22 : Because it is excluded [from them]

' Because it is—excluded—because of the non existence of action at the time of the production of substance. The action which produces an originaive conjunction of constituent parts is destroyed at the time of the production of the substance [constituted by those parts] subsequent to conjunction for conjunction is destructive to disjunction. Nor can it be maintained that action though non existent at the time of its effect from having existed the previous moment is the cause [of the substance so constituted] For after the destruction of a large piece of cloth there is non existence of action in the constituent parts at the moment previous to the production of fragments of cloth. In reality action is not the cause even of a substance depending on an originaive conjunction produced by action for it is to be considered that [the substance] is produced otherwise [viz] by conjunction V

Continued

द्रव्याणां द्रव्य कार्ये सामान्यम् ॥ २३ ॥

Aph. 23 : Substance is the common effect of substances

यति संयोगस्य संपाद्यकत्वेन संयोगोत्तरं द्रव्योत्पत्तिकाले तस्य नाशान्न न च कर्मणः का
र्यकालः सत्ये अपि तत्पूर्ववत्त्ववृत्तिस्यात् कारणात्वं निराकारमिति दार्ढ्यं महापटनाया
मन्तरं यद्यप्यपटाद्युत्पत्तिं प्रयत्नेन अपि तदवयवेषु कर्मणो भाषातः वस्तुतः कर्म जनित
रभ्यकर्तृणाधीनद्रव्यं अपि न कर्म कारण संयोगान्यथासिद्धत्वादिति ध्येयम् ॥

' अह्नामेकस्याह्नयकत्वमुत्पत्त्या दृष्टानीमेकस्मिन् कार्ये यदह्नामारभ्यकत्वमाह । द्रव्ये
च द्रव्याणि चेति द्रव्यं हि तेषां द्रव्याणां । तत्र द्वाभ्यां तन्तुभ्यां द्वितन्तुः पटा यद्वा
भिरपि तन्तुभिरैकः पट आरभ्यते । नभ्येकतन्तुको अपि पटा दृश्यते यत्रैकमेव तन्तुना
ज्ञानप्रतितन्त्रो भवत इति चेन्न तत्रैकस्य संयोगाभावेनाहमथाधिकारणाभावात् पटा
मुत्पत्तेः ॥

' Having stated that many things may originate one, [Kanāda] now declares that one product may be originated by many Of substances, i.e. of two or more substances Thus by two threads ■ piece of cloth consisting of two threads and similarly by many threads one piece of cloth is originated If it be objected that cloth may be seen which is made of one thread, in which the woof and the warp are made of one and the same thread we reply that it is not so, for there can be no cloth produced in this case there being no non coinherent cause, for there can be no conjunction of ■ single object U

Cont nued

गुणवैधर्म्याच्च कर्मणा कर्म ॥ २३ ॥

Aph 24 Action because of its dissimilarity from quality is not {an effect} of actions

' It has been stated that the similarity between substance and quality is that they originate things of the same class Also this has been denied of actions in the aphorism An action ■ not effected by another action' This is here repeated U

द्वित्वप्रभृतयः सत्याः पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाश्च ॥ २५ ॥

Aph 25 Numbers from duality upwards individuality conjunction and disjunction [are originated by more than one substance]

' He states that certain qualities also are originated by more than one substance Here the word individuality means the individuality of two or more objects Accordingly the sense is that numbers from duality to the highest individuality of two of more objects conjunctions and disjunctions are originated by more than one substance V

१ दृष्ट्यगुणयोः सत्तातीत्यारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यमुक्तं तत्र कर्म कर्मसार्थं न विद्यते इति सूत्रे कर्मणा कर्मजनकत्वं प्रतिषिद्धमेव तदिदं नूतनं इति भावः ॥

२ केवास्मिन् गुणानामप्यनेकद्वयारब्धत्वमित्याह । अत्र पृथक्पदं द्विपृथक्त्वादित्परं तथा च द्वित्वादित्परार्द्धवन्ता सत्या द्विपृथक्त्वादीनि संयोगविभागाश्च अनेकद्वयारब्धा इत्यर्थः ॥

असमवायात् सामान्यकार्यं कर्म न विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

Aph. 26 Action is not the common effect [of several substances] because it does not inhere [in more than one substance.]

' Action is not a common effect originated by more than one, because it does not inhere in two or more. It is established by experience that action is different in different substances

संयोगानां द्रव्यम् ॥ २७ ॥

Aph 27. Substance is the effect of conjunctions.

' One substance consisting of a piece of cloth &c, is the effect of many conjunctions of threads &c U.

' This is to be understood with the exception of the conjunctions of impalpable substances, of those of final wholes, and of those of heterogeneous substances. V.

रूपाणां रूपम् ॥ २८ ॥

Aph. 28. A colour is the effect of colours (more than one)

' The word colour in both places implies also taste, smell, touch, viscosity, intrinsic fluidity, unity, individuality of units, extension, velocity, elasticity and gravity. One colour &c, then, as a complex whole is produced by many colours &c, having become its coinherent cause V.

गुरुत्वप्रयत्नसंयोगानामुत्थेयम् ॥ २९ ॥

Aph 29 Throwing upwards (is the effect) of gravity, volition, and conjunction.

' असमवायात् द्वैतार्थद्वयं च समवायेन कर्मणो भवात् सामान्यकार्यं अनेकार्थं कर्म न विद्यते नास्तौत्यर्थः तथा च प्रतिद्वयं भिन्नं भिन्नं कर्म अनुभवसिद्धम् ॥

' द्रवूनां तन्त्यादिसंयोगानां षटादिरूपमेकं द्रव्यं कार्यमित्यर्थः ॥

' निःस्पर्शानां द्रव्याणाम् अन्त्याध्यायिनां विजातीयद्रव्याणाञ्च ये संयोगास्तान् विहायेति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

' रूपपदे रसगन्धस्पर्शसंवेद्यतांसिद्धिरुदयत्येवत्येकएवकृत्यपरिमाणवेगस्थितिस्वापक-गुरुत्यानामप्युपलब्धे तथा च समवायिकारणगतीर्बहुभी रूपादिभिरवयवप्रगल्भैर्वाप्यते इत्यर्थः ॥

1 Here gravity existing in the hand = clod of earth &c is the instrumental cause, conjunction with soul possessing volitions is the non coinherent cause of the throwing upwards of the hand, the throwing out of the hand is the non-coinherent cause of the throwing upwards of the clod Here also the term throwing upwards is applicable to throwing downwards &c U

* Gravity in that which is to be thrown upwards volition in the thrower and expulsion of the thrown from the hand—these are the three causes of throwing upwards Hence in the case of action also the existence of more than one cause must be admitted V

संयोगविभागाश्च कर्मणाम् ॥ ३० ॥

Aph 30 Conjunctions and disjunctions (are the effects) of actions

* It might be asked By means of what property is there an inference of supersensual objects such as the courses of the sun the moon &c as there is in inference of fire and other causes from smoke and other effects for an action has no effects? He therefore recalls to mind the previously mentioned effects of actions The word and implies in addition to conjunctions and disjunctions impetus and elasticity V

कारणसामान्ये द्रव्यकर्मणा कर्माकारणमुक्तम् ॥ ३१ ॥

Aph 31 In (treating of) causes in general action is said not be a cause of substances and actions

1 अत्र गुरुत्वस्य हस्तनोष्ठादिवर्तिनो निमित्तकारणत्वं प्रत्ययदात्मसंगोऽस्य समवायिकारणत्वं हस्तनिष्ठात्वेऽप्यस्य तु हस्तनोदनमसममवायिकारणम् अत्राप्युत्त्वेऽप्यपदमवक्षेपणादावपि लाघवमिति ॥

* उत्त्वेऽप्यस्य गुरुत्वम् उत्त्वेऽपि प्रथम उत्त्वेऽप्यहस्तनोदनञ्च एते च यथोक्तपक्षेऽप्युक्तम् अतः कर्मण्यप्यनेककारणकत्वं निरावाधमिति भावः ॥

* ननु यथा धूनादिरूपकारणेषु यद्वादिकारणानामनुमानं तथा ज्योतिर्द्रव्यकर्मणा सूर्यादिगतोऽना केन लिङ्गेनानुमानं कर्मणः कार्याभावादित्यतः पूर्वोक्तानि कर्मकार्याणि स्मारयन्ति ॥

' By the term 'causes in general,' the section treating thereof is indicated ; therefore in the section treating of causes in general the non-causality of action with regard to substance and action is affirmed, but it is not meant that action is in no way a cause so that aphorism, conjunctions and disjunctions (are the effects) of actions, should be set aside U

FIRST BOOK, SECOND DAILY LESSON

Causation,

कारणभावात् कार्यभावाः ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 From non-existence of cause is non-existence of effect.

' It may be said, In the foregoing daily lesson similarity between the categories, substance, quality, and action, as constituted by the notion of effect and the notion of cause, has been explained How is this possible? for while the relation between effect and cause is not demonstrated it is like talking about the horn of a hare To obviate this Kapāda establishes the relation between effect and cause. V.

' For it is seen that even when earth, a potter's wheel, water

' कारणसामान्यपदेन तत्प्रकारमुपलक्ष्यते तेन कारणसामान्याभिधानप्रकरणे द्वय कर्मयो प्रति कर्मणो कारणत्वमुक्तं न तु सर्वव्याप्यकारणमेव कर्मेति विवक्षिते देन संयोगविभागाच्च कर्मणामिति सूत्रं व्याख्येतेति भावः ॥

' ननु पृथक्पृथक् कार्यत्वघटितं कारणत्वघटितञ्च साधर्म्यमुक्तं तत्कार्यं सङ्गच्छते कार्यकारणभावस्यासिद्धत्वेन अशसिपाणसमानत्वादित्यतः कार्यकारणभावमेव व्यथयिष्यति ॥

' दृश्यते हि मध्यवर्तितत्कुनात्मसूत्रादौ समवर्तिते ऽपि दण्डभावाद्धटाभावः भूसंज्ञितादौ समवर्तिते ऽपि योजाभावादधुराभावाः स च दण्डघटयोर्वाङ्मात्रयोर्वा कार्यकारणभावमन्तरेणानुपपन्नः । अन्यथा योमादाभावे ऽपि घटाभावः शिवाशकनाश्रभावे ऽप्युत्पन्नाभावाः स्यात् किञ्च घटघटादीनां कदाचित्कत्वमनुभूयते तदपि हेतुफलभावमन्तरेणानुपपन्नं न हि निश्चित्वादात्मत्वे सति किञ्चित्वादानसत्त्वक्यं कदाचित्कत्व भावानां कारणत्वेऽप्यमन्तरेण सम्भवति तदा हि स्यादेव न स्यादेजानं तु कदाचित् स्यात् न हि भावो न भवत्येव न व्यतिरेकमिति न व्यकत्मादेव भवति न वा निष्पाण्यादेव अशसिपाणादे भवति किन्तु दण्डवैभावेः सोपाख्यास्यावधेर्घटपटादौ कार्यं दर्शनादवधिस्तु कारणमेव यथं कार्यकारणभावाभावे प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती न स्यातां तथा च निरीक्षे जगज्जायेत ॥ श्री-प्रज्ञाधनसाधनमन्तरेण प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिसाधनताज्ञानमन्तरेण निवृत्तिः ॥

a potter thread &c are brought together from non existence of a potter's staff there is non existence of the pot, and though earth water &c, be brought together, from non existence of a seed there is non existence of a shoot. This relation between the potter's staff and the pot, and between the seed and the shoot is impossible without the relation of cause and effect, for otherwise there would be non existence of the pot also in the case of non-existence of a loom, and non existence of the shoot even in the case of non existence of a fragment of stone &c. Moreover it is observed that a pot, a piece of cloth, and the like exist only from time to time. This too would be impossible without the relation between cause and effect, for the temporary existence of things which are, which consists in their being at one time and not being at another, is impossible without connexion with a cause. For in this case (were there no connexion with a cause), a thing might be or not be, but could not be from time to time, since an existing thing is not non-existent nor does it come into existence without a cause, nor does it come into existence fortuitously nor does it come into existence from anything unreal such as the horn of a hare but from a really existing assignable determinant such as a staff or a loom as is seen in effects such as a pot or a piece of cloth. Now the limit or determinant is the cause. Moreover were there no relation of cause and effect there would be no activity or inactivity for in such a case the universe would be desireless since without a knowledge of the means of attaining that which is desired there would be no such thing as activity and without the knowledge of the means of avoiding that which is undesired there would be no such thing as inactivity. U

• Continued

न तु कार्याभावात् कारणाभावः ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 But there is not from non existence of effect non existence of cause

' If there were not a restriction in the relation between cause and effect, it would follow also that if the effect should not exist the cause would not exist. The rule is not that non-existence of effect results in non-existence of cause, but that non-existence of cause results in non-existence of effect. Therefore the practical application of this introductory section of two aphorisms is that persons desirous of emancipation are concerned in non-existence of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain in non-existence of activity for the sake of non-existence of birth in non-existence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity, in the cessation of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults and in forming a mental presentation of the soul for the sake of cessation of false knowledge U

General ty and particularity सामान्य विशेष इति युद्धपेक्षम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 Generality and particularity both depend upon intellection

' After the enunciation and definition of the first three categories he now states the definition of the category generality formerly enunciated. Generality = twofold highest and not highest. The highest is being, the not highest = substantiality &c, contained under being. The distinguishing property of generality and particularity is intellection. Extensive intellection is that of generality exclusive intellection is that of particularity.

' Generality is the highest and particularity the not highest

१ यदि कार्यकारणभावनिषेधो न भवति तदा कार्याभावादपि कारणभावात् स्यात् कार्याभावः कारणभावाप्रत्ययतन्त्र कारणभावस्तु कार्यभावे प्रति तन्त्र तेन दुःखाभावाद्ये कर्माभावे कर्माभावार्थं प्रयत्यभावे तदर्थस्य दोषाभावे तदर्थे मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तये तदर्थे स्वात्मसाक्षात्काराय सुसुक्ष्मा प्रयुति प्रयोजनमोषोद्धातिकस्याप्यस्य द्विसूत्रप्रकरणस्य ॥

२ पदार्थत्रयोदशसंख्यानन्तरमिदानीमुक्तिरस्य सामान्यपदार्थस्य लक्षणमाह । सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरञ्च तत्र परं सत्ता अपरं सत्ताध्याय्य दृश्यत्वादि तत्र सामान्यस्य तद्विशेषस्य च लक्षणं युद्धपेक्षे । अनुवृत्तबुद्धिः सामान्यस्य व्यावृत्तबुद्धिर्येषस्य ॥

३ सामान्यं परं विशेष अपरं सामान्यम् इति द्वयं युद्धपेक्षं युद्धपेक्षालक्षणा यस्य सत्ता तया च सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरञ्च तत्र परसामान्यं सत्ता दृश्यत्वादिकन्धपरसामान्यं

generality Accordingly there are two kinds of generality That is dependent upon intellection which has intellection for its characteristic. Generality then is twofold highest and not highest The highest generality is being the not highest generality is substantiality &c The distinguishing property of the highest and not highest kinds of generality is intellection the intellection of extensiveness being the characteristic of generality i.e. of highest generality and the intellection of non extensiveness the characteristic of particularity (i.e. of not highest generality) Extensiveness is existence in many places non-extensiveness is existence in few places. Being therefore is the highest because it exists in more places than any other universal and the classes substantiality &c. are not highest because they exist in fewer places than the notion of earth &c. so that generality or the highest and particularity or the not highest universals are not absolute but relative to intellection The following hindrances to universality are enumerated by the Nyaya teachers Indivisibility of the individual identity confusion infinite regression loss of form and absence of connection are the aggregate of things preventing universality Thus the notion of ether is not a class because it exists only as one individual The notions of a pitcher and a water pot are not two universals because there are neither more nor less individuals under either The notions of matter and form are not one universal because of the

तत्र सामान्यविशेषयोः परापरयोर्लक्षणं बुद्धिरेव अनुवृत्तत्वबुद्धिः सामान्यस्य व्यावृत्तत्व बुद्धिर्विशेषस्य लक्षणम् अनुवृत्तत्वम् अधिकदेशवृत्तित्वं व्यावृत्तत्वमल्पदेशवृत्तित्वं तथा च सत्तायां सर्वसामान्यापत्तया अधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् परत्वमत्र द्रव्यत्वादिकास्तु सत्ता पक्षे न्यूनदेशवृत्तित्वात् परत्व एविवक्ष्यादपक्षे तया अधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् परत्वमपीति परत्यरूपं सामान्यत्वम् अपरत्यरूपं विशेषत्वञ्च न नियतं किन्तु बुद्धयेवमिति । जाति व्याधका उक्ता न्यायाचार्ये ध्यक्तरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्क्षेपे ज्ञानवर्धयति । रूपद्वानिरसस्य न्ये जातिव्याधकरुद्धं इति । सत्रैकव्याक्तकृत्यादाकाशत्वं न जाति अन्यनानातिरिक्त व्यक्तिकत्वाद् घटत्व कलसत्त्वञ्च न जातिद्वय परस्परव्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणयोरेक व्यक्तिसमावेशेन सङ्क्षेपे भूतत्व मूर्तत्वञ्च न जाति अनवस्थाभावात् सामान्यत्व न जाति विशेषत्व व्यावृत्तस्यभावस्य रूपद्वानिविशेषत्वजातिव्याधिका समवायसम्बन्ध भावात् समवायस्य न जाति समवाये समवायान्तरस्वीकारे ज्ञवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् ॥

confusion pervading the one individual by reason of two common substrata of absolute mutual non-existence. Generality is not a universal for if so there would be a regress to infinity. The notion of particularity is prevented from being a universal by loss of form for particularity is naturally exclusive. The notion of co-inhesion is not a class because of the non-existence of connection by co-inhesion, for from the assumption that co-inhesion inheres in anything else a regression to infinity would follow. V

Cp the Muktaṭī on Bhāṣya parichchheda 8. The characteristic of generality is co-inhesion in more than one together with eternity. It is said 'together with eternity' because co-inhesion in more than one belongs also to conjunction &c. It is said 'In more than one' because co-inhesion together with eternity belongs also to ether, to extension, and the like.

Existence is universal भावो ऽनुपत्तेरेव हेतुत्वत् सामान्यमेव ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 Existence is general only for it is a cause of extensive intellection.

* Existence—being—[is general] because it is a cause of extensive intellection—of the notion of existing in many places the word only (eva) excludes the notion of existence in few places. V

द्रव्यत्व गुणत्व कर्मत्वञ्च सामान्यानि त्रिणिषाश्च ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 The essences of substance quality and action are general and particular.

* The particle and (cha) implies in addition the notions of earth &c the classes contained in substance the notions of

* सामान्यमिति । तत्तत्तन्नु नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकमव्ययत्वम् । अनेकसमवेतस्य सवो नादीनामप्यस्यत उक्तम् । नित्यत्वे सतीति । नित्यत्वे सति समव्ययस्य गणपरिमाणा दीनामप्यस्यत उक्तम् अनेकमिति ॥

* भावः सत्ता अनुपत्तिरर्थकदेशदृष्टित्वयुद्धेहेतुत्वात् एवकारेणाप्यदेशदृष्टित्वयु द्विव्ययच्छेदः ॥

* चकार पृथिवीत्वादीनि द्रव्यगतजाती कथत्वादीनि गुणगतजाती उत्प्रेरणत्वादीनि कर्मगतजाती समुच्चिनोति ॥

colour &c the classes contained in quality, and the notions of throwing upwards &c, the classes contained in action U

अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 With the exception of the ultimate particulars

' The words general and particular [in the preceding aphorism] are to be understood with the exception of those particulars that are said to exist as eternal substances. According to the teachers [of this system] they are ultimate, because they exist in the end or conclusion [of the division of a compound substance] and there is [then] nothing further which causes non extensive conception. According to the authors of the Vṛtti they are ultimate because they exist at the end or conclusion of production and destruction, and are ultimate particulars because they exist in eternal substances. For those particulars only are causes of non-extensive conception, and are not at the same time general in their character U

सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 That is existence from which [there arises the conviction] with respect to substances qualities and actions, that they are existent

Existence is not identical with substance &c

द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यो ऽयान्तर सत्ता ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Existence is something different from substances qualities, and actions

' It might be said, Existence is not apprehended by means

१ अन्त्या विशेषा नित्यद्रव्यशून्यो वे ऽभिहिता. सान् यर्जयित्वा सामान्यविशेषाभिधानमित्यर्थः । अन्ते प्रसंगे भवन्तीत्यन्त्या यतो न व्यावर्तकान्तरमस्तोत्याचार्याः उत्पादविनाशयोक्तौ श्रयाने भवन्तीत्यन्त्या नित्यद्रव्याणि तेषु भवन्तीत्यन्त्या विशेषा इति एतदुक्तं । ते हि विशेषा एव व्यावर्तयुद्धिदेवो न तु सामान्यरूपा अपीति ॥

२ अनु द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यः पृथग्भावेन सत्ता नानुभूयते स्तो द्रव्याद्यन्यतममेव सत्ता यतो हि यद्यपि भवति सत्ता भेदेनानुभूयते यथा घटः पटात् न च सत्ता तेषां भेदेनानुभूयत इति तदात्मिकेवेत्यत्र आह ॥ तस्यादपि ननुयताः सत्ता चानुयता । तथा च अनुयताननुयतत्वनववर्णविरुद्धधर्माभ्यासेन तेषां भेदस्य सिद्धत्वात् ॥

like existence is declared to be distinct from substances qualities, and actions on account of its existence or co-inhesion in qualities only U

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 Also by the non existence [in it] of generality and particularity

1 He states another distinction If the universal in quality were not something over and above substances qualities and actions, it would then be apprehended as constituting a class contained under one or other of the universals substance quality, or action U

The essence of action.

कर्मसु भावात् कर्मत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 The essence of action is explained from its existence in actions

1 He states the distinction of the universal in action from substances qualities and actions The essence of action is also explained, like existence to be another class distinct from substances qualities, and actions on account of its existence or co inhesion in action only U

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 Also by the non existence [in it] of generality particularity

1 If the essence of action were identical with substances &c the generality and particularity of substances &c, would inhere

1 भेदकान्तरनाष्ट । यदि द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यो गुणत्वमतिरिक्तं न भवेत्तदा द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वतदवान्तरजातिमत्तया उपलभ्येतत्यर्थः ॥

2 द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यो भेदक कर्मत्वमप्याह । कर्मत्वेन भावात् समयावात् दर्मत्वमपि जात्यन्तर द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यो भिन्नमुक्तं सत्तावर्तित्यर्थः ॥

3 कर्मत्व यदि द्रव्याद्यात्मकं भवेत्तदा द्रव्यत्वादिसामान्यविशेषस्तत्र समवेपादित्यर्थः । सेषमेकाकाराः सत्तु सृष्टौ सत्ताद्वयत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वानां चतसृषां जातिना द्रव्यगुणकर्मभेदप्रतिपादनाय एकप्रकरणेनोक्तव्यप्रधेयम् ॥

in it It is to be understood that these four aphorisms alike in form [viz 10, 12, 14 16] are stated in one section to explain the distinction from substances qualities, and actions, of the four universals existence substantiality the universal in quality and the universal in action U

Existence is one

सदिति निष्क विशेषाद्विशेषनिष्ठाभावाच्चैकोभा -
अः ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 17 Because of the non particularity of the property of being, and of the non existence of a particular property therein there is [only] one existence

A conception in the form of being or the applicability of that word is the property of existence This conception is common, without distinction in regard to substances qualities, and actions Hence existence or being abides in them as only one For otherwise either being would not exist, or they would not exist, for existence is in the same number of individuals as substance &c Because of the non existence of a particular property —the meaning of this is that from the non-existence of a property or ground of inference in particularity or distinction there is no distinction For there is no particular property in existence like the particular property or distinction of extension of length and shortness in the case of the inference, 'That is the selfsame lamp U

SECOND BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON

Qualities of earth रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शश्रवती पृथिवी ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 Earth is possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch.

सदित्याकारकं ज्ञानं यद्विशेषोपाया या सत्ताया निष्क तस्य द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सामा नमप्रतिष्ठे तेन भाव्य सत्ता यद्वैय संपु यतंते चान्यथा द्रव्यत्वादिभिस्तु न्यय्यतिष्ठतया सत्ता या न स्यात् तानि या न स्यु विषयनिष्ठाभावाच्चैति विशेषो भेदस्तत्र यत्निष्क मनुमान मदभावाच्च न भेद इत्यर्थः । भवति हि स एवाय दीप इत्यनुगमस्तत्र यदा पितृनिष्क दीपं हस्तग्रादिपरिमाणभेदभावाच्च विशेषनिष्क नास्तीति भावः ॥

¹ The colour of the earth is of many kinds blue yellow &c Hence the characteristic of possessing universality contained under the universality of substance and being the general substratum of blue colour So also there is in the earth taste of various kinds pungent astringent &c Hence the characteristic of possessing a universality contained under the universal existence and being the general substratum of pungent taste In like manner by the substitution of the words 'astringent &c, other characteristics are to be inferred Smell is of two kinds fragrant and unfragrant Hence the characteristic of possessing a universality contained under the universal substantiality and being the general substratum of smell Thus too it will be seen that the notion of substance is a substratum of classes which are substrata not general of qualities which are substrata general or not general of odour It must not be objected that as smell and taste are not observed in a stone &c both these qualities are not invariably present For even though smell and taste accidentally be not observed in it they are observed in its ashes The self same particles which were originally constituent of the stones are also originally constituent of its ashes Therefore the presence of these attributes is not merely occasional If it be asked How then is a breeze fragrant and water mixed with Karavella [a kind of gourd] bitter? This is no objection for the taste and smell of those are conditions produced by

¹ रूप नीलपीताद्यनेकप्रकारं पृथिव्या एव । तथा च नीलरूपसमानाधिकरणद्वय-
त्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्व लक्षणम् एव रसं कटुकपाषाणानेकप्रकारकं पृथिव्यामेव तथा च
कटुरससमानाधिकरणद्वयत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्व लक्षणम् एव कषायविषदग्नेषण लक्षणा-
न्वद्भूतानि । गन्धो द्विविधः सुरभिरसुमिरश्च तथा च गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्वयत्वव्याप्य-
जातिमत्त्व लक्षणं तथा गन्धसमानाधिकरणगन्धसमानाधिकरणगुणासमानाधिकरणना-
त्यधिकरणद्वयत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । न च पाषाणादेः गन्धरसयोरननुभवात् तत्राव्यापकमिदं
मुभयमपीति याच्य तत्रापाततो गन्धरसयोरननुभवोऽपि तदीयभस्मसु तदुपलम्भात् य-
स्यावयवा पाषाणारम्भकास्त एव तत्रास्मादम्भका अपीति नाव्याप्तिः कथं तर्हि सुरभि-
समीरणं तित्त्वाकारयेत्तज्जलमिति प्रतीतिरिति चेन्न यं विशेषाधिकरत्वात् तयोर्गन्ध-
रसयोः स्पर्शाव्यनुप्याशीति पाकजं पृथिव्यामेव तथा च पाकजस्यसंसमानाधिकरणद्वय-
त्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्व लक्षणम् पाकजस्यैव विशेषान्तरव्याप्तं पृथिवीस्यैव एव विशेषान्त-
रश्च शिरीशस्यह्रीकुसुमादेः स्पर्शविशेषे स्फुटतरम् ॥

the earth . There is a touch in the earth, neither hot nor cold, but temperate . Hence the characteristic of possessing a universality contained under the universal substance and being the general substratum of the feeling of temperate warmth . Temperate warmth may be clearly explained by another description, that it is the touch of the earth , another description is clearer, viz, that it is a species of touch residing in the flowers of the Śirīṣa, Lavangī &c. U.

Qualities of water इपरसस्पर्शवत्य आपो द्रवाः स्निग्धाः ॥ २ ॥

Aph ■ Water is possessed of colour, taste, and touch and is fluid and viscid

1 In water the colour is white, the taste sweet, the touch cold, the fluidity natural . Thus in the aphorism on water by the enumeration of five qualities, five characteristics of water are implied by the sage . The characteristics of water are that it is a class preceptibly contained under the universal substance and existing in possession of colour not the general substratum of bright and white but the general substratum of blue colour . It is a class

1 जले रूपं शुद्धं रसो मधुरः स्पर्शः शीतः द्रव्यस्य सामिश्रिकं तथा च जलसूत्रे पञ्चाङ्गं गुणानामुपादानात् पञ्चैव जलतत्त्वानि मुनेरभिप्रेतानि । तथा च नीलसमानाधिकरणमाह्वयक्रासमानाधिकरणरूपवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्वाप्यजातिमत्त्वं तित्तादृत्तिभूतवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्वाप्यजातिमत्त्वं शीतस्पर्शवत्त्वं साक्षिद्रिद्रव्यत्वस्य स्नेहवत्त्वमित्येतानि सन्नयानि जलस्येति भावः । हिमकरकादौ यदि न साक्षिद्रिद्रव्यत्वस्य तदा साक्षिद्रिद्रव्यत्ववद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं धिक्त्वगीयम् । तद्यथाद्रव्यतन्दीजलादौ वा नीलोपलब्धिः सा आययोपाधिकी भान्तिरेव विधिति विवेचे तस्यैव ध्वलमोपलब्ध्येः यद्यपि जले कोऽपि रसो नानुभूयते तथापि हरीतक्यादिकषायद्रव्यमन्नजलान्नर जनमा धुर्यमनुभूयते एव तस्य तद्वज्जकत्वात् । सूर्यकरादिर्भोगाज्ज्ञेयं यदुष्णस्पर्शः प्रतीयते सापि सूर्यकरादेरेव यद्यपि हिमकरकादौ द्रव्यत्वं नानुभूयते इति मतं तस्य जले अन्तर्भावः सम्भवति तथापि उष्णता विलीने तत्र जलस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेव दिव्यतेजःसंयोगात् तत्र द्रव्यप्रतिरोधः काठिन्यप्रतीतिस्तु तत्र भान्तिरेवेति सुक्तावलोक्य । केचित्तु दिव्यतेजःसंयोगात् जलपरमाणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकं तत्रैव त्रसरत्वादिकं क्रमेण हिमादौ जायते तादृशद्व्यणुकादिकञ्च द्रव्यस्वरहितं कठिनमेवेति हिमादौ काठिन्यप्रतीतिर्न भान्तिरित्याहुः । सैहस्तु जनस्य एतादावपि तदुपस्तम्भजनस्यैव सैहः तत्परुषाच्च एतादेवं नानुकूलस्य सक्तुसिकतादौ पिण्डीभावश्चरः सङ्गुहनामकः संयोगविशेषो द्रव्यसहितस्यैव कारित एव द्रव्यमात्रकारितस्यैव काचकाञ्चनद्रव्यादिव तदुत्पत्तेर्नापि सैहमात्रकारित धनीभूतपदादिभिरपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ॥

perceptibly contained under the universal substance existing as something sweet and not existing as something bitter. It is possessed of cold touch, of intrinsic fluidity and of viscosity. If there is no natural fluidity in ice, hail, &c., it must be understood that they belong to a class included under the universal substance and existing in the possession of intrinsic fluidity. The observation of blue colour in the sea, the water of the Kālmā (Yamunā) &c., is an illusion produced by the conditions of the substratum, for when it is tossed into the air it is perceived to be white. Though no taste be perceived in water, yet after eating astringent substances such as yellow myrobalan, sweetness is observed in water, for it is distinguished by that [taste]. The hot touch which appears in water through conjunction with the sun's rays &c., belongs properly to the sun's rays &c. Though it might be asked, inasmuch as fluidity is not perceived in ice, hail &c., how it is possible that it should be contained in water yet when the ice hail &c., are melted with heat, it is proved sensibly to be water. The author of the *Muktāvalī* maintains that its fluidity is not derived from conjunction with celestial light, but the appearance of solidity is in those cases an illusion. But some contend that [through conjunction with celestial light there are produced in ice &c., successively from aqueous atoms an aggregate of two atoms, an aggregate of three atoms and so forth, and that such aggregates of two or more atoms are destitute of fluidity] and solid and that accordingly the appearance of solidity is not an illusion. There is also viscosity in water, and that of clarified butter and the like is the viscosity of the water which is one of the ingredients. It is through the excess of this that clarified butter &c. is highly inflammable. That kind of conjunction which is called agglomeration, and which consists in meal, sand &c., becoming globular, is caused by viscosity accompanied with fluidity. Were it caused by fluidity alone, it would be produced from the fluidity of glass, gold &c. Nor is it produced by viscosity alone for then it would follow that it would be produced also by thickened clarified butter &c. V

Q all s of light

तेजो रूपस्पर्शवत् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 Light has colour and touch



1 Light [or heat] is possessed of luminous colour and touch.

If it be objected Luminousness is the giving of light to other bodies and such colour is not found in heat or in such light as in exists in gold in a frying pan or in water White colour is nowhere found in these nor is a hot feel found in moonlight or gold How then is this so? We reply that it may be inferred that luminous colour exists in heat &c because they are light If it be said Luminosity is not proved to exist in these by their own colour we reply that it is inferred from their possessing a hot feel If it be asked How is the luminosity [proved to exist in gold?] We reply that it will be explained that it is because it is inferred to be light from its being a distinctive substratum of fluidity which is produced but not destroyed by the closest conjunction with fire and that the existence of light in a frying pan &c is inferred from the possession of heat to the touch For light is of four kinds that in which colour and touch predominate as sunlight, that in which colour predominates and touch does not as moonlight that in which neither colour nor touch predominates as the eye that in which colour does not, but touch does predominate as the hot season and light as existing in water, a frying pan and the like U

With respect to the relation between light and heat cp

1 रूप भास्वर स्पर्शश्चोष्णस्तदुत्तेज इत्यर्थः । ननु भास्वरस्य प्रकाशकत्वं तादृशञ्च रूपं नोष्मणि न वा चामीकरस्य भज्जनरूपावस्थे धारिस्थे वा तेजसि । शुक्लञ्च रूपमुत्तेजु न क्वापि उष्णञ्च स्पर्श न चान्दे न वा चामीकरे तत् कथमेतदिति चेन्न उष्मादि ते जस्थित्येन भास्वररूपानुमानात् । तेजस्त्यमेव तत्र स्वरूपासिद्धमिति चेन्न उष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वेन तदनुमानात् चामीकरे कथमिति चेत् तत्र भास्वरस्वभावे ऽपि अत्यन्तानलसंयोगेनानु च्छिद्यमानजन्यद्वयत्वाधिरूपावस्थेन व्यतिरकिणा तेजस्यानुमानादिति घट्ट्यमाणात्प्रात् भज्जनरूपादिनिष्ठे चोष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वेन तजस्यानुमानात् । चतुर्थेऽपि हि तेज किञ्चिदुत्तमरूपस्पर्शं यथा तारादि किञ्चिदुत्तमरूपस्पर्शं यथा नयनम् किञ्चिदनुत्तमरूपस्पर्शं यथा निदाघ धारिभज्जनरूपादिगतञ्च तेज ॥

Muktārāli on Bhāṣā parichchheda : 40 'Heat is a particular class existing in touch and is known by perception. So also light is a particular class which is the inherent cause of the feeling of generated heat. It is not to be maintained that the possession [by light] of a hot feel cannot be predicated of the rays of the moon &c, for heat exists there too but is not recognised because it is overpowered by the touch of the water which they contain. In like manner it is not recognised in the brilliance of a gem because it is overpowered by an earthy feel, nor in the eye &c because it does not there predominate.

Quality of air **स्पर्शान् वायु ॥ ४ ॥**

Aph 4 Air is possessed of touch

'We are here to understand a touch that is neither temperate nor hot nor cold. A touch of a different class belonging to the air is understood. The possession of such a heterogeneous touch is the characteristic of air and the heterogeneity of the touch of the air is known by perception. V

Ether **त चाकाशे न विद्वन्ति ॥ ५ ॥**

Aph 5 Those [qualities] do not exist in ether

'Those [qualities] colour taste smell and touch do not exist in ether. The appearance in ether of whiteness like that of coagulated milk is an illusion caused by the whiteness of the rays of

१ उष्णत्वं स्पर्शान्तरं जातिविशेषं प्रत्यक्षमिदं । इत्यत्र ज्ञेयानुसंगसमवायिकारणतायच्छेदकं तेजस्य जातिविशेषः । न चोष्णस्पर्शस्य चन्द्रकिरणद्वयव्याप्तमिति दाक्ष्यम् । तत्रापि शीघ्रस्य सत्त्वात् । किन्तु तदन्तर्गतजलस्पर्शेनाभिभवाच्च नु रादौ चानुभूतत्वादप्ययम् ॥

२ अत्र स्वर्गो आकाशोऽनुष्णाशीतो वायुः तेन वायव्यो विजातोऽस्पर्शो लभ्यते तथा च तादृशविजातोऽस्पर्शस्य वायुलक्षणं धेजात् त्वं वायुस्पर्शं प्रत्यक्षमिति ॥

३ ते रुपरसगन्धस्पर्शा आकाशे न सन्तीत्यर्थः । तद्विधत्तलिमाकाशमिति प्रतीतिं नु सूर्यकरधर्तलिमापाधिजी भान्तिरेव नीलं नम इति प्रतीतिरपि सुमरीर्द्विषदिगवस्थितस्यन्दनीलमयिष्वरस्य नीलमयिष्विणी भान्तिरेव कश्चित् सुदूरगतस्य परावर्तमानस्य च सु॥ स्वगतकल्पकनीमिकापलनात् तदन्तर्गतलक्षणविशेषो तादृशप्रतीतिरित्याहुतावपि ह्यनुसारनवनानामपि तयापनम्भादिति शङ्के ॥

the sun . The appearance also of blueness in the sky is an illusion occasioned by the blueness of the sapphire peak situated on the south side of mount Meru . Some maintain that this appearance is occasioned by the blueness of the pupil of the eye from the eye's falling upon its own pupil after travelling to a distance and returning . This is not the case for those whose eyes are true have the same perception V

सर्पिर्जंतुमधूच्छिष्टानामग्निसयोगाद्द्रवत्वमद्विः सामा-
न्यम् ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 The fluidity through conjunction with fire, of clarified butter, lac, and wax is common to them and water

¹ The fluidity which belongs to clarified butter &c, is due to a special cause, the conjunction of them with fire and is not intrinsic . Such intrinsic fluidity is the characteristic of water . Only fluidity is common to earth and water, not natural fluidity . Hence there is not too much asserted U

² The fluidity of clarified butter &c. which is due to a special cause, is like the intrinsic fluidity existing in water, because the class constituted by the universal fluidity exists in both, but there is in clarified butter &c no possession of natural fluidity . Fluid in the aphorism on water (II 1 2) has the special meaning of natural fluidity . Accordingly there is no discrepancy V

त्रयुसीसलोहरजतमुवर्णानांमग्निसयोगाद्द्रवत्वमद्विः सा-
मान्यम् ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 The fluidity, through conjunction with fire of tin, lead iron silver, and gold, is common to them with water

¹ सर्पिरादीना यदद्रवत्वमस्ति तदग्निसयोगाच्चिमित्तत्वात् ननु सांसिद्धिकं तादृशञ्चापि सत्त्वं द्रवत्वमात्रं तु पृथिव्या अग्निः सामान्यं न तु सांसिद्धिकं द्रवत्वमपीति नातिव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

² एतादीना यथेमितिह द्रवत्वं तज्जलगतसांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वतुल्यं द्रवत्वस्यजातेरुभयत्र सत्त्वान् सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वं तु एतादिषु नास्ति जनमूत्रोक्तद्रवपदं सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वं विशिष्टपरमिति नासङ्गतिरिति भावः ॥

By the use of the plural number of the word gold white copper, copper, brass quicksilver, &c. are implied The explanation of this aphorism is to be understood as similar to that of the former V

विषाणी ककुद्धान् प्रान्तबालधिः साक्षावान् इति गोत्वे
दृष्ट लिङ्गम् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 That she has horns & hump a tail hairy at the extremity and a dewlap is the received mark of being a cow

As in the case of the universal cow the marks of possessing horns &c. are generally received or universally assumed means of proof, so with respect to air the mark of touch &c, is also the means of proof This is the inner meaning of this and the following aphorism In the former of these aphorisms in the mention of the cow & having horns the verb to be is implied Accordingly a particular kind of horn not common to the buffalo is understood and this is a mark of being a cow & also is the position of a hump That it has a tail hairy at the extremity—according to the derivation 'the hair is situated at the extremity in this' a peculiarity of the body, constituted by the tail is asserted That is a particular cow with a tail hairy at the extremity, whose tail is hairy and particularly so at the extremity With respect to the tail of the sheep &c, there is not hairiness at the extremity for the whole tail is hairy

सुपर्णानामिति दानुयघनेन खास्यतामयितलपारदादीनामप्युपगच्छ । व्याख्यान
स्वास्त्य सूत्रस्य पूर्वपदेव बोध्यम् ॥

यथा गोत्वे विषाणित्वादीनि लिङ्गानि सामान्यतो दृष्टानि लोकसिद्धानि प्रमाणानि तथा अतीन्द्रिये चापि स्वर्गादीनि लिङ्गान्यपि प्रमाणाणीति सूत्रद्वयनिर्गुह्यार्थः । तत्र प्रथमसूत्रे विषाणीति प्रमाणावामस्त्यर्थः प्रत्यय तेन ॥ मर्दिषादिप्राप्तो विषाणविशेषो लभ्यते स च गोत्वे लिङ्गम् इव ककुद्धानि । प्रान्ते बालधिर्निरिति श्रुते बाला आधीयन्ते गस्मिन्निति ह्यस्त्यस्य पुच्छरूपाद्विशेषो उच्यते प्रकटो ज्ञेयः बालधिर्गम्य स प्रान्ते बालधिर्गोपिषट् मर्दिषादिपुच्छे तु सामान्येन बालमप्यस्वादान्ते बालधिस्तु मर्दिषादिपुच्छे प्रलम्बत्वादिरूपमर्थभावात् पुच्छविशेषो गोत्वे लिङ्गम् साक्षा गलकम्यनेन तुता गोत्वे लिङ्गम् विषाणीत्वादित्यत्र द्वारविषयतायच्छेदक्रम इति शब्देन परामश्रुते तत्राय प्रयोगः अथ गोर्दिषाणविशेषवत्त्वात् ककुद्धानां पुच्छविशेषवत्त्वात् साक्षाग्रस्या ह्यप्यनुभूतगोविषयवदिति ॥

As there is nothing remarkable on account of pendulousness &c in the tail of the buffalo &c a peculiarity in the tail is a mark of being a cow. The dewlap is a particular formation in the neck the possession of which is a mark of the class cow. By the word 'it' is pointed out the distinctive attribute of being an object commonly known by the possession of horns &c. The practical cognition is 'This is a cow because it possesses horns a hump a particular kind of tail or a dewlap' as was the case with particular cows formerly observed. V

1 As with respect to the universal cow the horns &c are properties [mark] recognised as predicable of the whole class [known to pervade it], so also the properties [marks] of air and the other five supersensible substances [viz ether, space time soul and the internal organ] recognised generally come to be a means of proof. U

Existence of air proved **स्पर्शश्च वायोः ॥ ९ ॥**

Aph 9 Also touch is [a mark] of air

2 Having stated the validity of [this form of] inference which effects the requirements of common life he proves by it the existence of air. The word mark is to be supplied. The particle and implies also sound wafting and agitating. The sense of the aphorism is therefore that the existence of the air is inferred from a heterogeneous touch from the rustling of leaves &c from the wafting aloft of grass cotton &c and from the agitation of branches &c. V

Its properties in visible **न च दृष्टानां स्पर्श इत्यदृष्टलिङ्गो वायुः ॥ १० ॥**

Aph 10 And it is not the touch which belongs to visible things therefore air has an invisible mark

1 यथा गोस्य प्रति विषाणादीनि लिङ्गानि यद्वैतव्यपिकानि तथा ज्ञेयान्द्रियव्यादिद्रव्यपञ्चकलिङ्गान्यपि सामान्यतो दृष्टानि प्रमाणभायमासादयन्तीति भावः ॥

2 इयं लोकवाक्यानिर्वाहकस्यानुमानस्य प्रामाण्यमुक्त्या अनुमानेन वायुं साधयति । लिङ्गमित्यनुपपद्यते चकार शब्दवृत्तिरूपान् समुच्चिनोति तथा च विज्ञातीयस्पर्शेन पर्णादिशब्देन नभसि दृग्गुणसादीनां यस्यां शाखादीनां कस्येन च वायुस्तनुमीयते इति भावः ॥

1 Thus touch which is made the ground of inference does not belong to earth, water, and light which are visible for it is unaccompanied with colour. Accordingly, since it must be inferred that this touch has some substratum, air has an invisible mark or a mark that is observed generally, and is ascertained to exist from the force of the properties of the ground of the inference U

2 That touch from which as being its substratum, air is inferred [to exist] does not belong to visible things viz, earth water, and light. For this reason air has an invisible mark. It has, as being a substratum a mark which is not visible, wherefore the resultant sense is that air has for its mark a touch which does not exist in visible things V

Air a substance

अदृश्यवस्त्वेन द्रव्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 It is a substance because of its not inhering in any substance

3 That of which a substance is the substratum is said to inhere in that substance, that of which a substance is not the substratum does not inhere in a substance. The sense is that air is not inherent in any substance. Accordingly the substance air has like ether, an atomic characteristic. For all other categories inhere in substance, and inherence belongs to all except the eternal substances, for according to this explanation, since a combination of two atoms is originated by primary atoms the material

1 अथ स्वर्गो य मत्तं क्रियते स दृष्टानां एषिव्यप्लेजसाम् न भवति क्वाप्तहचर स्यात् तथा घाय स्वर्गं क्वचिदावियत इत्यनुमेयमित्यदृष्टलिङ्ग सामान्यतो दृष्टलिङ्गो ऽपि वायु पञ्चमर्ताद्यलादायात् इत्यर्थः ॥

2 येन स्वर्गेन वायुरधिष्ठितायाः अनुमियते स स्वर्गो न दृष्टानां एषिव्यप्लेजसाम् इति हेतोः वायुरदृष्टलिङ्ग आस्ति दृष्टमधिष्ठिताया यस्य तादृशं लिङ्गं यस्य स दृष्टा एषिस्वर्गलिङ्गो वायुरिति फलितार्थः ॥

3 द्रव्यमायमभूतमस्यास्तीति द्रव्ययत्त न द्रव्ययत्त अद्रव्ययत्त द्रव्यानायितमित्यर्थं तथा चाकाशेयत् परमाणुलघुयो वायुर्द्रव्यम् अन्येवा पदार्थानां द्रव्याप्रितस्यात् अपि सत्युच्चावचं नित्यद्रव्येभ्य इत्यभिधानात् परमाणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकारमात द्व्यणुकादिप्रत्ययेनाऽपत्तिरिति मद्गत आरम्भस्येवापदनीयत्वादिति ॥

cause of the origin of a large integrate whole is a succession of combinations of two or more atoms U

Continued

क्रियावत्याद्गणवत्त्वाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Also [air is a substance] from its possessing actions and qualities.

' The words The aerial atom is a substance are to be supplied. It must be admitted that there exist in the primary atom the possession of qualities such as conjunction originative of combinations of two atoms &c. and the possession of action in conformity with those qualities. This is not a doubtful and undemonstrated assertion but the means of establishing the existence of primary atoms are a mote in a sunbeam and the like which mote is composed of parts because it is a substance that may be seen with the eye like a water pot. The portions of a mote are like a half jar [both integrate and integrant] since they are small portions composed also themselves of parts. Therefore as in earth &c. there is a primary atom so it must be allowed equally in the case of the air since there are in each case similar series of portions and combinations of portions. V

Ar an eternal
a balance

अद्रव्यत्वेन नित्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 [Air] is said to be eternal because it does not in here in any substance

* Air in its primary atomic character is to be supplied | A substance is destroyed by the destruction of either its co-inherent or its non-co-inherent cause. A primary atom not being composed of

१ चायथीयपरमाणुद्वयमिति शेष । द्वाणुकारम्भकसंयोगादिरूपगुणवत्त्वं तदनुकूल
क्रियावत्त्वञ्च परमाण्वाययत्रमद्भौकार्यमिति न सन्दिग्धसिद्धा हेतु परमाणुसिद्धिप्रका
रस्तु त्रसरेण सायययत्राणुपद्वयत्वाद् घटयत् त्रसरेणोरवयवा साययत्रा महदवयव
त्वात् कपालयदित्यादि स्यञ्च एष्वित्यादेः यथा परमाणुसंज्ञा सायुत्वेने ऽपि निराश्रय
स्य श्रयपवाधपविपरम्परायास्तस्यत्वादिति ॥

परमाणुलक्षणयोरिति शेषं द्रव्यं हि समर्थाधिकार्यासमर्थाधिकार्यान्तर
नाशाच्चर्यति परमाणोस्तु निरवयवतया नेतदुभयमस्ति तथाच विनाशकाभावाच्च विन
र्यति क्रियायत्ये गणयत्स्व च हेतौ सावयवस्त्वमपधि ॥

parts has neither such cause. Therefore there being nothing to destroy it, it is not liable to destruction. The being composed of parts is a condition of which the cause is the possession of actious and qualities. U

1 Of the primary aerial atom is to be supplied. That which has no substance as its co-inherent cause is said to differ in that respect from that which has a substance as its co-inherent cause. V

वायोवायुसम्पृच्छनं नानात्वलिङ्गम् ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 The concurrence of air with air is a mark of its multiplicity.

2 Concurrence of wind with wind or conflict of winds, is a kind of conjunction. This conjunction is the meeting two winds of equal velocity, but coming in different directions and different in their action [or motion]. It is inferred from the flying upwards of grass, cotton &c. For the upward motion and concurrence of two winds is invisible. But it is inferred that the visible action characterised by the flying upwards of visible grass &c., is produced by either a blow or impulse of substance possessing touch and velocity. The upward motion of the two winds, the character of which is to move horizontally, being impossible unless they repel each other, proves a mutual repulse. U

वायुसंघर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावादृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 Inasmuch as in the contact with air there is no act of perception there exists [in it] no visible mark.

1 वायुपरमाणोरिति श्रेयं नास्ति द्रव्यं समवायिकारणतया यस्य सद्रूपं द्रव्यसमवायिकारणकमिव सत्येनेत्यर्थः ॥

2 वायुसम्पृच्छनमिति वायोवायुना वा सम्पृच्छनं भवेत्तद्विशेषः । स च समानश्रेतवैर्यिकृष्टदिक्रिययोः संबिपातः । स च सृष्टतुलकादेरुर्ध्वगमनेनानुमीयते वायोऽर्ध्वगमनस्य संबिपातस्य चातीन्द्रियत्वात् । मृणादीनानु प्रत्यक्षाणामुर्ध्वगमनस्य दृष्टत्वात् क्रियाया प्रत्यक्षाया स्पर्शपट्टेन वदृष्टत्वाभिधातनोदनान्तरजन्यमनुमीयते तथा हि निर्वर्णगमनस्य भागस्य वायोऽर्ध्वगमन परस्परप्रतीपातमसरेणानुपपन्नमार्गं परस्परप्रतीपातं साधयति ॥

1 For where there is a visible mark there is a perception of pervasion [universal concomitance] as of fire by smoke, but in the present case of contact with air, perception of pervasion of air is impossible because air transcends sense. Accordingly there is no mark in air universally concomitant and cognised by perception, and air has therefore an invisible mark. V

सामान्यतो दृष्टाच्चाविशेषः ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 And inasmuch as its existence is known by general inference it is not particular

1 Not particular means devoid of particularity not particularised by particularity and particular is the particular class included in the universal substance i.e. the universal of air. And by inferring from the notion of touch that the touch which is experienced must have some substratum as also that it cannot be one of the other [substances] the notion of its adhesion in a substance other than the eight substances being established air is proved to be a substance other than the eight substances with respect to the subject which determines that which is to be proved. By general inference means from a mark different from the relation of cause and effect or from a mark other than that of invariable sequence. In the Nyaya Aphorisms it is taught that inference is of three kinds from the antecedent from the subsequent and that which is drawn generally

1 दृष्टं लिङ्गं हि यत्र व्याप्तेः प्रत्यक्षं भवति यथा वह्नेर्धूमः प्रकृते ॥ धातुसंचित्तुर्दे-
पि धातुव्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षं न सम्भवति वायोरात्रीन्द्रियत्वात् तथा च प्रत्यक्षपक्षेति व्याप्तिक-
लिङ्गं धातो नास्तीत्यदृष्टलिङ्गे धातुरिति सुष्टुक्तमेवेत्यर्थः ॥

2 अविशेषः विशेषरहितः विशेषाविशेषित इति यावत् विशेषश्च द्रव्यत्वव्याप्य-
जातिविशेषो धातुत्व तथा चानुभूयमानं स्पर्शं कथंचिदापित स्पर्शत्वादित्यनुमानेन
इतराधासदकृतेन स्पर्शे अदृष्टव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्यापितत्वसिद्धौ अदृष्टव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्यत्वेन
धातुरपि साध्यतायच्छेदककोटौ सिध्यतीति भावः सामान्यतो दृष्टादिति कार्यकारण-
भिचलिङ्गात् अन्यव्यतिरेकलिङ्गाद्वेत्यर्थः । न्यायसूत्रे पृथयत् शेषयत् सामान्यतो दृष्ट-
मिति त्रिविधमनुमानमुक्तं तत्र पृथयत् कारणातिङ्गकं कथलान्यपि वा शेषयत् कार्यति-
ङ्गकं केवलव्यतिरेकं वा सामान्यतो दृष्टं कार्यकारणभिचलिङ्गरूपं अन्यव्यतिरेकं वा
इत्यर्थः ॥

a mark inferential of those beings which are distinguished from ourselves and others. The names also of Mantra and the like which are given by a father to a son are virtually given by God by means of such precepts as Let a father on the twelfth day give a name to his child. Thus it is established that a name is a mark of the existence of God. In like manner a work being a product is a mark of the being of a God for the earth &c being effects must have a maker, as is the case with a water-pot. U

¹ It may be asked How is the omniscience of the maker of words and works proved? Accordingly it is stated. A name is produced on perceiving the thing named and an effect is produced on perceiving the material cause. A father and others on seeing the body of a son &c give it a name such as Chaitra or Mantra, and in like manner a potter and others on seeing a piece of earthenware, &c make a water pot &c. So it is concluded from the nature of the case that the framer of all applied to names and the maker of the earth &c, which are effects, must be omniscient, for he must know by perception all such things named, and the material causes of earth &c. V

The existence of ether. निष्कमण्य प्रवेशनमित्याकाशस्य लिङ्गम् ॥ २० ॥

Aph 20 Egress and ingress—such is the mark of the existence of ether

² Here the word such expressive of a class includes also throwing upwards, &c. It is a doctrine of the Sankhyas that the

¹ ननु सर्वज्ञत्वं भक्ताकर्मकर्तुं कुत सिद्धमित्य आह । भेदायां संज्ञिप्रत्यक्षमाध्य-
त्यस्य कार्यस्य सृष्टादानप्राप्यसाम्यस्य विनादिना हि पुरादिशरीरे दृष्ट्यैव तत्र सर्वमे-
वादिभक्ता निवृत्त्यन्ते अथ कुनानादयो ऽपि कृपानादिकं दृष्ट्यैव घटादिकं कुर्वन्ति
अतो निमित्तमाधुनजाकर्तुंमादृशसंज्ञिप्रत्यक्षस्य सिर्वादि कार्यकर्तुंस्तदुपादानप्राप्यस्य
चावश्यकत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वमवश्यमप्यवश्यमेव ॥

² अत्र प्रकारार्थेति शब्देनोत्प्रेष्ययादेरपि गृह्य स्पर्शप्रता मज्ज वेति निष्कमण्य प्रवे-
शनस्य गुण्यात्मिकाकाश विना सुषुप्तमानमाकाशनामक द्रव्याभारमनुमापयतीति सा-
ध्यमतम् ॥

motion of tangible bodies & e their egress and ingress being impossible without the existence of ether which is a unoccupied char-
 ables us to infer that there is another substance called ether V

तदलिङ्गमेकद्रव्यत्वात् कर्मणः ॥ २१ ॥ *

Aph 21 That is not a mark [of the existence of ether] for an action inheres in one substance only

* This opinion of the Sankhyas is rejected That egress &c is not a mark is not a mark of existence of ether Since action has one solid substance as its site action which inheres only in that which is solid cannot warrant an inference of the existence of ether as underlying it For an effect which is inherent implies a co inherent [or material] cause and there is not between ether and action the relation of inherence and subsistence V

कारणान्तरानुक्लिप्तिवैधर्म्याच्च ॥ २२ ॥

Aph 22 Also because the properties [of ether] differ from the mark of another cause

* It might be urged that egress ingress, &c infer the existence of ether, as being its non coinherent cause Hence this statement is made [Egress and ingress are not a mark of the existence of ether] because its properties differ from the mark of another cause, viz. of a non-coinherent cause. U

* Agreement (anukripta) is an abstract term formed by a primary (krit) affix The meaning is therefore that since there exists

1 तदेतन्मतं निरस्यति । तत् निष्कमणादिकम् अनिङ्गम् आकाशस्य निङ्गं न भवति कर्मणः क्रियाया एव मूर्ते द्रव्यमाश्रये यस्य तत्त्वात् तथा च मूर्तेमात्रसमवेतं कर्म न समवायितयाकाशानुमूलसमर्थं समवेतकार्यं हि समवायिकारणमादित्यति न, आकाशकर्मणो समवायिसमवेतभाव इत्यर्थः ॥

* ननु चासमवायिकारणतयैवाकाशमनुमापयिष्यति निष्कमणप्रवेशनादौत्यत आह कारणान्तरस्य असमवायिकारणस्य वा अनुकृतिर्लक्षणं तद्वैधर्म्यादित्यर्थः ॥

* अनुकृतिरिति कर्तृद्विधितो भाव इति न्यायात् अनुकूलं वादिप्रतिपाद्यभयसम्मतं यत् कारणान्तरम् असमवायिकारणं गुणं कर्म च तद्वैधर्म्यात् द्रव्यत्वरूपतद्वैधर्म्यस्याकाशे मन्यात् नासमवायिकारणतयाकाशमनुमापयितुं निष्कमणादिकं शक्येत्यर्थः ॥

in either a difference of properties in consequence of its being a substance from quality and action which are another universally acknowledged cause viz. the non coincherent cause therefore egres &c cannot infer the existence of ether as being its non inherent cause V

संयोगादभावः कर्मणः ॥ २३ ॥

Aph 23 Non existence of action results from conjunction

It is stated that action does not infer the existence of ether as its instrumental cause Since after conjunction there is non existence & non production of action, ether is not in relation to action an instrumental cause The sense is that since it is observed that action (or motion) does not come into being in fruits leaves &c after their conjunction with the ground the instrumental cause of motion is the non existence of a particular kind of conjunction &c and not ether for the negation of ether does not involve the negation of action ether being universally diffused V

कारणगुणपूर्वकः कार्यगुणो दृष्टः ॥ २४ ॥

Aph 24 The quality of an effect is observed to be pre exist ent in the quality of the cause.

The way is prepared for the statement that it is sound that necessitates the inference of the existence of ether The particular quality of an effect is observed to pre exist in the cause, as the colour of a water pot &c in portions of the water pot &c. Accordingly the particular quality or sound which is apprehended by the organ of hearing having no prior existence as the quality of

निमित्तकारणतया ऽपि नाकाशानुमापन्नं कर्मत्वात् । यत् संयोगात् संयोगानन्तरं पश्येता भावः अनुत्पादः अत आकाशं न कर्मणि निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः । अयं भावः पञ्चपत्रादीनां भूष्यादिसंयोगाभ्यन्तरं कर्मानुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् संयोगवियोगाभावादिकमेव कर्मणि निमित्तकारणं न स्यात्तत्र तद्व्यतिरेकः कर्मव्यतिरेकस्यासिद्धेस्तस्य व्यापकत्वादिति भावः ॥

शब्दस्य आकाशानुमापक इत्यभिधानु भूमिकामारचयति । कार्यस्य यो विशेषः गुणः स कारणगुणपूर्वक इत्ये दृष्टं यथा घटरूपादि कषातकषादिपूर्वकं तथा च शब्दरूपा यो विशेषगुणः सौर्जन्दिगुणवत्तस्य कारणगुणपूर्वकत्वाभावात् न कार्यगुणस्य किन्तु नित्यद्रव्यस्यैव गुण इति शब्दाधारतया नित्यद्रव्यविदित्वस्य ॥

परत्र समवायात् प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च नात्मगुणो न मनोगुणः ॥ २६ ॥

Aph 26 Since it inheres in something else and is known by perception sound is neither a quality of the soul nor a quality of the internal organ

1 If sound were a quality of the soul there would be such cognitions as I am played by the breath or by the hand I am sound ing, as there are such cognitions as I am happy I will I know, I wish &c But this is not the case, whereas it appears to all that a conch shell is played with the breath and a lute with the hand. Moreover sound is not a quality of the soul because it is, like colour, apprehended by an external organ. So too if sound were a particular quality belonging to the soul it would be like pain &c, perceived by a deaf man. It is therefore fairly stated that it must inhere in something else. The reason that it is not a quality of the internal organ is stated to be that it is known by perception. The reason that the words soul and internal organ are not, as they might have been made into one compound word (ātma manase) is that they may both with equal propriety be said to be known by perception. For the same reason it is implied that sound is a quality of space and time. U

परिशेषान्निर्गुणमाकाशस्य ॥ २७ ॥

Aph 27 It remains that sound is a mark of ether

1 Sound is to be supplied Sound must exist in something

1 शब्दो यद्यात्मगुणः स्यात् तदा ऽहं सुखी यति ज्ञाने इच्छामीत्यादियत् अहं पुंस्त्वं अहं वाद्ये अहं शब्दवानित्यादिषां स्यात् न स्वप्नमस्ति किन्तु शब्दश्च पूर्यते धीरा वाद्यते इति प्रतिपत्तिः साक्षात् । किञ्च शब्दो नात्मगुणः बाह्येन्द्रियवाद्यस्यात् कथा दियत् अविष्य शब्दो यद्यात्मगुणविशेषगुणः स्याद्विपरिवर्तनभयतः दुःखादिशब्दः न स्यात् सुष्ठुक्तं परत्र समवायादिति अमनोगुणस्य हेतुमाह प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति नात्ममनसो गुण इति समासे कर्तव्ये यदममासकरणेन सुखस्यापत्तया प्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यनेनेह हेतुना दिक्कालयोरेपि गुणस्य शब्दस्य प्रतिपिद्धमिति सूचितम् ॥

2 अथ इति शेषः । अत्रापि शब्दः कथमिहाश्रितो गुणस्यात् कथादियदिति सामान्यतोद्घाटदृष्टद्वयतिरिक्तद्वयमिच्छितः । गुणश्चायं बाह्येन्द्रियवाद्यजातोऽपत्यात् कथादि यत् अनित्यस्य सति विमुक्षमयेतस्यात् ज्ञानादिशब्दः अनित्यत्वञ्च साधयिष्यते । परिशेष मिदस्य दृष्टव्यादयश्चकन्त्यनायासात् । अत्राभावात् नित्यस्य सर्वत्र शब्दोपलब्धेर्विमुक्तम् ॥

because it is a quality like colour &c Thus it is proved by a general inference that there is another substance over and above the eight substances [earth water light air time space the soul, and the internal organ] Sound is a quality because like colour &c. it constitutes a class known by one external organ It will be proved hereafter from its inhering without continuity in an eternal substance that like knowledge it is not eternal. The substance proved by the residuary method is eternal since there is no proof of its being formed of parts and universally diffused, inasmuch as sound is perceived everywhere U

Ether an eternal
substance

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २८ ॥

Aph 28 The substantiality and eternity of ether are explained by air

To prove by analogy that the substance that has sound for its mark is a substance and eternal it is stated that as air is eternal because it does not inhere in any substance so also is ether and that as air is a substance because it has qualities so also is ether U

As the primary aereal atom is eternal because it does not inhere in any substance and because it has qualities so also is ether V.

Ether a unit

तत्त्व भावेन ॥ २९

Aph 29 Its unity is explained by existence

As being or existence is one so also is ether only one U

शब्दलिङ्गाविशेषाद्विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच्च ॥ ३० ॥

Aph 30 Also because sound its mark is not particular and because there does not exist a particular mark of ether

शब्दलिङ्गस्य द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे अतिदेशेन साधयन्नाह । अद्रव्यत्वादाया वायोर्नित्यस्य तथाकाशस्यापि गुणवत्त्वादाया वायोर्द्रव्यत्व तथाकाशस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥

यथा वायुपरमाणोरद्रव्यत्वेन नित्यत्व गुणवत्त्वेन च द्रव्यत्व तथाकाशस्यापीत्यर्थः ॥

भाय सत्ता सा यथेका तथाकाशमप्येकमेवेत्यर्थः ॥

¹ The unity of ether is established = to be understood. It being ascertained that it is an eternal substance and that all sounds have that one only substratum it follows that the hypothesis of another substratum would be superfluous. Moreover in the conception of ether sound is regarded as its mark and this mark is not particular and there is no other mark establishing its particularity or establishing its divisibility. It will be stated hereafter that though knowledge &c are a non particular mark of souls yet there is a proof of the plurality of souls in another mark which is difference of condition. U

² As plurality of souls is proved by the consideration that in one soul at one time an effect is produced in the form of pleasure and in another soul an effect is produced in the form of pain and so there is a difference in two effects of soul pleasure and pain so is it established by the absence of proof to the contrary and by the simplicity of the hypothesis that ether is not manifold but exists as a unit, inasmuch as there is no particularity in sound which is the mark of ether by which the multiplicity of ether might be proved there being no other mark demonstrative of the multiplicity of ether. V

Individuality of
ether

तदनुविधानादेकपृथक्त्वञ्चेति ॥ ३१ ॥

Aph 31 In conformity with this is its individual unity

¹ तत्त्वमाकाशस्य सिद्धमित्यर्थं धीमये सति सर्वेषां शब्दानां तदेवाकाशमर्थये उप सादाध्यायान्तरकल्पनाया कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गं शब्दस्य यदाकाशं कल्पनीयं तत्रापि शब्दं यत्र सिद्धं तच्छाद्यशिष्टं न च विशेषसाधकं भेदसाधकं लिङ्गान्तरमस्ति आत्मना यद्यपि ज्ञानादिकमपिशिष्टमेव लिङ्गं तथापि व्यवस्थातो लिङ्गान्तरादात्मनानात्यसिद्धिरिति ध्येत ॥

² यथा गुणजिह्वात्मनि कृताचित् मुख्यरूपमेव कार्यं जायते तदेवान्यस्मिन्नात्मनि तु एकरूपमेव कार्यं जायते इत्यात्मकार्यया मुख्यदुःखयोर्बलवधादात्मनानात्यं तथाकाशे शब्दरूपलिङ्गस्य न कश्चित्त्विशेषो येनाकाशनानात्यं सिध्यति ॥ याकाशनानात्यसाधनं लिङ्गान्तरमस्ति तथा च प्रमाणाभावात् साधवाच्याकाशस्य न नानात्यं कित्येकरूपं कित्यमित्यर्थः ॥

1 The individual unity of ether is proved by its unity from the consideration of the universal presence of the attribute individual unity wherever unity exists V

2 The proof of its individual unity is that individual unity necessarily follows unity : The particle *its* indicates the completion of the daily lesson . The scope of this section is to state the characteristics of particular substances which possess qualities and are not objects of the cognition of the internal organ . Therefore the characteristics of earth water light ether and in connection with them that of the divine soul are stated in this daily lesson . Accordingly the earth has been said to be possessed of fourteen qualities . These qualities are colour taste smell touch number, extension individuality conjunction disjunction highest and not highest generality gravity fluidity and self restitution . Exactly the same number of qualities with the exception of smell and with the addition of viscosity belong to water . These same qualities with the exception of taste smell viscosity and gravity belong to light and with the exception of smell taste colour gravity viscosity and fluidity to air . With the addition of sound number and the four following qualities [extension individuality conjunction and disjunction] belong to ether . Only number and the four following qualities belong to time and space . Number and the four following qualities accompanied with highest and not highest generality and impetus belong to the internal organ . Number and the four following qualities and knowledge desire and volition belong to God

1 यत्र यत्र इत्यत्र तत्रैवेकपृथक्त्वमिति व्याप्तेराकाशस्यैकत्वेनेव एकपृथक्त्वमिति रिति ॥

1 नियमेनेकपृथक्त्वमेकत्वमनुविधत्ते इत्येकपृथक्त्वमिति इति आदिरूपपरिसमाप्तेः सा उपपत्त्यवशिष्टविशेषगुणयुक्तव्यलक्षणमादिकार्यं । तत्र पृथिव्यपेक्षायाप्याकाशानां प्रसङ्गत ईश्वरात्मनश्च लक्षणमस्मिन्नादिके तत्र चतुर्देशगुणवती पृथिवी ते च गुणा रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुणत्वद्वयत्वसंस्काराः । ता यन्त एव गन्धमपास्य क्षेत्रेन सहापास्य । एत इव रसगन्धस्पर्शगुणान्यपास्य तेजसः । गन्धर सरूपगुणत्वस्वेष्टद्वयान्यपास्य साधो । शब्देन सह संख्यादिपञ्चगुणयत्नमाकाशस्य स प्यादिपञ्चकमात्रं दिक्कालयोः । परत्वापरत्वव्यवहितं संख्यादिपञ्चकं मनसः । संख्यादिपञ्चकं ज्ञानव्याप्यव्यवशेषरस्य ॥

SECOND DAILY LESSON

Natural and com-
municated qualities

पुष्पवस्त्रयोः सति सचिकर्षे गुणान्तरायादुर्भाषो घस्त्रे
गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 1. A flower and a garment being brought into contact, the non-appearance in the garment of another quality is a mark of the non-existence of smell in the garment.

With the purpose of investigating smell &c., the characteristics of the elements, it is now established that smell &c. are natural and communicated. Colour, taste, smell, and touch being natural where they are produced in the order of qualities proceeding from causes, become in such cases characteristics, but not in other cases. For the fragrance experienced in a breeze, or the cold experienced on the surface of a stone, or the warmth experienced in water, is not a characteristic. Therefore it is said, A flower and a garment being brought into contact, or when a garment is brought into contact with a golden ketaki (Pandanus Odoratissimus) flower, the fragrance of the golden ketaki which is then experienced does not belong to the garment, for it is not produced from the garment in the order of a quality proceeding from a cause, but is communicated through contiguity with the golden ketaki flower. For the non-existence of smell in the ketaki is not a mark of the non-existence of smell in the garment. What then is the mark? It is said to be the non-appearance of smell

इदानीं भूतानां लक्षणानि गन्धादीनि एरीचिविपुर्लब्धादीनां स्याभाविकत्वमौ-
घाधिकत्वञ्च व्यत्यसापयद्वाह । उपरसगन्धस्यार्था यत्र कारणगुणप्रक्रमेणोत्पद्यन्ते तत्र
स्याभाविकाः सन्तो लक्षणतामुपयान्ति नान्यथा न हि समीरणे उपलभ्यमानं घोरं
शिलातले उपलभ्यमानं शैत्यं जले उपलभ्यमानमौष्ण्यं वा लक्षणं भवति तदेतद्वाह पु-
ष्यवस्त्रयोरिति न हि कनककेतकीकुसुमसचिकर्षे वाससि कनककेतकीघोरमुपलभ्यमानं
वाससः । न हि वाससः कारणगुणप्रक्रमेण लटुत्पद्यन् किं स हि कनककेतकीसचिकर्षादि-
घाधिकं न हि घस्त्रे गन्धाभावे केतकीगन्धाभावो लिङ्गम् । किं लिङ्गमत उक्तं गुणान्तरा-
यादुर्भाष इति गुणान्तरात् कारणागुणात् अयादुर्भाषो नुत्पत्तिः यदि हि घस्त्रे यो
गन्ध उपलभ्यते स तस्य स्वाभाविकः स्यात्तदा तदवयवेषु तन्तुषु केतकीसचिकर्षात् पूर्वं
सत्र घस्त्रे घोरलभ्येत न चैवमित्यर्थः तथा च विद्यादाध्यासिता गन्धो न दस्त्रसमर्थः
तदवयवगुणाजन्यधिमेषगुणात्वात् शीतोष्णस्पर्शादिवत् ॥

from another attribute : & its non appearance or non production from a quality which is a cause For if the smell which is smelt in the garment be natural, it will be perceived before the contact with the ketakī in the threads which are its constituent parts This is not the case and therefore the smell in question does not adhere in the garment, inasmuch as the particular quality is not produced by the qualities of the integrant parts, as is the case in cold and hot touch and the like U

Smell the character
istic of earth

व्यवस्थितः पृथिव्या गन्धः ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2. Smell is established as the mark of earth

' The characteristic of earth is stated to be its natural smell Smell discriminated by its disjunction from and junction with other things and by its excluding things of similar and dissimilar classes, is established as the characteristic of earth For the earth indeed has smell and only the earth has smell It is therefore established that smell, which excludes earth from water and the next seven substances which are of the same class, and from quality and the four following categories which are of a different class, is natural to earth U

Analogously heat is
the characteristic of
light

इति नोपपत्ता व्याख्याता ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 By this heat is explained

' It is stated that the method of establishing that smell is a natural quality may be analogously applied to heat as the characteristic of light (or fire) This analogy is to be regarded as holding good with respect to cold &c. as characteristics of water &c. U

' स्वाभाविक गन्ध पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह : पृथिव्या व्यवस्थितो ज्योतान्यपेक्षाभ्यां परिच्छिन्नः समानासमानजातीयव्यावर्तकतया गन्धो लक्षणमित्यर्थः भवति हि पृथिवी गन्धवत्तेष्व पृथिव्ये गन्धवतीति तदेव समानजातीयेभ्यो जनाद्यद्यभ्यो असमानजातीयेभ्यो गुणादिपञ्चम्यो व्यावर्तकः स्वाभाविकः पृथिव्या गन्ध इति व्यवस्थितम् ॥

' गन्धस्य स्वाभाविकत्वव्यवस्थापनप्रकारमुप्याताया तेजोलक्षणेऽप्यतिदिशमाह : अथादिनक्षत्रे प्रेत्यादावप्यमतिदेवो दृष्टव्यः ॥

SECOND DAILY LESSON

Natural and com-
municated qualities.

पुष्पवस्त्रयोः सति सचिक्रये गुणान्तरापादुर्भाषो वस्त्रे
गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 2 A flower and a garment being brought into contact the non appearance in the garment of another quality is a mark of the non-existence of smell in the garment.

With the purpose of investigating smell &c., the characteristics of the elements, it is now established that smell &c. are natural and communicated. Colour, taste, smell and touch being natural where they are produced in the order of qualities proceeding from causes, become in such cases characteristics, but not in other cases. For the fragrance experienced in a breeze or the cold experienced on the surface of a stone or the warmth experienced in water is not a characteristic. Therefore it is said: A flower and a garment being brought into contact or when a garment is brought into contact with a golden ketaki (*Parthenocytisus*) flower, the fragrance of the golden ketaki which is then experienced does not belong to the garment, for it is not produced from the garment in the order of a quality proceeding from a cause but is communicated through contiguity with the golden ketaki flower. For the non-existence of smell in the ketaki is not a mark of the non-existence of smell in the garment. What then is the mark? It is said to be the non-appearance of smell

[illegible]

from another attribute & its non appearance or non production from a quality which is a cause. For if the smell which is smelt in the garment be natural, it will be perceived before the contact with the ketaki in the threads which are its constituent parts. This is not the case and therefore the smell in question does not inhere in the garment inasmuch as the particular quality is not produced by the qualities of the integrant parts, as is the case in cold and hot touch and the like. U

Smell the character
1st of earth

व्यवस्थितः पृथिव्या गन्धः ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Smell is established as the mark of earth

1 The characteristic of earth is stated to be its natural smell. Smell discriminated by its disjunction from and junction with other things and by its excluding things of similar and dissimilar classes, is established as the characteristic of earth. For the earth indeed has smell and only the earth has smell. It is therefore established that smell which excludes earth from water and the next seven substances which are of the same class, and from quality and the four following categories which are of a different class, is natural to earth. U

Analogously 1st is
the characteristic of
light.

एतेनोष्णता व्याप्याता ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 By this heat is explained

1 It is stated that the method of establishing that smell is a natural quality may be analogously applied to heat as the characteristic of light (or fire). This analogy is to be regarded as holding good with respect to cold &c. as characteristics of water &c. U

1 स्याभाविक गन्ध पृथिव्या सत्त्वमाह । पृथिव्या व्यवस्थितो योगान्वयोगाभ्या परिच्छिन्नः समानासमानजातीयव्यवर्तकतया गन्धो नतत्त्वमित्यर्थः भवति हि पृथिवी गन्धप्रत्येय पृथिव्येय गन्धप्रतीति तदेव समानजातीयेभ्यो जनाद्यष्टाभ्यो असमानजातीयेभ्यो गुणादिषष्ठ्या व्यावर्तकः स्याभाविकः पृथिव्या गन्ध इति व्यवस्थितम् ॥

1 गन्धस्य स्याभाविकत्वव्यवस्थापनप्रकारमुपस्थाताया तेजानतत्त्वोपपत्तिदिशया । अथादिनतत्त्वोपस्थाताद्यवस्थापनप्रकारमुपस्थाताया तेजानतत्त्वोपपत्तिदिशया ।

¹ It is stated that the characteristic of light [or fire] which consists of a hot feel is, like the characteristic of earth, not universally predicable of water, &c. V.

तेजस उष्णता ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4. Heat is [the characteristic] of light

² The characteristic of light is examined. It is meant that natural heat is the characteristic of light Colour also, white and luminous, is implied U.

³ Heat belongs to light alone not to any thing else Therefore the characteristic of light cannot be universally affirmed of any thing else. V.

Cold the characteristic
of water

अप्सु शीतता ॥ ५ ॥

Aph. 5. Cold is [the characteristic] of water.

⁴ Natural cold is the characteristic of water. Therefore it cannot be also universally affirmed of the surface of stone, sandal-wood, &c. By cold also its colour and taste are characterised, and viscosity and natural fluidity are also implied U.

⁵ Cold belongs to water; not to any thing else Therefore the characteristic of light cannot be universally affirmed also of the surface of stone &c, inasmuch as its appearance there is communicated [i e not natural] V.

¹ पृथिवीलक्षणस्यैव उष्णत्वस्यैव रूपतेजोलक्षणस्यापि न जलादावतिथ्यातिरि-
त्याद ॥

² तेजोलक्षणं परीक्षते । स्वाभाविक्युष्णता तेजोलक्षणमित्यर्थः रूपमेव शुक्रमास्य-
रूपमलक्ष्यते ॥

³ तेजस एव उष्णता नान्येषामिति तेजोलक्षणस्य नातिथ्यातिरिक्तिं भावः ॥

⁴ स्वाभाविकी शीतता अप्या लक्षणमित्यर्थः । तथा च शिलातलस्यैव पहादी
नातिथ्यातिरिक्तिं भावः । शीततया रूपरसादप्युक्तलक्षणे घट्टे सांसिद्धिकद्वयत्वञ्चाप
लक्षयति ॥

⁵ अप्सु शीतता नान्येषां न जललक्षणस्य शिलातलादावतिथ्यातिरिक्तं शीतप्र-
तीतिरौघाधिकत्वादिभि भावः

Aph 6 The notions of posteriority in relation to posteriority of simultaneity of slowness and quickness are marks of the existence of time

१ इति कारो ज्ञानप्रकारपर प्रत्येकममिसम्बध्यते तथा चापरमिति प्रत्ययो युगप
दिति प्रत्यय चिरमिति प्रत्यय त्विप्रमिति प्रत्यय कालनिह्वानोत्थर्य । अपरस्मिन्नपर
मित्यनेन परस्मिन् परमित्वपि दृष्टव्य तनायमर्थं यदुत्तरतपनपरिस्पन्दनान्तरितजन्मनि
स्थिरे युवानमयधि इत्या परत्वमुत्पद्यते तच्च परत्वमममयापिकारणसापेक्षम् । एवं
स्थिरमयधि कृत्या मूनि अपरत्वोत्पत्तिर्निर्दूषणीया । युगपदिति युगपज्जायन्ते युगपत्
तिष्ठन्ति युगपत् क्षुशन्ति इत्यादिप्रत्ययानाञ्च एकस्मिन् काले एकस्या मूर्धगतौ एकस्मिन्
मूर्धगत्यर्थाच्छकाल इत्यर्थं न चाप्राप्ता एवं मूर्धगतयोऽप्येवंप्रतामनुभजन्ति न च स्थिरप
प्रत्यासवा एव ता तस्मादेतादृशप्रतिशष्टप्रत्ययान्ययानुपपत्त्या विशेषणप्रापक यद्दृश्य म
कान् ॥

Time an eternal
substance

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे घायुना व्याप्यते ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 7 Its substantiality and eternity are explained by ur

As the primary aereal atom is a substance because it possesses qualities, and eternal because it is a substance not inhering in any other substance (cp II 1, 12 & 13), so also is time U

* Time is, like the primary aerial atom a substance because a subject in which qualities exist, and eternal because it has no parts V

Unity of time

तत्त्वं भाष्येन ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Its unity is explained by existence

* The sense is that time, like existence, is one because the conception of quickness &c which are the marks of its existence, are in every case not particular, and because there exists no particular mark like that of the plurality of souls (cp II. 1, 30) It may be objected, Time is manifold according to its division into moments, aggregates of two moments, hours, watches, days, days and nights, lunar fortnights, months, seasons half years, years, &c, how then can it be one? This is no valid objection, for the appear-

१. यथा चापुपरामाणोर्मुणवत्वादद्वयस्य च द्वयद्वयत्वाच्च नित्यत्वं तथा काल
स्वाधीत्यर्थः ॥

स्यापीत्यर्थः ॥
 १. घामुपरमागोरिय कालस्यापि गुणाद्ययत्वाद्द्रव्यत्वं निरययत्वाच्चित्त्यमि
 त्यर्थः ॥

१ चिरादिप्रत्ययानां कालसिद्धानां सर्वत्राविशेषादनेकात्वे ऽप्यात्मनामिव विशेषसि
द्धानां सत्तायदेकत्वं कालस्येत्यर्थः । नन्वेवं स्रजलवमुद्धूतं पार्मादयसाद्योरात्रपतमास
स्ययनसवत्सरादिभेदेन भूषासः कालास्ततः कथमेक इति चेन्न भेदमानस्य उपाधिनवि
न्यत्यात् तत्रा एक एव स्फटिकमणिजंघातापिज्जाद्युपाध्यापरागेण भिन्न इव भासत त
थैक एव कालः सूर्यस्यन्दाद्यवच्छेदभेदेन तस्यकार्यावच्छेदभेदेन च भिन्न इव भासते इत्य
भूषणमात् ॥

ननु तथाप्यतीतानागतवर्तमानभेदेन कालत्रयमस्तु श्रूयते हि त्रैकाल्यमुपायतेति चे
काल्यासिद्धिः इत्यादीति चेन्न वस्तुतत्त्वाभावात्तत्त्वप्रत्यक्षसाधच्छेदेन त्रैकाल्यव्यवहारात् येन
हि वस्तुना यं कालोऽव्यच्छिद्यते स तस्य वर्तमानः यत्प्राग्भावेन यं कालोऽव्यच्छि
द्यते स तस्य भविष्यत्कालः यत्प्राग्वर्तमानेन यं कालोऽव्यच्छिद्यते स तस्यातीतकाल
तथा चावच्छेदकत्रित्वाधीन कालत्रित्यव्यवहारः ॥

ance of a division is caused by an accident : It is to be understood that as one and the same crystal, by accidentally reflecting the colour of a China rose *tīpinja* (*Xanthochymus Pictorius*) &c, appears to be divided, so also time though one only appears, by reason of division marking the course of the sun &c, and the division marking the effects of such and such cause to be divided. It may be objected Yet time is threefold according to the division into, past future, and present, for it is said in the Veda, The three times return The three times are unaccomplished, &c This is no valid objection for the ordinary conception of time as threefold rests upon the distinguishing of things as antecedently non-existent or potentially existent, and subsequently non-existent : & as having ceased to exist For the time occupied by a thing existent is its present, the time occupied by its antecedent non-existence is its future, and the time distinguished by its destruction or subsequent non-existence is its past, so that the ordinary conception of time as threefold rests upon triad nature of the distinction U

Time a cause of non-
eternal substances

नित्येष्वभावादनित्येषु भावात् कारणे काला-
ख्येति ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 9 The term *time* is applicable to a cause inasmuch as it exists not in eternal and exists in not eternal things

¹ The term *time* is applicable to a cause, the cause of all things produced. The reason is stated to be that it does not exist in things eternal and exists in things not eternal. For since with regard to eternal substances such as ether, there is no such notion

¹ कारणे सर्वोत्पत्तिमत्कारणे काल इत्याख्या : हेतुमाह नित्येष्वभावात् अनित्येषु भावादिति नित्येषु आकाशदिषु पुणञ्जातं चिरं जातं चिरं जातं इदानीं जातं दिवा जातं रात्रौ जातं इत्यादिप्रत्ययस्याभावात् अनित्येषु घटपटादिषु योगपद्यादिप्रत्ययानां भावात् अन्यपद्यातिरेकाभ्यां कारणं काल इत्यर्थः न केवलं योगपद्यादिप्रत्ययानां भावात् अन्यपद्यातिरेकाभ्यां कारणं काल इत्यर्थः न केवलं योगपद्यादिप्रत्यययत्नात् कालस्य सर्वोत्पत्तिमिचिमितकारणत्वम् अपि तु पुष्पफलादीनां हेतुनिरूपयान्तिकप्राप्तये यथादिशब्दासत्तादेतदध्यवसेयम् ॥

as produced simultaneously produced slowly, produced quickly, produced now, produced during the day, produced at night whereas notions of simultaneity and the like do exist with regard to substances not eternal such as a water pot a piece of cloth &c, time is proved by an inclusive and an exclusive (1 = by an affirmative and = negative) argument to be a cause. It should be understood that time is the efficient cause of all things produced not only in virtue of such notions as simultaneity, but also in virtue of the terms hibernal vernal pluvial &c, as applied to flowers fruits, &c U

Existence of space
proved

इत इदमिति यस्तद्विषय लिङ्गम् ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 The mark pertaining to space is that whence the knowledge arises that one thing is remote or not remote from another

1 Pertaining to space—belonging to space causing us to infer the existence of space For that substance is space from which, with reference to two bodies in a determinate position and existing simultaneously, there springs the knowledge that one in which there is there the conjunction with more numerous conjunct objects, is more remote than one in which there is conjunction with less numerous conjunct object and that that body in which there are less numerous conjunctions of conjunct objects is more remote than that body in which there are more numerous conjunctions of conjunct objects For unless such a substance exist there is nothing to account for the two bodies having more or less numerous conjunctions with conjunct objects Unless this be accounted for there can exist no such thing as the conception of each body so characterised, and

1 विद्य इदं दिश्य दिगनुमापकम् इतो ज्येतरसमुक्तसंयोगाद्यदि द्युतरसमुक्त संयोगाधिकरण परम् इतश्च संयुक्तसंयोगभूयस्त्वाधिकरणाद्विदं समुक्तसंयोगात्परोक्षस्याधिकरणमपरमिति नियतदिग्देशयो समानकालयो विषयोर्धतो द्रव्याद्यवति सा दि गित्यर्थः । न हि तादृश द्रव्यमन्तरेण भूयसा संयुक्तसंयोगानात्परोक्षसा वा विषयोऽप्यभापकमन्यदस्ति न च तदुपनयमन्तरेण तत्तद्विशिष्टवृष्टि न च सामन्तरेण प्रात्यापर स्वयोरुत्पत्ति न च तदुत्पत्ति विना तद्विशिष्टप्रत्ययव्यवहारो ॥

without such a notion a highest and not highest [generic and specific] form of generality is impossible, but if that were impossible there would not be, as there actually are cognitions speculative and practical characterised by such generality U

¹ The words near or remote are to be supplied after one thing from another The mark then of space is the conception of local contiguity or remoteness according to which we know that one thing is far from or near to another Space therefore like time, is proved to exist inasmuch as it is that in which conjunction takes place and the not inherent cause of local propinquity or remoteness Space moreover, though one being divided according to difference of concomitants gives rise to the common distinction of east &c The quarter adjacent to this concomitant i.e. to the mountain behind which the sun rises is the east That which is remote from this mountain is the west The region adjacent to mount Meru is the north That which is remote from mount Meru is the south That which is adjacent to the mountain behind which the sun rises and remote from mount Meru is the south east. The region remote from Meru and remote from the mountain behind which the sun rises is the south west That which is adjacent to Meru and remote from the mountain behind which the sun rises is the north west That which is adjacent to Meru and adjacent to the mountain behind which the sun rises is the north-east That in which the conjunction takes place which is produced by the conjunction of soul with requitative efficacy and

¹ इत इदमिति परमपर एति शेष तथा चास्मादिदं दूरम् अस्मादिदमन्तिकमिति देशिकपरत्वबुद्धिर्यतस्तादृश दिग्निह तया च फलवत् देशिकपरत्वापरत्वासमवापि कारणसयोगाश्रयतया दिक् सिध्यति सा च एकापि उपाधिभेदात् प्राच्यादिव्यवहार उपाधिश्च तदीयोदयगिरिसंज्ञिता या दिक् सा तदीयपाची तदीयोदयगिरिव्यवहारा तु तदीयप्रतीची तदीयसुमेरुसंज्ञिता या दिक् सा तदीयोदीची एव सुमेरुव्यवहारा आयाची उदयगिरिसंज्ञिता सुमेरुव्यवहारा आग्नेयी सुमेरुव्यवहारादयगिरिव्यवहारा च निर्जती सुमेरुसंज्ञिता उदयगिरिव्यवहारा च वायवी सुमेरुसंज्ञिता उदयगिरि संज्ञिता च शेषानी अदृष्टयदात्मसंयोगजन्यान्निश्चयाजन्यसंयोगाश्रय कथंम् एतन् अन्यसंयोगाश्रय अथ ॥

by the rites of fire is above, that in which the conjunction caused by falling takes place is below V

Space an eternal substance

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 The substantiality and eternity [of space] are explained by air

* It is a substance because possessed of attributes and eternal because it has no substratum [cf II 2 7] U

सत्य भावेन ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Its unity [is explained] by existence

* The unity of space like that of existence is proved by its having a not particular mark and by the non existence in it of a particular mark From this its individual unity may be inferred [cf II 1 31] U

कार्यविशेषेण नानात्वम् ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 Its diversity is [caused to be conceived] by the difference of its effects

* It is explained why, whereas space is one only there is the practical assurance of east, &c Its diversity, the common diverse conceptions of east &c, is caused by the difference of its effects, the accidental qualities of produced bodies But in reality space is one only V

आदित्यसयोगाद्भूतपूर्वाद्भविष्यतो भूताच्च प्राची ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 [Space is regarded as] east because of a past future or present conjunction of the sun

* गुणवत्त्वाद् द्रव्यत्वम् अनादित्याच्च नित्यत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

* दिग्लिङ्गादिविशेषाद्विशेषेण दिग्भाषाच्च अनाद्यदेकत्वं सदनुविधानादेकपक्षत्वम् ॥

* दिग् एकत्वे ऽपि व्याख्यादित्यवहासमुपपादयति । कार्यविशेषेण अन्यभूतैरुपयोगिना नानात्व प्राच्यादिनानाव्यवहारं चक्षुत एकैव दिगित्यर्थः ॥

' The east [*prachi*] is so called because the sun moves [*anchati*] forward [*prak*] there : Accordingly the space in which conjunction first takes place of the sun in its course from east to west of Meru whether such conjunction be past future or present is east. Mention is here made of these three divisions of time, which rest upon the division of human observation. One man has the practical assurance that this is the east because the conjunction of the sun in the orient first took place yesterday. Another has the notion of the east from observing that the conjunction of the sun in the orient will first take place tomorrow. Another has the notion of the east from observing that there is a present conjunction of the sun now taking place in that quarter. U

तथा दक्षिणा प्रतीची उदीची च ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 So likewise [space is regarded as] south, west and north

' In like manner the practical assurance of the south arises from past future or present conjunction of the sun with the mountains &c in the southern quarter. So also the notion of west and north may be analogously accounted for. U

एतेन दिगन्तरालानि व्याख्यातानि ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 By this [similarly] the intermediate divisions of space are explained

' The notion of the south east quarter arises from combining

' प्राक् अस्या सविता अश्वतीति प्राची तथा च यस्या दिशि मेरुप्रदक्षिणक्रमेण भ्रमत आदित्यस्य प्रथम संयोगो भूतपूर्वो भविष्यन् वा भवन् वा दिक् प्राची अत्र पुरु प्राग्भिस्त्रिभिर्दमाश्रित्य कालत्रयोपवर्णनं भवति हि कस्यचित् पूर्वद्यु प्रातरस्यादिदिग् आदित्यसंयोगः प्रथम एत इतोय प्राचीति प्राचीव्यवहारः कस्यचिदपरद्वयस्या आदित्य संयोगः प्रथम भावीत्यभिस्त्रिधा प्राचीव्यवहारः कस्यचिदिदानीं अस्या आदित्यसंयोगो भवच्चत्तान्यभिस्त्रिधा प्राचीव्यवहारः ॥

' तद्वदेव दक्षिणदिग्घटितमगादिना सहादित्यसंयोगात्भूतपूर्वात्भविष्यतो भूताद्वा दक्षिणाव्यवहारः एव प्रतीच्युदीच्योरपि व्यवहार उच्ये ॥

' प्राचीदक्षिणयोर्दिग्घोर्लक्षणसाद्वर्ण्यं दक्षिणपूर्वा दिगिति व्यवहार एव दक्षिण पश्चिमा पश्चिमोत्तरा उत्तरपूर्वैस्तुल्यं एते आदित्यसंयोगा येन विभुना दृश्येणोपनी यन्त सा दिगिति कणादिरहस्ये व्युत्पादित विस्तरतः ॥

the characteristics of the eastern and southern quarters. So also the south-west, and north-east may be inferred. It is explained at length in the *Kaṇāda rahasya* that space is that by which, as an eternal substance, these and other conjunctions of the sun are manifested. U

Nature of doubt. सामान्यप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषसूतेरव
सशयः ॥ १७ ॥

Aph 17 Doubt [arises] from perception of a general, non perception of a particular, and remembrance of particularity

1 Doubt arises from perception or knowledge of a general, 1 of a common property, from non perception or ignorance of a particular included in one of two alternatives, and from remembrance or knowledge of two alternatives. With reference to doubt therefore, the cause is knowledge of a common property, absence of certainty as to something comprised in one of two alternatives, and knowledge of two alternatives. The word 'and' implies the addition of knowledge of a non general property, and of opposed propositions, which are mentioned in the *Nyāya Aphorisms V*

दृष्टं न दृष्टं ॥ १८ ॥

Aph 18 That which is seen, and that which was formerly seen [are causes of doubt]

2 Doubt is twofold that which has an external and that

1 सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मस्य प्रत्यक्षात् ज्ञानात् विशेषस्य एककोटिध्याप्यस्य अप्रत्यक्षात् अज्ञानात् विशेषस्य कोटिद्वयस्य स्मरणेनानात् सशयो भवतीति शेषः । तया च संशयः प्रति साधारणधर्मज्ञानम् एककोटिध्याप्यनिश्चयाभावात् कोटिद्वयज्ञानञ्च हेतुरित्यर्थः । चकारात् न्यायसूत्रोक्तयोः असाधारणधर्मज्ञानप्रतिपत्तिवाक्यज्ञानयोः सङ्गुहः ॥

2 द्विविधः सशयो संहितविषयकोऽन्तर्विषयकश्च संहितविषयकोऽपि दृश्यमानधर्मि को दृश्यमानधर्मिकश्च तत्र दृश्यमानधर्मिको यथा कर्ध्वत्वादिशब्दस्य धर्मिलो दर्शनात् अप्रत्यक्षात् पुरुषो धेति अदृश्यमानधर्मिको यथा अणवे आटाद्यन्तरिते गोलक्यादिविषये विद्याशालावदर्थनात् अप्रत्यक्षात् धेति धस्तुतस्तत्रापि विद्याशालाधर्मिक एव सन्देहो विद्याशालाधर्मिको गोलक्याधर्मिको यति विद्याशालाधर्मिको द्विविधधर्माभावात् यतः सामान्यप्रत्यक्षात् हेतुत्वेनैकत्र दृष्टं सशयकम् एकत्र धर्मिणि वा दृष्टं सशयहेतुरित्यत्र प्रथमा विधामात्र । दृष्टसूत्रस्य सशयहेतुः तेन दृष्टाभ्यां स्वाणुपुरुषाभ्यां तुल्य वर्तते दुराचरते यद्वर्धत्वात् तद्दृष्टं संशयहेतुरित्यर्थः ॥

which is an internal object That again which has an external object relates to something of which the properties are perceived, or to something of which the properties are unperceived That which relates to something of which the properties are perceived, is such as when on seeing a determinate object and having tallness as an attribute the doubt arises whether the object be a post or a man That which relates to an object the properties of which are not perceived is such as when on seeing merely the horns belonging to a cow gayal or other animal in a forest where it is concealed by the intervention of bushes &c the doubt arises whether it be a cow or a gayal But in the latter case the doubt really relates to the quality of the horn whether the horn belong to a cow or to a gayal and consequently the statement of this distinction is due merely to a refinement of language The general [i.e. common property] which is the cause of doubt gives rise to doubt either when observed in several objects or in one The first statement is therefore explained in this aphorism Height perceived is [in the former case] the cause of the doubt The height that is to say, which is perceived in a present object and which belonged equally to a post and to a man previously seen is the cause of the doubt U

यथादृष्टमयथादृष्टत्वाच्च ॥ १९ ॥

Aph 19 That which is perceived in a certain way [is a cause of doubt] because it is [at another time] perceived not in that way *

That which is seen in a certain way, gives rise to doubt by reason of its being perceived not in that way For instance Chaitra being seen in a certain manner with hair is at another time seen not in that manner but without hair When in the course of

* अथवादृष्टत्वादेतोर्व्यादृष्टमपि सशायक यथा चैत्रो यथादृष्टः केशयान् का सान्तरे अथवादृष्टः केशविनाशतो दृष्ट इत्यर्थः । क्रमेण तत्रैव चैत्रे घट्टादृष्टमस्तके दृष्टे सति भवति सशयचैत्रोऽप्य सकेशो निष्केशो वेति तत्र हि चैत्रत्व समानो धर्मः सशायक स चैत्रैव दृष्ट इत्यभिप्रेत्य एव धर्मिणि दृष्टः सशयहेतुः ॥

time Chaitra is seen with his head covered with his garments a doubt arises whether this Chaitra have hair or no In this case the being Chaitra is a common property which gives rise to doubt and this common property is seen in one object The cause of the doubt therefore is seen in one undivided object U

¹ It is stated that a property may exist under two alternative conditions in one object. For if Chaitra be seen with his head muffled up a doubt arises whether he have hair or no and the cause of this doubt is the knowledge of the notion Chaitra accompanied by the notion of hair or of the absence of hair V

विद्या ऽविद्यातरय सय ॥ २० ॥

Aph 20 Doubt also [arises] from knowledge and want of knowledge

² Internal doubt is produced by knowledge and the want of knowledge. For instance an astronomer predicts truly and predicts untruly eclipses of the moon &c Accordingly a doubt arises in his mind as to his knowledge whether it be correct or not Or knowledge is sometimes science and sometimes not science wanting demonstration, and consequently a doubt arises with respect to something whether inasmuch as it is known it exists or not U

श्रोत्रग्रहयो यो ऽयं स शब्द ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 21 The object which is apprehended by hearing is sound

³ It is now established by means of a definition that sound is

¹ एतत् कोटिद्वयसद्वचनित धर्ममाह । भवति हि प्राचूतशिरसि क्षेत्र अथ क्षेत्रान् निष्केशो यत्पादिसद्वचनित तत्कारणञ्च कश्चिदभाषसद्वचनितधर्मस्वज्ञानम् ॥

² आन्तरमययो हि विद्या ऽविद्याभ्या भवति यथा मौलूतिक सम्भवादिशक्ति च न्द्रोपरागादि असम्भवापि तत्र स्वज्ञाने संशया ऽस्य जायते सम्भवादिदृष्टमसम्भवति यदा ज्ञानं हि क्वचिद्विद्या क्वचित्द्विद्या अप्रमा भवति तथा च ज्ञापमानत्यात सद्विदमसा ह्येति संशयो जायते ॥

³ इदानीं शब्द धर्मस्य लक्षणमुखेन व्यवस्थापयति । श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते श्रो श्रवणे विन्दतन्त्रलौकिकप्रत्यक्षविषय इत्यर्थः । शब्दत्वादेरपि सादृश्यत्वादर्थ इति ज्ञातिमान्

possessed of properties . It is apprehended by hearing, that is, is an object of ordinary perception produced in the organ of hearing . The notion of sound, being of the same kind, is an object, and is therefore a class . The full definition, then, of sound is that it is a class included in the notion of a quality which exists as the object of common perception produced in the organ of hearing . V

Doubt with respect
to sound answered

तुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषु विशेषस्य उभयया
दृष्टत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

Aph 22 Since the particular [class of sound] is perceived both in things homogeneous and in things heterogeneous [a doubt arises with respect to it]

‘ A doubt arises with respect to sound’ is to be supplied, and by ‘ sound’ must also be understood the notion or class of sound and the notion of its being apprehended by the organ of hearing . Since, then, the exclusion of particularity or difference of sound is perceived in things homogeneous, i e in the twenty three qualities, and in things heterogeneous i e in substances and notions, sound gives rise to a doubt respecting itself, whether it be a quality, a substance, or an action . U

Some have maintained that, inasmuch as there exist names and notions of low and loud sounds, sound is a substance . The refutation of this opinion is here commenced . Since there is per-

इति तदर्थस्तथा च अथोन्मिद्वजन्यैकिकरूपस्यविषयगुणितुल्यस्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वमेव
शब्दलक्षणं पर्यवहितम् ॥

शब्दे सम्यगिति शेषः । शब्दे शब्दत्ववैयर्थ्यात्त्ववैयर्थ्यात् तच्च तुल्यजातीयेषु त्रयोविधतां गुणेषु अर्थान्तरभूतेषु द्वयेषु कर्मसु च विशेषस्य व्यापने उभयया उभयत्र दर्शनात् शब्दो किं गुणो द्वयं कर्म वेति सम्यगजनयति ॥

केचित्तु सूत्रं शब्दमहाशब्द इत्यादियत्प्रादादयमेव शब्द इत्युक्तत्वं निराकर्तुमारभतः । शब्दे गृह्यमाणस्य शब्दत्वादर्थेष्वस्य तुल्यजातीयेषु त्रयोविधतां गुणेषु अर्थान्तरभूतेषु द्वयेषु कर्मसु च उभयत्र उभयत्र द्वयं कर्म निश्चितेन तदभाववत्तया निश्चितेसु च अदृष्टत्वात् शब्दो द्वयं न वेति कथं इति दृष्टये तथा च निश्चितोभयकोटिमद्वयवत्त्वस्यापारम्यं शब्दत्वे ह्यनन्तरं तद्वत्तादा सम्यगजनयतीति भावः ॥

ceived no particularity in the nature of sound apprehended in sound, both in the twenty-three things homogeneous, i. e. in the qualities, colour, &c., and in things heterogeneous i. e. in substances and actions, which are distinguished by belonging to the class substance and other classes, 'a doubt arises'—for these words are to be supplied—whether sound be a substance or no. The knowledge of the existence in the nature of sound of particularity, in the form of exclusion from that of which both alternatives are distinguished, gives rise to such a doubt V.

एकद्रव्यत्वाच्च द्रव्यम् ॥ २३ ॥

Aph. 23. Since it inheres in one substance only, [sound] is not a substance.

That of which one substance is the substratum, inheres in one substance only. Inasmuch, therefore, as no substance has only one cause of inherence, sound, since it differs in properties from substance, is not a substance. U.

The opinion that sound is a substance is here rejected. Sound is not a substance, for it inheres in one substance, i. e. resides in one only; whereas it is well known that no substance abides in one other substance only. V.

नापि कर्मावाप्तुपत्त्यात् ॥ २४ ॥

Aph. 24. Now is it an action, for it is invisible.

Sound is not an action, for the perception of which sound is the object is not visual, i. e. is produced by some other external organ than the eye. The class sound, therefore, does not belong to

एकं द्रव्यं समवायि यस्य तदेकद्रव्यं द्रव्यञ्च किमप्येकद्रव्यसमवायिकारणकं न भवतीति द्रव्यैर्धर्मवाच्यं शब्दो द्रव्यमित्यर्थः ॥

इदानीं शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वं निरस्यति । शब्दो न द्रव्यम् एकद्रव्यत्वात् एकमात्राद्विद्यमानत्वात् न ह्येकमात्राद्विद्यमानं किमपि द्रव्यं प्रसिद्धम् ॥

प्रत्ययस्य शब्दविषयकस्यावाप्तुपत्त्यात् चक्षुर्मेववाहिरिन्द्रियजन्यादित्यर्थः तथा च शब्दस्य ॥ कर्मवृत्तिवाप्तुपत्त्यवाप्तुत्तिजातित्वात् रसस्वादिवदिति भावः ॥

action, because like the class taste &c it exists as a class not included in things visually perceived U

गुणस्य सतो उपवर्गः कर्मभिः साधर्म्यम् ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 25 The transiency of [sound] which is a quality, is a property common also to actions

1 It may be objected that sound is an action, since like throwing upwards &c it comes rapidly to an end The answer is as follows —Transiency is rapid destruction Thus in the class quality is dependent, like qualities [such as pleasure and pain, and the like], on rapid occurrence of being and ceasing to be It is, therefore, only a property common also to actions, but not the whole essence of action Rapid destruction, which you advance as an argument, is found in other instances besides action, as is shown by the conception of duality by pleasure and pain, &c U

सतो लिङ्गाभावात् ॥ २६ ॥

Aph 26 Since there is no mark of [sound as] existing [before utterance, it does not so exist]

2 Meeting the objection —Let it be allowed that sound is a quality, yet it is not a mark of the existence of ether, for it would justify the inference of the existence of ether, only if it were an effect of ether, whereas it is eternal its occasionally not being observed being due to the non existence of something to make it known, it is stated If sound existed previously to its

1 ननु शब्दः कर्म आशुतरविनाशित्यात् उत्प्रेषणादियदिति चेदत्राह । अपर्ययः आशुनाशः स च गुणस्येति द्वित्यादिषदाशुभाविनाशकसचिषाताधीन इति कर्मभिः साधर्म्यमाश्रमस्य न तु कर्मत्वमेव त्वदुक्तरेताराशुतरविनाशित्वस्य द्वित्वज्ञानमुखदुःखादिभिरनेकान्तिरुत्यमिति भावः ॥

2 ननु सिध्यतु शब्दो गुणस्तथापि नासावाकाशसिद्धम् आकाशं हि तदा शुभाय येत् यदि तस्य कार्यं स्यात् किन्तु नित्य एवाय कदाचिदनुपलम्भस्तु व्यञ्जकाभावः प्रयुक्त इत्याशङ्क्याह । यदि हि उच्चारणात् प्रागुध्ये शब्दः सन् स्यात् तदा सतोऽस्य लिङ्गप्रमाणान्तरं स्यात् न चाप्यवधारया शब्दसत्ये प्रमाणमस्ति तस्मात् कार्यं एवाय न व्यङ्ग्य इति ॥

utterance there would be a mark or another proof of it as an existing thing. There is no proof of sound in the case of its not being heard. It is not therefore manifested as pre-existent. U

¹ The doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas that sound is not produced but eternal, but that it is sometimes unperceived because there is nothing to make it known is rejected. Because there is no mark of sound as existing means because there exists no proof establishing the eternity of sound. V

नित्यवैधर्म्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

Aph 27 Since [sound] differs from the eternal [it does not exist previously to utterance]

² A difference is perceived between sound and the eternal. For it is inferred by what is spoken that Chaitra, Maitra and others exist even when concealed because Chaitra speaks but it is never inferred from that which is made known as a water pot and the like that that which makes known such as a lamp and the like exists. Therefore sound is produced but is not made known as previously existent. U

³ After the statement of the absence of a proof a proof of the contrary is stated. Sound is not eternal because it differs from the eternal : e because it ceases to be for that it ceases to be is established by the evidence of sense. V

अनित्यश्चाय कारणात् ॥ २८ ॥

Aph 28 It is not eternal for it has a cause

¹ शब्दो न जन्मते किन्तु नित्य एव स कदाचिदप्रत्यवन्तु तस्य व्यञ्जनवैधर्म्यादिति मीमांसकमतं निरस्यति । सता नित्यस्य शब्दस्य सिद्धाभावात् शब्दनित्यतासाधकप्रमाणभावादिति फलितार्थः ॥

² नित्येन घटास्य शब्दस्य वैधर्म्यमुपलभ्यते यतश्चैत्रो वक्तोत्यत्राशुतो ऽपि चैत्रमेवादिवचनेनानुमीयते न च व्यञ्जक प्रदीपादिव्यञ्जेन घटादिना क्वचिदनुमीयते तस्माज्जन्य एवार्थे न व्यङ्ग्य इति भावः ॥

³ साधकभावात्तत्र साधकमप्याह । नित्यवैधर्म्यात् विनाशित्वात् शब्दो न निवृत्तत्वात्तस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादिति भावः ॥

¹ Because its production from a cause is observed, is to be supplied For a sound is observed becoming manifest by the conjunction of a drum and drumstick, and the like It is, therefore, not eternal, because it is produced. Or 'for it has a cause' implies that the reason is that it possesses a cause U.

² Sound is not eternal, because it has a cause. For eternal things have no causes V

न चासिद्धं विकारात् ॥ २६ ॥

Aph 29 This is not unproved by change

¹ It must not be argued that there is no proof that sound has a cause, since, inasmuch as it is loud or soft, a change is perceived. For a loud or soft sound is perceived in consequence of the hardness or softness of the beating of a drum with a drumstick, and the like But the loudness &c of that which is manifested, is not dependent on the loudness &c of that which makes known. From its cause or change, therefore, it is inferred that it is produced, not that its existence is made known U

² That sound has a cause is not disproved by its change or existence as loud, soft, &c For in the absence of hardness or softness in the beating of a drum with a drumstick and the like, there

¹ कारणत उत्पत्तेर्दृष्टत्वादिति शेषः उपलभ्यते हि भेरीदण्डसंयोगादिभ्यः प्रादुर्भूतं शब्दः तथा द्योत्यन्तिमत्वादनित्यो ऽयमिति यद्वा कारणत इति कारणवत्त्वहेतुमुपलक्षयति ॥

² शब्दे ऽनित्यः कारणतः कारणवत्त्वादिति यावत् न हि नित्यानि कारणवन्ति भवन्ति इत्यर्थः ॥

³ शब्दस्य कारणवत्त्वमसिद्धमिति न याच्यं तीव्रमन्दादिभावेन यिकारस्य दर्शनात् भेरीदण्डाभिघातस्य तीव्रतया तीव्रस्य मन्दतया मन्दस्य शब्दोपलम्भात् न ह्यभिव्यञ्जकतीव्रत्वाद्याधीना ऽभिव्यङ्ग्यतीव्रत्वादिः तथा च कारणतो विकारादनुमोदते ज्ञेयो ऽयं न त्यभिव्यङ्ग्य इति ॥

⁴ शब्दस्य कारणवत्त्वं नासिद्धं विकारात् तीव्रमन्दादिभावात् न हि भेरीदण्डादभिघातस्य तीव्रमन्दादिस्वाभावे शब्दस्य तीव्रमन्दादिभावः केनचिदुपलभ्यते नाप्यभिव्यञ्जकस्य तीव्रमन्दादिभावेन शब्दे तीव्रमन्दादिभावो भवितुमर्हति श्रुतो भेरीदण्डादभिघातादिकारणजन्यत्वं शब्दस्याकामेनापि याच्यमिति नासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

could not be observed to exist loudness or softness of sound. It is impossible that loudness, softness, &c. should exist in sound as a consequence of the loudness, softness, &c. of that which manifests it. It must therefore be admitted even by an opponent that sound is produced from a cause, this cause being the beating &c. of a drum with a drumstick, &c. V.

अभिव्यक्तौ दोषात् ॥ ३० ॥

Aph. 30. Since in its manifestation there would be a defect [sound is not manifested.]

1 If sound were manifested, an unalterable relation of evolvent and evolute in things co-extensive and apprehended by the same sense would be wrongly conceived to exist. But no such unalterable relation is observed to exist among such objects. If this be not assented to, it will follow that when one letter (as ka) is manifested, all letters will be manifested. The objection that an unalterable relation of that which manifests and that which is manifested is observed to exist between the existent, a man, and a Brahman, which are co-extensive, and are manifested according to their diverse natures, places, and origins is invalid. For they are not co-extensive, for the extension of the human and the Brahmanical, is not so great as that of the existent. U.

संयोगाद्विभागस्य शब्दाच्च शब्दनिवृत्तिः ॥ ३१ ॥

Aph. 31. Sound is produced by conjunction, disjunction and [other] sound.

2 By conjunction—by the conjunction of a drum and drum-

1 शब्दस्याभिव्यक्तौ समानदेशानां समानेन्द्रियग्रहाणां प्रतिनिधित्वस्य शब्द-
ज्ञातत्वं दोषः स्यात् ३. च शब्दस्यानां प्रतिनिधित्वस्य शब्दज्ञातत्वं कश्चिदुच्यते अत्र यदि
तदा न स्योक्रियेत तदा ककाराभिव्यक्तौ सर्ववर्णाभिव्यक्तिप्रसङ्गः । ननु समानदेशाना-
मपि सत्त्वनरात्प्रादुर्भावात् स्वरूपभेदसंस्थानयोगनिवृत्त्यानां प्रतिनिधित्वस्य शब्दज्ञातत्वं
दृष्टमेवेति चेन्न तेषां समानदेशत्वाभावात् न हि यावत् देश सत्त्वस्य साधने न रा-
त्यस्य प्रादुर्भावस्य या ॥

2 संयोगात् भेरीदण्डादिसंयोगात् विभागात् ध्वनिं वाद्यमाने तत्र संयोगस्तावदा

stick and the like By disjunction—in a bamboo when being split, for in this case conjunction is not the cause of the first sound for no such conjunction exists, and consequently disjunction of the two pieces of bamboo is the efficient cause and the non coinherent [or extrinsic or immaterial] cause is the disjunction between the piece split off and the ether When sound is produced at a distance on a lute &c. it is propagated by continual reproduction till arriving at that space in ether which is limited by the outer ear it is perceived Sound therefore is produced also from sound U

लिङ्गाच्चानित्य शब्द. ॥ ३२ ॥

Aph 32 Sound is not eternal because of its mark

1 Articulate sound is not eternal because though constituting a class it is apprehended by the organ of hearing as in the case of a lute &c U

Object one of the
Mīmāṃsakas

द्वयोस्तु प्रवृत्त्योरभावात् ॥ ३२ ॥

Aph 33 But [were sound quickly destructible] the activities of two would not exist

2 The objection of a Mīmāṃsaka is stated Of two—of teacher and pupil—the activities—the activity of the teacher in teaching and of the pupil in learning—would not exist would follow to be non-existent Since such expressions as The teacher teaches

द्वयस्य शब्दस्य कारणं तदभावात् तस्मात् घटशतद्वयविभागो निमित्तकारणं दत्ताकाशविभागश्चासमवायिकारणम् । यत्र च दूरे वीणादावुत्पन्नं शब्दः तत्र सन्तानक्रमेण उत्पद्यमानः शब्दः कर्णशृङ्खल्युत्पत्तिरुत्तमाकाशदेशमासादयन् मृद्यते तेन शब्दादपि शब्दः निष्पत्तिरिति ॥

1 वर्णात्मकं शब्दोऽनित्यं जातिमत्येव सति योत्रयादृशस्यात वीणादिभ्यनिवदित्यर्थः ॥

2 मीमांसकः प्रत्यक्षतिष्ठते । द्वयोरुक्तश्रव्ययोः प्रवृत्त्योः गुरोरध्यापने प्रवृत्तिः श्रव्यस्य तु अध्ययने तयोरभावात् अभावप्रसङ्गात् गुरुः श्रव्यान् वेदमध्यापयति श्रव्येभ्यो वेदं ददाति इत्यादियाक्यानामेकार्थन्यानुभवेन अध्यापनं दानमेव तथा च शब्दस्याशु विनाशित्वं तस्य दानप्रतिपदयोरसम्भ्रजत्वात् अध्यापने अध्ययने च प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् अतः शब्दस्याग्रयं स्वैर्यं स्वीकार्यं नाशकानुपलब्ध्येश्च तत्राग्रे प्रमाणाभावात् तावत् कालं स्थिरज्जेन कः पञ्चाचाश्रयिष्यति इति न्यायेन नित्यतेषां फलितमिति भावः ॥

his pupils the Veda, and The teacher gives his pupils the Veda, are recognised to be identical in sense, teaching is nothing else than giving. As, therefore, if sound were rapidly destructible it would be impossible to give and receive it, there would exist no activity in relation to teaching and learning, the permanency of sound must, therefore, be admitted. It also follows from the absence of a proof of destruction of sound, no destroying agent being observed. The eternity of sound is also established by the argument. It has so long existed, who shall destroy it after this? V.

प्रथमाशब्दात् ॥ ३४ ॥

Aph. 34 From the word 'first' [it follows that sound is eternal.]

The eternity of sound must be admitted, Inasmuch as in the Vedic text, "He thrice recited the first, and thrice the last," it is affirmed that the first and last texts recited at the adding of fuel to the sacred fire were thrice pronounced; for to pronounce them thrice would be impossible, unless sound were eternal. Therefore its eternity is established according to the argument previously employed V.

सम्प्रतिपत्तिभाषाच्च ॥ ३५ ॥

Aph. 35. Also from the existence of recognition

The permanence of sound necessarily follows from the existence of recognition or recollection. Such recognitions as that Maitra is reading the same verse as Chaitra read, or that this is the same letter *ka*, would be impossible unless sound were permanent. V.

१ शब्दस्याद्यस्य नित्यत्वमुपेयम् त्रिः प्रथमामन्वाहं त्रिस्तवामन्वाह इति श्रुतेः प्रथमोक्तमयोः सामिधेयोः त्रिवृत्कारणस्य विहितत्वात् न हि स्थैर्यमन्तरेण त्रिवृत्कारणं सम्प्रतीतिरिति पूर्वोक्तव्यायेन नित्यतायाः सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

२ शब्दस्याद्यस्य स्थैर्यं सम्प्रतिपत्तेः प्रत्यभिज्ञाया भाषात् सत्त्वात् यः प्रत्यभिज्ञेनैव यदितस्तमेव मित्रः पठति स एवायं इत्यादि प्रत्यभिज्ञाशब्दस्य स्थिरतामन्तरेणानुपपत्तेरिति भावः ॥

M masaka subject
tions answered

सन्दिग्धा सति बहुत्वे ॥ ३६ ॥

Aph 36 A plurality existing [these arguments] are doubtful

' A plurality diversity and non permanency existing in the particular motions of the limbs in dancing and the like teaching learning and recognition are observed to exist in regard to them Therefore teaching &c the arguments or middle terms for the permanence of sound are doubtful, that = undistributed. For otherwise from such observations as He learns dancing He dances thrice ' Chaitra is performing the same dance as was performed by Chaitra, permanence would be proved similarly of all these actions V

सख्याभाव. सामान्यत ॥ ३७ ॥

Aph 37 The existence [in sound] of number [results] from generality

' It may be said : There are fifty letters texts of eight and texts of three syllables and the anushtubh metre of eight syllables How if letters be not eternal can they be infinite according to diversity of utterance? The reply = as follows The existence of number i.e. of the numbers fifty and the like results from universality from the letters la ga &c existing as classes Though there be an infinity of the letters la &c the things belonging to the class la ga &c exist as fifty or three or eight just as substance quality &c exist as nine or twenty four in virtue of a division of that which is included in the class U

' नृत्यादीनामङ्गवियोगिण्याणां बहुत्वे ऽपि नानात्वे ऽपि अस्थैर्ये ऽपीति यावत् सति अध्यापनाभ्यासप्रत्यभिज्ञाना दर्शनात् अध्यापनाद्या स्थैर्ये साध्य सन्दिग्धा अने कान्तिका नृत्यमधीते त्रिर्नृत्यते यदेव नृत्य क्षेत्रेण कृत मैत्रस्तदेव करोतीत्यनुभवस्य सर्व सिद्धत्वादित्यर्थ ॥

' ननु पञ्चाशद्वर्णा अष्टावरो मन्त्र अतरो मन्त्र अष्टावरो मुष्टुक्षित्यादिसख्या कथं वर्णानामनित्यस्य उच्चारणभेदेनानन्त्यसम्भवादित्यत आह । सख्याया पञ्चाशदा दिसख्याया भावः सत्त्वात् सामान्यत कत्यगत्यादिजातित इत्यर्थे ककारादीनामा नन्त्ये ऽपि कत्यगत्याद्यङ्गिज्ञानपञ्चाशत्त्व त्रित्यमष्टत्व वा द्रव्यगुणादीनामान्तर्गण्य कभेदेन नयचतुर्धिशतित्यादिवदित्यर्थ ॥

an eye and the like are employed. Now, that in which this universal cognition resides and which employs for its instruments the olfactory and other organs is the soul. U

सोऽनपदेशः ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 That is an invalid argument [which affirms that sensible cognition is an attribute either of the body or of the senses]

¹ In anticipation of the objection — 'Let the body or the organs of sense be that in which cognition resides, for, these being both more manifestly related to cognition than their negations are why should we imagine any other cognising subject? For consciousness is an attribute of the body being like its colour, &c., one of its effects, and the same may be said to be the case with regard to the organs of sense as attributes — it is stated that this is an invalid argument, i. e. the appearance of an argument, inasmuch as the middle term being undistributed it is as uncertain that cognition is the effect of the body or the senses, as that knowledge of an object is generated by the lamp [by the light of which it is seen] U

² That—the argument to establish the existence of cognition in the body—is a fallacious argument—the mere appearance of an argument. For a water pot a piece of cloth and the like do not in virtue of being effects of the body reside in the body. It cannot be proved that cognition exists in the body, for this would be a violation of the argument just stated. V

कारणाज्ञानात् ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 Because there is unconsciousness in the causes

¹ ननु शरीरमिन्द्रियाणि वा प्रसिद्धेराशये ऽस्तु प्रसिद्धं प्रति तदुभयान्वयव्यतिरेकयोः स्फुटतत्त्वान् किं तदन्वययत्नमनया तयाहि चैतन्यं शरीरगुणं तत्कार्यं त्वात् तद्वयादियत् शरीरमिन्द्रियगुणव्योऽपि वाच्यमित्याशङ्क्याह । अपदेशो हेतुः तदाभासोऽनपदेशः तथा च तत्कार्यत्वं प्रदीपज्ञानादाऽनेकान्तिकृत्यादनपदेश इत्यर्थः ॥

² स देहवृत्तित्वसाधको हेतुः अनपदेश इत्याभासं देहकार्यत्वस्य घटपटादेः सत्येन तत्र देहाव्यक्तत्वाभावात् उक्तहताद्यभिधाराय प्रसिद्धेर्देहवृत्तित्वसिद्धिरित्यर्थः

It is meant that cognition cannot reside in the body or in the organs of sense because of the unconsciousness or absence of consciousness in the causes or constituent parts, of the body, such as the hands, feet, &c. It is observed that the particular qualities of earth and the other substances are determined by the previous qualities of the cause of the substances. In like manner if there existed consciousness in the causes of the body, it might possibly exist also in the body itself. But this is not the case. Should it be urged that consciousness must also exist in the constitutive portions of the body, it may be denied on the ground of the want of unanimity which would ensue, for unanimity is never observed between many sentient beings [whereas it is observed in the actions of the body]. Moreover were the hand for instance cut off, there would be no recollection of that which was experienced at the amputation according to the maxim One does not remember that which is experienced by another. Again when the body perished there would, as a consequence be no fruition of the results of injuries and the like done therein for Maitra does not experience the results of the evil done by Chaitra and actions would accordingly be lost, and there would come to pass events not determined by former acts. U

कार्येषु ज्ञानात् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Because there would be consciousness in the effects.

2 Anticipating the objection that consciousness exists in ॥ mi

1 शरीरकारणानां करचरणादीनां तदवयवानां वा अज्ञानात् ज्ञानगुणत्वादित्यर्थं पृथिव्यादिविशेषगुणानां हि कारणगुणपूर्वकता दृष्टा तथा च शरीरकारणेषु यदि ज्ञान स्यात्तदा शरीरे अपि सम्भाव्येत न चैवमन्यस्तु शरीरकारणेष्वपि चैतन्यमिति चेत् एकमत्याभासप्रसङ्गान्न न हि यद्गुणं चैतनानामेकमस्य दृष्टमप्यकारणच्छेदेनानुभूतस्य कारणच्छेदे स्मरणप्रसङ्गात् ततो नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्य इति किञ्च शरीरनाशे तत्कनहिमादि फलानुपभोगप्रसङ्गान्न न हि चैत्रेण कृतस्य यावत् कन मेत्रो भुङ्क्ते ततश्च कृतकानिरक्तताभ्यामवयवस्य स्यात् ॥

2 ननु शरीरकारणेषु सूक्ष्ममात्रया ज्ञानमस्ति शरीरे तु सूक्ष्मतो नाकारणगुण पूर्वकता न ऐकमस्यानुपपत्तिरित्याशङ्क्यह । यदि तु शरीरमूलकारणेषु परमात्तु चैतन्यं

minute degree in the causes of the body, and is manifest in the body, and that there is not therefore the absence of a prior existence of the quality in the causes, nor the impossibility of unanimity, it is stated that if consciousness existed in the atoms which are the primary causes of the body, it would exist also in the water-pots and like products or effects which derive their origin from it; and also consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots and the like, because the particular attributes of the earth pervade all terrestrial existence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these products. U.

अज्ञानाच्च ॥ ६ ॥

Aph. 6. And because it is not known [that any minute degree of consciousness exists in products of matter]

'In anticipation of the objection that consciousness may exist in an inappreciable degree in water-pots and other material products, it is stated that inasmuch as it is not known by any kind of evidence, there is no consciousness in a water-jar and the like. Otherwise it might have to be admitted that a hare has horns, if we are to allow what is unwarranted by any form of evidence. For by no kind of evidence is it known that there exists consciousness in a water-jar and the like. U.

'It is not known,' means 'because there is no form of evidence conveying the notion of consciousness as existing in the various products.' The word 'and' implies that such an hypothesis is

स्यात् तदा तदारब्धेषु कार्येषु घटादिष्वपि स्यात् किञ्च पार्थिवविशेषगुणानां सर्वपा-
रिघृयत्तिताया व्याप्तेः कार्येष्वपि घटादिषु चेतन्यं स्याच्च न च चेतन्यमुपलभ्यते
इत्यर्थः ॥

ननु घटादायपि सूक्ष्ममात्रया चेतन्यमस्त्येवेत्याशङ्क्यते । सर्वैः प्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात्
कुम्भादीनां चेतन्यमित्यर्थः सर्वप्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात्प्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात्प्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात्प्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात्
न हि घटादौ चेतन्यं केनापि प्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात् ज्ञायत इति ॥

अज्ञानात् केनापि प्रमाद्वैरज्ञानात् तत्तत्कार्यगतज्ञानस्याज्ञानाजन्मनात् तथा च नियमा-
यकत्वाच्च तत्तत्कार्येषु ज्ञानमित्यर्थः अकारो गौरवं समुच्छिनेति तथा च नानावयवेषु
नानाचेतन्यरूपनापेक्षया चेतन्यधारतया एकं द्रव्यान्तरमेव कल्पयितुमुचितमिति भावः ॥

unnecessary It is more fitting to conceive some one other substance as the subject of consciousness than to imagine a varied consciousness existing in various portions of matter V

अन्यदेव हेतुरित्यनपदेशः ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 The means of proof is something else [than has been supposed] —this is not a valid argument

' It may be urged It has been affirmed that a ruling soul is inferred from the organ of hearing and other instruments This is not a legitimate inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor produced by, the soul, and unless one of these alternatives be admitted there is no proof of any inseparable co existence of these organs and the soul, and unless there be such inseparable co existence there can be no valid inference of this kind. To this it is replied that the means of proof can but be something else than that which is to be proved It cannot be identical with that which has to be proved for were it so it would follow that there would be no difference between the means of proof and the thing proved A means of proof constituted by identity with that which is to be proved, is no means of proof —is invalid as an argument U

अर्थान्तरं स्वर्थान्तरस्याऽनपदेशः ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 One thing cannot be an argument [of the existence of another thing with which it is wholly unconnected]

' It might be asked by an objector how quality not produced

' ननु श्रोत्रादिभिः कारणैरधिष्ठाता अनुमीयते इत्युक्तं तदुक्तं न हि श्रोत्रादिभिरात्मन स्तादात्म्यं तदुत्पत्तिर्वा न च ताभ्यामन्तरेणाऽविनाभावसिद्धिः न चाधिनाभावमन्तरेणाऽनुमितिरित्यत आह । हेतुः साध्यादन्य एव भवति न तु साध्यात्मा साध्याधिगोचरत्वात् तस्मात्तादात्म्यघटितो हेतुरहेतुरनपदेश इत्यर्थः ॥

' ननु साध्यादनुत्पत्तस्य गुणत्वस्य कथमनुमायकत्वम् तथा सति धूमादिना यद्वाया दीरिय रासभादेरप्यनुमानापत्तेरित्यत आह । हि हेतो यतोऽर्थान्तरं यत्स्वन्तरम् अर्थान्तरस्य ननु यत्स्वन्तरस्य अनपदेशः अहेतु रासभादेर्याप्तिशून्यो हि धूमादिः रासभादौ साध्या हेत्याभासः यस्यादौ तद्व्याप्यत्वस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् प्रकृते तु व्याप्तिसत्त्वाच्चागमकस्यमिति भावः ॥

by that which is to be proved can warrant any inference, for were this the case smoke &c, might prove the existence of an ass &c, or as well as that of fire. It is therefore stated that one thing or kind of substance, cannot be an argument for the existence of another thing or another kind of substance. Thus smoke &c if the existence of ass is to be proved, would be fallaciously adduced as a means of proof being void of invariable concomitance with asses, &c. But with reference to fire &c it would not be so, for in that case there would exist a concomitance. In the present case there must be a concomitance there is not merely an accidental relation. V

सयोगिसमवाय्यकार्यसमवायिविरोधि च ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 9 The conjunct the inherent the co-inherent in one thing, and the contradictory [are means of proof]

1 Such form of proof as The body has skin because of its corporeality, is that of conjunction. For skin is described as a natural integument of matter capable of growth and decay, and is neither a cause nor an effect of the body, but merely produced together with the body and invariably conjoined with it. In like manner the form of proof from inherence is such as Ether possesses extension, because of its substantiality, like a water pot, &c. Here extension which has to be proved is established by substantiality a property essential to ether. Or another example would be —The divisibility of extension must somewhere cease, therefore the atomic, as a degree of extension is proved, whence it is inferred that atoms exist in which the atomic inheres. The inference

1 शरीर स्वयत् शरीरत्वादित्य हेतु शरीरो दृष्टित्वशब्दव्युत्पत्तेश्चाश्रय इति स्व गित्युच्यते तच्च न शरीरस्य कार्य कारण वा किन्तु सहेतुत्ववैकल्यात् नियतसयोगवत् । अयं समवायि यथाकार्य परिमाणव्युत्पत्त्यात् घटादिवदिति च न परिमाण साध्य इत्यस्येनाकार्यसमवायिना धर्मस्य साध्यते षट् परिमाणतारतम्य कश्चिद्विधान्तमित्यनेनाश्रुत्यं परिमाणवियोगे सिद्ध तेन तदाश्रय परमाणुरनुमीयते शब्दादिना स्वाकाशस्य ज्ञानादिना त्वात्मनो अनुमान कार्यहेतु कारणानुमानमिति बोद्धव्यम् ॥

from sound of ether, and from knowledge &c. of soul is not given as an inference of cause from effect U

' The conjunct means the means of proof connected with conjunction. Is a means of the proof is to be supplied after each term of the aphorism. That which is connected by conjunction is the mark of the existence of that which is dependent on conjunction is included in the conjunction. Otherwise how could there be such inferences as that in a particular place there are charioteers because there are chariots excellently driven there? Here the relation determining the conclusion is the connection by conjunction with the conjunct. In like manner the inherent is a mark of the existence of that in which it inheres. Else how in the case of seeing a mere portion of an animal &c. could it be inferred from such determinate part that the whole is an animal &c.? Nor can it be argued that there being in the case of conjunction of the sight with that portion a conjunction with the whole object it is difficult to prove that such an inference as this is not a mere perception for it is possible only where there is a desire to infer. Since therefore a chariot and the like are not effects or products of a charioteer &c. and are different from the charioteer &c. but invariably accompanied by the charioteer &c. the being invariably accompanied by an object is the being inferrible from it is not restricted to the case of identity with or production by that object. V

' संयोगि संयोगानुयोगि लिङ्गमिति सर्वशेषः । तथा च संयोगानुयोगि संयोगप्रति योगिनो लिङ्ग व्याप्य कथमन्यथा श्रये देश सारथिमान् द्विलक्षणगतिमद्रथादित्यादाय नुमिति साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धश्चात्र स्वसमुक्तसंयोग एव समवाय्यदि समग्रतस्त लिङ्ग कथमन्यथा पश्याद्यवयवमात्रदर्शनदशाया विशिष्टावयवेना श्रयचिन पश्यादेर नुमिति न चावयवचक्षु संयोगदशायामथपलिन्यापि संयोगसत्त्वात् तस्यापि प्रत्यक्ष दुर्वा रमिति धाव्य तयापि सिद्धाधीयया तादृशानुमानसम्भवात् तथा सारथ्यादिभिश्च सारथ्याद्यवयवस्य च रथादे सारथ्यादेर्व्याप्यत्वात् व्याप्यत्व न तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिनियत मिति भावः ॥

कार्ये कार्यान्तरस्य ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 One effect is [a mark of the existence] of another effect

* An effect colour for instance, is a mark of the existence of another effect, such as touch. It is implied also that that which is not an effect, the unity of ether, is a mark of the existence of the individual unity of ether which is not an effect, and so in the case of infinite magnitude U

* An effect or product of the earth such as smell, is a mark of the existence—for these words are to be supplied—of another effect such as taste. Co inhesion in one object is juxtaposition constituted by in coexistence. In like manner invariable taste &c should be regarded as a mark of the existence of invariable colour &c. Since, therefore, there is in smell &c, an invariable concomitance with taste, &c which is not indifferent from or produced by smell it is proved that invariable concomitance is not astricted to the cases of identity and causality V

विरोधभूतं भूतस्य ॥ ११ ॥

Aph. 11 A non-existent contradictory [is a mark] of the existent

* The contradictory mark of co-existence or middle term is exemplified. Rain which has not fallen, is a mark of there having been no conjunction of air and clouds. In like manner the recita-

१ कार्ये रूपे कार्यान्तरस्य स्पर्शस्य लिङ्गम् । उपलक्षणञ्चेतत् अकार्यमप्यारागेत्यम् आकार्यरूपयत्ये लिङ्गम् एव परममहत्त्वम् ॥

२ कार्ये पृथिव्या कार्ये गन्धादिकं कार्यान्तरस्य रसादेर्लिङ्गमिति शेषः एकार्यसमवाय समवायघटितसामानाधिकरण्यम् एव नित्यरसादिकमपि नित्यरूपादेर्लिङ्गं द्रष्टव्यम् तथा च गन्धादे रसादाभेदस्य रसादिजन्यत्वस्य चाभावात् घ्याप्तेस्तदुभयनैयत्यवाधितमेवेति भावः ॥

* विरोधि लिङ्गमुदाहरति : अभूतं यपै भूतस्य वाक्यभसयोगस्य लिङ्गमेव स्फोटादे विरोधी मन्त्रपाठ तथा चाभूतमनुत्यच स्फोटादि भूतस्य मन्त्रपाठस्य लिङ्गम् ॥

tion of a sacred text is preventive of a tumour &c and accordingly there not having existed a tumour &c is a mark of there having been a recitation of a sacred text U

' It is exemplified how the contradictory may be employed as a middle term The non existent or non adjacent or in other words non adjacency of the contradictory is a mark—for these words are to be supplied—of the existent of that which has come into or remains in existence The illation assumes the following form This wood = combustible when conjoined with fire because gems &c (said to have the power of extinguishing fire) do not co exist as in the case of other substances reduced to ashes This district contains unintimidated snakes for though there are snakes there are no ichneumons as there are in certain other countries where there are venomous serpents V

भूतमभूतस्य ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 That which has been [is a mark] of that which has not been

' Another contradictory argument is exemplified A tumour &c which has been is a mark of the recitation of a sacred text which has not been so also conjunction which has existed between wind and clouds is a mark that there has not been rain there having been a fire is a mark that there has not been extinction of fire by means of gems &c Similar instances may be inferred U

' विरोधिने व्याप्यत्वमुदाहरति । अभूतम अस्तिविहित विरोधि विरोध्यस्तिविधा नमिति यावत् भूतस्य जातस्य स्थितस्य वा विरोधिने लिङ्गमिति शेष अप्यनुमानप्रकार इय क्वाप्ता दाहयान् वह्निमयुक्तस्य सति मण्वाद्यसंविधानात् भस्मोभूतस्यन्तरयत् अय देशा निमपाहिमान् अहिमत्से सति नकुलशून्यत्वात् तादृशनिश्चितदेशान्तरव दित्यर्थ ॥

' विरोधिनिर्दिष्टोदाहरणान्तरमाह । भूत स्कोटादिकम् अभूतस्य मन्त्रपाठस्य लिङ्गम् एवभूतो वाय्वमसयोगा भूतस्य चर्यस्य लिङ्गम् एवभूतो दाहो भूतस्य मण्वा दिसमवधानस्य लिङ्गमेवमन्यदप्युदाह ॥

' That which has been that which has come into or remains in existence is a mark that there has not been its contradictory, a mark, in other words, of the non adjacency of its opposite For examples This wood is not co existent with gems &c, for it burns This district has no ichneumons for it has unintimidated snakes, and so forth V

भूतो भूतस्य ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 That which has been [is a mark of something repugnant] which has been.

' Another mark of concomitance or middle term is exemplified There is sometimes inference from an existing opposite to an existing opposite as when on seeing a snake swelling with anger it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush In this case the snake excited is in existence and the ichneumon hidden by the bush is in existence There is therefore an existent object as the mark of an existent object On the other hand rain cannot exist at the same time as conjunction of clouds and wind nor can tumours &c co-exist with recitation of sacred texts U

प्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वादपदेशस्य ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 [These forms of inference are valid] because the mark is preceded by knowledge [of invariable concomitance]

' Knowledge is recollection of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) The mark of this co existence is the middle term There is there

' भूतमुत्पन्नं स्थितं वा अभूतस्य विरोधिना विरोध्यमविधानस्य निवृत्तिमित्यर्थं यथापि कालात्ता मयपादासिद्धिर्दिता दादृशत्वात् अयं देशो नकुलग्रन्थ भूतिरहितोऽस्ति मत्वात् ॥

' निवृत्तान्तरमुदाहरति । विद्यमानेनेय विरोधिना विद्यमानस्यैव विरोधिना अत्र चिदनुमानं यथा विस्फूर्जन्तमग्निं दृष्ट्वा भाटान्तरितस्य नकुलस्य अत्र हि विस्फूर्जन्तमग्निं भूतो विद्यमानो नकुलो अथ विद्यमानं व्यति भवति भूतो भूतस्य निवृत्तिमित्यर्थं यथापि यथैवयोग्योऽस्तु नैकस्मिन् काले विद्यमानता । वा स्फोटमन्त्राट्टकारिति ॥

' प्रसिद्धि स्मर्यमाणा व्याप्ति अवदेशो हेतुयत्न तेन स्मर्यमाणा व्याप्तिरिति शब्दो हेतुहेतुत्ववयवेनापनपाद्यवयेन बोध्यते इति भवति प्रसिद्धिपूर्वको अपदेश इति तथा च

fore expressed by that member of the syllogism which states the argument or by the subsumption a middle term characterised by invariable concomitance mentally resuscitated. Therefore the argument as has been stated has for its antecedent some general knowledge. In the above instanced inference then of the soul as a governing element from its instruments such as the organ of hearing and of the soul as a substratum from qualities such as knowledge there is an invariable concomitance, but when you attempted to prove by the mark of its being an effect of the body, that knowledge is a quality of the body there was no invariable concomitance.

It may be asked What is this invariable concomitance? It is not merely a relation of coextension for coextensionness or incompatibility with absence of that which is to be predicated in the conclusion is not recognised where only positive conditions of concomitance are found for unsusceptibility of incompatibility with that which is to be so predicated may be such an exclusively positive condition of concomitance. Smoke also contains in itself in compatibility with various predications in the conclusion. Nor is it the relation of inseparability for that is either non existence of the mark or middle term in the absence of that which is to be proved [viz the major which has to be proved of the minor], or existence of the mark argued from the existence of that which is to be predicated in the conclusion. And if you say that a definite relation of condition and conditioned positive or negative may be asserted between smoke and rain because smoke sometimes does not exist where rain does not exist and exists where rain exists we deny it for such would be the case only if we found any determinate relation.

योत्रादिना करणेनाधिष्ठातु ज्ञानादिना च गुणेन तदाययस्यात्मनो यदनुमानमुक्तं तत्र सर्वत्र व्याप्तिरस्ति त्वया तु शरीरप्रायत्वेन हेतुना ज्ञानस्य यच्छरीरगुणत्व साधितं तत्र न व्याप्तिरिति भावः ननु केयं व्याप्तिर्न तावदव्याभिचारितसम्यग् च व्यभिचारस्य सा व्यात्यन्ताभावसामानाधिकरण्यानधिकरणत्वस्य केवलाम्बवित्यवशिष्टे साध्यानाधिकर

Nor is it the relation of totality or integrity. If you say that invariable concomitance is the connection of the middle term with the whole of the major term such connection does not exist in the case of smoke &c, where the concomitant objects are not co-extensive [for though fire exists wherever smoke exists, smoke is said not always to exist where fire exists not being found in red hot iron &c] Let it be connection of the whole middle term with the major, but this is impossible for there does not exist in the whole of the middle term connection with the individuals denoted by major [e g all fire does not exist in a hearth in a cattle station a mountain &c, but exists in the whole aggregate of places where smoke exists, as also elsewhere] Let it be connection of the whole major with the whole middle term. This also it cannot be, for it is impossible that there should be connection between each extensive part of the middle and each extensive part of the major. In the case of the concomitant objects not being co-extensive the definition that invariable concomitance is connection by totality would be unduly restricted.

यानधिक्तरणत्वस्यापि केयनान्वयिसम्भवात् धूमादेरपि यत्किञ्चित्साध्यानधिक्तरणाधि-
करणात्वात् । नाप्यत्रिनाभाय । न हि साध्यं विना भायो वा ऐतो । अविना साध्याच्चे-
दस्ति भायो वा धूमस्यापि क्वचिद्व्याप्तभावे भावात् । रासमसत्त्वे सत्त्वाच्च नियतव्यतिरेको-
नियतव्याप्ययो विद्यमान इति चेत् न नियमस्यैव निरूप्यमाणत्वात् नापि काश्चिन्न-
सम्बन्धः स यदि कस्त्वस्य साध्यस्य साधनसम्बन्धः न प्रियमव्याप्ते धूमादापि नास्ति
अथ कस्त्वस्य साधनस्य साध्यसम्बन्धः सोऽयमस्य साध्यस्य कस्त्वसाधने सम्बन्धाभावा-
दनुपपन्नः अथ कस्त्वस्य साध्यस्य कस्त्वेन साधनेन सम्बन्धः एतदप्युक्तं न हि कस्त्वेन
साधनेन कस्त्वस्य साध्यस्य क्वचिदपि सम्बन्धः सम्भवति तत्त्वैकमेव साध्यसाधनयोः स-
म्बन्धात् प्रियमव्याप्ते व्याप्यते नापि स्वभाविकः सम्बन्धः स्वभायो हि स्यत्य भवौ
वा स्यमेव भायो वा तत्र तज्जन्यत्वस्यैव निमित्तत्वं तदा समवायनलगाया व्याप्याय-
व्याप्ते तदाचित्तत्त्वस्यैव निमित्तत्वं तदापि सद्योपे व्याप्तिः न हि समवायः क्वचि-
दाश्रितः संयोगस्यापि हेतुधर्मधूमत्वादात्मचित्तत्वात् हेतुधर्मधूमत्वादात्मकत्वाच्च ना-
प्यनौपाधिकः सम्बन्धः उपाधेत्येव दुर्यवत्यात् मुख्यत्वेऽपि दुर्यवत्यात् मुख्यत्वेऽप्यन्या-
न्यायवत्त्वात् साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादेव्याप्तिः साधनवद्वत्त्वात् नापि
सम्बन्धमात्रं व्याप्तिः व्यभिचारिसम्बन्धस्यापि द्वेषयित्रोपक्रान्तिशेषोपाभेताया व्याप्तिरुप-
त्येऽपि तज्ज्ञानस्यानुमित्तवत्त्वत्वात् अनुमित्तकारणोभूतज्ञानविषयव्यापकत्वे निरूप-
यितुमुचितत्वात् नापि साधनवद्विष्टात्यन्ताभावप्रतिषेधोपक्रान्तिशेषोपाभेताया व्या-
प्तिः यद्वैरपि धूमवद्विष्टात्यन्ताभावप्रतिषेधोपक्रान्तिः न हि धूमवति महानवे पर्वतस्यैव-

Nor is it natural conjunction. For the nature of a thing is the thing's proper mode of being or its being in itself. If by the secondary affix be meant its being produced in such and such a place, our definition will be too narrow to apply to invariable concomitance constituted by in-coexistence. If by the secondary affix be meant co-inherence in any thing, the definition will be too narrow to include co-inhesion, for co-inhesion is not co-inherent with anything else. For conjunction neither inheres in, nor is produced by, smokiness the character of the middle term. Nor is it connection as a general predicate. The general predicate is difficult to explain and were it easy, would be difficult to understand. And were it easy to conceive yet there would be a reciprocal inherence or logical see-saw, being based on an induction of what did not pervade the middle term, though pervading the major. Invariable concomitance is not merely connection. For since fallacious connection includes particular place and particular time, knowledge of such connection even were it an invariable concomitance, would be useless in illation, for we should prescribe only such invariable concomitance as is the object of cognition causative of illation.

हृत्नात्यन्ताभावः इदं संयोगि द्वयत्वादित्यादौ संयोगात्यन्ताभावस्य साधनसमानाधिकरणत्वादध्यापकताप्रसङ्गात् प्रतियोगिविरुद्धसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसमानाधिकरण्यं ध्यातिः संयोगात्यन्ताभावस्यापि प्रतियोगिविरुद्धत्वाभावादिति चेन्न संयोगात्यन्ताभावस्यापि प्रतियोगिविरुद्धत्वात् अन्यथा स्वच्छेदभेदरूपनानाविधय्यात् न हि कृतकत्वानित्यत्वपौर्वत्यर्थकवच्छेदभेदः कल्प्यते नापि साध्यैषाधिकरणयानधिकरणत्वं केवसान्वयिनि साध्यैषाधिकरण्यप्रसिद्धेः साध्यानाधिकरणाधिकरणत्वं हि तत् नापि यत्सम्बन्धितावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वं यस्य तस्य वा ध्यातिः वहित्वस्यापि धूमसम्बन्धितावच्छेदकत्वात् अधिकदेशवृत्तितया तच्च तथेति चेत् ध्यापकताच्छेदकस्याधिकदेशवृत्तैरप्यभ्युपगमात् धूमत्वस्यापि गगनतलावलम्बिधूमवृत्तितयाधिकदेशवृत्तित्वात् अत एव एतद्वारणाय विशेषणमिति चेत् तर्हि यदुपायतावच्छेदकं तदेव स्वबन्धितावच्छेदकत्वेनानुमतं तया चात्माययः । एतच्च यत् सामानाधिकरण्यावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वं यस्य तस्य सा ध्यातिः त्वप्युक्तदोषाक्रान्तिमिति चेत् अत्रोच्यते अनौपार्धिकः सम्बन्धो ध्यातिः-अनौपार्धिकत्वं योजत स्वव्यभिचारिव्यभिचारिसाध्यसमानाधिकरण्यं यावत्स्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरण्यसाध्यसमानाधिकरण्यं वा यावत् साधनाध्यापकाध्याप्यसाध्यसमानाधिकरण्यमिति निरुक्तिद्वयार्थः यावत्साध्य-ध्यापकध्यापकत्वं वा बहुव्रीहिणा दुर्बलमिति चेत् अत एव भूयोदर्शनापेक्षा तर्कापेक्षा

Nor is invariable concomitance in coexistence of the major which is absent only when there is absolute non-existence of that of which the middle is predicated, fire for example being absent where there is an absolute non-existence of things smoky for volcanic fire can but be non-existent in a kitchen hearth though smoky. For in such an instance as This is conjunct for it is a substance the definition would be unduly restricted for otherwise absence of conjunction would reside in the same objects as the middle term conjunction. It may be said that invariable concomitance is in-coexistence of the predicate of the conclusion absent where there is absolute non-existence of an appropriate subject repugnant to such absent predicate absolute non-existence of conjunction not being repugnant to such absent predicate. This we deny for absolute non-existence of conjunction is repugnant to such absent predicate for otherwise it will be useless to imagine any kind of distinctive attribute, as it is not imagined that there is any distinctive attribute discriminating between the produced and the non-eternal.

च । यद्वा साधनसमानाधिकरण्यात्सामानाभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिश्चात्यन्ताभावाच्च यदि त्वादि सामान्यच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताज्ञे प्रियचित्तेन तत्र महानसीदधूमे पर्यवर्तयत्यन्ताभावात्सामान्याभिरूपये इति न देव धूमयति यदिर्नस्तीति प्रतीतेरनुदयात् दृश्यत्वं ननु सयोगित्वात्सामानाभावासमानाधिकरणमेव न हि भवति दृश्य न च योगीति प्रतीति संयोगाना प्रत्येकमव्याप्यत्वे इति सयोगित्वसामान्यस्य व्याप्यत्वेन तस्य उच्यते व्यापकत्वात् । नन्वनीयाधिकृत्यमुपधिपिरह उपधिरेव दुष्परिहृयनीय इति चेन्न साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वात्प्राप्त्या तदुक्तं साधने साधनाधि साध्ये निरुपाधिकरूपेण । ननु केन साधनाव्यापकत्वात्साध्यव्यापकत्वमेतत् तथा यावत् प्रत्यक्ष प्रत्यक्षस्योत्पत्त्यादित्यत्राहृत्यरूपवत्त्वं न इयामेति सिद्धांतनयत्वादित्यत्र शक्यप्राकृत्यम् । ह्युत्पत्त्यवत्त्वं प्रत्यक्षप्रापकम् आत्मनि गुणरूपमिदं च प्रत्यक्षे तदभावात् नापि शाकपाकजत्वं प्रथमतस्तथापि काश्चिन्नजन्तदजस्यैकतादेव प्रथमे तदभावादिति चेन्न पर्यवर्तितसाध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वस्य तथा विपर्ययत्वात् पर्यवर्तितत्वं साध्यं यदस्मादवच्छेदेनोपाधेर्यापकत्वमभ्यन्त तदस्मादवच्छिन्नं भवति यद्विपर्ययत्वावच्छेदेन प्रत्यक्षस्योत्पत्त्यवत्त्वं व्यापकम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यद्विपर्ययत्वं प्रत्यक्षे वनरप्रथमतस्तथावच्छिन्नं साध्यं प्रति शक्यमुत्पादे । प्राकृत्यकत्वस्य व्यापकत्वावधारणादेवमन्यत्राप्युक्तम् । ननु नायमुपाधिपदसाध्यं यदस्मात् अन्यत्र भावते स उपाधि यथा स्फटिकादेव जपाकुसुमादि विषमव्याप्योपाधि च व्याप्यताभावात्तदस्य साधनाभिमतं नवभासनादिति चेत् सत्यं समव्याप्यं यदादेव नवभासयत्प्रामाण्यादेव मुख्य उपाधि

* Nor is invariable concomitance the not being a subject of in compatibility with the predicate, since incompatibility with a predicate does not exist in an inference from only positive conditions for such incompatibility means containing that which does not contain the predicate

Nor is invariable concomitance the possession of a form determined by the same connection as something else as for instance, the fiery is determined by connection with smoke. This is not the case for the fiery is more extensive [fire existing where there is no smoke as in a heated lump of iron] Were it the case there would be observed a wider extension [of the nature of fire] characterised by invariable co existence [with smoke] there being a wide extension of the nature of smoke [or vapour] inasmuch as there exists smoke [or vapour] pendant on the surface of the sky [of Megha duta v 5 where it is said that a cloud is a mass of vapour light water and air] If a distinction be made for the purpose of excluding such instances it must be allowed that that which is characterised by invariable concomitance is allowed to be characterised by existence of connection and there is thus only an identical affirmation

एदप्रयोग अन्यत्र तु गीष्म गुण व्यभिचारोच्चायकस्य यत्त्रि पट्टापकस्य व्यभिचारि तस्य तद्व्यभिचारित्वनियमात् भवति च साध्यव्यापकस्योपाधेर्यव्यभिचारिसाधन इत साध्य व्यभिचारिति पट्टापकाव्याप्य यत् तत् तदव्याप्यम् इति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिचायकस्य वा सत्प्रतिपक्षोत्थापकस्य वा पक्ष उपाधे साध्यव्यापकस्याभावात् साध्याभावासाधनात् तदुक्तं वाद्युक्तसाध्यनियमस्युक्तेऽपि कयकेरूपाधिरुक्ताव्य पर्यवसित नियमयन् दृष्टता वाजसाय्यात् इति उच्यते चाय वाध्यव्यभिचारानुकूलतर्काभावप्रतिकूलतर्के । यत्तु पट्टा भिचारित्यन साधनस्य साध्यव्यभिचारित्वं स उपाधिरिति तत्र सूतोपा न करणे न हेतोः न प्रकारे न सत्तवे न तु पट्टाभिचारित्वेन ज्ञातेन साधनस्य साध्यव्यभिचारित्वं इति ज्ञायते पूरणीयम् अज्ञायमानोपाध्यापनात् स्फुटव्यभिचारित्वनाप्राप्यप्रापनात् यो ग्यतागर्भा तु दुर्निरूपणा व्यभिचारोच्चायकस्यव्यवस्थाया उपाध्युद्भायनाशयत्वाच्च पक्षतरत्यन्तु उपाधिलक्षणाक्रान्तमपि स्वयंप्रातकत्वाद्योपाधि यथा पक्षे सन्दिधाने फान्तकस्यम् यदि हि तत्र न सन्देहस्तदा न पक्षता यदि पक्षता तदा सन्देहस्यावश्य कतया सन्दिधानैकान्तिकत्वयोपपत्त्यात् अयं गद्य मूढे स्वेष्टस्यम् ॥

If the statement that *invariable concomitance* consists in *compatibility* [or the subject's *susceptibility* of the predicate] has been thus shown to be fallacious we may here proceed to state that *invariable co-existence* is a *not accidental* connection. By *being not accidental* is meant in coexistence of the predicate failing that is too widely or too narrowly affirmed only, where the argument fails. Or, in other words it is in coexistence of the predicate determined by absolute non existence dependent on absolute non-existence of all that which is in-coexistent therewith. The meaning of the last two expressions is in-coexistence of the predicate such in coexistence being neither more nor less extensive than the argument. In other words it is an extensiveness as extensive as the predicate. If you object that this is difficult to understand by reason of the relative compound employed you must look at it and consider it again.

In other words *invariable concomitance* is in-coexistence of the predicate absent where there is absolute non existence of that which contains the mark or argument. By absolute non-existence is meant non existence of that which has as a common characteristic a universal entity such as the fiery &c. It is therefore no objection to our definition that the smoke of a culinary hearth is compatible with non existence of the smoke of a mountain for there never arises the conviction that there is not fire in that which has smoke. Substantiality never has a common substratum with absolute non existence of connection for we have the conviction that there is no substance which is not conjunct. Though conjunctions singly are not included the nature of conjunction in general is so included and may be predicated universally of substance.

It may be objected that the being not contingent is absence of a concomitant and that it is difficult to describe a concomitant. This we disallow for an accident [or special condition] is that which does not invariably exist in the mark of concomitance whereas it

does invariably exist in that which is to be proved. Accordingly it has been said. A concomitant is accidental in relation to a mark of co-existence, and not accidental in relation to that which is to be proved. It may be objected. This definition does not include an accident which is only not invariably present in that which is to be proved, as in the instance, Air is perceptible, for there exists in it perceptible touch, where the having an appreciable colour is [a concomitant of that which has to be proved, i.e. of the perceptibility of air], or in the instance "He is black, for he is the son of Mitrá [a low caste woman] where the production of blackness by cooking herbs [might be a special condition of blackness]. For possession of an appreciable colour is not invariably concomitant with perceptibility, since it does not exist in the perceptibility of soul, quality and action, nor is the being produced by cooking herbs invariably concomitant with blackness inasmuch as it does not exist in a black crow, cuckoo, cloud fruit of the rose-apple, &c. This objection will not hold. For it was meant that a special condition is invariably present in that which is finally determined as what is to be proved, and not invariably present in the means of proof. That which is finally determined as that which is to be proved has as a condition the universal presence in it of the conditions which are special. The possession of appreciable colour, in the first instance is universally present in the perceptible qualified by external substantiality, and is a positive and negative condition [of the perceptible, i.e. it may be asserted that wherever there is appreciable colour there is perceptibility, and wherever there is not appreciable colour there is not perceptibility of external substances]. In the second instance we may make a similar inference from its being observed or the authority of the *Gharak* and the *Susruta* [two medical works] that the fact of being produced by eating herbs is an attribute universally present in that which is to be proved, which is determined to be an accidental darkness in men.

It may be said that this is not the meaning of the word con-

comitant for a concomitant is that of which the attributes appear in some other object, as a China rose &c [seen reflected] in crystal &c, as in the universal co-existence of one thing with another, which other thing does not always co-exist with the first [as in the co-existence of fire with smoke which is said to be invariable, while that of smoke with fire is not invariable] the concomitant not being inseparable does not appear in the argument. This is true. The term concomitant is used in its primary meaning only where there is a mutually implied co-existence as of fire produced from moist fuel [for wherever there is such fire there is also smoke and vice versa]. In other cases the word is employed in a secondary sense. The secondary sense expresses that which is casual or accidental, according to the rule That is accidental in an object which is accidental to that which is universally present in that object. The evidence of concomitance is accidental in an accident inseparable from that which is to be shewn to be concomitant. Hence from the hypothesis that the evidence of concomitance is accidental to that which is to be proved and according to the rule that what is not included in what is invariably concomitant with an object is not included in that object, we are led to conclude that there is no proof of such concomitance, or there results the possibility of a contrary argument. For if a concomitant inseparable from the predicate be not in the subject it is an argument that the predicate is not in the subject. It has accordingly been said. The respondent may bring forward an accident determining another conclusion, inconsistent with the establishment of the thesis maintained by the defendant, such accident being equivalent to a germinal vitiation of the thesis and this may be upheld by arguments adverse to the absence of erroneous and fallacious arguments in its favour.

It may be said that that is a concomitant by the accidentalness of which the argument is accidental in relation to that which is to be proved. But in this definition the third [or instrumental]

case is not employed to express instrument, means form, or definition. Nor is the construction to be completed thus. That is an accident by the accidentalness of which being known the argument is known to be accidental in relation to that which is to be proved. For this definition would not apply to obvious cases of the accidental not applying to the unknown accidental. A fitting sense is difficult to discover in these words since it is impossible to express an accident without stating that it is casual or accidental. The being other than the subject though included in the definition of an accident, is not the definition of an accident for it would involve a contradiction. Where there is an uncertain applicability to the subject, as in such a case if it be not uncertain it is not the subject and since if it be the subject it must be doubtful there is certainty of doubtful applicability. That which remains to be said, may be sought in the Mayukha. U

Enumeration of
fallacies

अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेयोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चानपदेशः ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 Fallacious arguments are the unobserved, the non-existent and the dubious

For the discrimination of past and future marks of co-existence from fallacious arguments, the author proceeds to commence the section on fallacies. The unobserved is that which is unaccompanied that with which no universal concomitance has been observed and the contradictory is that to which there is a repugnant universal concomitance. In this term unobserved are included that of which the inclusion is unestablished, and the contrary. The non-existent is that which is not in the subject, or that which

इदानीं एतानां वर्तिष्यमाणाञ्च हेतूनां हेत्याभावाद्द्विषेकाच्च हेत्याभावात्प्रकरणमारभमाण आह । अप्रसिद्ध इति अग्राप्ते प्रहेतित्याप्तिको विपरीतग्राप्तिकञ्च विरुद्ध इति व्याप्यत्यासिद्धिविरुद्धयोः सङ्गुह असन् इति पक्षे सन् अपसधर्म इत्यर्थः स च क्वचित् स्वरूपविरुद्धान् क्वचिन् सन्देहाद्विषयविषयोरभावात् मिदसाधने सन्दिग्ध इति पक्षे साध्यसदस्यकोटिरसदस्यजनकः स च सद्यः समानधर्मदर्शनात् क्वचिदसाधारणधर्मदर्शनात् क्वचित् पक्षे एव हेतुः साध्यतदभावाद्द्वयदर्शनात् आद्यः साधारणानैकान्तिकः द्वितीयस्त्यसाधारणनैकान्तिकः तृतीये प्रुपसहारे ॥

the division into the purely positive the positive and negative and the purely negative Among these the purely positive is an attribute existing in all subjects of attributes such as knowable necessary nameable &c. subjectibility predicability destruction of anything containing absolute non existence of eternal substances and absolute non existence by cessation of destructible qualities &c. For there is no such thing as that in which these properties do not exist The purely positive is therefore that which exists everywhere or that which cannot be absolute non existence Though these exist in themselves that is no objection It has been said Validity of reasoning is recourse to existence not the being different or not different That argument therefore is purely positive that which is to be proved by which is purely positive Of this the four forms existence of the subject existence of similar instances absence of contrary instances, and absence of contrary but equally susceptible subjects lead to conviction. Of an argument positive and negative together with non-existence of contrary instances there are five forms of the purely negative together with the exclusion of existence of similar instances there are four forms An apparent argument or fallacy is therefore that which is void of one or other of the forms which determine relative assurance, and similarly fallaciousness is voidness of one or other of the forms which determine illation Doubt accompanied by assurance of the voidness of one or other of the forms

सादृश्यं किञ्चित् पश्येत् धर्मा न विद्यन्ते तत्र च सर्वगतत्वं प्रत्यक्षाभासप्रतियोगित्वं वा के चनान्यदित्य एतेषाञ्च स्यात्प्रयुक्तित्वेऽपि न दोषः तत्पूर्वप्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षं दृष्टौ न भिद्यमानित्वे यत् इति कथनान्यपिमाधको हेतुः केवलं न्ययी शस्य च पक्षसत्यपक्षसत्यावधारित स्वासत्त्वप्रतिपक्षितस्थानि चत्वारि कषाणि गमकत्वापधिकारानि अन्यव्यतिरिक्तवस्तु हेतोः विपक्षासत्त्वेन मध्य पक्षं केवलव्यतिरिक्तं सपक्षसत्यव्यतिरिक्तेषां चत्वारि तथा च यस्य हेतावायन्ति कषाणि गमकत्वापधिकारानि तद्व्यतिरिक्तेषां स हेतुराभासः सपक्षं गमकत्वापधिकारान्यतररूपगुणस्य हेत्वाभासस्य तनान्यतररूपगुणस्य निश्चयघटसन्देहोऽप्यनुमितिप्रतिपक्षकं यादिहेतारसाधकतासाधकं न च कथनान्यविकेयसत्यव्यतिरिक्तो हेतवारन्यतररूपगुणस्य हेत्वाभासत्वायतिः केवलान्वयिनि विपक्षासत्त्वस्य केवलव्यतिरिक्तं सपक्षसत्यस्य गमकत्वापधिकारत्वाभासात् सपक्षवायवासिद्धिरूपसिद्धभासासिद्धाया पक्षसत्यरूपविरहादाभासस्य व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिविरहाधारणानेकान्तिकानां विप

prevents inference and proves the inconclusiveness of the defendant's argument. Fallaciousness is not incident upon voidness of one or other of the two arguments the purely positive and the purely negative, because of the non existence of that which leads to the conviction of there not being contrary instances in the purely positive and of there being similar instances in the purely negative. Absence of proof respecting the subjects respecting the nature of the argument, and partial inconclusiveness are fallacies by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the subject. Absence of proof of inclusion self contradiction, and general plurality of consequents are fallacies due to the form which is non-existence of contrary instances. Particular diversity of result and non exclusion are fallacies due to the failure of similar instances. Impossibility [where the predicate does not exist in the subject] and possibility of a contrary subject are fallacies due to the absence of possibility and of impossibility of contrary subjects. In like manner accidentalness and inapplicability in an argument fail to determine illation because of the absence of certainty of

साधनरूपैकत्वात् असाधारणानैकान्तिकानुपसर्हारिणो सपक्षसत्त्वैकत्वात् बाधित
सत्प्रतिपक्षितयोरबाधितत्वासत्प्रतिपक्षितत्वश्चिरदात एव सोपाधित्याप्रयोजकत्वयोरपि
विपक्षासत्त्वनिश्चयाभावादगमकस्य अनुकूलतर्कोभावप्रतिकूलतर्कोयोरपि विपक्षासत्त्वनि
श्चयविरहात् एव साध्यविकलसाधनविकलोभयविकलद्रष्टान्ताभासाना यदि दैत्याभास
विधया देयस्य तदा सपक्षसत्त्वानिश्चयत यदि स्यात्तन्मेष दृष्टान्ताभासतया तद्यापि
द्वार ऐतो सपक्षसत्त्वानिश्चय एव अनुपदर्शितान्वयानुपदर्शितव्यतिरेकास्तु न्यूनाप्राप्त
निग्रहस्थानपपयसबा एव आत्माद्यन्योन्याय्यवचक्रकानयस्यास्तु व्याप्तिनिश्चय विच
दयन्त सपक्षसत्त्वविपक्षासत्त्वान्तररूपविकला एव दैत्याभासतामासादयन्ति तत्र पक्ष
साध्यसदस्यकोटिकस्यवज्जनको दैत्याभास सव्यभिचार पक्षे साध्याभासनिश्चयफलको
दैत्याभासो विरुद्ध व्याप्तिव्यवधर्मताप्रमितिर्विरहो ऽसिद्ध बाधसत्प्रतिपक्षो काश्चपे
मते न स्यतन्मै तत्र बाध बाधयासिद्धायनैकान्तिके वा पर्यवसति तदुक्त बाधायाम
पक्षधर्मो ऐतुरनैकान्तिको वा इति सत्प्रतिपक्षो अन्यत्र व्याप्यादिसंशयमासादयन् अने
कान्तिकादायैव पर्यवसति एतिकारस्तु अप्रसिद्धो नपदेशो ऽसन् सन्दिग्धवानपदेश
इति सूत्रस्यवकारस्य बाधसत्प्रतिपक्षसमुच्चयार्थतामाह तेन सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणस
मसाध्यसमातीतकाला एव दैत्याभासा इति गीतमीयमेव मतमनुधावति परन्तु यि
मद्वसिद्धसन्दिग्धमलिङ्ग काश्चपेो श्रवोत् दैत्याद्यभिधानात् सूत्रकारस्वरसो दैत्याभास
त्रित्ये वकारस्तुसमुच्चयार्थ इति सत्यम अन्ययोरवभयात् प्रपञ्चो न कृतो मूले यि
सरो ऽप्येष्ट्य ॥

the non-existence of contrary instances. Absence of favourable and unfavourable probable argumentation also fail to determine illation, because of the absence of certitude as to the non-existence of contrary instances. In like manner apparent but unreal examples inadequate in regard to that which is to be proved or in regard to the argument invalid as being fallacious are so through the uncertainty of the existence of similar instances. If they are immediately invalid as being examples in appearance only, yet are they so mediately through the arguments on account of the uncertainty of the existence of similar instances. Arguments where neither positiveness nor negativeness can be shown are concluded by urging the objection that time is insufficient or not to be obtained. *Petitio principii*, arguing in a circle, and arguments which involve an infinite regression though they should afford conviction of a universal concomitance being deficient of one or other of the forms or conditions of valid argumentation i. e. of existence of similar instances or non existence of contrary instances, involve fallaciousness. The fallacy which gives rise to doubt with respect to the alternatives of the existence or non-existence of the predicate in the subjects is that of including too much or too little in the enunciation of a supposition. The fallacy which results in certainty of the non existence of that which is to be proved in the subject is the contradictory. Absence of certain knowledge of what are the attributes of a subject of a general proposition is the unproved. But in the opinion of Kāśyapa the impossible and the existence of contrary but equally valid subjects are not independent fallacies. Of these the impossible is determined to be included in absence of proof as regards the subject or plurality of consequents. Therefore it has been said. An impossible or too extensive attribute of the subject as an argument leads to diverse results. Valid counter subject also showing the doubtfulness of the universal concomitance he determines to be included in plurality of consequents. The author of the *Vṛtti* asserts that

the particle and in the aphorism, Fallacious arguments are the unproved, the non-existent and the dubious, implies the addition of the impossible, and possibility of a real contradictory subject. He therefore follows the doctrine of Gautama. The five merely apparent arguments are that of which the extension is too great or too small, that which involves a contradiction, that which is identical with the subject, that which is identical with the major term, and that the time of which is the past. But the author's own view of the fallacious appears from such statements as that Kāśyapa declared the self contradictory, the unproved, and the doubtful to be no arguments, and the particle and in reality serves to connect the aphorism with the preceding aphorisms. Prolixity has been avoided in this note from fear of needlessly encumbering the treatise. Full details may be sought in the *Mayūkhya*. U

The existence of the soul proved.

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसचिरुपादाविष्यद्यते तदन्यत् ॥ १८ ॥

Aph. 18 That which is effectuated from the connection of soul with objects of sense is other [than a fallacious argument.]

1 The result of the distinction drawn between fallacies is now stated. It is by connection of the soul with objects of sense that knowledge is produced, and knowledge, the argument for existence of the soul, is other than the unproved, the contradictory, and plurality of consequents, i. e. it is not an argument in appearance only. Knowledge, then, is in two ways a mark of the existence of the soul, either because knowledge must exist in knowing subject, because it is an effect, like colour, or because it assumes the form of recollection, I who saw am the same as I who am touching. In the for-

1 इदानीं हेत्याभासविषयेनस्य फलमाह । आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसचिरुपादाविष्यद्यते तदन्यत् इति । तद्व्यात्मनि लिङ्गम श्रुतिद्विविद्वानैकान्तिकेभ्यो ज्ञेयत आभासमित्यर्थः । तथाहि ज्ञानमात्मन्युभयथा लिङ्गम ज्ञानं क्वचिदाश्रितं कार्यत्वादूपादिव्यतिरिक्तं वा प्रत्यभिज्ञा-रूपतया वा यो ज्ञमदाह सो ज्ञ स्पृशामीति तत्र ज्ञानगतं कार्यत्वं नासिद्धं यदिष्यद्यत इत्यभिधानात् न विकृतं सामान्यतो दृष्टे इव विरोधाभावात् न चानैकान्तिकं तत एव तथा च स्वगतकार्यत्वमुक्तत्वाद्वा सामान्यतो दृष्टेन ज्ञानमेवात्मनि लिङ्गम प्रत्यभिज्ञा नन्तु भिन्नकर्तृकेभ्यो व्यावर्तमानमेककर्तृकताया पर्यवस्यति ॥

mer case that knowledge is an effect is not unproved knowledge being designated in the text as that which is produced, nor is it contradictory for there can be no contradiction with regard to what is universally observed, and on the same grounds it is not many sided. Knowledge, then mediated through its nature as being an effect or an attribute is a mark of the existence of the soul. Again recollection being excluded from diverse agents is limited to a single agency U

Plurality of souls प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिश्च प्रत्यगात्मनि दृष्टे परत्र लिङ्गम्॥१६॥

Aph 19 Activity and inactivity observed in one's own soul are the mark of the existence of other souls

¹ The inference of the existence of soul being explained the mode in which the existence of other souls is inferred is now stated. Activity and inactivity generated by desire and aversion are modes of volition. By activity and inactivity bodily functions having for their end attainment of the pleasant and avoidance of the unpleasant and characterised by muscular action are produced. Therefore when we see muscular action in the body of another, we infer in the following manner the existence of another soul. This muscular action is generated by volition, being a muscular action like our own muscular action, and this volition is produced by or exists in soul being a volition like our own volitions U

² Though in going and other actions activity only and not inactivity is seen to be the cause yet muscular action in such forms

¹ आत्मन्यनुमानमभिप्राय इदानीं परात्मानुमानमाह । प्रत्यगात्मनीति स्वात्मनीत्यर्थं इच्छाद्वयजनितं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ता प्रवर्तयिष्येता ताभ्याम्ब हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारफलके शरीरकर्मणी चेष्टासंख्ये जन्येत तथा च परशरीरे चेष्टा दृष्ट्या इदं चेष्टा प्रवृत्त्यज्जन्वा चेष्टात्यात्मा मदीयचेष्टायत् स च प्रवृत्त्यज्जन्वा चात्मनिष्ठो वा प्रवृत्त्यात् मदीयप्रवृत्तिरिति परात्मानुमानम् ॥

² यद्यपि गमनादिक्रियाया प्रवृत्तिरेव हेतुर्दृश्यते न तु निवृत्तिरिति तथापि हिंसा द्विनिवृत्तिना गन्तव्यदेशावस्थिताना सुदृढजन्तूना व्याजनादना अपहरणादिकया चेष्टापि दृश्यते यथेति नानुपपत्तिः ॥

as the expulsion of insects with a fly flipper from places of resort for the sake of inactivity in regard to injury, is observed There is therefore no want of proof that inactivity is a motive of muscular action V

SECOND DAILY LESSON

Examination of the
internal sensory

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसचिरूपं ज्ञानस्य भाषोऽभावरत्न म
नसो लिङ्गम् ॥ १ ॥

Ann 1 Existence and non existence of knowledge on contact of the soul with the objects of sense are the mark of the existence of an internal organ

1 Distinction of real and fallacious arguments is the object of the preceding daily lesson In order now to bring the investigation of soul to a conclusion by a breach of the order of enunciation (i e of the order in which the substances were enumerated) an examination of the internal organ is instituted It will be shown that movement of this organ is the mark of the existence of the soul If the interior sensory be examined as being an instrument of

1 हेतुहेत्याभासविशेषक आह्निकार्थ । इदानीमात्मपरीक्षाशेष वर्तमानम् उद्धृत्य क्रमलङ्घनेन मनःपरीक्षामयत्नारम्भात् । मनोमतिमात्मनो लिङ्गं वर्तते तद यदि मनो ज्ञानरूपत्वेन मूर्तत्वेन च परीक्षितं भवति तदा यत्प्रति मन इन्द्रियान्तरादिभिमत विषयप्राप्तिरिति इन्द्रिय सम्यध्यत स आत्मेति सिद्धं भजत त्वत्तदर्थं क्रमलङ्घनम् । आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसचिरूपं सति यस्मिन् इन्द्रियसचिरूपे ज्ञानस्य भाग उत्पाद असचिरूपे ज्ञानस्याभाषो गुत्पादस्तन्मन इत्यर्थं ननु मनोवैभवेऽपि करणधर्मत्वादेव ज्ञानाद्योगप्रसुपपद्यते किञ्च मनो विभु विशेषगुणगुण्यद्वयत्वात् कालगत ज्ञानासमवायिकारणस्य योगाधारत्वादात्मयत् स्पष्टात्यन्ताभासप्रत्यादाकाशयदित्यादि वैभवाधरु प्रमाणमिति चेत् मेव यदि मनो विभु स्यात् तदा सर्वेन्द्रियसचिरूपत्वात् तत् सर्वेन्द्रियक्रमेण ज्ञान स्यात् कार्याधरोधात्तत्रमिति चेत् न हि सामग्री निराधारिरेषमाकलयति येन चालु पत्यरासनत्वादिविरोधाय विभ्यत चित्ररूपयत् चित्राकारमय वा स्यात् भ्रष्टव्य दोषश्च ऋन्मोक्षलक्षण इति चेत् तत्रापि व्यासङ्गदर्शनात् तर्हि कथमन्यस्योक्तं युगपत् प्रत्यमीति कथमनुष्यप्रसाय इति चेत् ग्रीष्मसञ्चारिमनोज्ञानितेषु पञ्चभु स्मृत्युपनातज्ञानेषु योगपद्याभिमानात् व्यासङ्गेऽपि करणधर्मधीन इति चेत् उक्तोत्तरत्वात् सुमुत्साधीनो व्यासङ्ग इति चेत् सत्यमुत्साया सर्वविषयकसर्वोदयप्रसङ्गात् सुमुत्साया अपि अभिमताऽप्यहोन्द्रियमनं सम्यग्ज्ञानात्रफलकत्वात् तस्माज्ज्ञानाद्योगपद्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या सिध्यति अणु मनः ॥

cognition and as having form then soul is proved to exist as that by which the internal organ is actuated when it is brought into connection with an organ of sense apprehensive of its proper object in consequence of the other organ. This is the reason of the breach of the order of enumeration. That is the internal organ which being in connection with an organ of sense, when there is contact of the soul and an object of sense, knowledge exists or comes into being and which not being in connection with an organ of sense knowledge does not exist or does not come into being. It may be argued that though the internal organ were an all pervading substance, all cognition would not necessarily be simultaneous, because of its property as an instrument, further, that the internal organ is an all pervading substance, because, like time, it is a substance void of any peculiar attribute, because like soul it is the site of conjunction with the non-cohesive cause of knowledge, because, like ether, it possesses absolute negation of sound, and so forth. If this argument to prove that it is an all pervading substance be adduced, we reply that were the internal sensory an all pervading substance then as it would be in contact with all sensual organs, cognition would be one only and composed of all sensation. If it be replied that such is not the case because there is a contrariety among the effects we deny this for the instrument is not concerned with contrariety or non contrariety, so that one should be apprehensive of a contrariety between visibility and sapidity and the rest, or that there should be a variegated form, as there is a variegated colour. If you object that there is a plurality of simultaneous sensations in the case of eating a long ear of corn [which is at once seen and tasted] we deny this for in that case also distraction is observed. If you ask how it is that you are conscious of synchronous perception of colour, taste smell and touch, we reply that neither is this the case for this is merely a sense of simultaneity in five cognitions represented in memory and produced successively by the rapidly shifting internal organ. If be urged that the distraction depends on the property of the in

strument, we deny this, for the answer has been already stated. If it be maintained that the distraction depends on the desire of knowing, we deny this, for on that supposition it would follow that when there was a desire to know all there would be a total presentation of all objects, whereas the only result of a desire to know is connection of the internal organ with the sense organ percipient of its proper object. Inasmuch, therefore, as non simultaneity of cognition would be otherwise impossible, the internal organ is proved to possess atomic dimension. U

तस्य द्रव्यत्वानित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air

1 It may be urged that the internal organ which is proved to exist by the inference that a sense of pleasure &c is effected by an instrument because it is an action, like the sense of colour &c, or because simultaneous cognition is impossible, is proved to exist as an instrument whence, then, its substantiality and eternity? It is therefore stated that, as an aerial atom inferred to exist by reason of the compound substance air, is a substance because it possesses qualities and actions, so the internal sensory inferred from impossibility of simultaneous cognitions is a substance because it possesses qualities. For without conjunction with the organs of sense it would not be productive of cognition so that there would be no possession of qualities. Moreover presentation of pleasure &c must have a sensitive organ as its instrument, because, like the presentation of colour &c, it is a presentation. Therefore the internal sen-

1 ननु सुखाद्युपलब्धि करणसाध्या क्रियात्वात् रूपोपलब्धिप्रदित्याद्यनुमानात् युगपज्ज्ञानानुपपत्त्या च यन्मनः सिद्धं तत्करणतया तथा च तस्य द्रव्यत्व नित्यत्वञ्च कुत इत्यत आह । यथा ज्यवधिद्रव्यानुमितो वायुपरमाणुर्गुणवत्त्वात् क्रियावत्त्वाच्च द्रव्यम् तथा युगपज्ज्ञानानुपपत्त्या नुमितं मनो गुणवत्त्वाद्व्य न हि तस्य इन्द्रियसंयोगा न्तरेण ज्ञानोत्पादकत्वं येन गुणवत्त्वं न स्यात् किञ्च सुखादिसाक्षात्कार इन्द्रियकरणकः साक्षात्कारत्वात् रूपादिसाक्षात्कारवद्वितीन्द्रियत्वेन मनः सिद्धम् इन्द्रियत्वं ज्ञानकारण-मनःसंयोगाद्यवयवमित्यवसिद्धमेव मनसो द्रव्यत्वम् नित्यत्वञ्च तस्यानापितत्वात् ॥ स्वाद्यवदकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावादनपितत्वमिति ॥

sory is proved to exist as an organ. The nature of an organ is to be a site of conjunction of the internal sensory with the cause of a cognition. It is therefore established without any difficulty that the internal organ is a substance. Its eternity is proved by its having no substratum, and that it has no substratum follows from the absence of any warrant in imagining portions constituent of it U

* As there is in an aeternal atom substantiality inasmuch as it possesses originative conjunction and other attributes, and eternity inasmuch as there is no warrant for assuming that it has constituent parts, so the substantiality and eternity of the internal organ follow from its possession of conjunction productive of cognition and its possession of other attributes and from absence of proof of its production and destruction V

प्रत्यक्षायौगपद्याज्ञानायौगपद्यात्वेरुम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 Because of non-simultaneity of volitions and non-simultaneity of cognitions it is one [in each body]

* A decision is stated with reference to the doubt whether internal organ be one in individual bodies or more than one. The words internal organs and in each body are to be supplied. If there were in each single body many internal organs or common sensorics there would be simultaneity of cognitions and volitions. The opinion that many volitions are simultaneously exerted since we see simultaneous action in the arms legs fingers and toes of a dancer is erroneous, for this arises merely from the rapid transition of the internal organ U

‘ यथा सायबोधपरमाणां आरम्भकसंयोगादिरूपगुणवत्त्वात् दृष्टान्तं तदवयवस्य नोपर प्रमाणाभावाच्चित्तस्य तथा ज्ञानजनकसंयोगादिरूपगुणवत्त्वात् तदुत्पादविनाशयो प्रमाणाभावाच्च मनस्सापि दृष्टान्तं नित्यत्वञ्चेत्यर्थः ॥

‘ तत्र हि प्रतिशरीरमेकमनेकं धर्ति सन्देहे निर्णायकमाह । मनः प्रतिशरीरमिति श्रेयं यद्वैकीर्णमर्थाय शरीरे बहुनि मनसि स्थितत्वा ज्ञानप्रवक्षानां यौगपद्य स्यात् यदु न्तर्लोकीकरधराहृत्तोषु युगपत् कार्यदर्शनाद्युपपत्त्यं यद्वत् प्रत्यक्षा उत्पद्यन्ते इति ॥ तै तदुक्तं मनसः शेषप्रत्यक्षादेव तदुपपत्तः ॥

' The unity of the internal organ in individual bodies is established. When there is conjunction between the mind and any member of the body, a volition is exerted in restriction to that member, and not in restriction to other members. It must not, therefore be said that there being a plurality of internal sensories two volitions may be simultaneously exerted, because conjunction between the mind and each of two members at the same time is possible, and that as determined by the ten fingers and ten toes twenty acts of volition are produced at the same time [for otherwise how would the corresponding actions be produced?], for the feeling of simultaneity in those actions as of that in the scattering of the hundred petals of a lotus is illusory inasmuch as they are produced in successive moments merely by the rapid transition of the internal sensory. So if the internal organ were manifold, then since each internal organ might be in conjunction with synchronous sensations of smell taste &c simultaneous production of cognitions derived from the organs of smell taste &c would be possible. The internal sensory therefore is in each individual body one only and not manifold. If it be objected that the internal organ must necessarily be manifold since we observe action in the two parts of a scorpion and the like when cut in two we reply that this is not the

' प्रतिशरीर मनस एकस्य व्यवस्थापयति । यदहो मनसं संयोगो यदा भवति तदा तदङ्गायच्छेदेन प्रथम उत्पद्यते नान्वायच्छेदेन एवञ्च मनसो नानात्वे एकदा ङ्गद्वयेनापि एकैकस्य मनसं संयोगसम्भवात् प्रथमद्वयमुत्पद्यते न च विशत्यङ्गुल्यच्छेदेन एकद्वयं विद्यति प्रथमा उत्पद्यन्त क्वचमन्यथा एकद्वयं तेषां क्रिया उत्पद्यन्ते यावत्तत् उत्पत्त्यपश्चरतत्यतिभेद एव तामु यौगपद्याप्रतीतभर्मरूपत्वात् मनसं प्रायु सञ्चारोद्रेकं भिन्नभिन्नवर्णेषु तामामुत्पादात् एव मनसो नानात्वे युगपदेव प्राणरसनार्द्राभि सद्य ते प्रामेकैकस्य संयोगसम्भवात् प्राणजरासनार्द्रादीनामांषि युगपदुत्पादाप्राप्तयि । प्रतिशरीरं मन एकमेव न तु नानेत्यर्थः । ननु किञ्चरश्चिक्रादिखण्डद्वय एव क्रियादर्शनान्मनसो नानात्वमाश्रयकमिति चेच्च तदानीमदृष्टयशेन मनोऽन्तरर्षाच्चवेद्यादेव तत्सम्भवात् अन्यत्र प्रथमायोगपदस्य ज्ञानायोगपदस्य च प्रामाणिकत्वेन मनसो नानात्वस्थोक्तारस्य कर्तुम शक्यत्वादिति । कर्मशुषडादिवन्मनसं सङ्कोचचिक्राशब्ध्यामेव प्रथमाना ज्ञानानाञ्च योगपदायोगपदयोर्निर्जात एकमेवैकस्मिन् शरीरे मन इति केचित्त तदपि न मनोर मम अनेताश्रयानां तत्प्रागभाजानां तत्प्राध्यक्षानाम् अनन्ततत्परमाश्रयानाञ्च कल्पने महानिरयादिति सूत्रेण ॥

changed except by volition. Nor can it be objected that two airs with differently directed motion may like two pieces of confluent water, have an upward motion. Were this the case there would be an upward but not a downward motion, or in exsufflations and the like there would be horizontal motion. There is then a being who, by his volition impels the vital air upwards or downwards. It is no valid objection to ask how there could be upward and downward motions of the vital air in a condition of dreamless sleep; for at that time though volition proper does not exist there exists another kind of volition which is called automatic conation. In like manner the opening and closing of the eyes causes us to infer a ruler of the body, for closing the eyes is an action productive of conjunction of the eyelids and the opening of the eyes is an action productive of disjunction of the eyelids. These two actions being constantly manifested without any visible cause such as motive force are not produced otherwise than by conation. As the dancing of a doll depends upon the volition of a subject willing so also does the movement of the eyelids. Therefore a being who exerts volition is inferred. Similarly vitality is a mark of the existence of the soul for by the word life the effects of vitality such as growth reparation of muscular lesion &c are indicated by implication. For as the owner of a house builds up the broken edifice or enlarges a building which is too small so the ruler of the body effects by food &c the increase or enlargement of the body which is to him in the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like causes what is wounded to grow again and partially dissevered hands or feet to re-coalesce. Thus like the master of a house is proved a guardian of the body. In a like manner the motions of the internal sensory are also a mark of the existence of the soul. For it has been shown in the foregoing section that the internal organ is possessed of form and of indivisibility. Its appliance to an instrument of sense cognisant of its proper object, depends on desire and effort. The desire and effort which actuate the internal organ are

inferred to be identical with the soul. This may be exemplified by a child standing in a corner of a room, who throws a ball or a handful of red powder about the room. It may be objected that the dancer of the doll, the master of the house, and the child are not other than body that they should be examples, and that it is in the body that consciousness resides, inasmuch as the body is an object of self-consciousness the conviction of being pale, stout and the like is produced by the juxtaposition of the body with self-consciousness. Moreover, (it may be urged), that which was experienced in childhood is remembered in youth or in old age, whereas in the case of separate bodies as those of Chaitra and Maitra there would be no act of memory, as it is said, One man remembers not that which another saw. In the latter case there will be no recollection because Chaitra and Maitra are the offspring of different parents, but though childhood and youth be different, the act of recollection will take place in the order of cause and effect because there is but one individual. To this we reply that it would follow on the same premises that the son would remember what was experienced by the father. If it be rejoined that perception of difference of body prevents this, we reply that an old man, by having a body different from that which he had as a child, through perception of his body would be incapable of remembering what he experienced as a child. A child that never knew his father has no perception of difference of body. The notion my body is generally in the case of the word my belongs to the self-consciousness. If you reply that so also does the notion my soul we reply that such is not the case, for the word my is usual tropically, since the genitive may be used where no numerical difference is implied as in the case of *Kīnu's head* [where *Kīnu* and *Kīnu's head* are one and the same thing]. Moreover on your supposition there would result the loss of merits and requital unmerited, for the body is constantly different in the transmigratory state, but it is admitted that the harm done by a conscious subject, cannot have its result unful-

filled. It is also inferred from affections of the other organs that there is a soul, for after experiencing the particular taste which accompanies the particular colour of an orange or *chira-ulla* fruit, on again observing such fruit, there arises in one desirous of tasting it a watering in the mouth. This can only take place by an inference respecting the acid flavour, the inference only by recalling the invariable coexistence of the colour and taste, the revocation only by a permanent impression, the permanent impression only by experience of the universal co-existence, and experience only by seeing it repeatedly, and this series of cognitions, in the order of cause and effect is impossible unless there be one and the same agent in all. Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama, From the affection of other organs of sense ; Pleasure and the like are also to be regarded, like knowledge, as arguments of the existence of the soul. For pleasure and the like must inhere in something, that is, reside in some substratum, being products or qualities like colour &c. Hence a general inference accompanied by a residual inference takes for its object inherence in a substance other than eight substances. For the proposition that desire which does not inhere in earth and seven other substances, inheres in a substance, is incomplete unless it assumes as its object inherence in a substance other than those eight substances. But if the residual method be not first employed, inherence in a substance other than eight substances will have to be argued by negative probation and thus the division will be made. It is absurd to say that inference has for its form only that which is essential to universal co-existence, for that is the form of conviction without which the conviction is incomplete. Otherwise there could be no inference having for its object inherence in what is uncaused such as that a binary atomic aggregate which does not inhere in anything caused or produced, inheres in something because it is composite. U

तस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Its substantiality and eternity are explained by air

! It may be said Granted that the soul is perdurable, why is it eternal and why a substance? It is therefore stated that as there is no warrant for assuming that an acrial atom has parts and therefore it is eternal so also is soul eternal, and that as an acrial atom is a substance because it possesses attributes so also is soul a substance U

Objections to the preceding arguments

यज्ञदत्त इति सच्चिर्कर्म प्रत्यक्षाभावाद्दृष्टलिङ्गं न विद्यते ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 In the contact [of the organs of sense and the object] from which the judgment This is Yajna-datta is derived, there being no perception, there exists no visible mark

* There being contact if in the judgment This is Yajna-datta there is no act of perception, there is no visible mark, no mark by which a universal co existence is ascertained from perception There is no visible mark establishing the existence of soul as there is a visible mark in the case of fire viz smoke observed concomitant with fire perceived U

* Though there be contact of the eye and other organs with the body of Yajna datta yet since there is no visual or other perception of the soul which presides over that body there is no visible mark i. e. no mark which being invariably attended by a predicate is an object of perception How then is an inference of the existence of the soul possible? For there being contact with fire &c,

1 ननु सिध्यतु आत्मा स्थिरं सत् नित्यं इति कुत कुतश्च द्रव्यमित्याह यथा साधुपरिमाणोरवयवप्रकल्पनाया न प्रमाणमते नित्यत्वं तथा च मनोऽपि यथा गुणत्रयाद्वाधुपरिमाणुद्वयं तथात्मप्रतीत्यर्थं ॥

2 सच्चिर्कर्म इति अथ यज्ञदत्त इति चेत् प्रत्यक्षं नास्ति तदा दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षतो यज्ञो तथापि लिङ्गं नास्ति यथा यद्भिन्ना प्रत्यक्षेण सहचरितो यज्ञोतो भूमे यज्ञो दृष्टं लिङ्गं तथात्मसाधकं लिङ्गं दृष्टं नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥

3 यज्ञदत्तशरीरे चक्षुरादिसच्चिर्कर्म सत्यपि तदधिष्ठातुरात्मनश्चाधुषाद्यभावात् दृष्टं व्याप्यत्वेन प्रत्यक्षविषयीभूतं लिङ्गं नास्तीत्यतः कथमात्मानुमानं सुघटमं यज्ञादेः सच्चिर्कर्म तत्प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं तद्वापिप्रत्यक्षाद्वाधुषाद्यनुमानान्तु निराबाधमर्थेति भावः ॥

after the perception of it an inference as to fire &c. meets with no obstacle because universal concomitance therewith has been observed, but this is not the case with the present inference V

सामान्यतो दृष्टाच्चाविशेषः ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 Moreover, from that which is observed generally there results no distinction.

1 Though there is a generally observed mark, yet there is no proof therefrom of the existence of the soul from its nature as soul or as a substance over and above eight substances. It would be thereby established only that desires &c. must inhere in something but there is nothing to suggest the thought of a soul. Therefore it is stated that there results no distinction U

2 From that which is generally observed i. e. from observation of inclusion under something determined by a general attribute, there results no distinction i. e. no inference from a peculiar property, according to the rule that there must be observed in that which determines the character of the subject determination by the predicate under which the middle term is contained V

तस्माद्भागमिक ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Therefore the soul is proved to exist by revelation

3 The existence of the soul &c. rests on revelation for, inasmuch as there is no mark of an observed universal concomitance any inference of the existence of the soul is impossible. The exis

1 सामान्यतो दृष्टमपि लिङ्गं भवति न तु तत् आत्मत्वेन अष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तत्वाद् व्यत्येन वा स्वादात्मसिद्धिः किन्तु तेनेच्छादोना कश्चिदापि तत्त्वमात्रं विध्येत तत्र आत्ममनोपविक्रमितीत्यर्थं तदेतदाह अविशेष इति ॥

2 सामान्यतो दृष्टान् सामान्यधर्मोपचिद्व्याप्यत्वग्रहणं अविशेषं विशेषधर्मप्रकारेण भानुमिति व्यापकतापच्छेदकत्वग्रहणं भानुमिति विशेष्याच्छेदकत्वे तन्मत्स्यादि धर्मः ॥

3 आगमिक इत्यस्य आत्मेत्यादि श्रुतेः दृष्टीतव्याधिकनिष्ठाभावादात्मनो भुमितिर्न सम्भवति अत आत्मा आगमनाश्रमाद्यैव इत्यर्थः । तथा आत्ममनोपविक्रममत्स्यादि द्विक्रममिति भावः ॥

tence then of the soul rests solely on the authority of revelation
Thus this system for cogitation on the soul is useless. V

Objections answered अहमिति शब्दस्य व्यतिरेकावागमिकम् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 9 Existence of the soul being the *conditio sine quâ non* of the use of the word I is not evidenced only by revelation

* Revelation is not the sole evidence of the existence of the soul, but that there is a soul is evinced also by the inference that the word I, or the word soul must denote some object because it is a term like the terms water pot &c It might be said Let earth &c. be the objects which it denotes : Hence the words because it is the *conditio sine quâ non* of the use of the word I that I, because the term I is excluded from earth &c For there never arises any such supposition or assurance as I am earth I am water, I am light, I am air, I am ether I am time, I am space I am mind If you object that such assurance arises in relation to the body, we reply that it is not so for it would be equally applicable to the bodies of others if that it arises with

* नात्ममात्रं प्रमाणमात्मनि किन्त्वहमिति पदं वा साभिधेयं पदत्वात् अहं इति पदवत् इत्यनुमानादप्यात्मसिद्धिः । ननु एषिव्यादि तदभिधेयं स्यादित्यत आह व्यतिरेकादिति एषिव्यात्यादितो अहमिति पदस्य व्यतिरेकाद्व्यावृत्तेरित्यर्थः । न हि भगवत्ये एषिव्याद्व्याप्यं अहन्तत् अहं वागु अहमाकाशम् अहं क स अहं दिश अहं मन इति व्यप द्वेष प्रत्यये वा शरीरे भवतीति चेन्न परशरीरे तत्प्रसङ्गात् स्वशरीरे भवतीति चेन्न स्वस्यात्मभिन्नत्वात् नित्यं मनः शरीरमिति वेषधिहरण्येन प्रत्ययाच्च नन्विदमपि सामान्यतो दृष्टमेव तस्य विशेषोपर्ययसंभवेति दृष्टमेवेति चेन्न अहम्ये इहैवमात्मत्वमेव प्रकारं तथा च पञ्चधर्मताद्वलादेवाहन्त्वस्य प्रयुक्तिनिमित्तत्वं पर्यवस्ये तच्चानन्यसाधारण्यमेवेति विशेषसिद्धेः स्य सामान्यतो दृष्टादपि व्यापकहकताद्विशेषसिद्धिः यच्चात अयं साक्षात्कारः किमनेनेति तदपुक्तं न हि मनमन्तरेण सङ्कशुरुस्याप्रदामलक्षणात् नम न च तदन्तरेण तत्र निदिध्यासननाधिकारः न च निदिध्यासनमन्तरेण सदासनमिध्याज्ञानोन्मूलनचमस्तत्प्रसाक्षात्कारः न हि शाब्दमानुमानिकं वा ज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानोन्मूलनचमभेदविहातौ दृष्टमिति भावः । ननु तथापि परोक्षे आत्मनि कथं संकेतयत् इति चेत् क एवमाह नात्मा प्रत्यक्ष इति किन्तु मनसा संयोगप्रत्यासत्त्यात्मपदं कथमन्यथाह मुखी ज्ञानामीच्छामि यत् दुःखीत्यादिप्रत्ययः न ह्यपमवस्तुरु सन्दिग्धवस्तुको वा भीसादिप्रत्ययवत् अस्यापि निश्चितउत्सुवत्वात् न च सिद्धं किञ्चिज्ज्ञानमन्तरेणापि ज्ञापमानत्वात् नापि शब्दः तदनुसन्धानाननुविधानात् प्रत्यक्षाभासो अमिति चेन् तर्हि अत्रिचिदनाभासविषयो ऽपि न संप्रमित्तमाराप्यते इत्याशयेदविवक्षितम् ॥

respect to one's own body, we reply that this is not so, for there is not intended a self different from soul and because the term my body involves a difference of substrata. If you urge that this also is merely observed generally and therefore, not being determined by a peculiar attribute, involves a fallacy, we reply that it is not so, for in the term I egoity or spirituality is the form or essence, and that as an attribute of the subject it is determined that the ego is the cause of activity and this is not common to other objects, being a proof of a particular object. In like manner there is proof of the particular even from the generally observed, accompanied with the argument from impossibility. Whereas it is said, From merely hearing results presentation of soul what need of this proof? this is wrong, for without reflection the dross of unbelief in wavering minds cannot be purged away, without this purification there can be no aptitude for profound meditation on this object and without profound meditation there can be no presentation of truth competent to eradicate false knowledge together with its impressions. For it is by consuetude only that the sad lover can represent in imagination his beloved. For knowledge from verbal information or from inference is unable to uproot false knowledge, as is seen in the case of illusion in regard to direction in space and similar instances. If it be asked how whereas soul is invisible a sign of its existence can be apprehended we rejoine. Who has maintained that the soul is unknowable by perception? But soul is cognised by its juxta position with conjunctions with the internal organ else how such assurances as I am happy, I know, I desire I will, I am in pain? since such assurance is not without object or of doubtful object, for like an assurance of blueness &c it has a definite object. Nor is it derived from argument for it arises without any knowledge of an argument. Nor is it derived from verbal communication for it does not follow upon desire of such knowledge. If it be maintained that it is a mere illusory perception, we reply that there must be some object not

merely apparent, for it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not an object of certain knowledge cannot be erroneously surmised in another object U

यदि दृष्टमन्वत्तमह देवदत्तो ऽह यन्नदत्त इति ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 If the cognition I am Devadatta, I am Yajnadatta is a visual presentation [what need of any inference ?]

1 An opponent says If this be so what need of an inference ? The word *iti* marks the form of the cognition and the word *drishṭa* ends in the affix *litā* used in a passive sense. Presentation means perception. The sense therefore is as follows. If the perception which has for its form I am Devadatta I am Yajnadatta is only a perception what occasion is there for the trouble of making an inference ? For on seeing an elephant those who infer do not infer him to be one from his screaming U

दृष्टआत्मनि लिङ्गे एक एव दृढत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत् प्रत्यय ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 If a mark of the existence of the soul were seen, there could be but one assurance for it would be as evident as a percept

1 The anticipated objection is refuted. The sense as a whole is that if a mark of the soul's existence were observed or apprehend

1 यद्यञ्चैन किमनुमानेनेति पूर्वपक्षवादी आह । इति शब्देन ज्ञानप्रकारमाह दृष्टमिति भाषातत्प्रत्ययान्तमन्यत्तमित्यध्यय समापमर्थे अय देवदत्त अय यन्नदत्त इति प्रकारक दृष्ट दर्शन अध्यक्षमेवास्ति यदि किमनुमानप्रयासेन न हि करिष्यि दृष्टे चीत्कारेण तमनुमिमते अनुमातार ॥

1 आशङ्का निरस्यति । दृष्टे मनसा गृहीते आत्मनि लिङ्गे अनुमाने सति प्रत्यक्षत् प्रत्यक्षमानाकारक एक एव मुख्यश्च प्रत्यय भवतीति येष मुख्यत्वं दृढत्वात् अप्रामाण्यशङ्कानियतं न समस्यत्वात् मुख्यत्वञ्च गृहीतप्रामाण्यकृत्यम यथा दूरस्थे सरोवरादिसिद्धे दृष्टे ऽपि मरीचिकादिसंवेदनादृष्टप्रत्यक्षे अप्रामाण्यशङ्का उदेति तता यत्नाकारादिसिद्धेन तदनुमाने सति तदनुमाने सति सवादेन तत्र प्रामाण्यपक्षान्तादृष्टशङ्का नियतं तयात्मनि दृष्टे ऽपि विपरीतसम्भावनादिना तज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यशङ्का सञ्जायते ततो अनुमानेनात्मनि गृहीते सवादेन तत्र प्रामाण्यपक्षान्तादप्रामाण्यशङ्कानियतं न समस्यत्वं दृढत्वं तादृशपक्षस्य सुघटमेव तदुक्तं मिथै प्रत्यक्षपरिकल्पितमप्यनुमानेन सुमुत्सन्ते तर्क रक्षिका इति ॥

ed by the internal organ even were there an inference, there would be one and one only primary conviction, as in relation to a percept in the case of perception. Whence its primary nature? The being a primary conviction or being of recognised validity, results from its certitude or power of removing doubts of invalidity. As for instance when the distant water of a lake &c has been seen, there arises a doubt as to the objective value of such a perception, there being a feeling of uncertainty whether it may not be a mirage or the like, and when afterwards there arises the inference from cranes &c the mark of its being a lake, the doubt ceases on the recognition of the evidence by means of reflection, so, although the soul is perceived a doubt arises as to the validity of the perception on account of counter probabilities &c., but afterwards the soul being inferentially cognised, the certitude of such cognition is easily demonstrated such certitude consisting of competency to remove suspicion of invalidity through the recognition in that case of validity by means of argumentation. It has accordingly been declared by the sage The logicians desire to understand by inference even that which is fully established by perception V

देवदत्तो गच्छति यच्चदत्तो गच्छतीत्युपचारच्छरीरेत्यय ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 The cognition Deva datta goes Yajna datta goes is applied tropically to the body

¹ It may be objected that if the cognition I Yajna-datta refers to the soul a judgment of compatibility with motion such as Yajna datta goes is impossible. It is therefore stated that there are such judgments as I am fair complexioned, I am stout, and there are such complex concepts as my body. Of these in the

¹ ननु यदि यच्चदत्तोऽहमिति प्रत्यय आत्मनि तदा यच्चदत्तो गच्छतीति गमनसामानाधिकरण्याभावात्प्रत्ययमिति चेत् । अस्ति हि अहं गौर अहं स्थूल इति प्रत्यय अस्ति च मम शरीरमिति भेदप्रत्ययः । तत्र देवदत्तो गच्छतीति गतिसामानाधिकरण्यानुभवे । भक्त ममति प्रत्ययस्य यथार्थत्वात् यद्यपि देवदत्तस्य शरीरवृत्तिर्जातिस्तेन देवदत्तो गच्छतीति मुख्य एव प्रयोगो यद्यपि यद्यपि प्रत्यय तथैव देवदत्तपदं तदर्थच्छब्दात्मनि प्रयुक्तं येन तदोपचारिको बोद्धव्यः ॥

judgment Deva-datta goes the conception and enouncement of compatibility with movement is secondary, whereas the expression mine is used in its primary application. Although the nature of Deva-datta is a universal existing in the body and accordingly the expression Deva datta moves is correct even in its primary sense as also the judgment, if the term Deva datta be employed with regard to the soul determined thereby it is then to be understood in a secondary application U

It may be asked how if such a notion as I Yajna-datta has the soul for its object the judgment Yajna datta goes can apply to the soul for the soul has not the power of motion. It is therefore stated that the sense conveyed by the proposition Deva datta goes arises from the observation that the word Deva-datta implies corporeality. Since such propositions as Deva datta knows wishes acts hates &c are used in their primary sense the term Deva datta must have the power of denoting a soul appropriated to a determinate body. For as in the meaning of these propositions there is a manifold application the complication of this hypothesis is inoperative: it does not invalidate it and it may be considered that the primary sense possibly belongs to such application to the proposition of motion in the proposition He goes.

सन्दिग्धसूत्रधारः ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 The secondary application however is doubted

The word however indicates the view of an opponent. The name and notion of the Ego are known to relate both to the soul

नन्वाय वस्तुना दृष्टादिपदस्य यदात्मविवर्कं तदा वस्तुना गच्छतीति प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्प्रमाणं नित्यमसम्भवादिपदस्य च । देवदत्ता गच्छतीति यावत्प्रमाणं च देवदत्तादिपदस्य शरीरे सम्भवाद्युपपत्तिरिति देवदत्ता जानाति इत्यत्र कर्तारो दृष्टीत्यादिप्रयोगानां मुक्त्यस्य देवदत्तादिपदस्य विज्ञातावयवीराद्यच्छिदात्मनि शरीराद्यवयवस्यानन्तरं भूतिप्रयोगस्यैव नित्यस्याधिक्यकारणत्वात् गच्छतीत्यवयवात्मन्यप्याद्यकत्वे तादृशप्रयोगस्य मुक्त्यस्यैव सम्भवतीत्यपि दृष्टव्यम् ॥

सुम्भवात् सुप्यवयवोक्तम् । आत्मशरीरयोस्तथावयवमिति प्रत्यक्षं प्रयोगात् सुप्यवयवे तत्र पत्र सुम्भवात् पत्र विषयवर्ति इति सन्देहः ॥

seeking any mark of concomitance. It is not verbally communicated, being produced without reflection on words. It, therefore, belongs to the internal organ, and to the internal organ independent of the external organs, not being concerned with the body &c. Moreover if it be urged that if it referred to the body it would refer to the bodies of others and if it be referred to one's own soul it would refer to the souls of others, we deny this, for the soul of one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes cannot be externally perceived and the soul itself could be perceived only by apprehension of particular attributes appropriate to the several senses. Nor is this the nature of soul only, but of all substances for substance becomes perceptible by apprehension of particular attributes appropriate to the several senses. If you rejoin that on this ground ether also should be perceptible by the apprehension of sound, we reply that such would be the case were the organ of hearing capable of apprehending a substance or if ether possessed colour. If you object that the soul is equally devoid of colour, we reply that it is in the case of external substances only that possession of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. U

1 The cognition of the Ego and the expressions I Yajur datta am happy &c, are the cognitions of a distinctive object, the perception or presentation of an ulterior object of one different from the body &c, since they produce verbal information the object of which is different from the body. Such is the sense resulting from the aphorism. The application accordingly, to the soul as to something ulterior to the body is primary that to the body is secondary. Why so? The answer is because of existence : viz, the existence of pleasure &c in one's own soul and because of non

अहमतीति अह यजदत्तः सुखीत्यादित्ययद्वारः अयान्तरप्रत्यक्षः अयान्तरस्य शरीरादिभिर्वस्तु प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं यस्मात् शरीरादिभिर्विषयपरकशब्दबोधजनक इति फलितार्थः तथा च शरीरादिभिर्वस्तुत्वात्मनि तादृशप्रयोगो मुख्यः शरीरे स्वीयव्यारिके कुत इयमत आह प्रत्यगात्मनि स्वात्मनि भावात् अयान्तरं मुरादे सत्त्वात् परं शरीरे भावात् मुख्यादेरसत्त्वात् तथा च भूतिप्रयोगस्यात्मन्येव सत्त्वात्तत्रैव तादृशप्रयोगस्य मुख्यत्व शरीराद्योपचारिकत्वमिति न सन्देहगम्योऽपीति ॥

1 The word knowledge tacitly indicates the attributes of soul sensible pleasure, pain and the like As the bodies of Yajna-datta and Vishnu mitra are separate from one another, so are their knowledge, pleasure and the like separate Accordingly as the cognition This is Yajna-datta's body, is an object, so, though no knowledge, pleasure &c be produced in Yajna-datta, the cognitions I feel pleasure, I know, I will, I wish will be objects, because, the body being an object to the appropriate senses, its knowledge &c, like its colour &c, may be perceptible But this is impossible Therefore there is, such is the meaning, to be maintained a subject of knowledge, pleasure and the like, other than the body U

2 The knowledge of Yajna datta and Vishnu mitra does not in consequence of the difference of their bodies, in consequence, that is, of their bodies being different objects, become an object, during the perception of the body The word knowledge implies generally all the particular sensible attributes of the soul Therefore, as in our presentation of soul &c knowledge &c is the object, it being universally allowed that there are such cognitions as I know, I wish, I will, I feel pleasure I am in pain, I hate &c., so would there be in like manner were the body denoted by the word I, and did it possess the attributes knowledge &c, a cognition of knowledge &c even in the visual perception of body But no one

1 ज्ञानमिति योग्य सुखदुःखादिकमात्मगुणमुपलक्षयति यथा यज्ञदत्तचिच्छुमित्रयोः शरीरं परस्परभिन्नं तथा ज्ञानमुखादिकमपि भिन्नमेव तथा च यथा यज्ञदत्तस्यैव शरीरं तथा यज्ञदत्तस्य ज्ञाने सुखादौ वा अनुपपद्ये ऽहं सुखी ज्ञाने यत्ते इच्छामीति ज्ञानादिक विषयो भवति योग्यशरीरविषयकत्वेन तदीयरूपादिकतदीयज्ञानादीनामपि प्रत्यक्षसम्भवात् न च सम्भवति तस्मात् ज्ञानसुखादीनां शरीरादन्य एवावयो यत्तज्ज इति भावः ॥

2 न तु न हि शरीरविशेषात् शरीरविशेषविषयकत्वात् यज्ञदत्तचिच्छुमित्रयोर्ज्ञानमपि विषयो भवति शरीरसाक्षात्कारे ह्यस्यैः ज्ञानपदं योग्यात्मविशेषगुणसामान्यपरमं तथा च यथास्माकमात्मसाक्षात्कारे ज्ञानादिक विषयो भवति अहं ज्ञानमि इच्छामि यत्ते सुखी दुःखी द्वेष्मीत्याद्यनुभूयस्व सर्वसिद्धत्वात् तथा शरीरवाच्यतादायपि ज्ञानादेर्भावं स्यात् यदि शरीरमहम्पदयाश्च ज्ञानादिगुणकञ्च स्यात् न हि स्थूना यज्ञदत्तो ऽहं ज्ञानामीति वाच्यं प्रत्यक्षं कस्याचित्भवति तस्माच्छरीरे ऽहमादिव्यपहार औपचारिक एवेति नास्मकं प्रतिज्ञादानिरिति भावः ॥

has a visual presentative cognition in the form I the stout Yajna-datta, know. Therefore the use of the words I &c in reference to the body is only by a secondary application, and accordingly we do not surrender the matter of our thesis V

अहमिति मुख्ययोग्याभ्यां शब्दवद्व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचाराद्विशेषसिद्धेर्नागमिकः ॥ १८ ॥

Aph 18 The knowledge of the Ego being individually established like sound as a *conditio sine quâ non* neither too narrowly nor too widely affirmed by its predominant and sensible attributes, does not depend upon revelation

1 The following objection might be raised. The soul is not an object of perception since like ether, it is a colourless or a simple substance. Of the cognition I am thin or pale the body must be affirmed to be the object. Whereas there is sometimes the judgment I feel pleasure &c it is proper to suppose that pleasure and the like, becoming manifest without their substratum are

1 नन्यात्मा न प्रत्यक्षं नीरूपद्वयत्वात् निरवयवद्वयत्वाद्वा आकाशवत् तथाचाद्य लभ्यो गौर इति बुद्धे शरीरेमेव विषयो वाच्यः क्वचिदहं मुखीत्यादि धीरेषु पदव्यक्ति तथाप्याद्यमन्तरेण भागमानानां दुष्पादीनां शरीरे समारोप इत्येव कल्पयितुमुचितमप्येषां सुरभिजनम् इत्याद्यमन्तरेण प्रतीयमानधोरोपपत्तिरभेदाज्ज्ञेन समारोप नयेत इतरोपेन कलप्रत्ययस्यापि प्रसिद्धकलमन्तरेणान्यविषयत्वम् तथा अहमित्यव्यवृत्तं शरीरे एव प्राप्तयम् सुखादिकन्तु कदाचित् तत्रारोप्यते तेनात्मनि प्रत्यक्षाकारं ज्ञानं नास्त्येव सुखाद्याधारत्वेन यत्कल्पनीयं तदगममिच्छ भवतु ॥ तत्रापि यह इत्यत आह अयमर्थः अहं बुध्यते इत्यप्ये नानामिका न शब्दो नापि मीढक शब्दनिर्गुणोत्तरेणापि ज्ञाप मानत्वात् प्रत्यक्षत्वे च नीरूपत्वे निरवयवत्वे च द्वारधकमुक्तं तद्विद्विन्दप्रत्यक्षतायां भवति तत्र हि रूपप्रत्ययैरुद्वयत्रययोः प्रयोक्तव्यत्वात् मानप्रत्यक्षता च तदन्तरेणापि । ननु स्यादेव यदात्मनि प्रमाणी स्यात् तदेव नु नास्तीत्यत आह शब्दवद्व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचाराद्विशेषसिद्धेरिति यथा चित्वादिषु द्रव्येषु शब्दस्य व्यतिरेको व्योमिचारी नियतस्तेन तदाथयत्वाष्टद्वयातिरिक्तस्याकाशद्रव्यस्य विशेषस्य सिद्धिः प्रमिच्छायाः एष्यत्यादिषु व्यतिरेकस्याव्यभिचारात् तदाथयेषां च शब्दद्वयातिरिक्तेन भवितव्यम् । नन्येताग्रताप्यनुमानिक एव आत्मा न तु प्रत्यक्ष इत्यत आह अहमिति मुख्ययोग्याभ्यामिति अहमित्यातिरेकेण ज्ञाताकारमाह तेन सिद्धमिति ज्ञान शब्दनिर्गुणानुत्थानमन्तरेण निमीतिताऽप्य यदुत्पन्नं तन्मूल्येन अहमन्यग्रतां योष्येन प्रमाणासिद्धेन उपपादनीयम् न तु शरीरादिना तत्रेच्छाया व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचारात् मुख्ययोग्याभ्यामित्यनन्तरम् उपपादनायमिति प्रतीयमान आत्मनि प्रमाणां यद्वि चन्मगौरवमिवा त्यक्तानि मूलां ज्येष्ठानि ॥

attributed by metaphor to the body as in the notion Hot fragrant water, heat and fragrance appearing without a substratum, are metaphorically attributed to water. But in this case there being such attribution in the notion of water there is not another object independent of common water. In the case therefore of the Ego, the notion I is real only in reference to the body but pleasure and the like are sometimes metaphorically attributed to the body. There is then with reference to soul, no knowledge of it in the form of perception. That then which we must assume as the substratum of pleasure and the like must be established by revelation. There is no means of directly cognising it. The reply to this objection is the following. The cognition I feel pleasure I am in pain is not by revelation by verbal communication or by inference for it arises independently of any attention to words or arguments. Whereas it has been said that colourlessness and simplicity are preventive of perception this holds true only in the case of perception by the external organs for of this the possession of colour, and the existence of a plurality of substances are the necessary conditions. Internal perception is independent of these conditions. It may be objected that this would be the case were there any proof of the existence of the soul but there is none. Accordingly the words Being individually established like sound as a *conditio sine quâ non* neither too narrowly nor too widely affirmed. As sound as a *conditio sine quâ non* is not unduly restricted or extended so as to apply to the substances earth &c, and is decisive and there is thereby proof of a particular substance, viz ether as excluded from other eight substances, as the substratum of sound in like manner since the exclusive argument from desire does not fail by applicability to earth &c. the substratum of desire must be excluded from other eight substances. Lest it be argued that all this shows that the soul is an object of inference not an object of perception the words The knowledge of the Ego from its predominant insensible attributes are employed. By the particle *ita*

the form of the cognition is stated The knowledge of the Ego therefore which arises independently of any attention to words or arguments, in one whose eyes are closed must be produced by an original attribute of egoity, sensible or established by proof, but is not produced by the body, inasmuch as the exclusive argument from desire does not fail by applicability to it After the words From its predominant and sensible attributes, the words To be established are to be supplied Many proofs of the existence of soul omitted for fear of encumbering this treatise should be sought in the Mayúkha U

1 The Vedantins maintain that soul is nothing but eternal knowledge, according to the sacred text This imperishable soul is true knowledge the infinite supreme spirit and that in the course of thing being divided by the products of illusion the accidents of the form of the internal organ it appears manifold, according to such texts as One only without a second One moreover, the inmost soul of all beings, became the counterpart of every

1 वेदान्तिनस्तु नित्यविज्ञानमेवात्मा अविनाशी वा ते इमात्मा सत्य ज्ञानमनन्त ब्रह्म इति युतं स च यत्सुगत्या एका ऽपि मायाकार्याणामन्त करणरूपोपाधीना भेदात्तानेव प्रतिभाति एकमेवाद्वितीयम् इति एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूप रूप प्रतिक्रिया बभूव इत्यादयस्तेरित्याहुस्तन्मतं दूषयति । अद्वैतीति प्रत्यक्षविषय इति शेषः तथा चाह मुखीत्यादिसंज्ञिकमानसप्रत्यक्षविषय न आद्यमिक सत्य ज्ञानमनन्त ब्रह्म इत्याद्यागमप्रतिपाद्योद्देशरभिधेयं अत्र हेतुमाह मुख्ययोग्याभ्यामित्यादि मुख्य सत पदयोग्यं मुख्य दु खञ्च ताभ्या विशेषसिद्धेरीश्वरभेदसिद्धे इदेषु मुख्यस्य मुख्यस्य अन्येच्छानधीनैच्छाविषयत्वात् दु खञ्च ॥ द्विदेषु मुख्यत्वम अन्यदेवानधीनद्वेषविषयत्वात् योग्यत्वञ्च प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वम एतत्स्वरूपञ्च इत्यसिद्धिशङ्कानिरासार्थं ईश्वरे नित्यमुखाद्गीकारपक्षे व्यभिचारधारणार्थञ्च नित्यमुखस्यायोग्यत्वात् तथा च अन्य मुख दु खञ्च जीवस्येश्वरभेदसाधकम् । उपलक्षणञ्चेतत्त ज्ञाना ज्ञानेच्छायत्ता हेतुगञ्च ईश्वरभेदसाधका दृष्टव्या । ननु अद्वैमिति प्रत्यक्षविषय आत्मा ईश्वरभिधेयं अन्यमुखवत्त्वादित्यादौ दृष्टान्ताभावेन अन्यसद्वचारापहान् व्याप्तिज्ञानं दुर्घटमत उक्त व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचारादिति व्यतिरेके व्याप्तेरित्यर्थं प्रयोज्यस्य पञ्चम्यर्थस्तस्य च विशेषसिद्धायन्यत्र तथाचान्यत्रदृष्टान्ताभावे ऽपि व्यतिरेकेण ईश्वरस्य दृष्टान्तत्वसम्भवेन व्यतिरेकमहत्वापहान्नाधीनव्यतिरेकस्याप्यपि द्रष्टव्यत्वात् शङ्कानिरासायेतत् शब्दादित्येत्यर्थं आकाशस्य यथा शब्दरूपाद्वेत्तेर्यतिरेकव्याप्तिप्रकारेण ज्ञायमानादोश्वरभेदसिद्धिस्तथात्मनो अन्यमुख्यादिमत्यात् तत्सिद्धिरित्यर्थः ॥

form This doctrine is here refuted . After The knowledge of the Ego, the words Is the object of perception, are to be supplied . The object therefore of such common internal perceptions as I am happy, is not proved by revelation and inseparable from God who is declared in such texts as, True knowledge, the infinite supreme spirit . The reason of this is stated in the words From its predominant and sensible attributes &c . because of the proof of particularity, i e because of the proof of separateness from God, by that which is predominant and sensible, i e by pleasure and pain . Pleasure is among objects of desire predominant, because it is the object of desire not dependent on other desires, and pain is predominant among objects of aversion because it is the object of aversion not dependent on other aversions . Appropriateness is the being an object of perception . This is mentioned to remove doubt as to absence of proof of the argument, and to prevent a fallacious application in case of the assumption of eternal bliss in reference to God for eternal bliss is not appropriate, and consequently generated pleasure and pain is the proof of the difference between the individual soul and God . This generated pleasure and pain implies something more, and generated knowledge, desire, volition, and aversion are to be regarded as proofs of the separateness of the individual soul and God . It may be urged that in such arguments as The soul, the object of the perception of the Ego is different from God because it possesses generated pleasure &c there being no example and consequently no observation of congruity of similar instances with the universal affirmation, the knowledge of a universal concomitance is impossible . Hence the words As a *conditio sine qua* non neither too narrowly nor too widely affirmed, that is because of the universality of the exclusion . The conditions necessary to the proof may be universally affirmed in the proof of the particular . Though, therefore, there be no example of the universal affirmation, since by exclusion God may be the example, an inference with respect to the matter in hand is possible through observation of a uni-

ver al exclusion dependent on observation of concomitance with exclusion . To remove the doubt that the proof by a universally exclusive argument of the separateness from God is not applicable the words Like-sound are added meaning As is the case with sound and the like. As ether is proved to exist by its mark viz sound which is known by means of the form of universal exclusion , so the proof of the separateness of the individual soul from God is from the possession by the soul of generated pleasure &c V

Alleged unity of soul. सुषुप्तु खज्जाननिष्यस्यविशेषादैक्यात्म्यम् ॥ १९ ॥

Aph 19 Because of the indifference of the origin of pleasure pain and knowledge soul is one

The section treating of the investigation of soul being completed that treating of the plurality of souls is commenced This aphorism sets forth an adverse doctrine There is according to this doctrine but one soul though the bodies of Chitra Maitra and others be numerically diverse Why ? Because of the indifference of the origin of pleasure pain and knowledge since the origin of pleasure pain and knowledge as determined by all bodies is not particular If there were another mark probative of the separateness of the soul its separateness might be proved but there is not, just as in the production of sound as determined in such and such places its mark sound being non particular ether is one, as its mark the notions of simultaneity &c being non particular time is one and as its mark the notions of posteriority and priority being non particular space is one U

Plural ty of souls. व्ययस्यातो नाना ॥ २० ॥

Aph. 20 Because of its circumstances soul is manifold

॥ आत्मस्योपाधकृत्य ममाप्य इत्यातीमात्मनानात्म्यप्रकरणाभावे सत् प्रत्यक्षं सूत्रम् । यत्र स्य आत्मा चैवमेवाद्विदेहभेदे सिद्धं कुत सुषुप्तु खज्जानाना निष्य इत्यने रविशेषात् सद्यःपरीक्षायच्छेदेन सुषुप्तु खज्जानानामुत्पत्तिरवशिष्टेयं सत । यस्यात्मभेदमा धनं निदान्तरे भवति तदा विषयव्यात्मभेदः न च तदस्ति यथा सतत्पदशायच्छेदेन व्ययनिष्य-पाधवि "अद्वितीया विशेषादेकं स्य कालं प्रयापरादिप्रत्ययनिर्द्धारविशेषादेकैयं दिक् ॥

' The doctrine is stated that souls are manifold Why ? Because of their circumstances Circumstances are the several conditions as one is rich, another mean one is happy another unhappy, one is of high another of low birth one is learned, another reads badly The ■ circumstances being impossible without a diversity of souls evince a plurality of souls It cannot be maintained that as are the circumstances of one soul due to various states of being to childhood youth and old age so are the circumstances of one soul in the divers bodies of Chitra Maatra &c for it is by difference of time only that the existence in one subject of contradictory attributes is possible U

शास्त्रसामर्थ्याच्च ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 21 And on the authority of the Śāstra

' The Śāstra means revelation (Śruti) For, in the declaration of diversity of soul, it is revealed that Two spirits are to be known &c. U

FOURTH BOOK FIRST DAILY LESSON

सदकारणवन्निव्यम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 The eternal is ex stent and uncaused

' Some say that the existent is produced from the non existent

' सिद्धान्तमाह नाना आत्मानं युतं व्यग्रस्यात व्यग्रस्या प्रतिनियमं यथा कश्चित्पादो कश्चित्शुक्लं कश्चित् सुखी कश्चिदुच्छी कश्चिदुष्वाभिजनं कश्चित्चावाभिजनं कश्चिद्विद्वान् कश्चित् ज्ञात्स्व इतीयं व्यग्रस्या आत्मभेदमन्तरेणानुस्यूयमाना साधयत्यात्मना भेदम् न च जन्मभेदेन घात्यकौप्यारयाध्यभेदेन वा एकस्याप्यात्मनो यथा व्यग्रस्या तथा चैत्रमैवादिदेहभेदे ऽपि स्यादिति याच्य कालभेदेन विरुद्धधर्माध्यासहस्रभावात् ॥

' याश्च युति तवाप्यात्मनो भेदप्रतिपादनात् युयते दि द्वे प्रत्यणी वेदितव्ये इत्यादि ॥

' असत् सृज्जायते इति कोषिद्वदन्ति तेषामयमभिप्रायं बीजादिर्नादुरादिकार्यज नक तथा सति कुतलस्यबीजादेरप्यदुराद्युत्पत्तेः किन्तु चैत्रादेः स्थितस्य बीजास्यायय विभागेन प्रध्यमानन्तरमेद्रादुरात्पादात् बीजादिप्रध्यस एवादुरादे कारणास्मिति तथा च गीतमीयं पूययचमृत्रम अभावाद्यभावेत्यतिर्नानुपमस्य प्रादुर्भावात् इति तदेतन्मतं निराकुयच्च परमाणवादिक्रमेण स्याद दृढयति । सत् भावरूपं किञ्चित् अकारणयत् अजन्य नित्य विनाशप्रतिषेधायितुं अवर्षयिना मूलकारणं नासत् इत्ययं प्रध्यसस्य कारणत्वे दूषीकृतादपि बीजाददुरापत्तिरिति भावः ॥

Their view is as follows : A seed &c is not productive of a sprout &c as its effect for were this the case there would be produced a sprout &c from a seed &c in a granary . But inasmuch as the shoot is produced after the destruction of the seed when sown, by the disjunction of its constituent parts it is the destruction of the seed &c which is the cause of the sprout &c Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama enunciatory of an adverse doctrine From non-existence is production of existence for without destruction is no manifestation . In refutation of this doctrine a prefatory discourse is set up treating of atoms &c The existent means anything which is , uncaused, unproduced , the eternal matter which does not by destruction cease to exist . The sense is that the primary cause of integrate wholes is not the non-existent , for were destruction or subsequent non existence the cause a sprout would be produced even from a seed which had been ground into meal V

तस्य कार्यं लिङ्गम् ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 The effect thereof is the mark of its existence

1 Thereof—of an atom—an effect or product is water pot or the like is the mark of existence . Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama From the evolved is the production of the evolved, on the evidence of perception . Thus is the sequence of integrant and integrate wholes . If this series were unlimited there would be no

1 तस्य परिमाणो कार्ये षट्पादो लिङ्गम् तथा च गौतमीये सूत्रे व्यक्तात् व्यक्तस्य निष्पत्तिं प्रत्यक्षमाश्रयत्वात् इति श्रव्यव्यावर्धयिषस्तत्वाद्यनुभूयते स षट्पादो निरवधिः स्यात् तदा सैकर्म्यपक्षो परिमाणभेदो न स्यात् अनन्तायव्यवहारव्यवहारविशेषात् न च परिमाणप्रत्यक्षविशेषाधीना विशेषे स्यादिति चाख्य सख्याविशेषाभावात् तयोपर्यनुपपत्तेः प्रत्याश्रयि स्यादिति चेत् अन्यस्य कस्याचिद्विषयस्यैव प्रत्यक्षेऽनुपपत्तेः श्रव्यव्यवहारविना श्रव्येरेव द्रव्यनाशस्त्यात् विभागाच्च नावधि तस्यैकाग्र्यस्यानुपपत्तेः तस्माच्चिरवयव इत्यप्यसिद्धिः स एव प्रमाणम् । न च चरमेव प्रमाणम् तस्य चरमेव प्रमाणम् स एव प्रमाणम् द्रव्यव्यवहारं महत्स्य चानुपपत्त्युत्तरे कारणत्वम् अनेकद्रव्यप्रत्ययमादायैव अन्यथा महत्त्वमेव न स्यात् कस्य कारणत्वमभ्येत न च चरमेव प्रमाणम् स एव प्रमाणम् महत्त्वमाश्रयत्वेन तेषामपि सावयवस्यानुमानात् तत्तुल्यत्वं कथमवच्छेदं तस्मात् यत् कार्यद्रव्यं तत् सावयव पक्षे सावयव तत् कार्यं द्रव्यम् तथा च यतो श्रव्यव्यात् कार्यस्य निवर्तते तत् सावयवत्वमपीति निरवयवपरमाणुसिद्धिः ॥

difference in size between mount Meru and a grain of mustard seed for they would both be indifferently originated by an infinity of parts Nor can it be argued that the difference depends on an aggregation of extensions for without a difference of number they would be impossible. If it be said that annihilation may be the limit of the series of integrant and integrate bodies we object that there existing indivisibility in some ultimate element annihilation is impossible for it is only disjunction of its constituent parts or decomposition that can destroy matter. Nor is disjunction the limit for it is impossible that it should reside in a single object. A substance therefore without parts, must be the limit and this is an atom. A mote is not the limit for a mote has magnitude and is composed of substances more than one, being a visible substance. For magnitude is a condition of visual perception, only as it presupposes multiplicity of substance. Else magnitude would not exist and what would be the cause? Nor are the constituent parts of a mote atoms, for we must infer that those constituent parts as originative of a substance possessing magnitude are composed of parts like threads or the halves of water pots. Therefore what is generated substance is composed of parts and whatever is composed of parts is a produced substance. In whatever part then there ceases to be the nature of a product there ceases also to be that of containing parts and this is the proof of the existence of invisible atoms. U

1 Thereof means of the primary cause, the effect a mote or other produced substance the mark that which determines an inference. If the series of integrant and integrate wholes were end

1 तस्य मूलकारणस्य कार्ये असंख्येयादिकार्यद्वयम् लिङ्गमनुमापकम् तयाहि अथ यत्राप्यविधाराया अनन्तस्यै मेरुसर्वपयोरापि साम्यप्रसङ्गः अनन्तायप्यवारब्धत्वाविशेषात् अतः क्वचिद्विधायामो वाच्यः न च उभरेणो विधायाम् असंख्येया साधयव चातुषट्पदव्यत्यात् घटप्रदित्यनुमानेन द्व्यणुकरूपतदवयवोरुक्तं नापि द्व्यणुकं सव विधायाम् असंख्येयवयवा साधयवा मददवयवव्यत्यात् कपालवदित्यनुमानेन द्व्यणुकावयवस्य परमाणुरूपस्य मूलकारणस्य मिदं ॥ चेय क्रमेण तदवयवधारापि सिध्येत अनवस्थाभवेनानुकूलतर्काभावेन च तत्कल्पनाया असम्भवात् ॥

less, it would follow that Meru and a grain of mustard seed would be equal, inasmuch as they would both indifferently originate in an infinity of constituent parts. We must therefore allow a termination at some point. But the termination cannot be in a mote inasmuch as it is proved to have parts viz binary atomic aggregates according to the inference that a mote has parts, for it is a visible substance like a water pot. Nor can the series terminate in binary atomic aggregates for by the inference that the constituent parts of a mote must have parts, because they are parts possessed of magnitude, like the halves of a water pot, it is proved that of an aggregate of two atoms there is a part an atom as the primary material cause. It cannot in a like order be proved that this has a series of parts, for the hypothesis is impossible involving an infinite regression and wanting confirmatory circumstances | V

कारणभावात् कार्यभावः ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 From existence of the cause is existence of the effect

¹ From the existence of colour &c. in the cause results its existence in the effect, for the qualities of the cause are antecedent to those of the effect as is observed in the case of a waterpot, a piece of cloth, and the like U

² From the existence of the cause of the primary cause results the existence or being of the effects compound substances. Otherwise as the material cause of earth is earthy it would in like manner follow that, by having the non-existent for a material cause, no product or complex whole would exist V

अनित्य इति विशेषतः प्रतिषेधभावः ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 The negation Non eternal is of the particular

¹ कषादीनां कारणे सत्त्वावात् कार्ये सत्त्वाव कारणमुक्तपूर्वत्वात् तत्र कार्यमुक्ता भवन्ति घटादौ तथा दर्शनादित्यर्थः ॥

² कारणस्य मूलकारणस्य भावात् कार्याख्यमवयवार्थना भावः सत्ता अन्यथा मरुपादानकस्य मयमपस्थान् असदापादानकत्वेन कार्याख्यमवयवार्थनामसत्त्वमद्वादित्यर्थः ॥

1 The negation Non eternal is of the particular relates to particular things and hence arises the negation A compound substance is not eternal. But a universal negation Every thing is not eternal is impossible. V

अविद्या ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 [The supposition that atoms are non eternal is] nonsense

(1) The following objections may be raised. An atom is not eternal for it is matter like a water pot. Similarly the possession of colour taste &c may be adduced as arguments. So also by simultaneous conjunction with six other atoms an atom has six facets or parts, and consequently from its possession of parts and from its being the substratum of conjunction partially inherent we may infer that atoms are non eternal. Moreover if there be ether inside an atom then inasmuch as it has an interior it has parts, but if there be not ether inside an atom it follows that ether is not omnipresent.

Also the non eternity of an atom follows from the inference which establishes the doctrine of transitoriness that whatever is is momentary. If then there be such a series of inferences how can it be maintained that an atom is eternal? The answer is as follows. Every inference having for its object the non eternity of an atom is nonsense in the form of error since it springs from a fallacy. This fallacy is occasionally prevention of proof including the subject al

1 न नित्य इति प्रतिषेधस्य भावो भयं विरोधतः समुपदिश्येमापित्य तथाचाय एषो न नित्य इति प्रतिषेधो भवति न तु सव पदार्थो न नित्य इति सामान्यतः प्रतिषेधो कर्मवति ॥

2 ननु परमाणुर्न नित्य मूलत्वात् घटयत् एव रूपवत्परमवत्त्वादयः प्रत्येक एतद्य उच्येत एव पदकन मुगप्योगात् परमाणा यद्वर्तते तथा च सायवत्त्वात् अद्याप्य इति स्यादाश्रयत्वात् । किञ्च परमाणुर्मध्ये यदाकाशमास्त तदा सच्छिद्रत्वेनैव सायवत्त्वम अथ नाम्ना तदाकाशस्यासर्वगतत्वप्रसङ्गः । अपि च यत् सत तत् क्षणिकमित्यादिर्वाच्य पक्षमाधकानुमानादपि परमाणोरनित्यता तथा चेतावतो चेदनुमानपरम्परा तदा कथं मुच्यत परमाणुनि च इत्यत आह । परमाणोरनित्यत्वप्रतिषेधा स्यादप्यनुमिति अविद्या समरुपा आभासप्रभयत्वात् आपातता धर्मिकादकमानवाध मुच्यत विपक्षमाधकप्रमा यमुच्यत्याहुष्यत्यसिद्धिः प्रयचित् स्वकृपासिद्धिरत्यादि समानतन्त्रे द्रियेष्टव्यम् ॥

ways absence of proof of inclusion due to want of evidence preventive of contrary instances ; sometimes absence of proof as to the predicate. Thus and other matters may be sought in the Samānataura U.

1 Nescience is want of proof, viz the inference of non-eternity of sound ; for it arises from a fallacy, inasmuch as all the aforesaid arguments are vitiated by plurality of consequents V.

Conditions of perception *महत्त्वं नेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् ह्यपञ्चोपलब्धिः ॥ ६ ॥*

Aph ॥ Perception is of the great, in consequence of its containing substances more than one, and in consequence of colour.

1 Perception—visual and tactual presentation—takes place (for these words are to be supplied) in relation to the great, that is, in relation to that which has great extension. There is, accordingly, no perception of an atom inasmuch as it has no magnitude. It might be asked why there is no perception of air &c, there being great extension ; accordingly the words In consequence of colour,—that is in consequence of appreciable colour, and thus though there be colour in the eye &c, there is no perception of it. It might be asked how there exists magnitude in a mote whereas there is none in an atom, accordingly the words In consequence of its containing substances more than one. Since then containing substances more than one is the positive condition with regard to produced magnitude, and this does not exist in an atom &c, magnitude does not exist in an atom, &c. The containing substances more than one is the being a substratum in which a plurality of substances co-inhere V.

1 अत्रिष्टा परमा अर्थात् परमाणोरनित्यस्यानुमितिः दुष्टहेतुजन्यस्यात् पूर्वोक्तानां हेतूनामनेकान्तिरुक्त्यादिति भावः ॥

1 उपलब्धिः चाक्षुषं स्पर्शमत्र प्रत्यक्षम् महति महत्त्वरिमाणवति भवतीति शेषः तथा च परमाणोरनित्यभावाच्च प्रत्यक्षमिति भावः । ननु वाय्वादेरपि महत्त्वरिमाणुत्वात् कथं न प्रत्यक्षमत उक्तं रूपादिति उच्यते रूपादित्यर्थः तेन चतुरादी रूपास्त्ये अपि न प्रत्यक्षम् ननु वस्त्रेषादाद्येव कथं महत्त्वं न परमाणोऽवस्थित उक्तम् अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वादि-
ति तथा च इत्यमहत्त्वं इति अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् परमाणोऽर्थादेव तदभावा-
च्च महत्त्वं अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वं अनेकसमवेतसमवेतत्वमिति ॥

सत्यपि द्रव्यत्वे महत्त्वे रूपसंस्काराभावाद्वायोरनुपलब्धिः ॥ ■ ॥

Aph 7 The non perception of air, though there is therein substantiality and magnitude is in consequence of the non existence of the impression of colour

¹ Such being the case there should, it may be urged, also be perception of the light of a torch at midday or of the light of the eye in which colour inheres in consequence of the inherision of touch and which has magnitude The answer is as follows —By the term impression of colour is intended inherision or appreciability or non obscuration of colour Though therefore the self-same inherision in air of touch is inherision of colour, yet it is not qualified by colour, for there is in it absolute non existence of colour In the light of the eye there is no impression that is no appreciability, of colour In the light of the torch at midday there is no impression, that is no non obscuration of colour Of these, therefore there is no perceptibility In like manner impression of colour is to be analogously applied to the hot season heat or fire within a cooking utensil gold &c U

² Impression of colour, or impressed colour (according to the

¹ नद्येवमपि मध्यन्दिनेल्काप्रकाशस्य चाक्षुषस्य रश्मिर्वायोर्जा स्वर्गसमवायेन रूपममवापिनो महत्तय्योपलभ्य स्यात् अत आह । रूपसंस्कारपदेन रूपसमवायो रूपोऽभयो रूपानभिभवश्च जियदित । तेन धव्यपि वायो य यत्र स्वर्गसमवायः स एव रूपसमवायः तथापि रूपनिरूपितो नास्ति कणात्यन्ताभायस्तत्वात् चाक्षुषे च रश्मौ रूपसंस्कारः रूपोऽभयो नास्ति मध्यन्दिनेल्काप्रकाशे च रूपसंस्कारो रूपानभिभवो नास्ति इति न तेषां प्रत्यक्षता एवं यीष्मोष्मभर्जनरूपालानलरुनकादिषु रूपसंस्कार उच्ये ॥

² रूपसंस्कारः संस्कृत रूपं कृद्विहित इति न्यायात् उद्भूतानभिभूतरूपमिति यावत् तादृशरूपत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मात्माभावाच्च वायो उपलब्धिः प्रत्यक्षमित्यर्थः न च सम्बन्धसत्ताया सम्बन्धिसत्तानियामकत्वात् कथं न वायो कणाधिकरणत्वमिति वाच्यं 'वायो रूप नास्तीति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धेन कणाभावेन विरोधित्वात् वायु रूपशान्तिः प्रत्ययासत्त्वेन तदधिकरणताया साधकाभावाच्च यत्र तु न वाधकं किन्तु साधकान्तरं तत्रैव सम्बन्धसत्तासम्बन्धिसत्तानियामका इत्यभ्युपगमस्यावश्यगत्वात् द्रव्यत्वस्य सत्यकथनन्तु रूपसम्बन्धसत्यज्ञापनार्थम् महत्परिमाणसत्त्वाभिधानानुप्रत्यक्षगारुडसम्येत्यर्थम् उद्भूतत्यपि शेषण भर्जनरूपतादिस्वर्गवायोष्मोष्मचक्षुराक्षुषनाभ्यधारणार्थम् अनभिभूतत्यपिशेषणम् मध्यन्दिनेल्काप्रकाशादि प्रत्यक्षधारणार्थमिति सत्तेषु ॥

rule that a past passive participle may be employed adjectively) amounts to appreciable or to unobscured colour. This not existing or in other words there being non existence of the nature of a substratum having such colour for its essential property there is no perception or sensuous presentation of air. Nor can it be objected. Why is there not in air the nature of a substratum of colour inasmuch as the existence of a connection determines the existence of the connected object? For this is contradictory to the non existence of colour given in the presentative cognition that in air there is no colour, and there is nothing to prove that air is a substratum of colour there being no cognition that air possesses colour. It must be understood that existence of a connection determines the existence of the connected object in such cases only where there is no impossibility and where there is another proof. In fine to affirm the existence of substantiality is to imply the existence of connection with colour. To affirm the existence of great existence is to imply the existence of a cause of perception*. To predicate appreciability is to deny perception of fire within culinary utensils &c and of the hot weather heat &c. To predicate inappreciability is to deny perception of the light of a torch at midday and the like. V

Conditions of perception of colour

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥८॥

Aph 8 Perception of colour is consequent on co-inhesion of substances more than one and on particularity of colour

* Particularity of colour is particularity residing in colour. This is appreciability and non obscuration. On it perception is consequent. The words co-inhesion of substances, more than one are added to meet the possible objection that the colour of an

* रूपगते विज्ञेयो रूपविशेषः तज्ज्ञेयत्वं तत्त्वमनभिमतत्वं रूपस्यैव तस्माद्रूपस्योपलब्धिः । नयेयं परमाणोर्युक्तस्य च रूपं यत्नतेत्यत्र उक्तमनेकद्रव्यसमवायादिति श्रुतेः कथं भूयस्यपरं तेनानेकानि भूयसि दृश्याणि आश्रयतया यस्य तदनेकद्रव्यं चसरेणुप्रभं तत्समवायात् घटादयो ज्योतिर्यदुपायथा* परस्परया ज्ञेयद्रव्याश्रया न च रसस्पर्शादौ रूपस्यविरहात् उक्तं रूपविशेषेणुगते ज्ञातिविशेषे इव रूपस्याप्रियाय ॥

atom and of a binary atomic aggregate would be likewise perceived. The term more than one indicates plurality. Perception therefore, is consequent on the co-inhesion of a plurality of substances from a tertiary atomic aggregate and upwards, of which, as their substratum are substances more than one or a plurality of substances. Water pots and the like, originating in two constituent parts, as viewed in regressive order comprehend of a plurality of substances. Visual perceptibility has no relation to taste, touch &c inasmuch as there does not exist therein the essence of colours. It has no relation to the light of the eye, in consequence of the absence of appreciability. Appreciability is a kind of universal entity residing in a particular quality of colour &c and included in the essence of colour. U

Minima sensibilia. तेन रसगन्धस्पर्शेषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 9 By this is explained cognition in the case of taste smell and touch.

Of the senses other than touch co-inhesion in the same substratum with colour is the positive condition of perceptibility to the external organs. For this reason the conditions of perception of colour thus stated are here extended to other cases. By this means by knowledge afforded by perception of colour. As perception of colour is consequent on a particular kind of colour, that is on non-obscurtion and appreciability in the essence of colour, so perception of taste is contingent upon a particular kind of colour, that is, upon the distinctive quantities of non-obscurtion and appreciability.

स्पर्शान्तिरिक्तानां रूपसामानाधिकरण्यामेव यदिरिन्द्रियपालता प्रयोजकमिति रूपवत्त्वसामयौमिधाय तामन्यत्रातिदिशवाह । तेनेति रूपवत्त्वज्ञानेनेत्यर्थं यथा रूपविशेषात् रूपस्यानभिभूतत्वेऽभूतस्यादृषोपनलित्यस्तथा रसविशेषात् रसस्यानभिभूतत्वेऽभूतत्वनल्लणात् रसोपनलित्यर्थं यथामितरत्रापि योज्यम भवेत्तद्व्यसमवायव्यातिदेशे प्राग् रसनत्यमिन्द्रियाणामनुभवाद्गन्धस्पर्शनामवदृष्टम प्रायाणादाद्यनुभवाद्गन्धस्पर्शयोस्तदभस्मिन् तयो रूपवत्त्वात् तयोऽप्रायाणादायुपनम् एव न तु स्पष्ट इत्येके । विभक्ताययथाव्यप्यद्वयवृत्तानुभवात्तदवदृष्टम यत्र रसस्यापि उच्यते तज्जा रूपस्यानुभवात् स्पर्शस्य चाभिभवान्निततत्कर्तृरुच्येकादौ रूपस्पर्शनामनुभवादन्युपनम्. ॥

ciability in the essence of taste . This remark is to be applied in the other cases (viz those of smell and touch) and co-inhesion of a plurality of substances is to be extended to them . From inappreciability to the organs of smell taste and touch results non apprehension of smells tastes and touches . It is from their inappreciability in a stone and the like that smell and taste are not there perceived , for they are perceived in the ashes of the stone &c . Some maintain that they are perceived indeed in the stone &c but not distinctly . From inappreciability of colour in a substance included in its disjunct elements results its non presentation . This is the case likewise with taste . In hot water in consequence of appreciability of light or fire and of its obscuration by touch is non perception of light or fire . In comminuted camphor champaka perfume &c in consequence of their inappreciability is non perception of colour taste and touch U

तस्याभावादव्यभिचार ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 Because of the non existence of this there is no deviation

1 Gravity also is inherent in a plurality of substances and has a common substratum with colour and magnit ide . Why is it not perceptible ? This objection is obviated . Because of the non existence in gravity of the universal appreciability which is the nature of colour gravity is not perceptible

It might be said that granted that the essence of colour &c does not exist yet there may be perception . Accordingly the

1 ननु गुरुत्वादेः कथं न प्रत्यक्षं महत्त्वस्य उद्भूतरूपस्य च सामानाधिकरण्यस्य मध्येन तत्र सत्त्वादित्यत आह । अत्र तत्पदेन अपकान्तिस्यापि कारणरूपापस्य परामर्शं कार्योत्पत्तिर्योजकतया तस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् तथा च तस्य कारणरूपापस्य श्रमायात् अ सत्त्वात् अन्यभिचार उद्भूतरूपाभाव कार्यकारणभावकल्पनायां गुरुत्वदेः नान्यपक्ष्य भिचार इत्यर्थः तथा च सौकर्यविषयतासम्यग्धेन प्रत्यक्षसामान्य प्रत्यक्षातीन्द्रियाणां गुरुत्वादानां गुरुत्वस्यादीनां प्रतिजन्यतास्वीकारस्यावश्यकत्वेन तदन्योन्याभावस्य गुरुत्वादायस्यैव सामान्यभावाच्च गुरुत्वादेः प्रत्यक्षमिति भावः यत्तन्मात्रार्थस्तु एतस्मिन् मन्येयं व्याख्यातं स्वीकृतञ्च गुरुत्वादेः स्पर्शनप्रत्यक्षमिति सद्यः ॥

words no deviation are added, for it is a law that there is no deviation (or unduly wide or narrow assertion) of the five universal entities, the essences of colour &c, in relation to apprehensibility by the respective organs of sense. For there only where there is one of the five classes, colour &c, is there apprehensibility by the respective exterior organs, according to the logical form, that whereby absence of the one infers absence of the other. Gravity, by reason of the obscurity of the subject of the aphorism, by Pīśāstadeva classed among things transcendental is by Vallabhācharya said to be perceived by touch. U

It might be asked why there is no perception of gravity &c, since magnitude and appreciable colour exist there in a relation of juxtaposition in a common substratum. Accordingly the answer is given. In this place by the word this there is reflection upon a number of causes not stated in the text, but which are well known as positive conditions of realisations of the effect. From the non existence of this complement of causes results non deviation (i. e., neither excess nor defect of predication), that is on the hypothesis of the causal relation of appreciable colour &c there is deviation of affirmation in relation to gravity &c. By reason therefore of the relation of common objectivity to perception in general, and the necessity of admitting that the nature of gravity &c is preventive of the presentation of gravity and the like, which are transcendental and by reason of the non-existence in gravity of the mutually exclusive non existence of these, there being no instrument there is no perception of gravity &c. By Vallabhācharya this aphorism is otherwise explained and maintained, viz, that of gravity &c there is tactual perception. V

Common
sensib as

सत्यः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्व संयोगविभागे परत्वा-
परत्वे कर्म च रूपिद्रव्यसमवायात् चाक्षुषाणि ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 Numbers, extensions, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, and action, as inhering in coloured substance, are visible

¹ Things perceptible by one organ of sense having being discussed those perceptible by two are enumerated. The absence of compounds is to indicate the mutual independence of these as visible and tangible. Though magnitude is supposed it is not by the nature of extension. The word and involves the addition of viscosity, fluidity, and velocity. The term visible implies tangibility, or the particle and may be applicable here after visible. The word numbers in the plural comprehends all numbers from unity upwards. If it be held that unity is a universal entity, and not a quality, then if it exist in substance only, it is existence as of neither less nor greater extent than the nature of substance, if, on the other hand it exist in qualities and actions also it is existence as of neither less nor greater extent than real existence. If it be asked how then in the former case there is the nature of unity &c in quality &c it may be answered that it is by unity imputed, or that by reason of the notion of co inherence in one substance, the nature of unity is justly affirmed. This unity is eternal in eternal substances in non eternal substances it has for its non coincident or external cause causal unity. Duality &c is resultant from relative cognition. Relative cognition is the mental basis of various unities when two homogeneous or heterogenous substances are in contact with the organ of vision U

² Things perceptible by two organs of sense are enumerated

¹ एवमेकैकेन्द्रिययाह्वानमिधाय द्वीन्द्रिययाह्वानात् । इति वा चाक्षुषस्ये स्पर्शनस्ये वा परस्परानपेक्षत्यमुच्यते नान्यथा यद्यपि महत्त्वापेक्षा इति तथापि न परिमाणत्वेन चकार सैद्धयत्ययोगानामुपसर्गाद्यर्थं चाक्षुषाणीति स्पर्शनत्वमप्युपलभ्यति यद्वा चकार यत्र चाक्षुषाणि चेत्यत्रापि येषु सङ्ख्या इति धर्तृत्वमप्युपलभ्यते सङ्ख्या सङ्ख्या इति यत्त्व सामान्यमेव न तु गुण इति चेत् तद यदि द्रव्यमात्रमिति तदद्रव्यत्वेन सद्धान्तानतिरिक्तवृत्तिरिक्तवृत्तित्वमथ गुणकर्मणोरपि वर्तते तदा सप्तधा सद्धान्तानतिरिक्तवृत्तित्वमथ कथं तर्हि गुणद्रव्यव्येकत्वमिति प्रत्यक्षमिति ज्ञेयं प्रारोपितेनैव त्वेन एकार्थसमवायप्रत्यासत्त्या सम्भवेकत्वप्रत्यमयो वा तदेतदेकत्व नित्यद्रव्येषु नित्यमश्रित्येषु चकारणीकृत्यासमवायिकारणम् ॥

² द्वीन्द्रिययाह्वानात् । चाक्षुषाणीत्यत्रापि पूर्वचकारो योजनीयः तेन सङ्ख्यादीनि कर्मपर्यन्तानि रूपद्रव्यसमवेतानि चाक्षुषाणि स्पर्शनानि चेत्यर्थं कर्म चेति चकारात् उद्भूतरूपद्रव्याणां योग्यताना सैद्धयद्रव्याणां जातीनाञ्च सद्यः ॥

After the word visible the preceding particle and is to be construed The meaning is then that these entities beginning with sound and ending with action inherent in coloured substance are visible and tangible The particle and after the word action includes by implication viscosity velocity fluidity and their universal essences. The word coloured indicates appreciability and consequently there is no incongruity in the fact that these entities, when existent in atoms &c are not perceptible V

अरूपिष्वचक्षुषाणि ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 In uncoloured substances they are imperceptible to sight

1 The invisibility of these when existing in inappropriate i e uncoloured substances though involved in the preceding aphorism is stated for the sake of perspicuity The meaning is that these are invisible and intangible in uncoloured or inappropriate subjects It is not said that they are imperceptible because of the arising of an internal perception of the unity of soul V

एतेन गुणस्य भावे च सर्वेन्द्रिय व्याख्यतम् ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 By this it is explained that knowledge in regard to quality and existence is of all the senses

1 Existence means being of all the senses produced by all the senses knowledge perception The sense is therefore that these inasmuch as they are appropriate to are cognised by all the senses V

1 रूपिष्वचक्षुषाणि ॥ १२ ॥ अरूपिष्वचक्षुषाणि ॥ १२ ॥ अरूपिष्वचक्षुषाणि ॥ १२ ॥ अरूपिष्वचक्षुषाणि ॥ १२ ॥ अरूपिष्वचक्षुषाणि ॥ १२ ॥

1 भाव सत्ता सर्वेन्द्रिय सर्वेन्द्रियजन्यम् ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष तथा च संयोग सर्वेन्द्रिय योग्यद्वितित्यात् सर्वेन्द्रियैस्ते यज्यते इति भावः ॥

SECOND DAILY LESSON

The totality of the
non-etereal substances

तत् पुन एषियादिकार्यद्रव्य त्रिविध शरीरेन्द्रिय
विषयकसत्तम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 The aforesaid product substance earth and the like
is threefold under the names of body organ and object

1 Of these corporeity is a kind of universal attribute an ab-
solute whole possessing action and having for its non cohererent
cause conjunction, with soul endowed with volition but corporeity
is not a universal entity for terrestriality does not admit of the
generic and specific. The nature of an organ is adaptability to the
common sensory sensitive of knowledge other than reminiscence
or susceptibility of conjunction with the internal organ causative
of knowledge accompanied with insusceptibility of the appreciable
particular qualities other than sound In regard to the light of
the eye of animals that prevail at night another kind of light must
be admitted and in regard to visuality the words insusceptibility of
appreciable particular qualities other than sound and colour are to
be added While the nature of an object is to be the means of
phenomenal experience that is to say to be an object of ordinary
presentation which is common to substance quality action gene-
rality and non existence it is in accordance with the aphorism
product substantiarity the object of common internal presentation for
it is stated in the aphorism that earth and other product substances
are three fold Objectivity also then is not a universal entity U

1 तत्र शरीरस्य प्रथमवृत्तात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणवत्तत्क्रियावदन्याग्रयवित्त्वम् उपा-
धिभेदः न ॥ शरीरस्य जाति एषियोत्यादीना परापरभाषानुपपत्ते इन्द्रियस्यैव स्मृत्य
जनकज्ञानकारणमन संयोगाद्यप्यस्य शब्देनरोत्तुतत्रियेषत्रियेषगुणानाद्यप्यस्य सति ज्ञान
कारणमन संयोगाद्यप्यस्य या नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिस्तु तेजान्तरमेव चतुर्थ्ये ॥ शब्दरूपेतरौ
तुतत्रियेषगुणानाद्यप्यस्य सतीति देवम न त्विन्द्रियस्य जाति एषियोत्यादीना परापर
भाषानुपपत्ते विषयस्यैव यथापि प्रतीयमानभोगसाधनत्वम् तच्च नैतिकसाक्षात्कारयि
ष्यत्यस्य द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्याभायसाधारण्यम् सहायि सूत्रानुराधात् नैतिकसाक्षा-
त्कारविषयकाप्यद्रव्यस्य दृष्टव्यम् एषियादिकार्यद्रव्यम् त्रिविधिर्भिति सूत्रम् तथा च
विषयस्यमपि न जातिः ॥

1 Of these corporeity is a universal existing in that which possesses muscular action existing only in an absolute whole. In this definition the second existing is intended to exclude existence as in a hand, terrestriality, substantiality, existence &c. The term existing in that which possesses muscular motion, is intended to exclude conjunction of water-pots, bodies, &c. The universal, therefore, in the definition is applicable to human and other bodies by consideration of humanity, the nature of Chaitra, and other universals. There exists in trees &c organic motion through connection with divine air, otherwise fractures and wounds in them would not close up. From the multiplicity of the man-lion's (Vishnu's) body, according to the division of sons, the definition may be applied to it by consideration of the universal nature of the man lion. But corporeity is not to be defined only as universal, for thus there would be confusion with terrestriality &c, nor is the substratum of muscular motion, for the definition would be too narrow in relation to body deprived of organic movement. The nature of an organ also is not to be defined only as universal, for there would thus re-

1 अत्र शरीरत्वम् अन्वयव्यतिरेकमात्रेण चेष्टावृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं दृष्टव्यं पृथिवीत्यद्वयस्य सत्त्वादिधारणाय प्रथमदृष्टान्तम् घटस्थादिधारणाय चेष्टावृत्तिर्नास्ति घटशरीरसंयोगादि धारणाय जातेति मनुष्यस्यैवैतस्यादिजातिमादाय मानुषादिशरीरे लक्षणमन्यथ दृष्टा दावपि चेष्टा स्तुत्येव आध्यात्मिकव्यापुसम्यन्थात् अन्वया भागवत्सहरोदणादिकं न स्यात् कल्पभेदेन नृसिंहशरीरस्य मानात्मात् नृसिंहत्वजातिमादाय तत्र लक्षणमन्यथ न तु शरीरत्व जाति पृथिवीत्यादिना सङ्कृतात् नापि चेष्टाव्यवस्थाम् निश्चेष्टाशरीरे ऽप्यास्ते । इन्द्रियत्वमपि न जाति पृथिवीत्यादिना सङ्कृतात् किन्तु शब्देतरौभूतविशेषगुणानां द्रव्यत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमन संयोगावस्थित्यम् इन्द्रियमन संयोगवर्त्मन संयोगात्ममनसं योगाज्ञानकारणानीति धर्मव्याप्तिरिति चातिव्याप्तिधारणाय सत्यन्तम् योत्रे ऽव्याप्तिधारणाय शब्देतरिति व्याघादिनयनरस्मेश्चक्षुष्यस्वीकारे ॥ रूपेतरित्यति घटव्यम् घाणादौ गन्धादिसत्त्वाद्युत्पत्तेति शुक्लत्यादिव्याप्यम् अनुभूतत्व जातिर्नान्यत्र तदभावात्कृत्यमुत्पत्तस्य तच्च संयोग ऽव्यतिरेकसमवधारणाय विशेषेति कालदिगादावतिव्याप्तिधारणाय ज्ञानकारणेति चक्षुरवयवविषयसंयोगस्यापि चक्षुर्विषयसंयोगद्वारा ज्ञानजननत्वस्वीकारात् चक्षुरवयवादौ चक्षु मयुक्तकालविशेषणताया कालादौ रूपभावाच्चाक्षुरस्य जनकतया तदघटसंयोगस्यापि स्थावराविशेषणतासम्यन्धेन चाक्षुषकारणत्वात् तमादाय कालादौ चातिव्याप्तिधारणाय मन पदम् विषयत्वञ्च साक्षात् परम्परया दोषभोगसाधनत्वे सति जन्यद्वयत्वम् तस्य शरीरेन्द्रियवृत्तित्वेऽपि शिष्यवृद्धिरेषद्वार्यं तयो एवगुत्कीर्तनमिति मतेऽपि ॥

sult a confusion with terrestriality &c., but as the site of conjunction with the common sensory causative of cognitions, and not the site of appreciable particular qualities other than sound. The words not the site &c. are intended to prevent an unduly wide predication in regard to the cuticle, and the soul, the causes of cognitions being conjunction of the common sensory and the external organs of sense, conjunction of the cuticle and the internal organ, and conjunction of the soul and the internal organ .. The nature of an object is product substantiality, being the means of experiences in an immediate succession. Though it exists in body and organs, it is separately enumerated to give a more distinct conception to the learner. V

प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां संयोगस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात् पञ्चात्मकं न विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 The body is not composed of the five elements, for the conjunction of things perceptible and imperceptible is imperceptible

¹ The author now proceeds to refute the assertion that the body is composed of three or four elements. Were the body by reason of its odour moisture heat, breath and compressibility, composed of five elements, the body would be imperceptible in the same manner in which conjunction of wind with trees is imperceptible. The aphorism employs an example. After the word is the word body is to be supplied. Moisture, digestive heat and the other qualities exist only in their respective substances water, fire &c. Such is the case also with regard to four elements. Let it then it may

¹ इदानीं शरीरस्य त्रैभौतिकत्वचातुर्भौतिकत्वप्रपाद निराकर्तुमाह । गन्धस्पर्शवाक् कष्टरूपाद्यकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकं यदि शरीरं भवेत् तदा अप्रत्यक्षं भवेत् यथा प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां सायुजनस्थतीनां संयोगो अप्रत्यक्षस्तथा शरीरमप्यप्रत्यक्षं स्यादिति दृष्टान्तद्वारा सूत्रं पञ्चात्मकं न विद्यते इति शरीरमिति शेषः स्पर्शवाक्कादयस्तु उपपदम्भक्तजनानलगता एव चातुर्भौतिकोप्येवमनन्वस्तु त्रैभौतिकमत्रयणा भूतानां प्रत्यक्षत्वादिति चेच्च विज्ञातोपायम्भस्य प्रतिषेधात् एकस्य गुणस्याग्रार्थानं गुणानारम्भकत्वात् तद् यदि पृथिवीजनाभ्यामारम्भः स्यात् तदा तदा रज्यमवन्धमरसञ्चत्वात् एव पृथिव्यनलाभ्यामगन्धमरुपमरसञ्चः स्यात् पृथिव्यनलाभ्यामगन्धमरसमरुपमस्यैव स्यादित्याद्युद्धम् ॥

be urged, consist of three elements, for three elements are perceptible. This is not the case for an integration out of heterogeneous elements is denied. One quality in a whole is not originative of other qualities. If therefore the commencement were from earth and water, that which they originate would be void of odour and taste. In like manner if it originated in earth, and air, it would be destitute of smell, taste, colour and touch. Such and other inferences are obvious. U

गुणान्तराद्भादुर्भावाच्च न च्यात्मकम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph ३ The body is not composed of three elements, because there is not manifested another quality

1 A body originated by quality, perceptible earth, water, and light might be perceptible if there were manifested in it another quality having for its antecedent a quality of the cause. This is not the case, for it has been already stated that a single odour &c. is not originative. Therefore the body is not composed of three elements nor originated by three coloured substances. U

अणुसंयोगस्त्यप्रतिषिद्धः ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 A conjunction of atoms is not denied

1 How then do we observe digestive heat &c. in one single body? The answer is given in the text. A mutual conjunction of the five elements as receptive of one another is not denied. But

1 एषिष्यत्तेजसा प्रत्यक्षाणामेवार्थं शरीरं प्रत्यक्षत्वादपि यदि तत्र गुणान्तरं कारुण्यपूर्णकं प्रादुर्भावेत न त्वेतदस्ति शक्यं गन्धादेरनारम्भस्त्यस्योक्तत्वात् तथा न च्यात्मकमपि शरीरं न रूपद्वयतत्त्वात्तत्रावयवमपीत्यर्थः ॥

1 कथं तर्ह्येकस्मिन्नेव शरीरे पाकादीनामुपपन्नम् इत्यत आह । मिथं पचदानां भूतानां परस्परमुपपत्तिरुक्तत्वात् संयोगो न निषिध्यते किन्तु विजातीययोरेकत्रादौ प्रत्यक्षसमवायिकारणं संयोगो नेष्यते तथा च तदुपपत्त्यात् पाकादीनां शरीरे भवत्युपपन्नमिति तर्हि किमप्युक्तिरुमिदं मानुषशरीरमित्यत्र मैतमीयं सूत्रमुपपत्तिरिति परिचयं तद्विशेषगुणोपपत्त्ये एषियंविशेषगुणो गन्धो मानुषशरीरे आनाशमनपायो दृश्यते पाकादप्यस्तु शुष्कशरीरे नापत्तमप्यने इति तेषामेवाधिकृत्य गन्धस्य स्यामाधिकृत्यमिति परिचयव्यवस्थिते. ॥

It is not affirmed that two heterogeneous atoms are the non-coincident cause of a substance. It is, therefore, in consequence of the receptivity of those that vital heat &c is observed in the body. If it be asked then, of what nature the human body is, we cite the aphorism of Gautama:—That the body is terrestrial, for the particular quality (of earth) is observed. Odour the particular quality of earth is observed in the human body as not departing from it till its dissolution. Vital heat &c is not observed in the decayed body. These qualities, therefore, are accidental, but its odour is essential according to the constitution of terrestriality. U

तत्र शरीरं द्विविधं योनिजमयोनिजञ्च ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5. Of these, body is twofold uterine and non-uterine

1 Of these—among terrestrial, aqueous and other bodies—the terrestrial body is twofold. What are the two kinds? It is answered in the text that they are uterine and non uterine. Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies, known in the spheres of Varuna, the sun, and air, are exclusively non-uterine. The bodies of gods and sages are non-uterine, according to the text of revelation, Manu and others the sensorial sons of Brahmā. If it be asked how there can be an effect without a cause, we reply that the womb is not a

1 तत्र पार्थिववाय्वादिशरीरेषु मध्ये पार्थिवं शरीरं द्विविधम् के ते द्वे विधे इत्यत्राह । योनिजमयोनिजञ्चेति आप्यतेजसवायवीयशरीराणां दहनवादित्प्रायुलोकेषु प्रसिद्धानामयोनिजत्वमेव अयोनिजत्वं शुक्रशोणितसचिपातानपेक्षत्यम् अयोनिजञ्च देवानामपीत्याञ्च ब्रूयते हि ब्रह्मणो मानसा मन्यादय इति कारणमन्तरेण कथं काव्यमिति चेत् योनिः शरीरत्वाच्छेदेनाकारणत्वात् उष्मजकृमिमशकादिशरीरेष्वभिचारात् संस्था नविशेषतस्तस्य चासिद्धेः देवार्थशरीरापेक्षया प्रमदादिशरीराणामन्यादृशत्वात् योनिजम् द्विविधं जरायुजमपहजञ्च जरायुजमानुषपशुमगाणां गर्भाशयस्य जरायुजत्वात् सर्पकोटि-भस्मादयो ऽपि कुरिष्यन् इव अस्मादि जलादयो ऽपि शरीरेभ्यो इव भोगादिष्वनन्तरात् ॥ खलु भोगाधिष्ठानत्यमन्तरेण जीवनमरणस्यप्रजारणभेदप्रयोगयोऽसंजातीयानुबन्धानुक्तोपागमप्रतिभूनापगमादयः सम्भवति युद्धवृत्तभग्नसरोरेण च भोगोपपादके स्फुटे यव आगमे ऽप्यस्ति नर्मदातीरसम्भूताः शरसाञ्जुनपादयाः नर्मदातीरसस्यशात् ते यानि परमां गतिम् इत्यादिः प्रमशाने जायते वृक्षकण्डूगन्धादिसेवितः इत्यादिप्रवृत्त्यापि चेष्टावत्त्वमिन्द्रियवत्त्वञ्च नोत्पिदां स्फुटतरमती न शरीरव्यवहारः ॥

cause essential to corporeity, for the affirmation that it was so would be erroneous in regard to the bodies of worms mosquitoes &c, generated by warmth. No difference of constitution is known for our bodies are not different in appearance from those of the divine sages. The uterine is twofold viviparous and oviparous. Viviparous are the bodies of men and animals wild and domestic. The bodies of birds and reptiles are oviparous. Snakes worms fishes &c are called reptiles because it is their nature to creep about. Though trees &c are a kind of bodies being subjects of fruition—for life death sleep waking, the use of medicine seminal propagation, desire of the agreeable, aversion from the disagreeable &c are impossible without a subject of fruition and growth and the closing up of fractures are manifest means of fruition, and there is the sacred text. The Karala and Aijuna trees which grow on the banks of the Narmada from contact with the waters of the river attain to the highest state hereafter &c and such as in the burning ground grows a tree hunted by heroes and vultures yet germinant bodies do not evidently possess muscular motion and sensitive organs and they are not therefore in common usage called bodies. U

Non uterine bodies
or it

अनियतदिदेशः पूर्वकृत्यात् ॥ ६ ॥

Aph ॥ Because (the non uterine body) has antecedents of indeterminate time and space,—

It might be asked how the non uterine body of Manu and

ननु मन्द्यादीनामयोनिजं शरीरं कथमुत्पद्यते शुक्रशोणितारमरुपरमाणुनामेष्वपि शिष्टशरीरारम्भकृत्येन तत्र तदभावादित्याशङ्क्यामाह । अनियता दिदेशो यत्र ते अनियतदिदेशा परमाणवस्तत्पूर्वकृत्यात् तदधीनत्वात् सन्त्ययोनिजा इति दशमसूत्रेण पञ्चमान्तानां चतुर्णां सूत्राणामन्यथ तत्रा च धरुणस्याकाशे अयोनिजा आप्या तेजसा वायव्यो वा मानसाश्च देहा मन्ति तेन शुक्रशोणिताराद्यनपक्षोत्पत्तिकानामारम्भका परमाणवः कुत आगच्छन्ति योनिजेषु शुक्रशोणितपरमाणव सधारम्भका दृष्टा इत्याशङ्कानिरासार्थमुक्तमिदं धारिण्या ज्ञेया तेजसा वायव्यवायश्च परमाणव सत्त्वापु दिव्य सत्त्वपु देहेषु च मन्ति तेन दिग्देशनियमाभावात् अयोनिजशरीरात्पत्तौ न परमा सुदुर्भेदम न हि शुक्रशोणितपरमाणुभिवा परमाणवो न देहारम्भका दशमशतकस्य त्वादित्येनोपपत्तिप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः ॥

others is produced seeing that it is atoms originative of semen and blood that are originative of a particular body, and that these do not there exist. In anticipation of this difficulty the aphorism is stated Atoms indeterminate in time and space are those which are not restricted to particular time and space. From having these for their antecedents or conditions, there exist non uterine bodies, such being the connection of the four aphorisms succeeding the fifth with the tenth. There exist, therefore in the sphere of Varuna &c non uterine bodies, aqueous, igneous aerial sensorial. To meet the question as to whence come the atoms originative of beings whose production is independent of semen blood &c, it being seen that in the case of uterine bodies it is only seminal and sanguineous atoms that are originative the following statement has been made. Atoms terrene aqueous, igneous and aerial, exist in all quarters and are in all places and there being no local determination of the ether there is no lack of atoms in the production of non uterine bodies. For it is not true that no atoms other than seminal or sanguineous are originative of bodies since were it so, it would follow that there was no production of the bodies of gnats, mus juncos trees shrubs &c | V

धर्मप्रतिषेधाच्च ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 Also because of peculiar merit

| The sense is that in creation &c motion arises in the atoms in consequence only of conjunction of soul with the fruits of actions done in a former state of being, and that the atoms having by that action come together originate in the order of binary atomic aggregates &c the non uterine bodies of divine sages and others | The following explanation is also to be considered that this is in consonance

१ अदृष्टशरीरात्मनो योऽयं देव सर्गादौ परमात्मना धर्मं तेन च कर्मणा समुप परमात्मनो ह्यनुकर्मस्य अयोनिः देवर्षी । शरीरमारभन्ते इत्ययं उपनिषत्प्रत्ययः अधर्मप्रतिषेधाच्च सुदृजन्तु सामुद्रिकानां मशकादीनां यतनामपानि शरीरादनुत्पद्यन्ते इत्यपि दृश्यं ॥

quence of peculiar dement that the tortured bodies of mosquitoes and other insects generated by heat are produced U

समाख्याभावाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Also because names exist

1 Because names or terms are or exist, without an ancestor or father to bestow them, for these words, are to be supplied For not all names are imposed by a father &c, such terms as water pot, cloth, not being thus assigned It is therefore the same God who imposed names on water pots, cloth and other inanimate things, that imposed the names Manu Marichi &c on non uterine bodies V

सज्ञाया अनादित्वात् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 9 Because the name is without beginning

2 By means of the primordial name Brahma &c which became manifest in creation &c it is known that non uterine body exists For there are not parents of Brahmā, by whom the name Brahmā should be invented U

सन्त्ययोनिसाः ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 There exist non uterine bodies

3 Here is pointed out that which is established by the four preceding aphorisms The words peculiar bodies of Manu Marichi, and others are to be supplied V

घटलिङ्गाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 (This follows) also from the evidence of the Veda

1 समाख्या सज्ञा तस्याभावात् सत्त्वात् योजिषिवादिक् धिर्नधेति शेषः न हि सर्व्वं सज्ञा पित्रादिर्नैव निर्धेशिता घटपटादिसञ्ज्ञानान्तर्गताभ्यामायात तथा च येन प्रवरेण घटपटादयधेतनेषु सज्ञा निर्धेशितास्तेनैव मनुमरीच्यादिसञ्ज्ञा अयोनितेषु यरीरेषु निर्धेशिता इति भावः ॥

2 सज्ञादि वा ब्रह्मादिसञ्ज्ञा आदिभूता प्रायमिकीतया क्रियते अस्ययोनिसा गरी रमिति न हि तदा ब्रह्मणे मातापितरौ स्तः पाश्चा ब्रह्मादिसञ्ज्ञा कृता स्यादिति भावः ॥

3 इदानीं घटपटादिसञ्ज्ञा मूत्राणां साध्य निर्दिशति मनुमरीच्यादीनां देहधिशेषा इति शेषः ॥

reveals the flavour of grain fried and ground This is cognisant of taste and the classes contained under it Smell and taste have no power to cognise matter The organ of vision is igneous, for whereas it does not manifest odour &c it does manifest colour, in the same manner as the light of a lamp This organ, by contact in the form of conjunction cognises substances of appreciable colour and possessed of magnitude It cognises also by contact in the form of co-inherence in the conjunct, colour, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity, viscosity, fluidity, motion, and generality existing in such substances By contact in the form of co-inherence in the co-inherent in the conjunct it cognises universal entities existent in that which exists in the existent (such as the nature of the class cow, such nature existing in the class which exists in its constituent members.) By being qualitative of the conjunct by being qualitative of the co-inherent in the conjunct &c it cognises universal non existences (viz antecedent subsequent and absolute non existence) which are non-existent in the existent and also reciprocal non existences (such as the non existence of a water pot as a piece of cloth) which are non-existent in the non-existent residing in the existent According to the system of *Kanāla* there is no perception of co-inherence. The organ of touch pervades the body and is cognisant of appreciable touches and the classes therein contained It thus cognises the objects cognisable to the eye with the exception of colour and the universal entities residing in colour only According to the moderns it also cognises air Its contact (with the tactile object) is as described above. The form of inference respecting it is therefore as follows — This organ is aerial for while it does not manifest colour &c it does manifest touch like the wind from a fan which manifests coldness in the perspiration adhering to the limbs In all the aforesaid inferences the clause beginning with while or whereas is inserted to prevent an undue applicability to soul the internal organ &c So also, to prevent undue applicability to contact, we

must add the qualification there being substantiality. The organ of hearing is ether limited to the outer part of the ear. This cognises sounds by co-inherence and the universals contained in sounds by co-inherence in the co-inherent. What-ever organ is cognisant of anything is cognisant also of the universal non-existences in it non-existent, and of the reciprocal non-existences residing in it. So much for the five external organs. The common sensory is an internal organ, and by conjunction cognises soul tinged with its peculiar attributes. By co-inherence in the conjunct it cognises thought, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition, and a universal viz, the nature of soul. By co-inherence in the co-inherent in the conjunct it cognises the universals existent in thought, &c. A full discussion of the subject may be sought elsewhere. V

FIFTH BOOK FIRST DAILY LESSON

Action ^{तत्त्व} ~~तत्त्व~~ ३३ आत्मसंयोगप्रयत्नाभ्या हस्ते कर्म ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1. Action in the hand is by means of conjunction with, and volition of, soul.

¹ The object of the fifth chapter is the investigation of action. The investigation of action determinable by volition is that of the first daily lesson. In this there are sections treating of (1) throwing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without volition, (3) of action which has merit for its cause, (4) of actions good bad and indifferent. The aphorism is propounded in relation to a particular kind of muscular action. Action in the hand as its co-inherent cause is its means of conjunction with soul and of volition of soul. Of this action the non-co-inherent cause is conjunction with soul.

[illegible]

possessing volition / Volition is the efficient cause This is muscular action, for muscular action is action whose non coincherent cause is conjunction with soul possessing volition or action produced by volition of a subject other than the tangible which is not coincherent with or excluded from, self U

तथ हस्तसयोगाच्च मुसले कर्म ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 In like manner and from conjunction with the hand is action in the pestle .

1 By the particle and gravity is implied is another efficient cause In like manner from conjunction with the hand may also mean from conjunction with the hand possessed of upward motion In this instance the non coincherent cause is conjunction of the pestle with the hand conjunct with soul possessing volition The coincherent cause is the pestle The efficient causes are volition and gravity U

अभिघातने मुसलादेः कर्मणि व्यतिरेकादकारण हस्तसयोग ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 In the action produced in a pestle and the like by impact conjunction with the hand is not a cause being excluded from it

1 The cause of the sudden upward motion which is produced in the pestle when struck by the mortar is stated In this instance though there is conjunction of the hand with the rising

1 चकारेण गुह्य निमित्तकारणान्तर समुच्चिनोति तथेति तादृशमुत्प्रेषणमर्थे त्वर्थे यद्वा तथा हस्तसयोगादुत्प्रेषणवद्वस्तसयोगादित्यर्थं अत्र च प्रयत्नदात्ममयु न ह स्तेन मुसलस्य सयोगा असमवायिकारणम् मुसल समवायिकारणम् प्रयत्नगुह्ये निमित्त कारण ॥

1 उद्वृत्ताभिघातस्य मुसलस्याकस्माद् यदुत्पत्तनं जायते तत्र कारणमाह । अत्र यद्यपि मुसलन उत्पत्तता हस्तस्य सयोगो ऽप्यस्ति तथा अपि स सयोगो अन्यथा सिद्ध किन्तु उद्वृत्ताभिघात एव असमवायिकारणम् कुत गमिष्यत आह । व्यतिरेकादिति प्रयत्नस्य व्यभिचारादित्यर्थं यदि यद्वा प्रयत्न स्यात् मुसलस्यैवाकस्मिकमुत्पत्तनं न भवत् विधारकण प्रयत्नं मुसलस्य धारणमव भवत चट्टाधीन मुसलस्य पुनरुत्पत्तनं वा भवेत् इति भावः ॥

pestle, such conjunction is superfluous if regarded as a cause. The impact of the mortar is only the non coherent cause. It may be asked why this is the case. It is therefore stated that it is so because of the exclusion, that is, because volition would too widely or too narrowly predicated. If there were volition in this case, there would be no sudden upward motion in the pestle. By a volition to hold the pestle and mortar apart there would be a mere sustention of the pestle, or the upward motion of the pestle would depend upon volition. U.

तथात्मसयोगो हस्तकर्मणि ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 In like manner conjunction with soul in relation to action in the hand (is not a cause)

The aphorism is stated with the purpose of specifying a particular cause of the action of the hand as it flies upwards with the pestle, and of disproving the non coherent causality of conjunction with soul exercising volition. The meaning is that conjunction with soul that is conjunction with soul exercising volition, is likewise not a cause of action in the hand as it suddenly rises with the pestle. The term not a cause is in the preceding aphorism. The words in like manner are used to imply analogy. U.

अभिघातान्मुसलसयोगादुत्ते कर्म ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 The action in the hand is from impact and from conjunction with pestle

An answer is furnished to the question Whence then at

मुसलेन सद्योत्पत्तौ हस्तस्य कर्मणि कारको विशेषमभिधानु प्रयत्नप्रदात्मसयोगः स्यात्समवायिकारणत्वं निराकर्तुमाह । मुसलेन सद्योत्पत्तौ हस्तस्य कर्मणि आत्मसयोगः प्रयत्नप्रदात्मसयोगस्तथा अकारणमित्यर्थः अकारणमिति पूर्व्यमूत्रस्य तथेति तिदिशते ॥

कुतस्तर्हि हस्ते तदोत्पत्तनमत आह । यथा मुसले उत्पत्तिः मुसलमुद्रस्य बोहो सुत्पत्तिः तथा हस्तेऽपि तदोत्पत्तिः अत्राभिघातशब्देन अभिघातजनितः सस्कार उच्यते उपचारात् उत्पत्तौ मुसलस्य षट्सरेण कर्मणा अभिघातमदुरुतेन स्याद्यथे मुसले सस्कारो जनितस्तत्कृतः सस्कारमपेक्ष्य हस्तमुसलसयोगादसमवायिकारणादुत्तेऽप्युत्पत्तनं न तु तदुत्पत्तनं प्रयत्नप्रदात्मसयोगासमवायिकारणम् अत्रो हि हस्ते मुसलेन सद्योत्पत्तीति भावः ॥

that time the upward motion of the hand ? The hand rises at that time in the same manner in which the metal at the end of the pestle rises . By the word impact, is elliptically expressed recoil produced by impact. A recoil is produced in the pestle as its substratum by the vigorous action in the pestle accompanied with the impact. The upward motion in the hand also is consequent upon conjunction of the hand and pestle in relation to the recoil so effected, as its non-coherent cause. But this upward motion has not for its non-coherent cause conjunction with soul exercising volition, for the hand rises involuntarily together with the pestle
U

आत्मकर्म हस्तसयोगाच्च ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 Action of the soul is also from conjunction with the hand

¹ An answer is furnished to the objection In the case of the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body, conjunction with soul exercising volition is the cause why is it not so in the present instance ? The term soul tropically signifies a portion of the body. The impossibility of literal construction is the germ of tropical interpretation. The action then of the soul that is of a member of the body, that is of the hand results from conjunction of the hand and pestle. The word and implies also velocity. In the action of the hand conjunction with the hand is the non-coherent cause. There is here no unduly wide or narrow predication. This conjunction is at some times conjunction with the soul willing at others conjunction with the pestle possessed of velocity, as is the case with the limbs of one who has the gout. U

¹ ननु शरीरे शरीरावयवे वा यत्कर्मोपपद्यते तत्र प्रपञ्चप्रदात्मसयोगः कारणम् प्रकृते कथं न तदवयवत आह ॥ आत्मशब्देन शरीरावयवपर उपधारात आन्वयानुपपत्तिरप्यपचारधीनम् तथा आत्मनः शरीरावयवस्यार्थाच्च हस्तस्य यत्कर्म तन् हस्तमुपपत्तिरप्यपचारधीनम् यत्कर्मोपपद्यते तत्र प्रपञ्चप्रदात्मसयोगः कर्मादिद्वयधन्यमुपपत्तिरहस्तस्येति वाच्यम् यथा शरीरावयवस्य शरीरावयवस्योपपत्तिरप्यपचारधीनम् ॥

संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 7 In the absence of conjunction falling results from gravity

1 By the term conjunction impediments of whatever kind are implied In the absence therefore of impediments in consequence of gravity as its non coherent cause falling an action resulting in conjunction below, is produced Here in fruit &c poseing gravity the impediment is conjunction, in a bird &c sustentative volition is the impediment to falling; in an arrow discharged it is the recoil that is the impediment to falling The sense is that falling is dependent on gravity in the absence of these obstructives U

2 In the case of a body resting upon a tree or other high place falling in consequence of the breaking of the bough &c which supports it or by accidentally slipping it is gravity which is the cause not conjunction with soul exercising volition for that does not occasion falling but sometimes prevents it Hence it is that in the case of birds &c soaring in the sky in consequence of conjunction with soul possessing volition as an impediment there is no fall In like manner it is from conjunction with God possessing volition as an impediment that the earth and other worlds do not fall V

नैव न प्रियेयभावाच्चाध्वे न तिर्यग्गमनम् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 8 No upward or sideward motion takes place without a particular impulse

1 संयोगपदेन प्रतिग्रन्थक्रमानुगुणमवस्थिति प्रतिबन्धकाभावे गुरुत्वात्समयाधिकारात् पतनम् अथ संयोगफलितया क्रिया जायते तत्र गुरुत्वप्रति फलादौ प्रतिग्रन्थक संयोग विद्वद्भमादौ तु जिहार्क प्रवच पतनप्रतिग्रन्थक कापडादौ द्विप्ते संस्कार एव पतनप्रतिबन्धक एतदपामभावे गुरुत्वाधीन एतामित्यर्थः ॥

2 एतादृशुक्तदेशाकृष्टस्य देहस्य अधस्तम्यनशाखादिमङ्गलेन देवात स्थलनादिना यत यतन भवति तत्र गुरुत्वमेव कारणम् ॥ प्रयत्नयद्रात्मसंयोगः तस्य पुतनाप्रयोजकत्वात् कश्चित् प्रतिग्रन्थकत्वाच्च अत एव जिहार्कसि विहरता विद्वद्भमादीना प्रयत्नयद्रात्म संयोगादेव प्रतिग्रन्थाच्च यतनम् एव प्रयत्नयदीश्वरसंयोगात् प्रतिग्रन्थादेव भूरादिलोका ना न पतनम् ॥

' The perpendicular or horizontal motion which takes place in a clod of earth, an arrow &c, though they possess gravity, results from a particular, that is a violent, impulse. In the case of the falling, therefore, of a fruit a bird, an arrow &c, in the absence of conjunction, volition, and recoil, there does not exist a particular impulse, and consequently there is no vertical or lateral motion U

प्रयत्नविशेषाच्चादनविशेषः ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 9 Particular impulse results from particular volition.

नोदनविशेषादुदसनविशेषः ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 From particular impulse results particular casting upward

' As for particular impulse, whence is it produced? This question is answered. Particular impulse is produced by particular volition, of which the cause is the desire to throw sideways or upwards far or near. By this impulse &c., perpendicular or horizontal movement is produced in a substance such as a clod of earth. Casting upwards is throwing far upwards U

हस्तकर्मणा दारककर्म व्याख्यातम् ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 By the action of the hand, the action of a child is explained

' The action which is produced in the hand together with the pestle by the impact of the mortar, is not preceded by volition

' गुह्यत्वतोऽपि नोदकमण्डादेर्यदुच्यते तिर्य्यङ् च गमनं तच्चादनविशेषात् सीधं तराच्चादनात् तथा च फलपक्षिणाणां संयोगव्यवस्थाकाराभावे यत् पतनं तत्र नोदनविशेषो नास्ति तेन न तिर्य्यङ् न चोच्यते गमनमिति भावः ॥

' ननु नोदनविशेष एव कुल उत्पद्यते तत्राह । तिर्य्यङ् उच्यते दूरम् आसं वा विधायीतिच्छाकारणकं प्रयत्नविशेषं तज्जनितो नोदनविशेषस्ततो गुह्यत्वतोऽपि द्रव्यस्य लोप्यादेरुच्यते तिर्य्यङ् च गमनमुपपद्यते उदसनं दूरेतत्त्वेष्वपि ॥

' उद्वेगसामिधातात् मुसलेन सह हस्ते यत्कर्म उत्पन्नं तत्तापत् प्रयत्नपूर्वकं न भवति नापि पुण्यपापहेतुरित्युक्तं ननु यत् कालस्य कोडाकरचरणादिवाननं यत्तत्रातिदिशति यत् कालस्य यद्यपि करचरणादिवाननं प्रयत्नपूर्वकमेव तथापि हिताहितफलप्राप्तिफलं न भवति ॥ वा पुण्यपापहेतुरित्यतिदेशार्थः ॥

or a cause of merit and demerit. The analogy of this motion to a child's movement in the play of its hands and feet is pointed out. Though a child's movement of its hands and feet has volition for its antecedent it has no good or evil result and is not a cause of merit or demerit. Such is the meaning of the analogy U

तथा दग्धस्य विस्फोटने ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 In like manner in the case of the bursting open of one burnt

1 In a house which has been set on fire by a felon when a man has there been burnt and his body torn open by the fire the action which is produced in the hand &c by the will to kill the felon is neither a cause of merit nor a cause of demerit, as it has been said. In the slaying of a felon there is no sin in him that slays openly or covertly. Wrath encounters with. An incendiary a poisoner an assassin a thief a ravisher of wife or field—these six are felons U

Involuntary motion **प्रयत्नाभावे प्रसुप्तस्य चलनम् ॥ १३ ॥**

Aph 13 Movement of the sleeping takes place in the absence of volition

1 Movement action such as the sideward or upward moving of the limbs takes place in the sleeping in the body possessing a state of profound slumber even in the absence of volition generated by such desire as to throw upwards. A particular volition is not therefore always the cause of such motion V

1 आततायिनो केनाप्यगारे दह्यमाने तत्र दग्धस्य पुष्पस्य विस्फोटोद्विक्कते छाते स्ति तस्याततायिनो यधानुकूलन प्रयत्नेन हस्तादि यत्कर्म ज्ञाते तत्र पुष्पवत्तुर्न वा पापहेतु यथाहु नाततायिप्रथ दोषो ह्यनुभूयति कश्चन प्रकाश या प्रकाश या मनु स्तन्मन्युमच्छति । अग्निदोगरदश्चैव अस्त्रपाणिधनापद्धा । ध्वजदारापहारी च पदते आततायिन ॥

1 उर्थे विषमोत्थाटीच्छाजनितप्रयत्नाभावे अपि प्रसुप्तस्य सुषुप्तस्यान्यतस्य शरीरस्य चलन तिप्यगूर्ध्वाङ्गचालनादिकम् उत्पद्यते इत्यथ नया च प्रयत्नाद्यगो ॥ सर्वत्र हेतुरिति भावः ॥

चुणे कर्म वायुसंयोगात् ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 Action takes place in grass from conjunction with wind

The actions of the body being explained those of other objects are treated of. All such objects as trees, shrubs, climbing plants, are implied in the term grass U

मणिगमन सूच्याभिसर्पणमदृष्टकारणम् ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 The movement of the gem, and the approach of the needle are caused by destiny

By the term gem are intended vessels made of gold &c. and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incantations for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the ancients is that the vessel is set on the ground, and some other person lays his hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand in consequence of the efficacy of the incantation turns towards the spot where the stolen property has been deposited. The reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular volition, but the efficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or the demerit of the thief. The non coherent cause is conjunction of such a vessel with soul possessing such destiny (or results of actions done in previous states of existence), and the co inherent cause is

१ शरीरकर्माणि ध्याप्याय तदितरायथाह : सूक्ष्मदेन सूक्ष्मलताप्रतानादिकं सूक्ष्ममुपलक्षयति ॥

मणिपदेन जलपूर्णकाष्ठनादिमयवात्राश्रयभिप्रेतानि चैव्यधनलक्षणे तदृशपात्रे मान्त्रिकैर्मन्त्रप्रयोगां क्रियत तादृशपात्रन्तु भूमौ तिष्ठति तदुपरि श्रपरेण केनचिद्विषयं दस्त स्याप्यते मन्त्रसामर्थ्यान्तपात्र तादृशस्तर्हितमेव चैव्यधनायस्यानाभिमुखं गच्छति तत्र स्थाने गत्या स्थिरं भवतीति प्राचा कियदन्ती तादृशपात्रगमनेन प्रयत्नविशेषे हेतुं क्रिन्तुं पृथक्स्यामिन् मुक्तं चौरस्य दुष्कृतं वा निमित्तकारणम् तादृशपात्रन्तु सम धारिकारणम् एतं श्रपस्कान्तसविधाने कति सूक्ष्मीनां लोहशलाकानां घटयस्कान्ताभि मुखगमनं भवति तत्रापि अदृष्टमेव हेतुं ननु कस्यादृष्टेन सूच्याद ना गमनमिति चेत् तद्वगमनेन यस्य हितमहितं वा भवति तददृष्टस्यैव तत्र हेतुत्वम् सूक्ष्मोत्पलक्षणम् श्रपस्कान्तादृष्टलोहमात्रमभिप्रेतम् सूक्ष्मजान्तमण्यादृष्टानां सूक्ष्मानां गमने यद्वैध्वंस्त्वलने धार्यास्तैर्व्यगमने सर्वाद्याकासीनपरमाशु कर्माणि चादृष्टकारणकस्य सूक्ष्मनीयमिति संक्षेपः ॥

such a vessel. In like manner destiny is also the cause of the attraction towards a loadstone, which takes place in needles or metallic rods when in proximity to the magnet. If it be asked in consequence of whose destiny (or previous merits and demerits) motion takes place in needles &c, the reply is that it is the destiny of him to whom benefit or injury accrues by the motion, that is the cause. The term needle implies other objects iron in general, attracted by the loadstone being intended. It is to be inferred that destiny is the cause of the motion of pieces of grass attracted by amber, of the upward flaming of fire, of the horizontal motion of wind, and of the action of the primordial atoms at creation V.

इषावयुगपत्संयोगविशेषाः कर्मान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥ १६ ॥

Aph. 16. Particular non simultaneous conjunctions in an arrow are the cause of the diversity of its action

1 The sense of this aphorism is as follows. After conjunction of arrows &c moving with velocity, with a wall and the like, a cessation of motion is observed, though the arrows &c continue to exist. In this case it is not destruction of the substratum that is destructive of motion, for the substratum continues to exist. Also no other contrary property is observed. It therefore, follows that it is a self produced conjunction that destroys the action of the arrow. This conjunction produced in the fourth moment destroys the action in the fifth moment. The meaning therefore is that the production of the action then disjunction, next the destruction of the prior conjunction, the subsequent conjunction and the destruction of the action, make known the diversity of the action.

1 इदमत्राकृतं योगेन गच्छता शरीरेना कुड्गादिसंयोगानन्तरं शरीरे। सत्येन गतुः परमोद्दिश्यते अत्रायपनाशस्तत्रायत्तत्वायक आयस्य विद्यमानत्वात् विरोधिगुणान्तरञ्च नापलभ्यते तेन स्वजन्य संयोगश्च कर्मनाशकद्वयुच्यते स च संयोगश्चतुर्थदशे जातः पञ्चमदशे कर्म नाशयति तथाहि कर्मोत्पत्तिरयविभागः अयं पूर्यसंयोगनाश उत्तर संयोग कर्मनाश तैनायुगपत् संयोगविशेषा कर्मनानात्वज्ञापकादित्ययं संयोगविशेषा इति संयोगविशेष स्वजन्यत्वमेव अन्यथा संयोगमात्रस्य कर्मनाशकत्वे कर्म कश्चिदपि न तिष्ठति ॥

Particular conjunctions, means peculiarity in conjunction, of self production. Otherwise, were conjunction in general destructive of action, action could not abide anywhere U

नोदनादाद्यभिधोः कर्म तत्कर्मकारिताच्च सस्कारादुत्तर तथो
त्तरमुत्तरञ्च ॥ १७ ॥

Aph 17 The first action of the arrow is from impulse, the next is from self-reproduction caused by that action and in like manner the next and the next

The first action in an arrow when discharged is produced by a bowstring drawn by human volition. In this case the impulse is the non coinherent cause, the arrow is the co-inherent cause. Volition and gravity are the efficient causes. By this first action self reproduction termed velocity is produced in the same substance. This is established by the perception that it is the arrow moves with velocity. By this self reproduction action is produced in the arrow. Of this the non coinherent cause is the self reproduction, the co-inherent cause is the arrow, and the efficient cause is a particular keen impetus. In like manner a succession of actions one after the other is produced by the self reproduction which continues until the arrow falls. A single self reproduction produces a succession of actions for when an action is destroyed by subsequent conjunction produced by itself the self reproduction produces another action. It is not proper to suppose a succession

१ पुरुषप्रपञ्चे नादृष्टया पतञ्जिरुक्ता तुल्येयोराद्य कर्म जायते तत्र नोदनमसम
धाधिकारणम् इषु समधाधिकारणम् प्रपञ्चगुह्ये निमित्तकारणे तत्र चाद्येन कर्मणा
समानाधिकार्यो वेगाद्य सस्कारो जन्मते स च वेगेन गच्छतीति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धये तेन
सस्कारेण तत्रैव कर्म जायते तत्रासमधाधिकारण सस्कार समधाधिकारणमिषु निमि
त्तकारणान्तु तीव्रो नोदनविशेष एवञ्च यादृदिषु पतनमनुवर्तमानेन सस्कारेण उत्तरोत्तर
कर्ममन्तानो जायते स्वजन्योत्तरसंयोगेन कर्मणि नटे सस्कारेण कर्मोत्तरजननात् एक
एव सस्कार कर्मसन्तानजनकः नतु कर्म संतानवत् सस्कारमन्तानो ज्याभ्युपगन्तुमु
चितो गौर्यादिति दर्शयितुमाह । तथोत्तरमुत्तरञ्चेति तत्कर्मकारिताञ्चसस्कारादित्यत्र
पञ्चनञ्च न्यापनये रूपकमसन्तानवत् सस्कारसन्तानस्थोकारे गौरथम् यत्तु युगपत् प्रसि
प्तशरयोरेकस्य तादात्म्योपरस्य तु मन्दस्तत्र नोदनतीव्रत्वमन्दत्वे निमित्तम् ॥

of self reproductions like the succession of actions for the hypothesis is unnecessary To show this the words in like manner the next and the next are added and term Self reproduction caused by that action is in the singular number In the Nyāya doctrine which affirms a succession of self reproductions like the succession of actions there is complexity (or a violation of the law of parcimony) The reason that of two arrows simultaneously discharged the velocity of the one is swift and that of the other slow is the swiftness or slowness of the impetus U

संस्काराभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥ १८ ॥

Aph 18 Falling results from gravity in the absence of self reproduction

1 It might be objected that in such a case the arrow would continue in motion and never fall The answer is as follows There being non existence that is destruction of the self reproduction, the velocity produced by the first action from gravity as its cause, there results falling in an arrow &c that is the time during which the particular velocity lasts determined is the final moment destroys such velocity In some cases also conjunction with another substance is destructive of velocity It was in consequence then, of the existence of a preventive velocity that there was no previous fall of the arrow &c, but a succession of motions There was in consequence of the destruction of the cause of the action of moving no subsequent movement but falling results from the absence of an obstructive In this there is no impossibility V

1 नयेव शरश्चिरमेव गच्छेत कदाचिदपि न पततित्यत आह । संस्कारस्याद्यकर्म क्षान्तस्य वेगस्य अभावे नास्ति गुरुत्वात् कारणादेः पतनं शरादेः जायते इत्यर्थे यादृशवेगविशेषे याद्यन्त कालान्तिष्ठति तावानेवकालो अन्तिमवर्णायच्छिन्नस्तादृश वेग नाशयति अर्चिन्तु द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगोऽपि योगनाशक तस्या च प्रतिबन्धकस्य वेगस्य सत्त्वा देय पृथ्वी शरादेर्न पतनं किन्तु गतिसन्तानं यथाभूत उत्तरकालान्तु गमनकर्मणा कारण विनाशान्तगमनं किन्तु प्रतिबन्धकभावात् पतनमेव भवतीति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् ॥

SECOND DAILY-LESSON

नोदनापीडनात् सयुक्तसयोगाच्च पृथिव्यां कर्म ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 Action in earth results from impulse, impact, and conjunction with the conjunct

¹ In earth, in a bamboo &c, action is sometimes produced by the impul = of fire &c, and sometimes from the impact of an axe &c Similarly action is produced in a chariot &c through conjunction with the conjunct through conjunction with the harness, conjunct with the horses as they move In the first of these instances, that of action in a bamboo &c, the impulse of fire &c, is the non coinherent cause, the bamboo &c, the co-inherent cause, destiny the efficient cause In the second the blow with the hatchet &c, is the non-coinherent cause. In the third, conjunction with the harness conjunct with the horses is the non-coinherent cause V.

तद्विशेषेणादृष्टकारितम् ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 That action which is produced in a different manner from these, is caused by destiny

² That which, as an earthquake &c, = produced in a different manner, to the exclusion of these of impulse, impact and conjunction with the conjunct, = caused by destiny, = c has for its non coinherent cause conjunction with soul destined, since it is the destiny of him to whom pleasure or pain results from the earthquake, that is the particular cause of the earthquake V

¹ पृथिव्या यथादि कदाचिद्वृष्ट्यादिनोदनात् यस्मिं जायते वदन्ति च कुदाराद्यभिधातात् सय सयुक्तसयोगात् अथ्यादिसयुक्तसयुक्तसयोगात् रथादौ कर्म जायते तत्र प्रथमे यथादिकर्मणि वृष्ट्यादिनोदनमसमवायिकारणम् यथादि² समवायिकारणम् अदृष्टादिक निमित्तकारणम् द्वितीये कुदाराद्यभिधातोऽसमवायिकारणम् तृतीये अथसयुक्तसयुक्तसयोगात् समवायिकारणमिति ॥

² तेषां नोदनाभिधातसयुक्तसयोगानां विशेषेण व्यतिरेकेण जातं यत् भूकम्पादिक कर्म तत् अदृष्टकारितम् अदृष्टयदात्मसयोगात्समवायिकारणकमित्यर्थः भूकम्पेन यस्य मृत्युं दुःखं वा भवति तददृष्टस्य तत्रासाधारणकारणत्वादिति भावः ॥

अथा संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph ३ The falling of water results from gravity in the absence of conjunction

1 The section investigative of action co inherent in fluids is here commenced In this it is stated that the falling of water in the form of rain, has gravity for its non coherent cause This takes place when there is absence of conjunction, of conjunction with a cloud The absence of conjunction is, therefore the efficient cause U

द्रवत्वात् स्पन्दनम् ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 Flowing results from fluidity

2 It may be asked how there is in drops of rain action productive of mutual conjunction The answer is therefore given The flowing or distant progression of the stream or great aqueous whole composed by mutual conjunction of the fallen waters or raindrops, is produced by fluidity as its non coherent cause and by gravity as its efficient cause, in the waters as its co inherent or material cause U

नाड्यो वायुसंयोगाद्वातोद्गमः ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 The suns rays cause the ascent of water through conjunction with air

नोदनापीडनात् समुक्तसंयोगाच्च ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 Through the impress of the impulse, and conjunction with the conjunct

1 इदानीं द्रवद्रव्यसमवेतकर्मपरीक्षाप्रकरणम् सञ्जाह । अथा यत् पतनं यद्येकरूपं तद् गुरुत्वासमवाधिकारणकम् तत् संयोगस्य मेघसंयोगस्याभावे सति भवति तेन संयोगाभावस्तच्चिमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

2 चित्तौ प्रतिगतामेषा त्रिभुजा परस्पर संयोगेन महज्जलावयवविधितोरूपं पञ्जायते तस्य यत् स्पन्दनं दूरमसरणम् तत् द्रवत्वादसमवाधिकारणादुत्पद्यते गुरुत्वाच्चिमित्तकारणादसमवाधिकारणेऽपि ॥

1 It may be asked how the sun's rays have such power as to draw up waters situated on the earth Through the impress the congress by means of the impulse, the impulse of a strong wind waters conjunct with the sun's rays conjunct with the wind, fly upwards, as the rays of fire driven by the wind draw up boiling water in a caldron The particle and means as, and the example of water in a caldron is to be considered U

पृष्ठाभिसर्पणमित्यदृष्टकास्तिम् ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 The circulation in trees is caused by destiny

2 The circulation in tree of waters sprinkled on the root is caused by destiny The action by which the waters rise and cause the growth of the tree, results from conjunction of destiny with the souls of those in whose souls pleasure or pain is effected by the growth of the leaves, stem, fruit, flowers &c., as its non coinherent cause, from destiny as its efficient cause, and in water as its coinherent cause U

अथा सद्भाति विलयनञ्च तेज सयोगात् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 The freezing and thawing of water results from conjunction with light.

1 ननु यदि भूमिष्ठानामपाम ऊर्ध्वं गमनं भवति तदा गुरुत्वात् पतनवर्षणं स भव्यति तदेव ॥ कुतश्च्यत आह कारयन्तीति शेषे यदपामूर्ध्वमारोहणं तत् नाह सूर्यरश्मयो वायुसयोगात् कारयन्ति योगे वाय्वभिहता सूर्यरश्मयश्च आरोहयन्त्येव इत्यर्थं कर्त्राक्षत पाटोन्मस्यवायुसयोगादिति स च नाहो नाहोसम्बन्धीयो वायुसयोगो हस्तुपपादनीयः ॥

ननु सूर्यरश्मीनां कथमयं महिमा यत् भूमिष्ठा अपऊर्ध्वं नयन्तीत्यत आह । नो दनेन दनयद्वायुनोदनेन आपोदनादास्कन्दनात् वायुसयुक्ता रश्मयस्तत्सयुक्ता आपऊर्ध्वं धारयन्ति यथा स्वातीस्या अप क्यध्यमाना वायुनुचर्याद्विरश्मय उर्ध्वं नयन्ति धकार इवायंस्तत्र च उपमानं स्वातीयाणव्यापो दृष्टव्याः ॥

2 अमित सर्पणमभिसर्पणं तदभिसर्पणं मूले निषिक्तानामपाम् दृष्टे तददृष्टकारितं पत्रकापदफलपुष्पादिरुद्धिक्तं मुखं दुःखं वा येषामात्मना अदृष्टघनदात्मसंयोगादमम धारिकारणात् अदृष्टाविमितादस्मिन् समवायिकारणेषु ततः कर्म भवति येन कर्मणा अप ऊर्ध्वं गत्या दृष्टं घट्टयन्तीत्यर्थः ॥

¹ Aqueous atoms originating a binary atomic aggregate in consequence of being impeded by the light of the sky, do not originate in these aggregates fluidity : Snow, hail &c void of fluidity are thus originated by constituent elements void of fluidity, and successively by binary and other aggregates : They are consequently observed to be hard : It might be asked what proof there is that snow hail &c are water : The words and throwing from conjunction with light are therefore added : Action is produced in the atoms originative of snow hail &c by powerful conjunction with light : From this action results disjunction : Then in the course of destruction of the originative conjunction results destruction of the larger constituent parts of the snow, hail &c : Next in consequence of the departure of the conjunction with light which prevents fluidity, these same atoms originate fluidity in the binary atomic aggregates, from which results the throwing of the snow, and hail &c thus endowed with fluidity : Of this the efficient cause is the powerful ingress of light : U

तत्र विस्फूर्जयुर्लिङ्गम् ॥ ९ ॥

Apb 9 In these the rolling of thunder is a mark

² In these—in the waters of the sky—the rolling of thunder is a mark of the ingress of the light of the sky : that is it is the pealing of thunder which warrants the inference : The excessive

¹ दिव्येन तेजसा प्रतिबन्धादाप्या परमाणवौद्गुणसमारम्भाद्गुणेषु द्रवत्व नास्मन्ते तदा द्रवत्वगुणैरवयवेद्गुणैर्गतिप्रक्रमेण द्रवत्वगुण्यहिकरकादय आरभ्यन्ते तेन तेषां काटिन्वमुपनम्यते न चेत् हिमकरकादीनामाप्यस्य किं प्रमाणमत उक्तं विलयनञ्च तेज सयोगादिति तेज सयोगेन बलवता हिमकरकारम्भकपरमाणूनां क्रिया क्रियातो विभागस्ततश्चारम्भक्रमयोगनाशपरम्पराया हिमकरकादिमहावर्षविनाशस्तत्र द्रवत्वमिति चन्द्रकलेजं सयोगादियमात् स एव परम्पराया द्युगुणेषु द्रवत्वपरम्परे ततो द्रवत्ववता हिमकरकादिना विलयन तत्र च बलवत्तेजोनुपवेशो निमित्तम् ॥

² तत्र दिव्यासु आसु दिव्यानां तेजसामनुपवेशे विस्फूर्जयुर्लिं घञनिर्घाय एव लिङ्गमित्यर्थं आत्यन्तिकविद्युत्प्रकाशस्तावत्प्रत्यक्ष एव तदनुपपन्नं स्फूर्जयुं सौमि प्रत्यक्ष एव तेनानुमीयते यस्मान्नेचात करका प्रादुर्भवन्ति तत्र दिव्यन्तजो विद्युद्गुण मनुपविष्ट तदुपपन्नेन करकारम्भकालमपि द्रवत्वप्रतिबन्ध इति ॥

brilliance of lightning is perceptible, and after that follows the thunder which also is perceptible. It is therefore inferred that lightning the light of the sky, has entered into the cloud from which the hailstones appear. In consequence of this is the prevention of fluidity in the water originative of hail. U

वैदिकञ्च ॥ १० ॥

Aph. 10 There is also Vedic [authority establishing this]

अथ सयोगाद्विभागाच्च स्तनयिवोः ॥ ११ ॥

Aph. 11 [The rolling of thunder results] from conjunction with water and disjunction from a cloud

It may be asked how thunder is produced, for no impact nor any kind of disjunction causative of sound is observed. The answer is here given. Thunder results from conjunction with water, that is from its being struck by wind, and from disjunction from a cloud. V

पृथिवीकर्मणा तेजःकर्म वायुकर्म च व्याख्यातम् ॥ १२ ॥

Aph. 12 The action of light and the action of air, are explained by the action of earth

Conjunction with soul destined has been pronounced the cause of earthquakes. In like manner in the case of the action which is produced in light which causes a sudden conflagration, and in wind which causes a sudden agitation of trees &c., the non-coincident cause is conjunction with soul influenced by destiny, air and fire are the coincident causes, and destiny is the efficient cause. U

ननु शब्दकारणस्याभिघातस्य विभागविशेषस्य चाननुभवात् त्रिस्फूर्ज्जु कथं मुत्पद्यते इत्यत आह अथ जलानां सयोगात् अर्थाद्वायुना अभिघातात् स्तनयिव्रासंघाच्च विभागात् विस्फूर्ज्जुर्मुपपत्तीत्यर्थः ॥

भूकम्प प्रत्यदृष्टयदात्मसंयोग कारणमुक्तम् तत्रेयाकस्मिन्निदिगदादृष्टेतास्तेजः आकस्मिकदृष्टादितोभर्तेतोश्च प्रभञ्जनस्य कम्प यत् सजायते तत्राप्यदृष्टयदात्मसंयोगा समवायिकारणम् वायुतज्जसो समवायिकारणम् अदृष्टं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

आग्नेर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यंरूपजनमशूना मनसश्चाद्यकर्मादृष्ट-
कारितम् ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 The upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind, and the first action of atoms and of the internal organ, are caused by destiny

¹ The word first means existing in the earliest time of creation. There being no impulse, impact &c, at that time, it is conjunction with soul influenced by destiny that is in the = the non-coincident cause. The word first applies also to blazing upwards and blowing sideways. It is proper to hold that velocity is the cause of other actions of blazing and blowing, for there being a visible cause, there is no occasion for an unseen cause (or destiny as a cause.) U.

हस्तकर्मणा मनसः कर्म व्याख्यातम् ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 The action of the internal organ is explained by the action of the hand

¹ As the action of the hand in the throwing upwards of a pestle &c., has for its non-coincident cause conjunction with soul possessing will, in like manner the action of the mind which has for its purpose contact with the organ percipient of the desired object, also has for its non-coincident cause conjunction with soul exerting volition. Although the internal sensory as an organ is not an immediate object of volition it = to be considered that action is produced in the internal sensory by volition acting upon the channel which conveys the internal organ. It must be admitted

¹ आद्यमिति सर्गाद्यगालीनमित्यर्थं तदानीदनाभिधातादीनामभावात् अदृष्टं यदात्मसंयोग इव तदासमवायिकारणम् आद्यमूर्ध्वज्वलनं आद्य तिर्यंरूपं पवनमिति इतरेषां ज्वलनपथनकर्मणा यथासमवायिकारणकत्वमेव मन्तुमुचितं दृष्टे कारणे सत्यं दृष्टकल्पनानुपपत्त्यात् ॥

² मुपलब्धेपक्षादौ यथा प्रथमपदात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणकं हस्तकर्म तथा अभिमतविषयवाहिकीन्द्रिये रुचिररूपार्थं यन्मनसः कर्म तदपि प्रथमपदात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणकमेव यदापीन्द्रियं मनो न साक्षात् प्रथमविषयस्तथापि मनोवहनादीमोचरेण प्रथमेन मनसि कर्मात्यतिदंष्टव्या नाद्यास्तुत्यगिन्द्रियवाह्यत्वमद्वैतकृतस्य अन्यथा यावद्वहनादीमोचरेण प्रथमेनाश्रितपीताद्वय्ययं हरणमपि न सम्भवेत् ॥

that this channel is perceptible to the sense of touch, else the transmission of what is eaten and drunk, by means of volition acting upon the channel of the breath would be impossible V

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसविरूपात् सुखदुःखम् ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul, sense, mind and object

¹ Pleasure and pain imply other states Cognitions and volitions are also to be considered The infinity of the internal organ has been previously disproved and its atomic minuteness proved It has been stated that the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of an internal organ There can then be no pleasure and pain without conjunction with the internal sensory determined to such and such an organ of sense Were there no action in the internal organ there could be no feeling such as of pleasure in the foot of pain in the head &c Although every particular attribute of the soul depends upon contact with the internal organ pleasure and pain are alone expressly mentioned, these being in consequence of their producing acute affections more obtrusive than the others. U

तदनारम्भ आत्मस्ये मनसि शरीरस्य दुःखभावः संयोगः ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 Absence of action in the internal sensory reposing in the soul, non existence of pain in the body —this is union

² It might be objected that if the internal sensory be of a mobile nature it must be impossible to restrain it and consequently a system of meditation must be useless emancipation

¹ सुखदुःखे ह्यत्युपलब्धे ज्ञानप्रवृत्त्यापि द्रष्टव्य मनसो येभ्यः पूर्वमेव निराकृते अगुत्तरेण माधितम् सुगुपत ज्ञानानुपपत्तिश्च मनसो लिङ्गमित्युक्तं तत्र तत्तदिन्द्रिय प्रदेष्टेन मन संयोगमन्तरेण सुखदुःखे न स्यातामेव यदि मनसि कर्म न भवेत् न भवेत् पाद्रे मे सुख शिरसि मे यदनस्थाद्याकारो शुभयद्वयं यद्यापि मन माधिरूपं चिन्मात्रं स्यात्तदात्मविशेषगुणस्तथापि सुखदुःखे तादृशमवगतिरप्यस्ति स्फुटत्वादुक्तं ॥

² ननु मनश्चेत् चञ्चलस्वभावः तदा तस्य निरोधो न सम्भवति तथा च योग मन्तरेणात्मसाक्षात्कारस्यासम्भवादयथागस्यासम्भवेन मननशास्त्रं निष्प्रयोजनमापद्यते त्वयाशङ्कामाह । आत्मस्ये मनसि प्रवृत्त्येन ह्येन्द्रियादिकं परित्यज्य मनो यदा आत्म

being impossible since a presentation of soul is impossible. To this an answer is furnished. When the internal sensory abides in the soul when by sixfold union the internal sensory quitting the exterior organs &c abides in the soul alone there results the non commencement or non production of the action of the internal sensory. The sensory then becomes immovable. In this state there is non existence of pain in the body, that is pain is not produced in relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all things external. This is established by the words of the Skanda purana — The internal organ is smitten by the birth he should not therefore sigh. He should therefore restrain his breath for the sake of immobility of the interior sensory. That he may restrain his breath, let him practise sixfold union. Sitting checking the vital airs, abstraction suspension of the faculties meditation and contemplation — these are the six elements of union. After this then there being cessation of false cognition by the arising of a presentation of soul final emancipation is unimpeded and a system of meditation is not therefore fruitless. V

**अपसर्पणमुपसर्पणमशितव तसयोगाः कार्यान्तरसयोगाश्चेत्यदृष्ट-
कारितानि ॥ १७ ॥**

Aph 17. The egress and ingress (of internal sensories from and into bodies) conjunctions with things eaten and drunk, and conjunctions with other effects — all these things are caused by destiny.

1 Egress the issuing forth of the internal organ from the

मावर्तिष्ठति तदा तदनारम्भ तस्य मनः कर्मणश्चनारम्भ अनुत्पाद तदा मनो निश्चले भवति तदवस्थायाः शरीरस्य दुःखाभावः शरीरावच्छेदेन दुःखं न जायते स आत्मना व्याख्यायुक्तमनसः संयोगो योग उच्यते तथा च तदनन्तरमात्मसाक्षात्कारोदयेन मिथ्या ज्ञानादिनिवृत्तिरिति सत्यामपवर्गो निष्कृत्य इति न मननशास्त्रे निष्कृतमिति भावः ॥

1 अपसर्पणं मरणवस्थायाः देहान्मनसः उत्क्रमणम् उपसर्पणं देहान्तरोत्पत्तौ तत्र मनसः प्रवेशः अशितपीतयोरचञ्चलयोः संयोगो काव्यान्तराद्यामिन्द्रियप्राणानां देहेन सह संयोगाश्च यस्मात् कर्मणो भवन्ति इति पृथगीयम् इति एतानि कर्माणि अदृष्ट कारितानि अदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगासमयाधिकारवशात् ॥

that this channel is perceptible to the sense of touch, else the transmission of what is eaten and drunk, by means of volition acting upon the channel of the breath, would be impossible V

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् सुखदुःखम् ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 15 Pleasure and pain result from contact of soul, sense, mind and object.

1 Pleasure and pain imply other states. Cognitions and volitions are also to be considered. The infinity of the internal organ has been previously disproved, and its atomic minuteness proved. It has been stated that the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of an internal organ. There can, then, be no pleasure and pain without conjunction with the internal sensory determined to such and such an organ of sense. Were there no action in the internal organ there could be no feeling, such as of pleasure in the foot, of pain in the head &c. Although every particular attribute of the soul depends upon contact with the internal organ, pleasure and pain are alone expressly mentioned, these being in consequence of their producing acute affections, more obtrusive than the others U

तदनारम्भ आत्मस्य मनसि शरीरस्य दुःखभावः संयोगः ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 Absence of action in the internal sensory reposing in the soul, non existence of pain in the body,—this is union

* It might be objected that if the internal sensory be of a mobile nature it must be impossible to restrain it and consequently a system of meditation must be useless emancipation

1 सुखदुःखे ह्यनुपसख्येण ज्ञानप्रपञ्चाद्यपि द्रष्टव्य मनसो वैभव पृथग्मेव निराकृतं अणुत्वञ्च साधितम् युगपत् ज्ञानानुपपत्तिञ्च मनसो निवृत्तमित्युक्तं तेन तत्तदिन्द्रिय प्रदेयेन मन संयोगमन्तरेण सुखदुःखं न ख्यातामेव यदि मनसि कर्म न भवेत् न भवेच्च पादे मे सुख शिरसि मे घटनेत्याद्याकारोऽनुभवइत्यर्थं यद्यपि मन सन्निकर्षोपीन सत्त्वोष्णत्वविशेषगुणस्तथापि सुखदुःखे तोषसंश्लेषा इतिष्कुटस्यादुक्तं ॥

* मनु मनश्चेत् घञ्जनस्यभावात् तदा तस्य निरोधो न सम्भवति तथा च योग मन्तरेणात्मसाक्षात्कारस्यासम्भवात्तदवर्गस्यासम्भवेन मनश्चास्त्व निष्येजानमापद्यते त्यागद्वयामाह ॥ आत्मस्य मनसि घटद्वययोगेन इन्द्रियादिक परित्यज्य मनो यदा आत्म

being impossible since a presentation of soul is impossible. To this an answer is furnished. When the internal sensory abides in the soul when by sixfold union the internal sensory quitting the exterior organs &c abides in the soul alone there results the non commencement or non production of the action of the internal sensory. The sensory then becomes immovable. In this state there is non existence of pain in the body, that is pain is not produced in relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all things external. This is established by the words of the Skandā purāna — The internal organ is smitten by the breath he should not therefore sigh. He should therefore restrain his breath for the sake of immobility of the interior sensory. That he may restrain his breath, let him practise sixfold union. Sitting checking the vital air, abstraction suspension of the faculties meditation and contemplation—these are the six elements of union. After this then there being cessation of false cognition by the arising of a presentation of soul final emancipation is unimpeded and a system of meditation is not therefore fruitless. V

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1 अपसर्पणं मरणावस्थायां देहान्मनस उत्क्रमणम् उपसर्पणं देहान्तरोत्पत्तेः तत्र मनस प्रवेशः अशितपतेतयोरचञ्चलयो संयोगः काव्यान्तराणामान्द्रियप्राणाया देहेन सह संयोगाच्च यस्मात् कर्मणो भवन्ति इति पृथगीयम् इति वृत्तानि कर्मणि अदृष्टकारितानि अदृष्टवृत्तात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणकारिणि ॥

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ननु मनश्चेत् घञ्जनस्य भावः तदा तस्य निरोधो न सम्भवति तत्र च योगमन्तरेणात्मसाक्षात्कारस्यासम्भवात्तदवगत्यासम्भवेन मननशाम्यं निष्प्रयोजनमापद्यते त्यागद्वयामाह । आत्मस्य मनसि घट्टद्वयेन इन्द्रियादिकं परित्यज्य मनो यदा आत्म

being impossible since a presentation of soul is impossible. To this an answer is furnished. When the internal sensory abides in the soul when by sixfold union the internal sensory quitting the exterior organs &c abide in the soul alone there results the non commencement or non production of the action of the internal sensory. The sensory then becomes immovable. In this state there is non existence of pain in the body, that is pain is not produced in relation to the body. This is called the conjunction or union with soul of the internal organ excluded from all things external. This is established by the words of the Skandapurana — The internal organ is smitten by the breath. He should not therefore sigh. He should therefore restrain his breath for the sake of immobility of the interior sensory. That he may restrain his breath, let him practise sixfold union. Sitting checking the vital airs, abstraction suspension of the faculties meditation and contemplation—these are the six elements of union. After this then there being cessation of false cognition by the arising of a presentation of soul final emancipation is unimpeded and a system of meditation is not therefore fruitless. V

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¹ अपसर्पणं मरणावस्थायां देहान्मनसः उत्क्रमणम् उपसर्पणं देहान्तरोत्पत्तौ तत्र मनसः प्रवेशः अशितधीतयोरचञ्चलयोगः संयोगः कार्यान्तराणामिन्द्रियशान्तायां देहेन सह संयोगाच्च यस्मात् कर्मणो भवन्ति इति पुरणीयम् इति एतानि कर्माणि अदृष्टकारितानि अदृष्टयदात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणकारिणि ॥

body at the time of death, ingress the entrance of the internal organ into another body when it is produced, conjunctions with food and water eaten and drunk, and conjunctions of other effects, with the body that is of the sensual organs and vital airs, the actions from which these conjunctions arise for these words are to be supplied—these actions are caused by destiny, that is, have for their non-coherent cause conjunction with soul destined V

तदभावे सयोगाभावेऽप्रादुर्भाजश्च मोक्षः ॥ १८ ॥

Aph. 18 Where there is non existence of this (that is of destiny) there is non-existence of conjunction, and non existence of manifestation emancipation

Where there is non existence of this that is of destiny where there is destruction of other than fructescent results of actions by presentation of soul and of fructescent results by fruition there is non-existence of conjunction a severance from connection with the stream or series of bodies After this there is non manifestation that is to say non production of pain and from the absence of the body and of destiny as causes at that time emancipation or liberation is possible. Emancipation therefore is not chimerical like the horns of a hare V

Darkness.

द्वयगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यादभावस्तमः ॥ १९ ॥

Aph 19 Darkness is a non entity being dissimilar to the production of substance quality and action

It may be objected The action of a substance is observed also in darkness there being such cognitions as The shadow moves.

तदभावे तस्माददृष्ट्याभावे सति प्रारब्धेतरादृष्टानात्मसाक्षात्कारेण प्रारब्धा नाज्ज भोगेन चपे सतीति यावत् सयोगाभावाद्देहप्रवाहसम्यन्धस्य पिच्छेदस्तत्तारश्च अप्रादुर्भाज अप्रादुर्बुद्धस्यानुत्पत्तिर्देहकृपस्यादृष्टकृपस्य च कारणस्य विरुद्धिर्दिति तदन्ते. मेयं मात्त अपरं सम्भवतीति नाप्यर्थस्य अश्रवणसमानतति भावः ॥

ननु तमसापि द्वयस्य कर्म दृश्यते चनति ह्यर्पति प्रत्ययात् तत्र न प्रयत्नो न वा नेदनाभिधातो न वा गुह्यद्वयत्वेनवासकारस्तथा च निमित्तान्तरं यत्तत्र तच्च

In such cases there is no volition no impulse or impact, and no gravity or fluidity, another efficient cause must therefore be posited, but this does not appear. The reply is here supplied. By this also is confirmed the observation that there are only nine substances. The production of substances is dependent only on tangible substances and no touch is observed in darkness. Nor is there in darkness a touch but inappreciable touch, for where colour is appreciable touch must also necessarily be appreciable. If it be objected that this is the rule with regard to earth but darkness is a tenth substance, we reply that this is not the case for no other substance is a substratum of blue colour, and gravity is inseparable from blue colour, as also are taste and smell. If it be urged that as ether has sound only as its differencing attribute and darkness may in like manner have blue colour for its peculiar property we reply that it is not so for there is a contradiction to visibility, for were darkness merely something possessing blue colour, or blue colour it would not be perceived by the eye without an accompanying perception of external light. U

तेजसो द्रव्यान्तरेणावरणाच्च ॥ २० ॥

Aph 20 And because of the obscuration of light by another substance

1 It may be asked What then occasions the notion of motion

नानुभूयमानमित्यत आह । एतेन नयेद्यद्व्याप्तीत्युपधारणमप्युपपादितं द्रव्यनिवृत्तिस्तद्वत् स्पर्शवद्द्रव्याधीना न च तमसि स्पर्शोऽनुभूयते न चानुभूतमव स्पर्शं कपोलभवे स्पर्शोऽप्यस्यावश्यकत्वात् एविव्यामय निवृत्तिं मतस्तु दशमं द्रव्यमिति च च द्रव्यान्तरस्य नीलरूपानधिकरणत्वात् नीलरूपस्य च गुह्यनान्तरीयकत्वात् रसगन्धनान्तरीयकत्वात् यथाकाश शब्दमात्रविशेषगुण तथा तमोर्गोप नीलरूपमात्रविशेषगुण स्यादिति चेन्न चालुपत्यजिरोधात यदि हि नीलरूपजनीत रूपमेव वा तमः स्यात् बाह्यत्वाकपदहमन्तरेण चक्षुषा न गृह्येत ॥

1 तर्हि गतिप्रतीतिं किद्विवन्धनेत्यत आह गच्छता द्रव्यान्तरेणावृत्ते तेजसि पृथगे देशानुपलम्भादप्रिमदेशे चोपलम्भात्तेजोभावन्य गच्छद्रव्यसाधर्म्याद् गतिप्रतीतिं ननु वा स्तपी तत्र गतिरित्यर्थः अन्यथ्यतिरेकाभ्यां तथा प्रतीते उभूतरूपवद्व्याज्जेल सहाभावास्तमः ॥

of darkness? The reply is therefore furnished Light being obscured by another substance in motion and non existence of light not being observed in the east and being observed in the west and thus resembling a moving substance an erroneous conception of motion results but there is no real motion in the case for this appears from an inclusive and exclusive argument Darkness is absolute non existence of all light in that which possesses appreciable colour U

दिक्कालाग्राहकश्च क्रियावद्वैधर्म्याच्चक्रियाणि ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 21 Space time and ether, are also inactive being dissimilar to that which possesses action

The collateral section comprising two aphorisms on darkness being completed the section treating of voidness of action is stated The word also implies the addition of soul The dissimilarity from that which possesses action is the illimitation of space &c for action resides only in the concrete U

एतेन कर्मणि गुणाश्च व्याख्याता ॥ २२ ॥

Aph 22 By this are explained actions and qualities

The inactivity of qualities and actions is stated By this means by dissimilarity from that which possesses action Illimitation the dissimilarity from that which possesses action belongs also to qualities and actions and they also are explained to be inactive U

निष्क्रियाणां समवाय कर्मभ्यो निषिद्धः ॥ २३ ॥

Aph 23 The co inherence of things inactive is excluded from actions

एव द्विमूर्तरा प्रासङ्गिक तम प्रकरण समाप्य कर्मगुणताप्रकरणात् सकारा वात्मसंगत क्रियायता वैधर्म्य दिग्वादीनाममूर्तत्वं मूर्तत्वंनुविधानात् क्रियाया ॥

गुणकर्मणोर्निष्क्रियत्वमाह । एतेनेति क्रियावद्वैधर्म्येणेतत्त्वं क्रियावद्वैधर्म्यममूर्तत्वं गुणकर्मणोरप्यप्यति अति निष्क्रियत्वेनव्याख्या इत्यर्थः ॥

' It might be objected If qualities and actions are inactive how can there be any connection between them and substance ? connection by conjunction would be possible but that depends on action only Hence it is stated that co-inherence is the only connection of qualities and actions which are inactive and that this is excluded from actions Of this connection there is not even the production much less dependency upon action U .

कारण स्वसमवायिनो गुणा ॥ २४ ॥

Aph 24 But qualities as a cause are non cohererent

' It might be objected If qualities as being immaterial are not a co-inherent cause of actions how are qualities and actions produced by qualities ? For causation in the form of being something over and above a co-inherent cause is not possible The reply to this is therefore furnished Qualities are a non cohererent cause not a co-inherent cause also that they should be the sites of actions Non cohererent causality sometimes results from co-inherence in the same object with the effect as that of conjunction with soul in the particular attributes of sounds or of sound in conjunction and disjunction in sound, in other cases it results from co-inherence in the same object with the cause as that of the colours &c of the parts of a water pot &c in the colour &c of a water pot &c U

गुणैर्दिग्ज्याख्याता ॥ २५ ॥

Aph 25 By qualities space is explained

' ननु गुणकर्मणो यदि निष्क्रिये तदा ताभ्या दृश्यस्य कथं सम्बन्धः सयोगसम्बन्धः सम्भाव्यते न ॥ कर्माधीन इवेत्यत आह निष्क्रियानां गुणकर्मणा समवाय एव सम्बन्धः स च कर्मभ्यो निषिद्धः तस्य सम्बन्धस्य उत्पत्तिरयं नास्ति दूरे तु कर्माधीन इत्यर्थः ॥

' ननु शब्दरूपरसगन्धगुणकर्मसमवायिकारणं भवन्ति तदा गुणैर्गुणा कर्माणि ॥ कथमुत्पद्यन्ते न हि समवायिकारणातिरिक्तत्वरूपेणापि कारणता सम्भवतीत्यत आह गुणा असमवायिकारणः ॥ तु समवायिकारणमपि येन कर्माधारा स्य सा चासमवायिकारणता क्वचित् कार्यकारणसमवायात् यथात्ममनःसयोग्यात्मविशेषगुणेषु सयोग्यि भागवद्व्या न गच्छे क्वचित् कारणकारणसमवायात् यथा कपालादिकषादोना घटादिकषादिव ॥

¹ An objection might be raised In virtue of such cognitions as Action is produced here Action is produced now, time and space also are co inherent causes of action Else how could they be its site? It is therefore stated that as the qualities gravity &c, being unlimited are not co inherent causes of action so it follows also from its limitation that space is not a co inherent cause of action That to be a site does not imply co inherence is proved by such instances as those of cotton in a bowl curdled milk in a bowl, the roaring of a lion in a forest U

कारणेन कालः ॥ २६ ॥

Aph 26 By cause time [is explained]

¹ The words Is explained to be inactive are to be supplied according to an altered construction By the words by cause existence is indicated Time then as an efficient cause is merely the site of action but not co inherent with action. U

SIXTH BOOK FIRST DAILY LESSON

बुद्धिपूर्वा वाच्यकृतिर्वेदे ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 There is in the Veda a composition of sentences consequent upon design

¹ मनु इह कर्मोत्पद्यते इदानीं कर्मोत्पद्यते इत्यादि प्रतीतिवशात्² दिक्कालाद्यपि कर्मसमवायिकारण एव कथमन्यथा तत्र तयोराधारस्तेत्यत आह । यथा गुरुत्वाद्येषां गुणा न कर्मसमवायिकारणममूर्तत्वात् तथा दिगापि न कर्मसमवायिकारणममूर्तत्वादेवत्यर्थ आधारता तु समवायितामन्तरणार्थं कुण्डे यदराशि कुण्डे दधि घने सिद्धनादहत्वादियदुपपद्यते इति भावः ॥

² उक्तनेत्याभिप्रायेणाह निष्क्रियत्वेन व्याख्यात इति परिग्रहस्यानुग्रहः कारणेनेति भावप्रधाने निर्देशे तत्र निमित्तकारणत्वेनाधारमात्रं कर्मणः काला न तु समवायीत्यर्थः ॥

The object matter of the sixth book is the investigation of merit and demerit the primary causes of transmigration. Merit and demerit may be conceived as existing in virtue of such precepts and prohibitions as Let him that desires paradise offer sacrifices, Let him not eat kalanjā, assuming the authoritativeness of such injunctions and prohibitions. Such authoritativeness is established by the prior existence of the distinguishing attribute in the speaker of accurate knowledge of the meaning of the words. Absolute authoritativeness being denied the author proceeds in the first place to prove the quality determinant of the Veda. Composition of sentences framing of propositions is consequent upon intention, preceded by the speaker's accurate knowledge of the meaning of the sentences, because it is a composition of sentences, like the composition by ourselves and others of such sentences as There are five fruits on the river's bank. In the Veda means in the aggregate of sentences. Of this the composition of the aggregated sentences is the subject, and there is no unduly assumed causality in the priority of the intention of ourselves and others. For in such instances as Let him that desires paradise offer sacrifices the means of attaining the desired object or the fact of its being an effect are not objects of the intellect of ourselves or of our fellow creatures. Therefore there is established in the case of the Veda the prior existence of an absolute author and the definition of the Veda is words of authority not derived from knowledge of the meaning of propositions composed of words, accompanied

संसारमूलकारणयोर्धर्माधर्मयोः परीक्षा यद्व्याख्यायार्थं धर्माधर्मौ च स्वार्थं कामौ च यजेत न च कलज्जं भवयेत इत्यादिविधिनिषेधव्यवस्थानोदयो विधिनिषेध व्याख्ययोः प्रामाण्ये सति स्यात् तत्प्रामाण्यञ्च यत्तुययार्थवाक्यार्थज्ञानलक्षणगुणपूर्णं कत्वादुपपद्यते स्यत् प्रामाण्यस्य निषेधादतः प्रथमं यदप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकगुणसाधनमुपक्रमते वाक्यरुतिर्याक्यरचना सा सुज्ञपूर्व्या यत्तुययार्थवाक्यार्थज्ञानपूर्व्या वाक्यरचना स्यात् नदीतीरे पञ्च कलानि मन्तीत्यस्मदादिवाक्यरचनायत वेद इति व्याख्यसमुदाय इत्यर्थं तत्र समुदायिना वाक्यनारुति पक्षः न चास्मदादिबुद्धिप्रत्ययमन्वेनान्यथा सिद्धिः स्वर्गकामो यजेत इत्यादाविद्यसाधनतायाः कार्यतायाः अस्मदादिबुद्धिगोचरत्वात् तेन स्यत्तन्त्रगुणपूर्णस्य यदे सिद्धिति चेदस्यञ्च शब्दतदुपजीविप्रमाणातिरिक्तप्रामाण्यजन्यत्वमित्यविषयार्थकत्वे सति शब्दजन्यवाक्यार्थज्ञानजन्यप्रमाणशब्दत्वम् ॥

with the nature of that which is not an object of certain knowledge derived from evidence other than of words and of the evidence upon them dependent U

वाह्नये सज्ञाकर्म सिद्धिलिङ्गम् ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 The formation of names in the Brāhmana is an evidence of design

¹ It is stated in another manner that the words of the Veda had intelligence as their antecedent The Brāhmana here denotes a portion of the Veda The formation there of terms, or making of names points to the intention of the derivatist just as the making in ordinary language of such names as Long-car Long-nose Long neck U

बुद्धिपूर्वा ददाति ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 The words He gives have intelligence as their antecedent

² The injunction to make gifts in such precepts as He that desires paradise should give a cow, is derived from the knowledge of the causal efficiency of such gifts The particular employment of the root in the form He gives, implies giving, the sense of the root U

तथा प्रतिग्रहः ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 Likewise reception

³ The sacred texts enjoining reception also imply an intelli-

¹ प्रकारान्तरेण चेदवाक्यानां बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वमाह । वाह्नयमिदं चैदभागस्तत्र यत् सज्ञाकर्मनामकरणं तत् व्युत्पादकस्य बुद्धिमाक्षिपति तथा ज्ञाने सम्यक्त्वोदीर्घनामस्य स्वपीवादिनामकरणम् ॥

² स्वर्गकामो मा दद्यात् इत्यादौ यद्व्यानप्रतिपादनं तद्व्यानेष्टसाधनताज्ञानजन्यं ददातीतीति धातुनिर्देशो धात्वर्थे दानमुपलक्ष्यति ॥

³ प्रमाणान्तरमाह । प्रतिग्रहप्रतिपादिका अपि श्रुतयो बुद्धिपूर्विका प्रतिग्रहपदस्य विषया श्रुतिमुपलक्षयति तेन भूम्यादिप्रतिग्रहप्रतिपादिन्य श्रुतयः प्रतिग्रहोक्तुं येय साधनतत्परा कृष्यासारसर्मादिप्रतिग्रहप्रतिपादिका श्रुतयः प्रतिग्रहोक्तुरनिष्टसाधनता बोधिका न चट्टानिष्टसाधनते अर्थाचीनपुरुषबुद्धिबोधरा भवितुमर्हते ॥

gent antecedent. The word reception implies a sacred text of which it is the subject. Sacred texts enjoining acceptance of lauds &c indicate its efficacy to the welfare of the receiver. Sacred texts setting forth the reception of the skin of the black antelope &c, imply efficacy to that which is undesired by the recipient. The efficacy to the desired and the undesired cannot be merely objects in the minds of modern persons. U

आत्मान्तरगुणानामात्मान्तरे ऽकारणत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Because the attributes of one soul are not a cause with regard to another soul

1 Because the attributes of one soul its merits and demerits such as sacrifices injuries &c are not a cause of the attributes of pleasure and pain in another soul pleasure and pain are produced by such merit and demerit only as exist in each several soul not by merit and demerit inhering in different subjects. Otherwise were it much as one by whom a sacrifice was not offered nor a wrong done would receive its recompense there would result a loss of what was done and requital for what was not done. U

तद्दुष्टभोजने न विद्यते ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 That does not exist in the case of the eating of the wicked

1 That denotes the fruit of a benevolent action. When evil Brahmins unworthy recipients are fed at the obsequial rites no fruit accrues from this to the ancestor or the manning. I imply that the result of the obsequial rites does not accrue to the ancestor. U

1 आत्मान्तरगुणानां धार्मादिसादिपुण्यपापानां आत्मान्तरे वा सुखदुःखात्मिका गुणोत्थोत्पत्त्यकारणत्वात् इत्यत्र चत्वात्मनिष्ठानामेव धर्माधर्माभ्यां सुखदुःखेन व्यधिकारणाभ्यामन्यथा येन धार्मादिसादिकं न कृतं तस्य तत्फलं स्यादिति कृतद्वानिरकृताभ्यामन्यत्र प्रसज्येत ॥

1 तदित्याग्नीर्दानफलं परामर्शति दुष्टप्राप्त्या पात्रानधिकारिणो यत्र यादौ भोज्यन्ते तत्रापि पितरि तत्फलं न विद्यते न भयतात्पर्यं यादृक्फलमेव वा न भवति पितरीत्यर्थः ॥

दुष्ट दिसायाम ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 The evil has reference to wrong

¹ Has reference to wrong implies prohibited actions in general It should therefore be understood that a man occupied in forbidden action is the wicked U

तस्य समभिव्याहारी दोषः ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Demerit results from association with him

¹ It is stated that not only is there absence of fruit in the partaking of an unworthy Brahman invited to the obsequial rite but also sin accrues Demerit or guilt results from association characterised as eating in the same row sleeping reading and the like together with him i e with a Brahman occupied in illicit action U

तददुष्टे न विद्यते ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 9 This does not exist in the case of one not unworthy

¹ This guilt does not exist that is, does not accrue in the case of a Brahman not unworthy i e one who acts according to sacred precepts invited to partake in the obsequial rite U

पुनर्विशिष्टे प्रवृत्ति ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 Again the procedure should be in relation to that which is excellent

¹ दिसायामिति निषिद्धकर्ममात्रोपनयनम् तेन निषिद्धे कर्मणि प्रवृत्ति विज्ञानी यादित्यर्थः ॥

² ॥ केचन दुष्टब्राह्मणस्य आद्ये निमन्त्रितस्य भोजनेन फलाभावः किन्तु पापमपि भवतीत्याद्य तस्य निषिद्ध कर्मणि प्रवृत्तस्य ब्राह्मणस्य समभिव्याहारात् एतदपि भोजन सदृशयनसहाध्यवनादिनवणात् दोषः पापमित्यर्थः ॥

³ तत् पापमुदुष्ट वयाशास्त्र व्यवहारमात्रे ब्राह्मणे आद्ये भोजने ॥ विश्रुते न भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

¹ If excellent persons, those who regulate their conduct according to sacred precepts, are procured at obsequial rites or in receiving gifts, a man should avoid those who are censurable though they may have been invited. The text A man should not reject those who are invited, refers to worthy recipients. But a man should gratify blameable persons, when invited, by giving money, &c. U.

समे हीने वा प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 Again the procedure should be in relation to an equal or an inferior

² Where persons more excellent than oneself are not procured at obsequial rites, it is explained that the procedure in obsequial rites, alms &c., should be in relation to an equal, one like oneself, or an inferior, one less in point of merit &c., than oneself. Persons prohibited are by all means to be avoided, but not the unblemished whether they be equals or inferiors. U

एनेन हीनसमविशिष्टधार्मिकेभ्यः परस्वादान व्याख्यातम् ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 By this is explained reception of property from another, from inferior, equal, and superior, virtuous persons

³ Merit, a several increase of merit results in the acquisition of land &c., whether from an inferior, or an equal, or one more excel-

¹ चाप्ये प्रतिपद्ये वा विशिष्टा दयायास्तन्नुपसर्तमाना यदि सभ्यन्ते तदा निमन्त्रितानपि निन्द्यान् परित्यज्य तानेव भोजयेत् न निमन्त्रितान् प्रत्याचक्षीत इति तु सत्पात्रपरम निन्द्यास्तु निमन्त्रितान् दक्षिणदानादिना मनोदयेत् ॥

² समे स्यसदृशे हीने स्यापेक्षया गुणादिना न्युने कृदुष्टे पात्रे चादृशानादौ प्रवृत्तिः स्तेषामेवाग्रं दानात् पितरि सुखमित्यर्थं निषिद्धानां पर त्यागे नत्यादुष्टानां समहीनानामपीति भावः ॥

³ यद्योत्तरं धर्मात्वर्यं हीनादपि भूम्यादियतिपक्षे समादपि स्यापेक्षया विशिष्टा-द्रवि धर्मिन्नात् धर्म इत्यर्थं परस्वादान परस्मात् स्यस्य धनस्वादानं प्रतिपद्यः प्रति-दास्तु परस्वादानं चोर्थादिना परस्यग्रहणे व्याप्यते तथा च युतिः दृढात् सप्तमे दैव्याश्रये चत्रियात्पञ्चदशे ब्राह्मणात् प्राणसग्रे इति बुधापेक्षितमात्मानं कृदुभयं रक्षितुं सप्तदिनान्याहारमप्राप्य शूद्रभक्ष्यापहारः कार्यः स्य दशदिनान्याहारमप्राप्य वैश्यात् पञ्चदशदिनान्याहारमप्राप्य क्षत्रियात् प्राणसग्रे ब्राह्मणात् भक्ष्यापहारः ॥ दौषापेक्षाद् ॥

ent than oneself, being virtuous. Acquisition is the reception of property or wealth from another. According to the author of the Yjñi by the reception of property from another the taking of property by theft &c, is explained. In conformity with this is the text From a Śudra on the seventh day from a Vaiśya on the tenth, from a Kshatriya on the fifteenth, from a Brāhman in case of danger to life. To save himself or his family when starving a man may steal the food of a Śudra, when he has been without food for seven days, when he has been without food for ten days that of a Vaiśya, when he has been fifteen days without food, that of a Kshatriya. When his life is in danger, stealing food from a Brāhman tends not to demerit. U

तथा विरुद्धानां त्याग ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 Likewise the making away with those who are contrary

1 Not only is the taking of others' property, when in danger to life not forbidden but in such circumstances those who do not give anything to take away should even be put to death. And by all this there is no loss of merit or manifestation of demerit. In such a case those who are contrary, those who act in the contrary manner are to be put to death. Therefore it has been said Let a man save himself when in despair by whatsoever deed fair or foul when he is able let him practise righteousness. U

हीने परे त्याग ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 Making away with another has reference to an inferior

2 If another who does not give anything to take away is inferior or to oneself be the Śudra &c, may be put to death. U

1 न केवलं प्राणसंशये परस्वादानं न निषिद्धं किन्तु तस्य दद्यादामपहर्तुं ये न प्रयच्छन्ति तेषां यथोचितं कार्यं न तावता धर्महानिरधर्मप्रादुर्भावा यत्प्राप्तं तस्यैव दद्यात् विरुद्धानां विपरीतमाचरतां त्यागे यथं कार्यं इत्यर्थं तदुक्तं धर्मशास्त्रे यत्नं केनापि मनुना दास्यन् वा उद्धरेद्द्वानमात्मानं समर्थो धर्ममाचरेत् इति ॥

2 यदि स्वस्माद्धीनं परे भवति योऽपहर्तुं न ददाति तस्य श्रद्धाद्वेस्त्यागो यथं

समे आत्मत्यागः परत्यगो वा ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 In the case of an equal suicide or the destruction of the other

1 If the opposite party be ones equal—but only if he be a Brahman—in such a case suicide—the destruction of oneself by fasting &c —is to be committed. If there appear no means of preserving one-self or ones family and the opposite party be an equal he is to be made away with or destroyed. U

जिज्ञिषे आत्मत्याग इति ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 In the case of a superior suicide [is to be committed.]

2 In the case of an opposite party superior to oneself distinguished by study of the Veda &c suicide alone is lawful though there be danger to life a man may desire only his own death but must not slay a Brahman. U

SECOND DAILY LESSON

दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्टाभावे प्रयोजनमभ्युदयाय ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 Of action of which the motives are seen and unseen a motive where there is none seen tends to exaltation

3 Actions where the motives are seen are agriculture mer

1 यदि स्वमदृष्टे ब्राह्मण इव विरोधी भवति तदात्मन एवापचाक्षादिना त्यागो प्रमादः कर्तव्यः यदि स्वस्य कुटुम्बस्य वा स्वाध्यायस्य च दृश्यते विरोधी च समा भवति तदा तस्यैव त्यागो यथ इत्यर्थः ॥

2 स्वापेक्षया जिज्ञिषे वेदाध्ययनादिना उत्कृष्टे विरोधिनि आत्मन इव त्यागो विधिः प्राणमरणे मत्प्राप्त्यात्मनमजाभिप्रेयात न तु ब्राह्मण इत्यादित्यर्थः ॥

3 दृष्टप्रयोजनानि कृष्याणिउदराज्यसेवानीनि अदृष्टप्रयोजनानि वागदानग्रहणं धर्मोनि इत्यादि कर्मणा मध्ये यत्र दृष्ट प्रयोजनं नास्ति तत्र तदादृष्ट प्रयोजनं कृत्यं नोपमं सत्त्वाभ्युदयाय तत्प्रयोजनाय यदा अभ्युदयायति तस्यैव प्रयोजनं तत्र कर्त्तव्यं इत्यर्थः अदृष्ट प्रयोजनमप्युदयं तद् यदि योग्यं तदाभ्युदय आत्मसाक्षात्कारः यदि योग्यं दानादिना तदाभ्युदय इति तत्रापि यदा योग्यं पक्षतोत्यादिक्रिया सदा कर्त्तव्या य

chandise service of the king, &c. Actions where the motives are unseen are sacrifice, charity, chastity, &c. Among these actions where a visible motive is not observed, an invisible motive is to be supposed, and such a motive conduces to exaltation, or knowledge of the truth. Or the dative case to exaltation may be employed in the sense of the nominative in which case the sense will be that exaltation is the result. An unseen result is a remote consequence. If this be produced by asceticism, the exaltation = presentation of soul, if by sacrifice, almsgiving &c, the exaltation is paradise. In this instance such actions as sacrificing, giving alms, continence &c, do not immediately bear fruit, as such actions as milking, cooking &c, have immediate results, and such actions as sowing, ploughing &c after a while bear fruit, for there is no such proximate result observed. Nor is gun &c, through being known = virtuous, the result. For those who practise secret continence &c, do not design such results. The result therefore is the remotely future paradise &c and this does not immediately succeed the action which rapidly ceases to exist. It results therefore that there is in the interim a common site of the action and the fruit, viz. requisitive efficacy. U

अभिषेचनेपशामसहस्रवर्षगुरुकुलवासयानप्रस्ययज्ञदानमोक्षयदि-
नतत्रमन्त्रकालनियमाश्चादृष्टाय ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Inaugurations fasting, continence, residence in the family of a spiritual guide, life in the forest, sacrifice, almsgiving, oblation, the cardinal points constellations, sacred texts, seasons, and religious observances, conduce to invisible result

पति कर्षतीत्यादिक्रिया च विलम्बभाषिकना तथा जयति ददाति ब्रह्मचर्यं चरतीत्यादिक्रिया सा त सद्य फलिका न भवति तादृशस्य फलस्यानुपलब्ध्ये न च धार्मिकतया ज्ञानान्वाभादिकमेव फलम प्रच्छन्न धर्मचर्यादि चरता तत्फलानुद्देशात् सम्मान्त्रिभाषिक्यादिकमेव फल तत्त्वानुतरविनाशिन्या क्रियाया न सावर्गदित्यान्तरालिक क्रियाफलस्यो समानाधिकरणस्य प्रत्ये पत्येयमिति ॥

1 Of these some of the actions of which the result is unseen, are pointed out. These actions conduce to that is produce, unseen results. Among these inauguration is the sprinkling of kings, fasting the abstinence of the Sūraśūtra, continence abstinence from sexual intercourse, residence in the house of a spiritual guide that of religious students for the purpose of studying the Veda, living in the forest the actions of those who set out at the close of life for the forest, sacrifice the Rājāsūya &c, almsgiving at the beginning of the month Ashādhā oblation of rice cattle &c, the cardinal points orientation of morals &c, constellations the obsequial rites of the tenth lunar asterism Maghā &c. sacred texts, the holy monosyllable Om the Gayatrī &c, seasons the Chaturmāsya rites &c, religious observances purifications contentment, penance study, and meditation on the Duty. By the word and, are to be understood also those not here enumerated but which are proscribed by revelation and tradition. V

चातुराश्रम्यनुपधा अनुपधाश्च ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 The duty of the four periods of religious life [has been declared] Fidelities and infidelities [are causes of merit and demerit]

1 The duty of the four periods of religious life is the conduct proscribed in the four stages viz those of the religious student, householder hermit and mendicant. This has been already declared —such are the words to be applied. Infidelities are defects

1 तत्रादृष्टकृतानि कर्माणि चिद्वर्त्मनि प्रदर्शयति इतानि कर्माणि अदृष्टाद्य अदृष्टजनकानि तत्र अभिषेचनमभिवेका राज्ञाम् उपवास शिवरात्र्युपवासादि ब्रह्मचर्यं मष्टविधमभ्युनाद्विपञ्चनं गुरुकुलवासो ब्रह्मचारिणा वेदाध्ययनाद्यर्थं धानप्रस्य वयं श्रेये वनप्रस्थितानां पुटपाकादिकर्म यज्ञो राजसूयादि दानमाषाढ्यादौ प्रोक्तं ब्रौहिषदादीनां दिकप्राङ्मुखभोजनादि नक्षत्र मघाश्राद्धादिमन्त्र प्रणयगायत्र्यादिजप काल चातुर्मास्यश्रतादि नियमा शेषवृत्तान्तपतप स्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि चकारादनुक्तानि शैतस्मात्तान्यपि ॥

2 ब्रह्मचारिण्यदिप्राप्तप्रस्थमिश्रवृत्तेषु चतुर्षु आश्रमेषु विहितं यत्कर्म तत् चातुराश्रम्य पूर्वमुक्तमिति शेष उपधा भाष्यदोषा अनुपधा भाष्यदोषाश्च धर्म धर्मोपाधनानीत्यर्थः ॥

of faith, fidelities non deficiencies of faith, efficient causes of merit and demerit V.

भावदोष उपधा ऽदोषो ऽनुपधा ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 A deficiency of faith is an infidelity, a non-deficiency a fidelity

¹ Deficiencies of faith, lust, anger, covetousness, infatuation, intoxication, envy &c, are expressed by the term infidelity, non-deficiencies of faith, freedom from negligence and sloth, tranquillity of mind &c, are to be understood by the term fidelity V

यदिदृक्परमगन्धस्पर्शं प्रोक्षितमभ्युक्षितञ्च तच्छुचि ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 That which is of prescribed colour, taste, smell and touch, the aspersed, and the sprinkled are pure

¹ That colour &c, which is enjoined by revelation and tradition is prescribed The substance to which such colour &c, belongs as such is pure. Of these colour is prescribed in such texts as, He buys the soma for a cow, ruddy, one year old, with tawny eyes, He should take a white goat The aspersed is that which is sprinkled with water during the recitation of a sacred text, the sprinkled that which is sprinkled with water without a sacred text The word and implies that which is lawfully acquired This is such as is denoted by such precepts as that a Brahman should acquire wealth by performing sacrifices, by teaching, and by receiving presents U

अशुचीति शुचिप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 Impure denotes the negation of the pure

¹ कामक्रोधलोभमेहमदमात्सर्यादयो भावदोषा उपधाशब्दाच्चा अद्धाश्रमादा मातृस्यलन प्रसादादयो दोषा अनुपधाशब्दाच्चा इत्यर्थः ॥

² दृष्टं पृथ्वा स्मृत्या च यद्वर्णादिकं विहितं यस्य द्रव्यस्य तत्तथा तत्र रूपं अरुणाय शकटायन्या पिङ्गाय गया सोमं क्रोधाति श्वेतं कामलमासभेतद्व्यादौ प्रोक्षितं मन्त्रेणोदकमिक्षाम् अभ्युक्षितं विनामन्त्रमुदकमि 'च काराच्यायतो लद' तच्छ याजनाध्यापनप्रतिषेधेनाश्रयणो धनमर्जयेद्व्यादिनियमविधिबोधार्थम् ॥

' The contrary of such substance as is pure is impure. A substance of wrong colour, taste, smell or touch, one not aspersed or sprinkled or sprinkled with forbidden water, or unlawfully acquired is the property of a Brahmin acquired by agriculture or merchandise, is impure. U

अर्थान्तरञ्च ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 And something else.

' That which is vitiated by speech or by disposition even in that which is of excellent colour, taste, smell or touch, or in that which is aspersed or sprinkled or justly acquired is also impure. U

अथ तस्य शुचिभोजनादभ्युदयो न विद्यते नियमाभावात् विद्यते वा ऽथान्तरत्वाद्यमस्य ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 To the unrestrained there accrues no exaltation from eating what is pure inasmuch as there is an absence of religious observance, or it accrues because restraint is something else.

' To the unrestrained means to one deficient in restraint or wanting in self control. The eating of one void of the restraint denoted by such a rule as A man should eat after washing his hands and feet and rinsing his mouth, restrained in speech. When food is presented to him though pure he should twice rinse his

१ यद्व्य शुचि तद्विपरीतमशुचीत्यर्थं अप्रशस्तरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शमन्त्रप्रोक्षितमनभ्युक्षित निषिद्धजलाभ्युक्षित वा अन्यायामतम कृष्याणिजपागत द्राक्षणद्वयमशुचीत्यर्थं ॥

२ अप्रशस्तरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शमपि प्रोक्षितमभ्युक्षितं न्यायार्जितञ्च यत्तत्रापि पाणदुष्टं भावदुष्टञ्च यत्तदप्यशुचीत्यर्थं ॥

३ अथ तस्य यमरहितस्यासपतस्येति यावत् इत्थो पादौ प्रक्षाल्यावप्य वागयतो भुञ्जीत भोक्ष्यमाण प्रपतोऽपि द्विराचामेत इत्यादिव्योध्यतयमरहितस्य भोजनं नाभ्युदयाय किन्तु पापाय कुत इधमित्यत आह । नियमाभावात् नियमस्य सङ्कारिणाभावात् नि यमे सति यत्तदाह विद्यते वा यद्योक्तयमसाहित्येन भोजने मद्यत्याभ्युदय कुत इत्यत आह । अर्थान्तरत्वाद्यमस्य भोजनादर्थान्तरं यतो यम तथा च सङ्कारिकारणं विना ॥ फलसिद्धिस्तस्मिन् सति फलसिद्धिरित्यर्थं ॥

mouth does not tend to exaltation, but to sin. It may be asked why, the answer accordingly is furnished. Inasmuch as there is an absence of religious observance in consequence of the non-existence of the religious observance, the secondary cause. That which takes place where the observance is performed is stated. Or it accrues,—exaltation accrues only in the case of eating with the accompaniment of the prescribed restraint. It may be asked why, hence it is stated that it is because restraint is something else, that is, is something else than eating. The sense therefore, is that without the accessory cause there is no realisation of the result and that with it there is. U

असति चाभावात् ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 9 For there is non-existence [of exaltation] where [the eating of pure food] does not exist.

1 Though there be restraint where the eating of pure food is not there is non-existence of exaltation—such is the completion of the ellipse. Restraint and eating are therefore both causes of merit. The word eating designates secondarily other actions. Restraint and religious observance are accessories also of sacrifice, almsgiving, oblations, oblations and other acts prescribed by revelation and tradition. U

सुखादसम् ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 From pleasure arises desire.

1 Restraint having been specified as an accessory with regard

1 यमे सत्यपि शुचिभोजने सति अभावाद्भ्युदयस्येति ज्ञेयं तथा च यमे भोजनस्य हृष्यमेव पुण्यकारणमित्यर्थं भोजनमित्युपलक्षणं ध्यायदानहोमादीनामपि यातस्मात्तत्र संज्ञा यमनियमे सद्धारिणी ॥

2 एव धर्माधर्मप्रादुर्भावं इति यमपदकारिणमभिधाय दोषं सद्धारिणमभिधातुं दोषनिदानमाह स्रग्धन्तनयनितार्दिषयमयमनान्मनं सुखादुत्तरात्तरं तज्जातीयं सुखं तत्साधनं वा राग इच्छा संजायते अद्विगुण्टकादिजन्येन दुःखात् तत्र तत्साधने वा ह्येव इत्यपि दृष्टञ्च रागद्वेषयोरा प्रवर्तकत्वेन दोषा इत्यभिधायन्ती तथा च यातमात्रं सूत्रं प्रवर्तनरक्षणा दोषा इति ॥

to merit and demerit the origin of defects is stated, with the purpose of specifying defects as accessories. Desire or wish arises from pleasure generated by attachment to garlands sandal wood, women and other objects of sense, or in the pleasures of those successive kinds or in the means of those pleasures. It is also to be considered that aversion arises from pain begotten by snakes, thorns &c, in those pains or in the means of those pains. Desire, aversion, and infatuation in virtue of being incentives to activity, are called defects. Accordingly the aphorism of Gautam, Defects have for their characteristic incentive to activity U

तन्मयत्वाच्च ॥ ११ ॥

Aph. 11 Also through that being engrained

The words desire and aversion arise are to be supplied That which is engrained is a particular powerful reproduction engendered by use of objects of sense by the influence of which it is that the unhappy lover, who does not win his mistress sees his beloved in every object, and he who has been once bitten by a snake, in consequence of the forcible reproduction sees snakes everywhere. It has therefore been said Habituation to an object is its luminous revelation external or internal U

अदृष्टाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Also through destiny

The words desire and aversion arise are to be supplied Though destiny be a universal cause yet in relation to these it sometimes assumes the nature also of a special cause. Such cases

रागद्वेषो भजत इतिशेषं विषयाभ्यासजनितो दृढतरः संस्कारविशेषस्तन्मयत्वं यदुशांत कामातुरस्य कामिनीमलभमानस्य सर्वत्र कामिनीदर्शनं सदा भुजभुजददृष्टस्य तत्र दृढतरसंस्कारतः सर्वत्र भुजदृष्टदर्शनं तदुक्तं तन्मयत्वं तत्प्रकारो वाह्याभ्यन्तरेतस्तथा इति ॥

रागद्वेषादितिशेषं यद्यप्यदृष्टसाधारणकारणं तथापि क्वचित्ता प्रति असाधारणतामप्यनुभजति यथा तज्जन्माननुभूतकामिनीमुखस्यापि धीमनोऽर्धे कामिनीरागं अननुभूतभुजददृष्टदुःखानामपि भुजद्वेषु द्वेष इत्याद्युच्येयम् ॥

are to be inferred as the desire of a mistress at the commencement of youth, even in one who has not experienced in this birth the pleasures of love, the aversion towards snakes even in those who have not experienced pain from snake bites &c U

जातिविशेषाच्च ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 Also through particularity of race

Another necessary is stated Thus on the part of the human race there is desire towards rice &c on that of deer towards grass &c, on that of camels towards fivers, &c In all these cases destiny which determines such and such a race is the cause; but race or particular birth is only a means Similarly the desire of pigeons &c for refuse So also the aversion of buffaloes towards a horse of dogs towards a jackal of ichneumons towards a snake &c is to be inferred U

इच्छाद्वेषपूर्विका धर्माधर्मप्रवृत्तिः ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 Activity in merit or demerit has for its antecedents desire and aversion

Activity in a lawful action has desire for its condition, in an unlawful action injury &c activity has aversion for its condition Activity determined by desire in sacrifice &c begets merit activity determined by aversion in injury &c begets demerit These same desire and aversion cause the series of transmigrations

सहकार्यान्तरमाह । तथाहि मनुष्यजातीयानामसादे राग मगजातीयाना नृणा देवैः करमजातीयाना कष्टकादेः तत्रापि तत्तज्जातिनिष्पादक्रमदृष्टमेव तन्त्र द्वाराभावनु जातिर्जन्मविशेष इव पारायतादीनामुत्करे राग तथा महाव्यजातीयाना सुरङ्गद्वेष सा रमेवाशा शृगाले नरुमाना भुनङ्गमे इत्याद्युच्येयम् ॥

विहिते कर्मणि रागनिबन्धना निषिद्धे कर्मणि हिंसादेः द्वेषनिबन्धना प्रवृत्तिः रागनिबन्धना पापादेः प्रवृत्तिर्धर्मं प्रवृत्ते द्वेषनिबन्धना हिंसादेः प्रवृत्तिर्धर्मं तापेति रागद्वेषा ससारमनुवर्तयत तथा च योतमोय सूत्रम् प्रवृत्तिर्यामयुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इति धामारम्भा धाचिकी प्रवृत्ति इत्य प्रिय दितमितिपुण्या असत्यमप्रियमहितमिति पापा दुष्टि बुध्यते ज्ञायतेनेनेति तेन बुध्यते तेन मानसी प्रवृत्तिर्भूतदयादि शरीरोपवृत्तिर्दान परिचरणमि त्यादिका दशविधा पापा दशविधा पुण्या चेति ॥

Accordingly the aphorism of Gautama Activity is energy of word thought and body Verbal activity is energy of voice it is meritorious so far forth as it is true, kind, and useful, evil so far forth as untrue unkind, useless By thought intelligence, by which we think or know, is intended Sensorial activity therefore is compassion towards all creatures, &c Bodily activity is almsgiving ministrations &c, evil in ten ways and good in ten ways U

तत्संयोगो विभागः ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 By these are conjunction and disjunction

Existence in a future state is now declared to be the occasion of merit and demerit. By these—by merit and demerit—conjunction that is birth, is caused By conjunction is here intended connection with non previous pains of bodily organs. Disjunction is the disjunction of body and the internal sensory, characterised as death The meaning is therefore that this transitory world a series of births and deaths otherwise termed existence in a future state is caused by merit and demerit U

आत्मगुणकर्मसु मोक्षो ध्यास्यात ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 Emancipation is declared as dependent on the actions of the soul

This it is which is the separation of body and soul When there exist the actions of the soul emancipation ensues The actions of the soul are as follows —hearing meditation the prac-

इदानीं धर्माधर्मयोः प्रयोजनं प्रेत्यभायमाह । ताभ्या धर्माधर्माभ्या संयोगो जन्म अपृथ्याभिः शरीरनिर्दयदेनाभिः सम्यग्ध संयोग इत्येत विभागस्तु शरीरमेवाविभागो मरणवत्तया तथा चाय जन्ममरणप्रयत्नः संसारं प्रेत्यभायस्यानन्तराभाय इति वैदिकी सत्ता ॥

अयमेव शरीरविभाग आत्मकर्मसु सत्सु मोक्षो भवतीत्यर्थं तत्रात्मकर्मणि ता वत शरीरं मनन योगाभ्यासो निदिध्यासनमासन प्राणायाम उमदमसम्पत्ति आत्मपरात्मसाक्षात्कारो देहदेवान्तराद्यभोग्यपृथ्यात्यक्षधर्माधर्मपरिज्ञान तद् भोगानुपपन्नानादेह निर्माण तयोर्भागेन प्रत्ययो रागद्वेषनवृत्तयोऽप्यनुसारविग्रहादविमधर्माधर्मयोरनुत्पादात् प्रयत्तिरपाये जन्मापायो दुःखापायवत्तयोऽयमेतत्तत्र यदुपदायतित्यज्ञानमाद्यमात्मकम् ॥

tice of devotion, abstraction, a sitting posture, restraining the vital airs, of acquisition of quietism and self-subjugation, the presentation of one's own and others' souls, knowledge of merit and demerit previously acquired, whereof there must be fruition in other bodies and places, the formation of various bodies suitable to the fruition thereof, the destruction of merit and demerit by fruition, and emancipation characterised as removal of pain consequent on the cessation of birth, resulting from the cessation of activity in consequence of the non-production of further merit and demerit, by overcoming the mist of defects characterised as desire and aversion. Of these the primary act of soul is knowledge of the real nature of the six categories. U

SEVENTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON.

उक्ता गुणाः ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 1. The qualities have been stated

1 Desirous of investigating the qualities in the seventh book the author reminds us of their enunciation and definition. The meaning is that the qualities have been stated, that is, enunciated, and defined. V

एषिष्यादिरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शा द्रव्यानित्यत्वादित्यारब्ध ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Also the colour, taste, smell, and touch of the earth &c, inasmuch as substances are non-eternal, are non-eternal

1 The colour, taste, smell, and touch of earth; the colour touch, and taste of water, the colour and touch of light or fire; and

1 सप्तमे गुणान् परिचिचिपुस्तदुद्देश्येन चण्ये स्मारयति । गुणा उक्ता उद्दिष्टा लीकृत, श्रुत्यर्थः ॥

1 एषिष्या रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः, जलस्य रूपरसस्पर्शाः, तेजसोरूपस्पर्शाः, वायोः स्पर्शः, एतेषाम् नित्यायितानामनित्यत्वम् आशयनाशनाश्रयत्वात् चकारादेरन्त्यकपृथक्त्वपरि-
मितिर्गन्धस्पर्शसिद्धिरुद्देश्यमेतानां शयदः, तेषां अनित्यगता अनित्या एतेत्यर्थः ॥

the touch of air,—these, inhering in the non eternal are non eternal, inasmuch as they cease to be on the cessation of the existence of their substrata. The particle also implies unity, individual unity, extension gravity, natural fluidity, and viscosity. These also are in the non eternal, non eternal. V

एतेन नित्येषु नित्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 By this is declared their eternity in things eternal

1 By this—by the affirmation that their non eternity is caused by the non eternity of their substrata, the eternity of colour &c in eternal substrata is declared that is virtually asserted being involved. The reading adopted by the author of the Vritti is Non-eternity in things eternal. In this opinion colour &c are non-eternal in things eternal, that is in atoms : inasmuch as colour and the other qualities above mentioned are destructible by conjunction with fire. But it is to be considered that in this reading there is no congruity between the words by this and is declared. V

अप्सु तेजसि वायौ च नित्या द्रव्यनित्यत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 They are eternal in water light, and air, inasmuch as the substances are eternal

1 It may be objected, Why whereas colour and the other qualities residing in terrene atoms are destructible by conjunction with fire is it universally stated that they are eternal in things eternal? The things eternal are therefore characterised. The sense is that colour and the other qualities are not eternal when existing in eternal earth but are stated in the preceding aphorism to be eternal only when residing in eternal water light and air. V

1 एतेन आशयानित्यत्वे हेतुकानित्यत्वरूपेण नित्येषु आशयेषु रूपादीनां नित्यत्वमुक्तमुक्तप्राथम्यादात्त्यादित्यर्थं नित्येऽनित्यत्वमिति वृत्तिपरममतं पाठः, तन्मतं नित्येषु पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादीनामनित्यत्वमग्निसंयोगनाश्यादित्यर्थं, किंतु तादृशपाठे एतेनेति उक्तमिति च सङ्गतं न भवतीति ध्येयम् ॥

1 ननु पार्थिवपरमाणुगतानां रूपादीनामग्निसंयोगनाशवत्त्वात् कथं नित्यमिति सामान्यत उक्तमते नित्यानि विशेषयति । न खलु नित्यवृत्तियोगता रूपादयो नित्याः कतु नित्यजननेजोऽप्युगता ते एव नित्या पूर्वसूत्रे उक्ता इत्यर्थः ॥

अनित्येष्वनित्या द्रव्यानित्यत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 In things non eternal they are non eternal because the substances are non eternal

1 It may be asked whether qualities other than colour &c existing in things non eternal are eternal in which case conjunction &c would be eternal. It is therefore stated that all qualities which reside in things non eternal are non eternal in consequence of the non eternity of their substratum and that consequently there are no eternal qualities in things non eternal. U

कारणगुणपूर्वका एयित्या पाकजा ॥ ६ ॥

Aph. 6 [Colour taste smell and touch] produced by combustion in earth have for their antecedents the qualities of their causes

2 It is implied that the colour taste smell and touch residing

1 ननु रूपादिभिश्च अनित्यगता गुणा ऋ नित्यास्तथा च संयोगादिकमपि नित्यं स्यादित्यत आह । अनित्येषु ये गुणा यतन्ते त इयं सवानित्या आशया नित्यत्वात् तथा चानित्येषु नित्या गुणा न सन्त्येत्यर्थः ॥

2 कपरसगंधस्पर्शा अजययिगता इति विश्ववर्णीय कारणगुणपूर्वकाः स्यादयस्य यानि कारणानि अवयवा इति यावत् तथा ये गुणा स्य रूजातीयगुणा तस्य प्रादुर्भूयन्तीत्यर्थः तथा चावयववृत्तिरूपरसगंधस्पर्शानामसमयाविकारणानि अवयवगता कपरस गंधस्पर्शास्तथा समयाविकारणप्रत्यासच्चत्यन्तु स्वसमवायसम्यन्वयमिति बाध्यम् ननु यदा घटादेः यत्नरदग्निसंयोगानन्तरं कथं रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिरित्यत उक्त एयित्या पाकजा इति अपीतिशेषः तथा च एयित्या कपरसगंधस्पर्शा पाकजा अपि पाकस्तु रूपादिपरावृत्तिकलक विजातीयतज संयोगः, सोऽपि रूपादेरसमवायिकारण भवति तत्र च परमाणायत्र पाका रूपादिपरावृत्तिर्नादप्यधीनीति पीतुपाकजादिन तन्मत्त विजातीयग्निसंयोगादारम्भक संयोगनाशेन द्वागुरुपयन्तावयवविनाशे सति परमाणौ रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिस्तत्ताविजातीयग्निसंयोगादारम्भकसंयोगानुगुणक्रियाद्युत्पत्त्यारम्भकमयागादिप्रक्रमश्च पुनर्द्वेणुकादिमहावयव विषय्यन्तानामुत्पत्तिर्भवतीति । पिटरषाक्यादिनस्तु अवयविना सच्छिद्रतया विजातीयग्निसंयोगात् तदामपि रूपादिपरावृत्तिर्भवति न तु तत्रावयविना नाश प्रत्यभिज्ञाधिरोधादित्याहुः । अत्र च पाकप्रक्रिया वयनारब्धभिर्वा परित्यक्ता ज्वरातुसन्ध्या । ये तु नीलरूपादिव्यक्तय रक्तेका एव नित्या इत्याहुस्तन्मते नीलरूपं नष्टं यदा रूपाद्युत्पत्तिरिति न्यादिप्रतीतिव्यवहारयोगानुपपत्तिः समवायसम्यन्वयस्य नित्यतया तद्विषयतया रूपा पत्यसम्भवात् अन्यथा घटादीनामपि नित्यत्वमेकत्वञ्चाप्येत घटस्य रूपमिति भेद प्रत्ययात् गुणगुणिनोर्नाभेद नीलपीतादिनानातन्वादाारब्धे घटादेः चित्ररूपमेव ज्ञायते

in wholes, have for their antecedents the qualities of their cause, that is that they become manifest from the homogeneous qualities which are attributes of the parts, which are the cause of their own substratum. It is thus to be understood that the presentation of colour, taste, smell and touch residing in the parts which are the non coinherent causes of colour, taste smell, and touch, existing in the wholes, is by the connection of co inhesion with the co-inherent. In anticipation of the question how in a dark water pot &c after powerful conjunction with fire there is production of red colour &c, it is stated that in earth those qualities produced by burning also—for the word also is to be supplied—colour, taste smell, and touch in earth even when produced by burning have for their antecedents the qualities of their causes. Burning is an extraordinary conjunction with fire resulting in change of colour, &c. This also is a non coinherent cause of colour &c. On this subject those who maintain the combustion of atoms hold that it is in the atom that the change of colour &c consequent on combustion takes place and not in the whole. According to their doctrine the red colour &c is produced in the atom after the dissolution of the whole into binary atomic aggregates by destruction of the originative conjunction consequent upon an extraordinary conjunction with fire, and after this ensues again production beginning with binary aggregates and terminating in the whole possessed of magnitude in the progressive order of originative conjunction &c caused by the production of action &c conformable to originative conjunction in consequence of an extraordinary conjunction with fire. Those who maintain the combustion of wholes such as the pot, torch that, the wholes being porous it is in them that the

तादृशपटस्य नीरूपत्वे तच्चावुषानुपपत्तेः नय्यास्तु तत्र पटे तनदण्डप्रकारच्छेदेन नानेव
रूपाणि भवन्ति । अतएव "साहितो यस्तु यथैनं मुखे पुच्छे च पाण्डुर" । अतः खुर
विषाणाभ्यां स नीलो वृष उच्यते" ॥ इत्यादिकं सङ्गच्छते इत्याहुः रसान्धयोस्तु न
चित्रत्वं नानारसादिमदण्डप्रकारव्यानामप्यग्निना नीर त्वादिसंस्कारेणैव वक्ष्यभावात्
चित्रस्पर्शस्तु रूपस्य लोपयुक्त्या स्वीकरणीय एवेति सत्त्वेन ॥

change of colour &c. takes place in consequence of conjunction with the particular kind of fire, and that there is in this case no destruction of the wholes, for this would be contrary to observation. The order of combustion is here omitted to avoid voluminous prolixity, and may be sought elsewhere. According to the doctrine of those who teach that particular blue colours &c. are only individually eternal, the cognition and expression that blue colour has ceased to exist and dark colour has been produced is improper, inasmuch as connection by co-inherence is eternal and the production of such a cognition and expression with connection by co-inhesion as its object, is impossible. Else, were it possible, the eternity and unity of water pots &c. would follow. There being a cognition of difference in the nature of the colour of a water-pot, there cannot but be a difference in the attribute and then in the subject of the attribute. In a piece of cloth &c. originating in various threads &c. of blue yellow, and other colours, there is produced a composite colour for were such cloth colourless &c., its visual presentation would be impossible. In conformity with this, they say, is the verse. That is said to be a blue ox which is ruddy in colour in the face yellowish in the tail and white in the horns and hoofs. Taste and smell are never composite, there being no harm if it be but allowed that wholes originated by parts possessing various tastes &c. are tasteless &c. A composite touch must be allowed according to the analogy of colour. V

एकद्रव्यत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7. Because there is only one substance

‘ In reply to the objection. How can the qualities of the cause as not existing in the effect be productive of the qualities of the

‘ ननु कारणगुणानां कार्योत्पत्त्यात् कथं कार्यगुणजनकस्य धर्मधिकरणवादित्याद्य
द्रव्यमाह । एकं द्रव्यमधिकरत्नं यस्य सत्त्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यादित्यर्थं । तथा च कार
णगुणानां साक्षात् समवायसम्बन्धेन कार्योत्पत्त्येव स्वसमवायिसमवायव्यसामानाधि
करणसम्बन्धेन कार्योत्पत्त्यात्तदगुणजनकस्य नानुपपत्तिर्भाति भावः ॥

effect there being a difference of substratum? it is stated that it is because there exists that whereof there is one substance is the substratum, that is because there is a common substratum. Notwithstanding therefore, that the qualities of the cause do not exist in the relation of immediate co-inherence in the effect yet inasmuch as in the relation of community of substratum characterised as co-inherence with the co-inherent, they do exist in the effect, the production by them of the qualities of the effect is not impossible. V

अथोर्महतश्चेत्पलव्यनुपलब्धी नित्ये व्याख्याते ॥ ८ ॥

|| Aph. 8 The perception and non perception of the atomic and of that which has magnitude have been explained to be constant. |

1 The word eternal or constant refers as to a section to that which contains it to the fourth book which treats of eternity. The respective application of the words perception and non-percep-

1 नित्ये ऋति त्रिषदेषु त्रिषदेषु नित्यत्वप्रतिपादकं चतुर्थोऽध्यायमुपलक्षयति उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी इति यथायोगमन्यथ' येन यस्याभिप्रायश्चो दूरस्थस्यापि तस्य स' इतिन्यायेन तया चाणोरनुपलब्धिरिति लभ्यते तदेव स्युः नोक्तं कलस इति प्रात्यक्षिकप्रत्यये यथा नोक्तं रूप विषयस्तथा परिमाणमपि तत्र च परिमाणेन परमाणुपर्यन्त परिमाणमुच्यते द्रव्यत्वाच्च 'कञ्च द्रव्यप्रत्ययताया रूपत परिमाणमपि कारणं नहि महत्त्वमन्तरेण द्रव्य प्रत्यय भवति तया ॥ द्रव्यप्रत्ययकं रक्षत्येन स्वयञ्च प्रत्ययतया परिमाणं गुणोऽस्तीति निश्चीयते यदि हि घटाद्रित्यरूप परिमाणं स्यात् तदा महदानयोस्तुते घटमात्रमानयेत् तया च प्रतीतिसप्रतिपत्ती विरुद्धेयताया एव घटपदात् परिमाणं प्रतीयेत परिमाणपदाद्वा घट इति मानव्यग्रहारासाधारणकारणत्वं द्रव्यसावात्कारणविषयनिष्ठसामान्यगुणत्व या महत्त्व मानव्यग्रहारे हस्तचितस्त्यादिव्यग्रहारे न ॥ पलसद्रव्यादिव्यग्रहारे तच्च परिमाणञ्चतुर्थीय महत्त्वमपुत्र्य दीर्घत्व द्रव्यत्वञ्च तत्र परममहत्त्वपरमदीर्घत्वे विमुचतुष्टयधातनी परमाणुत्वपरमहृत्त्वत्वे परमाणुर्जतिनी अवान्तराणुत्वावान्तरद्रव्यत्वे द्रव्यगुणजतिनी वसरेणुमारभ्य महाव्यविषयन्त महाव्यवृत्त्यदीर्घत्वे एवञ्च सर्वत्रापि द्रव्याणि परिमाणद्वयान्ति वित्यामनकादावपुत्र्यग्रहारे समिदितुदपदादिषु च द्रव्यत्वग्रहारे भक्ति भक्तिश्चात्र प्रकर्मभावाभावा आसनके य प्रकर्मभावस्तस्याभाव कुशले वित्ये य प्रकर्मभावस्तस्याभाव आसनके स च गौतमुख्योभयभागित्वाद् भक्तिपदवाच्य दीर्घत्वद्रव्यत्वे नित्ये न यत्ते इत्येकं परिमाणं स्य ते न भवत इत्यपरे, महत्सु दीर्घमानोपतामिति त महत्सु वर्तुल त्रिकोणज्वालीयतामिति निर्धारणवत्ताद्वर्तुलत्वादीनामप्यपत्तेरिति तेषामाश्रयात् ॥

tion is according to the rule. That which is connected with another, is connected with the more remote. Non perception of the atomic is thus obtained. In the presentative cognition therefore, determined as a large blue water-pot, the extension is just as much an object as the blue colour, and by means of this, extension terminating in the atomic as a minimum is inferred, as also from substantiaty. Moreover of the perceptibility of substance the cause is coloured extension, for without magnitude substance cannot be perceived. Accordingly it is decided that, as being a cause of perceptibility of substance, and as being of itself perceptible, extension is a quality. For were the form of a water pot &c., its extension, a man would bring a water-pot, when he was told to bring the great, and thus there would be a contradiction in the order and the apprehension of it, and likewise by the term water pot, extension would be conveyed, or by the term extension a water pot. The notion of magnitude is that of a particular cause of the usage of measurement or that of a universal quality existing in objects and the cause of the presentation of substance. The usage of measurement is the usage of cubits spans &c. not the usage of weights, numbers &c. This extension is of four kinds, the great, the small the long and the short. Of these, infinite greatness and infinite length exist in the four pervading substances absolute smallness and absolute shortness exist in atoms. Intermediate smallness and intermediate shortness exist in binary atomic aggregates. Greatness and length reside in substances, from tertiary atomic aggregates upwards to composite wholes. In this manner all substances whatever possess two extensions or dimensions. The notion of smallness in a vilva or amalaka fruit and of shortness in such sugar canes &c., is relative. The relativity in this case is the existence or non existence of greater size. There is non existence in a jujube of the greater size, of which there is existence in an emblic myrobalan. There does not exist in an emblic myrobalan the greater size which exists in a vilva fruit. This as containing as parts both the primary and

secondary magnitudes, is described by the term relative magnitude U

कारणबहुत्वाच्च ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 9 Also in consequence of a plurality of causes, extension is produced

* The particle also implies the addition of magnitude and coalescence : Extension is produced in the ellipse to be supplied in the aphorism Among these plurality of causes alone produces greatness and length in a tertiary aggregate since greatness and accretion do not exist in their cause The plurality is derived from the relative cognition of the Deity The influence of particular destiny determines a plurality of objects in the divine cognition Similarly duality existing in two atoms is productive of extension in a binary atomic aggregate : In a piece of cloth originated by two threads not coalescent it is magnitude alone which is the non-coherent cause inasmuch as plurality and coalescence do not there exist But where a ball of cotton is originated by two balls of cotton in this case coalescence is the cause for there is here observed an increase of extension and there is no plurality, and magnitude even though it existed could not be an occasion of increase of extension Such being the case even were magnitude here a cause there would be no failure in the argument Hence it has been said By two by one or by all Coalescence is an

१ चकारो महत्त्वप्रचयौ समुच्चिनोति परिमाणमुत्पद्यते इति सूत्रशेषे तत्र कारणबहुत्वं केवलं त्र्यणुके महत्त्वदीपत्ये जनयती महत्त्वप्रचयौस्तत्कारणभावात् तच्च बहुत्वमीश्वरापेक्षायुद्धिजन्यं तदुद्धरणेकविषयत्वेऽप्यदृष्टाद्विषयेषामप्यदो नियामक एव परमाणुद्वयगतं द्वित्वं द्व्यणुके परिमाणात्पादकं वर्तते द्वाभ्या तन्तुभ्यामप्रचिताभ्यामारब्धे पटे केवलं महत्त्वप्रचयसमाप्तिरित्यत्र बहुत्वप्रचयौस्तत्कारणभावात् एव च द्व्यणुके तूलरूपिणद्वयसंस्तत्र परिमाणात्कर्षदर्शनात् प्रचय कारणबहुत्वस्याभावात् महत्त्वस्य सत्येऽपि परिमाणोत्कर्षप्रत्ययप्रयोजकत्वात् एवञ्च सति यदि महत्त्व तत्र कारणं तदा न त्रयं तदुक्तं द्वाभ्यामेकेन सर्वथा इति । प्रचयश्च आरम्भकः संयोगः सच स्वाभिमुखिज्विद्वयसंयुक्तत्वे सति स्वाभिमुखिज्विद्वयसंयोगजन्यः सचाप्रचयः संयोगः स्वावयवप्रतिष्ठितसंयोगापेक्षः परिमाणजनकः गुणकर्मरम्भे सापेक्षद्वितिवचनात् ॥

assurance that a jujube is small in relation to a bel-fruit, an emblemic myrobalan great in relation to a jujube, and a bel-fruit great in relation to an emblemic myrobalan. Among these the principal notion is that of greatness. The reason of this is stated to be that there exists particularity, that is, that there exists particular magnitude, because there is a relation of more and less. But among these the notion of smallness is relative. The reason of this is said to be the non-existence of particularity, that is the non-existence there is of particular smallness. [For minuteness as a product resides only in binary atomic aggregates, and as eternal abides only in the ultimate particles. But this does not exist in a jujube, &c. In other words, it is because there exist in the particles of the jujube &c plurality, magnitude and coalescence of constituent elements, which are a particular cause of magnitude, and because there does not exist in the jujube &c duality not having a common substratum with magnitude, which duality is the cause of smallness. U.

एककालत्वात् ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Because the time is one

' The greatness and smallness are both experienced at one time, and these greatness and smallness being contrary to one another cannot exist together in one substratum. Therefore, inasmuch as there exists a cause of greatness, the conception of magnitude is in this instance primary and the notion and usage with regard to smallness are derivative or relative only. U

दृष्टान्ताच्च ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 Also because of the example

' It is seen likewise that in the natural order of things there

' महत्त्वमणुत्वञ्च द्वयमध्येऋस्मिन् कानि अनुभूयेते, ते च महत्त्वाणुत्वे परस्परविरोधिनी निरुप्रायये मह सम्प्रयत, अतो महत्त्वकारणसदभावात् महत्त्वमणुत्वस्यैव मुख्योऽणुत्वप्रत्यययोगो च भाक्तावित्यर्थः ॥

' दृश्यते तथा यस्तुमत्या महत्त्वस्यैव कुयनामनरुचिन्येषु स्थानस्थानतराभ्युन्नतमण्यद्वारेण भवितव्यमित्यर्थः यथा यस्तुमत्या शुक्रस्यैव घटश्चद्वयस्फाटिकादियु शुक्रशुक्रतराभ्युन्नतमण्यद्वारः ॥

must be a practical conception of a great, greater, and greatest, in the jujube, emblic myrobalan,* and bel-fruits which possess magnitude, just as in the course of things there is a conventional notion of white whiter, and whitest, in a piece of cloth, a conch shell crystal &c, which are white U

अणुत्वमहत्त्वयोरणुत्वमहत्त्वाभाः कर्मगुणैर्व्याख्यातः ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 The non-existence of greatness and smallness in greatness and smallness, is explained by greatness and smallness

It may be objected that in virtue of the practical notion of small and great extension, it is known that in magnitude as an extension there exists magnitude, and in smallness as an extension there exists smallness. How then can these exist in substance alone, or how does not the contradiction emerge of the existence of quality in quality? In answer to this it is stated that as quality and action do not possess quality and action, so also greatness and smallness do not possess greatness and smallness, and that such a conventional notion is to be regarded as tropical U

कर्मभिः कर्माणि गुणैश्च गुणा व्याख्याताः ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 Actions are explained to be [void] of actions, and qualities of qualities

It may be urged that as qualities are possessed of qualities—and how else could there be such conventional notions as a loud sound, one sound twenty four qualities &c?—and as actions are

नन्वरुमहत्त्वपरिमाणव्यवहारवस्तान्महत्त्वेऽपि परिमाणे महत्त्वमणुत्वेचाणुत्वमस्तीति ज्ञायते ततः कथं द्वयमात्रवृत्तिस्थमनयो कथं वा गुणे गुणवृत्तित्वाप्ररोधो नाप्यव्यत इत्यत आह । यथा गुणकर्मणी नानुत्वमहत्त्वयतो तथा अणुत्वमहत्त्वेऽपि नानुत्वमहत्त्वयतो इत्यर्थं प्रयोगश्च भाक्ते दृष्टव्यः ॥

ननु यथा गुणा गुणवन्तः कथमन्यथा महत्तान् शब्दं द्वौ शब्दौ एकं शब्दं चतुर्धिश्रुतिगुणा इत्यादिष्वव्यवहारः, कर्माण्यपि च कर्मवन्ति प्रतीयन्ते कथमन्यथा शीघ्रं गच्छति द्रुतं गच्छतीति व्यवहारः, तथाचाणुत्वमहत्त्वेऽपि न तद्वृत्तौ स्यातामित्यत आह । कर्मभिः कर्माणि न तद्वृत्तिं गुणैश्च गुणा न तद्वृत्तस्तथाऽणुत्वमहत्त्वेऽपि न तद्वृत्तौ, व्यवहारस्तु सर्वत्र भाक्ते इत्यर्थः ॥

possessed of actions—and how else could there be such cognitions as, It goes quickly, It goes rapidly?—so in like manner greatness and smallness* must also be possessed of greatness and smallness. In answer to this it is stated that actions are not possessed of actions nor are qualities possessed of qualities and that in like manner greatness and smallness are not possessed of greatness and smallness but the conventional notion is in all these cases tropical U

अणुत्वमत्त्वहाभ्यां कर्मगुणाश्च व्याख्याताः ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 Actions moreover and qualities are explained to be [void] of smallness and greatness

It may be urged that in virtue of such conventional notions as small actions great actions small qualities great qualities the extension greatness and smallness must be concluded to exist in action and quality. It is therefore stated that as the extensions greatness and smallness do not exist in the extensions greatness and smallness, in like manner neither of those extensions exists in action or in qualities, and that the aforesaid conventional notions have as their objects increase and diminution V

एतेन दीर्घत्वद्वयत्व व्याख्याते ॥ १७ ॥

Aph 17 By this length and shortness are explained

It is stated that shortness and length are similar to smallness and greatness. As smallness and greatness are proved to exist by the conventional notions of great and small so shortness and length are proved to exist by the conventional notions of long and short. In like manner also the action and convention that one thing is

ननु गुणि कर्मणि महान्ति कर्मणि अणवो गुणा महान्ता गुणा इत्यादिव्यग्रहारयनात् कर्मणि गुणे च अणुत्व महत्त्वञ्च परिमाण सत्स्यतीत्यत आह । यथा अणुत्व महत्त्वपरिमाणयोर्नाणुत्वमहत्त्वपरिमाण तथा कर्मणि गुणेषु च तदुभयम उक्तव्यग्रहाराध्यापकयोर्कर्मविषयका इति ॥

इत्यत्यदीर्घत्वयोरप्यणुत्वमहत्त्वतुल्यतेत्याह । यथा अणु महद्विदितिव्यग्रहारमिदं अणुत्वमहत्त्व तथा इत्य दीर्घमितिव्यग्रहारमिदं इत्यत्यदीर्घत्वे यदमिदमस्माद् इत्यमिदमस्माद्दीर्घमित्यादिप्रत्ययव्यग्रहाराध्यापकयोर्कर्मविषयकात्रेयत्वम् ॥

shorter or is longer than another, have for their object increase and diminution V

अनित्ये ऽनित्यम् ॥ १८ ॥

Aph 18 In the non-eternal [extension] is non-eternal

1 Extension is non-eternal in the non eternal. It is in consequence of the destruction of its substratum that it ceases to exist. It is not to be maintained that in a water pot and the like where there is an increase or diminution by two, three or more atoms there is another extension recognised by perception on the ground that there is in this case no destruction of the water pot &c inasmuch as there exists in regard to it the recognition that it is the same water pot. For in the case of a diminution or increase of the atoms there is necessarily a destruction commencing in the tertiary atomic aggregates and terminating in the composite wholes there being necessarily a destruction of the binary aggregates, for the sum of destroying causes fails not in obtaining its effect through any difficulty with regard to the recognition. In the case of an increase in the body &c there is necessarily a destruction of the composite whole in consequence of the necessity of the destruction of the non-coherent cause. Nor can it be urged Where there is not destruction of a piece of cloth &c how can there be an addition of extension resulting from conjunction with other threads? For in this instance

1 परिमाणमनित्ये अनित्यमाश्रयिनाशादेव सत्त्वयतीत्यर्थं न च घटादेः त्रिचतु रादिपरमाणुविशेषे तदुपसृष्टे वा परिमाणान्तरं प्रत्यक्षमिदं स एवायं घट इत्यादिशब्दं भिन्नायास्तत्र सत्त्वेन घटादेरत्राश्रयिनाशादिति वाच्यं परमाणुविशेषे तदुपसृष्टे वा द्व्यणुके नाशस्यावश्यमत्वेन त्रसरेकस्याद्यन्त्यावश्यविपर्यन्तनाशस्यावश्यकत्वात् नहि विनाशस्य मयी प्रत्यभिज्ञाभिया कार्यं नाशविष्यति शरीरादाद्यवश्योपचयेऽसमवायिकारणनाशस्यावश्यकत्वादवश्यविनाश आद्यवश्यं न च घटादिनाशेऽपि तत्त्वान्तरसंयोगात् कार्यं परिमाणविपर्ययमिति वाच्यं तत्रापि येमादाभिघातेनासमवायिकारणतन्तुसंयोगनाशादेव पट नाशस्यावश्यकत्वात् किञ्च तत्त्वान्तरस्य तत्पटावयवत्वे पृथगे तत्पट एव न स्यात् तत्तन्तुरूपकारणभावात् तत्तन्तोरवश्यस्याभावे च न तेन परिमाणादेष संप्रकटोपान्तरादत् तस्मात्तत्र तत्त्वान्तरसंयोग इति पूर्वपटनाशात्पटान्तरोत्पत्तिरित्यवश्यं स्यात् कार्यं म अद्यप्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञानन्तु साक्षात्त्वेन संवेधं दीपकभिकेत्यादियत् । न च पूर्वपटान्तय एव तत्त्वान्तरसद्वकारान् पूर्वपटे सत्त्वेन पटान्तरमारभन्त इति वाच्यं सूत्रेण समानदेशतादिरौप्यादितिसत्त्वम् ॥

There must needs be destruction of the piece of cloth resulting from the destruction of the conjunction of the threads, which conjunction is the non-coherent cause, such destruction being caused by the striking of the loom, &c. Moreover if that other thread were a portion of that cloth, the cloth of which it is the thread would not previously exist, since the thread which is its cause would not exist. But if that thread be not a part, there can be thereby no addition to its extension, as is the case with other conjunct substances. It must, therefore, necessarily be admitted that in this case, when conjunction with another thread takes place there results production of another piece of cloth from destruction of the former piece of cloth. The recognition of the composite whole is caused by the homogeneity of the former and latter wholes, as in the recognition of the continuous identity of the flame of a lamp. Nor is it to be maintained that the former thread, through the subsidiary agency of the other thread, originate a new piece of cloth during the existence of the former piece of cloth for it would involve the contradiction of two substances at the same time occupying the same space. V

नित्ये नित्यम् ॥ १९ ॥

Aph 19 In the eternal it is eternal

* The extension which exists in things eternal, that is in ether &c and in atoms is eternal, for there is nothing to destroy it. U

नित्यं परिमण्डलम् ॥ २० ॥

Aph 20 Atomic extension is eternal

* The word *parimandala* technically designates atomic extension, and an atom characterised by such extension. An atom, that is a substance consisting of an ultimate particle characterised by atomic extension, is eternal. There is therefore no annihilation of eternal

† नित्येषाकाशादिसु परमाणुषु च यत् परिमाणं तच्चित्यं विनाशकाभावात् ॥

‡ परिमण्डलशब्देऽपरमाणुपरिमाणं तद्विशिष्टं परिमाणञ्च परिभाषया प्रतिपादयति परिमण्डलं परिमाणद्वयपरिमाणव्यतिरिक्तं परमाणुद्वयं द्वयं नित्यमित्यत न नित्यद्वयस्य दुर्भेदतत्पर्यं । तस्य नित्यत्वञ्च प्रागेव प्रतिपादितम् ॥

substance The eternity thereof has also previously been declared V

अविद्या च विद्यालिङ्गम् ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 21 Ignorance, moreover, is an indication of knowledge

It may be asked why should we admit substance in the form of atoms, since it cannot be perceived, and may be maintained that only such substance as is cognised by perception, such as tertiary atomic aggregates &c, is to be admitted To this the reply is furnished Ignorance, the absence of certain knowledge, that is such cognition as that earth is eternal or that water is eternal, having a composite whole as its object, is a mark or indication of the existence of the science or certain knowledge, the object of which is atomic that earth is eternal, inasmuch as certain knowledge has always for its antecedent the absence of certain knowledge, for such an error as that earth is eternal cannot arise in one that has no notion of eternity This mode of proving accidentally but really the existence of atoms, which has been formerly described, merits attention V

विभवान्महानाकाशस्तथा चात्मा ॥ २२ ॥

Aph 22 Ether, in consequence of its universal pervasion, is infinitely great, and so likewise is soul

Ether is pervading all things in consequence of conjunction

ननु परमाणुरूपं द्रव्यं कथमङ्गीकर्तव्यं तस्यापत्यत्वात् प्रमरेण्यादिकमु प्रत्यक्षं सिद्धं यद् द्रव्यं तदेवाङ्गीकरणीयमित्यत आह । अविद्या अप्रमा एषित्री नित्या ज्ञानं नित्यमित्यादिप्रतीतिरयथार्थविषयिणी विद्यायाः परमाणुविषयित्वे एषित्री नित्येति प्रमाया लिङ्गम् सत्यं प्रमाया अप्रमापूर्वकत्वात् नाह कुत्रापि नित्यत्वमज्ञानत एषित्री नित्येति भ्रमा भवितुमर्हेति एतच्छापाततः वस्तुत परमाणुसिद्धिप्रकारं प्राक् प्रदर्शितं स्यादरणीयम् ॥

विभवात् सर्व्यमूर्तसयोगादाकाशो महान् परममहत्परिमाणवान् सच्च परिमाणं नित्यमाकाशस्य नित्यत्वात् आकाशस्य सर्व्यमूर्तसयोगाभावे नानादेशाद्यच्छेदेन शब्दात्पत्यसम्भवात् तत्तद्वेशाकाशसयोगस्य तत्तच्छब्दासमवायिभारणत्वात् एवमात्मापि नित्यपरममहत्परिमाणवान् विभवात् अदृष्टवदात्मसयोगस्य सर्गाद्यकालीनपरमाणुकर्मणस्तुत्यादात्मविभयमप्यावश्यकम् ॥

with all finite things is infinitely great or possesses infinitely great extension. This extension is eternal since ether is eternal. Did there not exist in ether conjunction with all matter the production of sound limited to various places would be impossible for conjunction with ether in respective places is the non cohererent cause of respective sounds. In like manner soul also is possessed of eternal and infinitely great extension being all pervasive. The universal pervasion of soul is proved inasmuch as conjunction with soul influenced by destiny is the cause of action in the atoms at the time of creation V

तदभावाद्गुण मनः ॥ २३ ॥

Aph 23 In consequence of non existence of that [universal pervasion] the internal organ is absolutely small

¹ It may be urged. The internal organ is also like soul in all pervading substance inasmuch as it is the substratum of conjunctions which are the non cohererent causes of cognitions &c, why therefore has not its infinite greatness been enounced? In reply to this it is stated that in consequence of the non existence of that universal pervasion the internal sensory is absolutely small is not possessed of infinitely great extension. The proof that the internal organ is determinant of non simultaneity of cognitions is absolutely small results from the impossibility of ever become cognisant of an object of the forementioned influence prohibitive of universal pervasion V

गुणैर्दिग् व्याख्याता ॥ २४ ॥

Aph 24 By its qualities space is explained [to be all-comprehensive.]

¹ नव्यात्मग्रन्थेनापि विभुजानाद्यसमयाधिकारणसंयोगाद्यपत्यादिति तस्य महत्त्व रिमाणं कृता नाक्तमत आह । तस्य विभयस्याभावात्तन्मात्रं न परममहत्परिमाणयदित्यर्थं ज्ञानादीनामप्यनियामकतयाप्युक्त्ययत एव मनसः सिद्धिर्येवमसाधकप्रागुक्तानुमानस्य धर्मरूपाद्वरूपमाणं निराधतत्वादिति भावः ॥

By its qualities characterised as priority and posteriority existing in all finite things and consisting of the common prior, posterior and other conceptions of beings existent in all divisions of the universe space also explained to be all comprehensive If it be asked how the notion and expression of ten spaces or quarters of the compass arise whereas it is to be stated that relative conception having for its object the more and the less in conjunction with the conjunct is the cause of the production of priority and posteriority and whereas the conception of a plurality of spaces is contravened by the complexity of the conception or neediness of the hypothesis, to this we reply that this is no valid objection inasmuch as it has been stated that the conception is determined by the particular accidents of space U

कारणे काल. ॥ २५ ॥

Aph 25 Time relates to a cause

The designation time relates to a substance which is the cause of the cognitions of the prior posterior reciprocal simultaneous non simultaneous slow and fast Such a cognition common to persons in all places would be impossible unless time were universally pervasive Its universal pervasion is possession of infinite magnitude Or (it may be argued) that in virtue of such

गुणे सकलद्वीपप्रतिपुष्पसाधारणपूर्यापरादिप्रत्ययरूपे सकलमूर्तनिष्ठपरत्वा परस्परानवर्ते दिगपि व्यापकत्वा व्याख्यातेत्यत्र परत्वापरत्ययोक्त्येता मयुक्तस्योगभूय स्वार्थापस्यविषयापत्ताद्युद्धे कारणत्वस्य व्यत्ययात्वात् नानादिद्वन्द्वजनस्य कल्पनागोचरप्रतिहतत्वात् कथं तर्हि दश दिग् इति प्रतीतिव्यपदेशार्थं चेन्न तत्तदुपाधिनिवन्धनत्वादित्युक्तत्वात् ॥

परस्परव्यतिकरयोगपदव्यापकविरहितप्रत्ययरूपे द्वये काल इतिमगलान तादृश प्रत्यय सर्वत्रैवपुष्पसाधारण कालस्य व्यापकतामन्तरण न सम्भवतीति तस्य व्यापकस्य परमद्वन्द्वयोग इत्यर्थः । यद्वा यदानीं जातइत्यादिप्रतीतियनात् सर्वत्रैवप्रति मक्षिमितकारणस्य कालस्य प्रतीयते तदपिव्यापकत्वाधोन निमित्तकारणस्य समग्रव्य समग्रव्यकारणप्रत्यासन्ननिषमात । यद्वा अतीतानागतवर्तमानव्यवहार साध्विक इति सर्वगत इय काल । यद्वा क्षणलयमुद्रुतयामदिनाहोरात्रयमासवर्षेणसमग्रव्यत्सरादिश्यव हारव्यारणे द्वये कालाव्यति व्यत्ययव्यवहारस्य साध्विकत्वात्काल साध्विक इति परमम घान् तस्य नानाव्यवहार च कल्पनागोचरप्रतिहतत्युक्तम् ॥

cognitions as born now &c. time is the occasional cause of all that is produced and this is dependent on universal pervasion, for an occasional cause is the condition of the apprehension of the co-inherent and non-coherent cause. Or another argument might be that the notion of past present and future is applicable to all objects and therefore time is existent everywhere. Or that the designation time relates to the conventional divisions of moments *lavas* hours watches days days and nights lunar fortnights seasons half years years &c. and this conventional division being of universal application time is everywhere existent, and consequently infinitely great. It has been explained that the conception of a plurality of times is contravened by the complexity of the hypothesis. U

SECOND DAILY LESSON

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकार्थान्तरमेकत्वम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 1 Because of the exclusion of colour taste smell and touch unity is a different object

1 The investigation of number and individuality is commenced after that of extension because magnitude is the cause of the perceptibility of number &c. Unity is a different object different from colour &c. not having colour &c. for its form. The term unity implies number and the four succeeding qualities viz. extension individuality, conjunction and disjunction. The object of such cognitions as Space is one Time is one &c. must be allowed to be some quality different from colour &c. because of the exclusion of colour, taste smell and touch that is because of the non-

1 'एकत्वस्य' अख्यादिपञ्चकतेषु क्वापि परिमाणान्तराणां अन्तरमेव अख्यापञ्चकत्वयोर्निरूपणमारभते । एकत्वं अद्यान्तर रूपादिव्यो मि ननु रूपादित्वरूपम एकत्वपद सङ्ख्यादिपञ्चकोपसदृक गणनमेक कान एक इत्यादिप्रतीतिविषये रूपादिभिर्वा गुणोऽप्यपदमङ्गीकार्य गणनादियु रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकात् रूपादीनामभावादित्यर्थ नचेक सामान्यमेकाधिकेण एक समवाय एकोभाष इत्यादिप्रतीति का गतिरिति घाय्य तत्रा नायत्वाधोर्नाग्र्येपदिपदत्वव्यस्यैकत्वस्य भानाङ्गीकारादधिमन्यवानुसन्धयम् ॥

existence of colour &c in space &c It cannot be urged What is the case with such cognitions as one generality, one particularity, one co-inhesion, one non-existence &c, for we must admit in regard to these independently a notion of unity constituted by their being the object of a modification of the intellect V

तथा एवम ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Likewise individuality

The similarity of the quality individuality to number is stated Individuality also is like number another quality In this quality single individuality is like the number unity and dual individuality &c is like the numbers duality, &c Nor is it to be argued that there being observed a community of object in the cognitions, The water pot is individually apart from the piece of cloth, or other than, or different from it, individuality is only reciprocal non-existence, and not another quality, for did the negative particle signify no difference from the word apart as an adverb there could be no dissimilarity between the cognitions This is apart and This is not V

एकत्वेकपृथक्त्वयोरैकत्वेकपृथक्त्वाभावो ऽणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्या व्याख्यातः ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 The non-existence of unity and single individuality in unity and single individuality is explained by smallness and greatness

It may be objected that in virtue of such cognitions as one

एकत्वं गुणस्य सख्यातुल्यत्वमाह । एकत्वं अपि सख्यादगुणान्तरमेव तत्रैक एव गुणस्य सख्यातुल्यत्वं द्विपृथक्त्वादिकञ्च द्विपृथक्त्वादिसख्यातुल्यमिति न च घटः घटात् एव गुणस्य भिन्न इत्यादिप्रतीतिना समानविषयकत्वानुभवादन्वयान्वाभावाच्च एव एव गुणस्य न तु गुणान्तरमिति याच्ये न जगदस्यैव एव जगदस्यैव एव तद्वत्त्वाभावाच्च अस्मात् एवैक इदमिति प्रतीत्यैल्लक्षणानुपपत्तेः ॥

नन्येकमेकत्वमित्यादिव्यवहारवशादेकत्वेऽप्येकत्वमेवमेकपृथक्त्वद्विपृथक्त्वात्पृथगिति व्यवहारवशादेकपृथक्त्वप्येकपृथक्त्वमद्वीकार्यमिति तयोर्गुणस्य दृष्टं गुणस्य सत्त्वादतः प्रादुर्भावः । यथाऽणुत्वमहत्त्वेऽपि अणुत्वमहत्त्वयोस्तथा एकत्वेकपृथक्त्वयोरपि नैकत्वे एकपृथक्त्वे व्यवहारस्तु प्रकारान्तरेणोपपादनीय इत्यर्थः ॥

unity, there exists unity in unity, and in like manner in virtue of such cognitions as that single individuality is individuality apart from dual individuality, single individuality must be admitted to exist in single individuality, and that consequently there is a difficulty involved in their being qualities, inasmuch as they exist in qualities. In answer to this it is stated that as smallness and greatness do not exist in smallness and greatness, so also unity and single individuality do not exist in unity and single individuality, but this cognition is to be shown possible in some other manner V

नि.संख्यत्वात् कर्मगुणाना सर्वैकत्वं न विद्यते ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 4 Unity does not exist in all things, for actions and qualities are void of number

It may be asked as the notion of unity is common to qualities and to actions what reason there is to conclude that the unity which exists in substances does not exist in qualities &c Unity does not exist in all things. If it be asked why it is replied that it is because actions and qualities are destitute of number. Numberlessness is the state of those things that transcend number, that is, that are without number. Accordingly actions and qualities are without number. Inasmuch as number is a quality, number does not exist in qualities. Nor does it exist in actions, for qualities are denied of actions, for otherwise it would follow that actions were substances, and it has been demonstrated that number is a quality, and unity a number U

भ्रान्तं तत् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 That [notion] is erroneous

ननु गुणेषु कर्मसु च साधारणवैकल्यव्यवहारः किमत्र विनिगमनं यद्व्येष्ट्यैकत्वं न गुणादिव्यतिरागः । सर्वव्यापकत्वं तच्च विद्यते कुत इत्यत आह निःसंख्यत्वात् कर्मगुणानामिति सद्व्याया निष्क्रान्ता हि सद्व्यायास्तेषा भावो निःसंख्यत्वम् तथा च कर्मणि गुणाश्च निःसंख्यानि सद्व्याया गुणस्येन गुणेषु तावत् सद्व्याया न विद्यते नचा कर्मसु गुणाना कर्मसु निषेधात् अन्यथा द्रव्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् साधितञ्च सद्व्याया गुणत्वमेकत्वस्य च सद्व्यायात्वमिति भावः ॥

' It may be asked How then the notion of one colour, one taste &c ? It is stated in reply that the notion of unity in relation to qualities and actions is erroneous In the aphorism there is an ellipse of the word notion, this being the subject previously mentioned The notion thus applied is derivative and derived from essential inseparability, but this is not unity, for it has been stated to be other than unity U

एकत्वाभावाद्धक्तिस्तु न विद्यते ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 In consequence of non existence of unity, secondariness does not exist.

' It may be asked Say that this notion of unity be secondary or derivative in relation to substances also, and the cognition be erroneous in relation to them, then what of unity ? To this the reply follows If unity be now where taken in its primary sense, the notion thus applied cannot be secondary, for the secondary has for its antecedent the primary Nor is the conception erroneous for error has for its antecedents certain knowledge it being the certainly known that is erroneously attributed, for imputation of the unreal [as taught by the Vedāntins] is rejected by the establishment of imputation of the elsewhere experienced [as taught by the Vaiśeṣikas]

कार्यकारणयोरैकत्वेकपृथक्त्वाभावादेकत्वेकपृथक्त्व न विद्यते ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 Of cause and effect there is not unity and single individuality, in consequence of the non-existence of unity and single individuality

' तर्हि कथमेक रूपमेकारस इत्यादिज्ञानमित्यत आह । गुणकर्मसु पदेकत्वज्ञानं तद् भ्रान्तिमित्यर्थं सूत्रे च ज्ञानमितिशेषः प्रतिपत्तपूर्वपक्षत्वञ्च प्रयोगस्तु भाक्त स्यरूपा भेद एवञ्च मुक्तिं न च तदेकैकत्वमुक्तोक्तत्वात् ॥

' ननु द्रव्येण्यपमेकत्वयोगोभाक्तो स्तु तत्र भ्रान्त क्रमेकत्वमेत्यत आह । यदि पारमार्थिकमेकत्व्य क्वचित्चाभ्युपगन्तव्यं तदा न प्रयोगो भाक्त मुख्यपूर्वकत्वात्भाक्तं न चा प्रत्ययोभाक्त प्रमापूर्वकत्वात्प्रमस्य प्रमितं शरीरिण्यते नाप्रमितम असत्प्रातिनिर्वासात् अन्यथाप्याते साधनादिति भावः ॥

1 With the purpose of parenthetically rejecting the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the unity and single individuality and indivisibility of integrant parts and integrated wholes, it is stated that there is neither unity nor single individuality in cause and effect that is there resides no unity or single individuality in both the cause and its effect. For this the reason assigned is that there do not exist in the cause and its effect unity and single individuality. Unity is indivisibility, single individuality is non-dissimilarity. Since these do not exist in the sum of constituent parts and the constituted whole, the parts and the whole are not identical, for it is allowed on all hands that the thread is cognised as separate from the cloth and dissimilar to it. V

एतद्वनित्ययोर्व्याख्यातम् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 This is explained in relation to non-eternal [cause and effect]

2 This—the possession of non-existence of unity and single individuality by reason of possession of non-existence of indivisibility and non-dissimilarity—is affirmed of non-eternal cause and effect. Accordingly on the hypothesis of the indivisibility of the threads and cloth it would follow that in the case of the production

1 अथ यद्यपि योरेकत्वमेकपृथक्त्वञ्च न तु तयोर्भेद इति साङ्ख्यमतं प्रसङ्गादिराकर्तुमाह । कार्यकारणयोरेकत्व नयैकपृथक्त्व किमप्येतत्त्वमेकपृथक्त्व या कार्यकारणोभयनिष्ठ न भवतीत्यर्थः । अत्र हेतुमाह कार्यकारणयोरकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावात् एकत्वमभेदः एकपृथक्त्वमपेक्षायै तयोर्भावात् तन्तु पटादिव पटविधर्मत्वादित्येते सर्वसिद्धत्वादिति भावः ॥

2 एतदभेदाद्येधर्मभावात्त्वेनेकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावात्त्वम अनित्यये । कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वमित्यर्थः तथाच तन्तुपटयोरभेदाङ्गीकारे तन्तुत्वाददशाया पट उत्पद्यते पटोऽपि तददशाया तन्तुत्वात् तन्तुनाशदशाया पटो नश्यति पटनाशदशाया तन्तुर्नश्यतीत्यादिप्रत्ययप्रयोगात् प्रसङ्गः न चेत्तत्पक्षेतिनाशोपेक्षाप्रमाणिको अविर्भावोत्तिरोभावाभ्यामेव तत्पक्षेतिप्रतीतिरिति वाच्यमाविर्भावाङ्गीकारेन प्रत्याप्रसङ्गात् तत्पक्षेतिस्वीकारे तु किमपराद्ध पटाद्युत्पत्तिभिः अविर्भावे अविर्भावस्योत्पादस्य चानङ्गीकारे अविर्भावस्य सार्व्यादिकत्वप्रसङ्गः न ह्याविर्भावस्य सार्व्यादिकत्व साङ्ख्यैरपि स्वीक्रियते यस्मिन् पट उत्पद्यते पटा जिनश्यतीत्यादिक सार्व्यालोकात्पुनश्च यद्यत्पादघिनाशसाधक एवैव ययकानुभवस्य विषयान्तरविषयकत्वस्वीकारे घटपटादेरेष्यपलापपत्तरित्यसमसदावेयेन ॥

of the threads the cloth would be cognised and said to be produced, in the case of the production of the cloth the thread would be cognised and said to be produced, in the case of the destruction of the threads, the cloth would be cognised and said to be destroyed, and in the case of the destruction of the cloth, the threads would be cognised and said to be destroyed. Nor can it be maintained that production and destruction are no proofs, because it is possible that the cognition of these is caused merely by appearance and disappearance, for on the hypothesis of an appearance of an appearance there will result a regress to infinity. On the hypothesis of their production, therefore, what fallacy is there involved in the production of the cloth &c ? And if the appearance in appearance be not allowed to be production, it follows that appearance is constant, but the constancy of appearance is not admitted even by the Sāṅkhyas. In fact, the universal experience that the cloth is produced and destroyed and so forth, is proof of production and destruction, for if experience of one object be allowed to have another object for its object, we must deny also the water pot cloth, &c. This error has been sufficiently discussed. V

Conjunction.

अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मज संयोगजश्च संयोग ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 9 : Conjunction is produced by the action of one of the two conjunct objects by the action of both, and by conjunction

Uncontradicted cognition of the conjunct, is proof of the existence of conjunction. As results may be inferred substance as

संयोगे समुत्पत्तीतिरव्याधिता प्रमाणं कार्याणि च अवयवसंयोगेषु द्रव्यमस्ति संयोगे यावज्जकयादयः प्रत्यये परिमाणविरहे मेव-ज्ञेयसंयोगे शब्द इत्यादौह्यम् । नचा विरलौत्पत्तिरेव संयोगः क्षणभङ्गपरिणामयोर्निर्वासात् अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्ति संयोगः सदान्यतरकर्मजः क्रियायता ज्ञेयेन निष्क्रियस्य स्वाख्योस्तदभिमुखीकरणार्थतत्त्वस्य सक्रियस्यापि धायता यथा धायता पुरुषान्तरेण एष्टदेशसंयोगः उभयकर्मजः संप्रयोगोन्मेषादीः प्रत्येकं गद्योत्तसामर्थ्याभ्यामुभाभ्यामेव तज्जननात् सूतोयस्त्वहुतितकसंयोगादस्तत्त्वसंयोगः स चैकस्मादपि भवति यथा तन्तुयोरणसंयोगात् पटयोरणसंयोगः क्वचित्पटभ्यां संयोगाभ्यामेकः संयोगः यथा द्वाभ्यां तन्तुभ्यामाकाशस्य द्वौ संयोगौ ताभ्यामेकः एव द्वितन्तुकपटस्याकाशेन संयोगः क्वचित् धर्तुभिरपि संयोगैरेकः संयोगः आरभ्यते यथा दशभिस्तन्तुभिराकाशस्य दशसंयोगा एकमेव दशतन्तुकपटाकाशसंयोगमारभन्ते क्वचित्

proof of conjunction of integrant parts, colour &c produced by burning is proof of conjunction with fire, particular extension as proof of accretion, sound as proof of the conjunction of a kittle drum and ether and so forth. Conjunction is not mere contiguous production; as excluding momentary interruption and modification, conjunction is contact having non contact as its antecedent. This is produced by the action of one of the conjunct objects, as the conjunction of a hawk in motion with a motionless post, or the conjunction of one in motion with one not in motion towards him, is conjunction of a runner with back of another person running. Conjunction is also produced by the action of both conjunct objects, as that of two rams or of two wrestlers this being produced by both, each having individually acquired the power. The third kind

पुनरेकस्मादपि सयोगादसमवायिकारणात् सयोगद्वयमुत्पद्यते यथा पार्थिववाप्ययो परमाव्यो प्रथममनारम्भके सयोगे जाते पार्थिवे परमाव्यो पार्थिवपरमाव्यन्तरेण वाप्ये च परमाव्यावाप्यपरमाव्यन्तरेण च परमाव्यावाप्यपरमाव्यन्तरेण द्वाणुकद्वयपराम्भक सयोगद्वयमुत्पद्यते ताभ्यां सयोगाभ्यां सजातीयनिष्ठाभ्यां द्वाणुकद्वय युगपदारभ्यते तत्र य पार्थिववाप्यपरमाव्योरनारम्भकसंयोग उत्पद्यतेनेकेनेऽपार्थिवपरमाव्युनाप्यद्वाणुकेनेऽपि सयोगः वाप्यपरमाव्युना पार्थिवद्वाणुकेनापर सयोगो द्वाणुकयोरेवोत्पद्यतसमकालमेव जायते कारणाकारणसंयोगेन कार्यकारणसंयोगयोरेव जननात् भूतं प्रिभूनामन्यतरकर्मज एव विभुनोस्तु न सयोगः कारणाभावात् कर्म तावत्तत्र नास्ति नच तेन कारणाकारणसंयोगात् कार्यकारणसंयोगोऽपि नास्ति नित्यस्तु सयोगो न सम्भवति अप्रतिपार्थिकाया प्राप्ते सयोगत्वात् नित्यत्वे तद्विधातात् एवञ्च सति विभागोप्यजस्तत्र स्यात् पक्षेऽपि सयोगविभागोर्विरोधिनेरविशेषद्वयस्यैरेकत्रानुपपत्ते किञ्च सयोग इति प्रयोजिका युतिसिद्धि नच विभुनोस्तत्सम्भवं सापि द्वयोरन्यतरस्य वा एवमितिमात्रं युताययाया यस्य वा विनाशस्तु सयोगस्य समानाधिकरणाद्विभागादावयवनाशादपि क्वचित् यथा तन्नुद्वयसंयोगानन्तरमेकस्य तन्तोरेवयवयोर्मे कर्म जायते तेनाश्वन्तराद्विभागं क्रियते विभागादारम्भकसंयोगानाशस्तत्तुविनाशस्तन्नुविनाशात् सयोगानाशो यत्र तन्नुद्वय द्विरसंयुक्तं सदनुत्पत्तिक्रिय भवति कचित्तु तन्वयवयवकर्मणा यदा तन्त्यारम्भकसंयोगानाशं क्रियते तदा तन्वयन्तरे कर्मवित्तनात् आश्वयवयवविभागोऽपि युगपदत्यवयवयोः सयोगो न उपपत्तेत्याहुः । तज्जानुपपन्नं समवायिकारणानाशश्च विभागानुत्पत्ते समवायिकारणस्य कालसमकालस्यैवमित्यतिशयोक्तं अत्रापि सयोगो दृष्ट्यात्मन् निरपेक्षो युगात्समाश्रित्यैव स्वसमानाधिकरणात्पक्षाभावावप्रतीयेगी तथैवानुमयात् शाखाभावाच्चच्छेदेनापि मृच्छति न्ययोधतरो यत्तमानं कपिसंयोग न्ययोधतरो कपिसंयोग इत्यनुपपद्यत अवच्छेदमात्रेणा न्ययोधतरो परमाणुवृत्तिरापद्यते तथाच नोपलभ्येत विभूनामप्युपाधिभेद एव पदेऽस्तदवच्छेदेन वर्तमानस्य सयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वं परमाणुनिष्ठस्यापि सयोगस्य दिगादयोऽवच्छेदकाश्चिन्तनीयाः ॥

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Conjunction.

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संयोगे संयुक्तप्रतीतिरयाधिता प्रमाणं कार्याणि च अथयथसंयोगेषु दृश्यमग्निर्भवे पाकजरूपादय प्रचये परिमाणविशेष भेदकायसंयोगे शब्द इत्याद्यूह्यम । नचा विरलात्प्रतीतिरेव संयोग घणभङ्गपरिणामयोर्निरासात् अथातिपर्ययका प्राप्ति संयोग सचान्यतरकर्मज क्रियायता प्रयेनेन निष्क्रियस्य स्वायास्तदभिमुख्यक्रियारहितस्य सक्रियस्यापि धायत यथा धायता पुष्पांतरण एष्टदेशसंयोग उभयकर्मज मययोगमन्तयोयो प्रत्येक गृहीतसामर्थ्याभ्यामुभयामेव तर्जजननात् सूतोयस्त्वहुनितरसंयोगादन्ततर्कसंयोग स चैकस्मादपि भवति यथा तन्तुशीरसंयोगात् पटसंयोगसंयोग क्वचिद्वाभ्या संयोगाभ्यामेक संयोग यथा द्वाभ्या तन्तुभ्यामाकाशस्य द्वा संयोगौ ताभ्यामेक एव द्वितन्तुकपटस्याकाशेन संयोग क्वचिच्च यद्गुभिरपि संयोगैरक संयोग आरभ्यते यथा दशभिस्तन्तुभिराकाशस्य दशसंयोगा एकमेव दशतन्तुकपटाकाशसंयोगमात्मन्ते क्वचित्

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माणयोः प्रथममनारम्भके संयोगे जाते पार्थिवे परमाणोः पार्थिवपरमाण्वन्तरेण आय्ये
च परमाणावाय्वपरमाण्वन्तरेण च द्वाणुकद्वयपरमाण्वन्तरेण द्वाणुकद्वयपरमाण्वन्तरेण स-
ंयोगद्वयमुत्पद्यते ताभ्यां संयोगाभ्यां सजातीयनिष्ठाभ्यां द्वाणुकद्वय युगपदारभ्यते तत्र यः
पार्थिववाय्वपरमाण्वोरनारम्भकसंयोग उत्पन्नस्तेनैकेनैव पार्थिवपरमाणुना वा द्वाणुकेनैकः स
योगः आय्वपरमाणुना पार्थिवद्वाणुकेनापरः संयोगो द्वाणुकयोरुपाद्यत्वात्तत्समकालमेव
जायते कारणाकारणसंयोगेन कार्यकाराण्ययोगोरवश्य जननात् सूक्ष्मं विभूनामन्यतरकर्मज
एव विभुनेस्तु ॥ संयोगः कारणाभावात् कर्म साधकत्र नास्ति नच तेन कारणाकारण-
संयोगात् कार्याकार्यसंयोगोऽपि नास्ति नित्यस्तु संयोगो न सम्भ्रति अप्रतिपार्थिकतायाः
प्राप्तेः संयोगस्यात नित्यत्वे तद्विघातात् इवञ्च सति विभागोऽप्यजस्तत्र स्यात् नखेटापत्तिः
संयोगविभागयोर्विरोधिनेरविघनश्च दयस्वयोरैकजानुपपत्तेः किञ्च संयोगं प्रति प्रयोजिका
संयोगविभागयोर्विरोधिनेरविघनश्च दयस्वयोरैकजानुपपत्तेः किञ्च संयोगं प्रति प्रयोजिका
मुत्सिद्धिः नच विभुनेस्तत्सम्भवः साक्षि द्वयोरन्यतरस्य वा पृथगतिमात्रं युतायवाभा-
पत्य वा विनाशस्तु संयोगस्य समानाधिकरणाद्विभागादाप्यनशादपि क्वचित् यथा
तन्नुद्वयसंयोगानन्तरमेकस्य तन्तोरेवयवैर्गो कर्म जायते तेनाश्वन्तराद्विभागः क्रियते वि-
भागादारम्भकसंयोगानाशस्ततस्तु विनाशस्तनुविनाशात् संयोगनाशो यत्र तन्नुद्वय चिरं सं-
युक्तं सदनुत्पत्तिक्रिय भवति केचित्तु तन्त्वयवयवकर्मणा यदा तन्त्वारम्भकसंयोगनाशः
क्रियते तदा तन्त्यन्तरे कर्मचिन्तनात् प्राशयनार्थविभागाभ्यां युगपदत्यवाभ्यां संयोगो न-
श्यतीत्याहुः । तच्चानुपपन्नं समवायिकारणनाशचणे विभागादनुत्पत्तेः समवायिकारणस्य
स्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतीत्येयो तथैवानुभवात् शास्त्रामात्राद्यच्छेदेनापि महति
न्ययोधतरो यतमानः क्विसंयोगः न्ययोधतरो क्विसंयोग इत्यनुभवात् अत्रच्छेदमात्रेणा
न्ययोधतरो यतमानस्य संयोगस्याप्यव्युत्तिष्ठत्वं परमाणुनिष्ठस्यापि संयोगस्य दिगादयो-
ऽवच्छेदकाप्रचिन्तनीयाः ॥

of conjunction or conjunction produced by conjunction is such as conjunction of the hand with a tree resulting from conjunction of a finger with the tree. This moreover results from one conjunction as the conjunction of a piece of cloth with the grass may result from the conjunction of a thread and the grass. In some cases one conjunction is produced by two conjunctions, as two conjunctions with ether may be produced by two threads and by these two conjunctions a single conjunction of a piece of cloth made of two threads with the ether. In other cases a single conjunction is originated by a plurality of conjunctions as when ten conjunctions with ether originated by ten threads, originate a single conjunction between a piece of cloth made of ten threads and the ether. Sometimes on the other hand two conjunctions are produced from one single conjunction as their non-coherent cause, as when there having first taken place a non-originative conjunction between two atoms terrene and aqueous, subsequently two conjunctions originative of binary atomic aggregates are produced a conjunction in the terrene atom with another terrene atom and in the aqueous atom with another aqueous atom. By these two conjunctions existing in homogeneous objects two binary atomic aggregates are simultaneously produced. In these by the one non-originative conjunction produced in the terrene and aqueous atoms, a single conjunction of the terrene atom with the aqueous binary atomic aggregate and another conjunction of the aqueous atom with the terrene atomic aggregate are produced simultaneously with the production of colour &c. in the two binary aggregates, for the conjunction of a cause and non-cause must necessarily produce a conjunction of an effect and non-effect. The conjunction of all pervading entities with limited objects is produced by reciprocal action only. Of two all pervading substances there is no conjunction for there is no cause of conjunction. There exists in them no occasion therefore there results in them no conjunction of effect and non effect from conjunction of cause and non cause. An eternal

conjunction is impossible, for conjunction is contact having non-contact as its antecedent, and this is repugnant to the nature of the eternal. Also in this case (were eternal conjunction possible), no disjunction could be therein produced. Nor can it be allowed (as involving no objection, that no disjunction is therein produced), for conjunction and disjunction reciprocally repugnant and of indestructible condition, are impossible. Moreover previous unconnectedness is a necessary condition of conjunction, and this consists in the individual movement of one or other of two objects, or co inference in the substratum of the object joined. Destruction results from disjunction in-coexistent with conjunction, or from disintegration of the site of the conjunction in some instances, as when after the conjunction of two threads, action is produced in that portion of a thread which constitutes its extremity, by this action there is effected disjunction from what now becomes the extremity, from this disjunction results destruction of the original conjunction, from this results destruction of the thread, from destruction of the thread results destruction of the conjunction, where two threads having been long conjoined action is not produced in them. Some have maintained that when by action in the portions of the thread there is effected destruction of the conjunction original of the thread, the conjunction is destroyed by destruction of the substratum and disjunction simultaneously produced, inasmuch as action is conceived to exist in another thread. This is impossible for disjunction is impossible at the moment of the destruction of the co-inherent or material cause, it being a law that the co-inherent cause is of equal duration with the effect. This conjunction is absolute in the origination of substances, and relative in the origination of qualities and actions, non-existent in the case of the absolute non-existence of its proper substratum, for it is observed to be so. The conjunction existing between an ape and a great sacred fig-tree limited to conjunction with the branches only, exists, inasmuch as it is observed that there exists

in the sacred fig tree conjunction with the ape For were it to be accounted for otherwise than by such mere limitation, conjunction might possibly reside in an ultimate particle, and consequently be not cognisable . Locality is an accidental difference of all pervading substances , and conjunction as determined in position must be less than co-extensive with them Of conjunction residing in an ultimate particle, space &c may be regarded as determinant U

एतेन विभागो व्याख्यातः ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 By this disjunction is explained

¹ The analogy of conjunction to disjunction is stated. Disjunction also is of three kinds as divided into that produced by the action of one of the disjunct objects that produced by the action of both and that produced by disjunction . Of these the first is instanced in the disjunction of a hawk from a mountain , the second in that of two rams retiring from conflict , the third is of two kinds being either produced by the disjunction of causes only, or by the disjunction of causes and non causes . Of these disjunctions produced by disjunction the former class is exemplified where

¹ विभागे सयोगतन्व्यामाह । विभागोऽपि त्रिविध एककर्मजोभयकर्मजविभागज भेदात् तत्राद्य अयनयित्वा द्वितीयो मेययो तृतीयस्तु त्रिविध कारणाकारणविभागजन्य कारणाकारणविभागजन्यत्वेति तत्रादौयथा प्रथम कपाले कर्म ततः कपालद्वयविभाग ततो घटारम्भकसंयोगनाशस्ततो घटनाशस्ततस्तेन कपालद्वयविभागेन कपालस्याकाशा दिना विभागा जन्यते ततः कपालाकाशादिसंयोगभाशः तत उत्तरदेशसंयोगस्ततः कर्म नाश इति नच प्राथमिकेन कपालकर्मणा कथं कपालाकाशविभागा न जन्यते इति याच्यम् एकस्य कर्मण आरम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनकस्यानारम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनकत्वविराधात् अन्यथा विक्रैस्तत्कर्मलकुट्टमलादिभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् तस्मादनारम्भका काशकपालसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागो न कपालकर्म जनयेत् तस्य घटारम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनकत्वात् नच कपालविभागेन घटनाशात् पृथे कुत कपालाकाशविभागा न जन्यत इति याच्यम् आरम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागयतोऽययत्रस्य सति द्रव्ये देशान्तर विभागसम्भवात् कारणाकारणविभागजन्यविभागो यथा यत्र हस्तक्रिया हस्ततःविभागस्तेन शरीरतःविभागो जायते तत्र च हस्तक्रिया न कारण व्यधिकरणत्वात् शरीरे तु तदा क्रिया नास्ति अवयविक्रियाया यावदवयविक्रियानियतत्वात् अतस्तत्रकारणाकारण विभागेन कार्यकारणविभागे जन्यते इति अयमस्माद्विभज्यते इति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धोऽयं विभाग गुण संयोगनाशेन नान्यथासिद्ध इति सर्वेण ॥

firstly action is produced in one of the two halves of a water-pot, thence disjunction of the two halves of the vessel thence destruction of the conjunction originant of the water pot thence destruction of the water pot then by disjunction of the two halves of the water pot disjunction of the halves from the circumjacent ether &c. thence destruction of the conjunction of the halves with ether &c., thence conjunction with another place, thence destruction of the action. Nor is it to be urged in objection. How is it that disjunction of the halves of the water pot from the ether in which they were situated while component parts of the vessel is not produced by the primary action in the halves of the water pot? For one action productive of disjunction repugnant to the originative conjunction is contradictory to production of disjunction repugnant to non originative conjunction (such as that of the halves of the vessel with the ether circumjacent), since otherwise there would follow the possibility of the breaking of the buds of a full-blown lotus. The action then in the halves of the vessel cannot produce disjunction repugnant to the non originative conjunction of the halves of the water-pot and the ether inasmuch as such action produces disjunction repugnant to the conjunction originative of the water-pot. Nor can it be objected. Whence is it that disjunction of the halves of the vessel and the ether is not produced by the mere disjunction of the two halves, previously to the destruction of the water-pot? For disjunction from another place is impossible in an existing substance in any portion possessed of disjunction repugnant to the originative conjunction. Disjunction produced by disjunction of causes and non-causes is exemplified whereby action of the hand disjunction of the hand from a tree is produced; and by thus mediate disjunction of the body from the tree. In this disjunction the action of the hand is not the cause for there is a difference of substratum. But there is not at that time action in the body, for the action of a composite whole is determined as the action of the sum of the constituent parts. In

this case, therefore, there is produced by disjunction of cause and non cause ■ disjunction of effect and non-effect. This same quality, disjunction, is proved to exist by the presentative cognition that one object is disjoined from another, and is not therefore otherwise accounted for or unnecessarily assumed. V.

**संयोगविभागयोः संयोगविभागाभावो ऽणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां व्याख्या-
तः ॥ ११ ॥**

Aph. 11. The non-existence of conjunction and disjunction in conjunction and disjunction is explained by smallness and greatness

1 Conjunction and disjunction are not possessed of conjunction and disjunction, as smallness and greatness are not possessed of smallness and greatness, for qualities have no qualities V.

कर्मभिः कर्माणि गुणैर्गुणा अणुत्वमहत्त्वमिति ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Actions [are explained to be void] of actions and qualities by smallness and greatness

2 The aphorism Actions &c is repeated for clearness, or to aid the memory Its meaning has been already expounded. (VII 1 15) V.

युतसिद्धभावात् कार्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागो न विद्यते ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 Inasmuch as there ■ non existence of unconnectedness, there exist not conjunction and disjunction in an effect and its cause

3 A solution of the difficulty why there should not be con-

1 संयोगविभागो न संयोगविभागयन्तो यथाऽणुत्वमहत्त्वे नाणुत्वमहत्त्वयतो गुणाना निर्गुणत्वादित्यर्थः ॥

2 कर्मभिरिति सूत्रं स्पष्टाद्यै स्मरणाद्यै वा पुनस्तत्र अस्वार्थं प्रागेवाभिहितं ॥

3 ननु अत्रयथावयविनो. कथं न संयोगविभागाश्रित्याशङ्क्यामाह । युतसिद्धिः परस्परसम्बन्धगुणयोरवस्थानं कार्यकारणयोरवयवयथावयविनोर्न संयोगविभागा यतते युतसिद्धभावात् नहि घटाद्यवयवो कपालाद्यवयवसम्बन्धः सन् तिष्ठति येन तयोः संयोगविभागो सम्भाव्येयातामिति ॥

junction and disjunction in constituent parts and constitutes wholes, is stated Unconnectedness is the state of two objects void of mutual connection . Conjunction and disjunction do not exist in a cause and its effect that is in the constituent parts and the constituted whole inasmuch as there is non existence of unconnectedness . For a constituted whole a water pot and the like does not remain in existence out of connection with its constituent parts the two halves of the vessel &c, that conjunction and disjunction should be possible in the integrant parts and the integrate whole V

गुणत्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

Apl 14 Inasmuch as it is a quality [a word has not conjunction with the object which it denotes]

¹ A previously supposed view is here stated with the purpose of establishing that there exists between a term and its designates a connection of power in obviation of the difficulty —How can there be a conjunction between a verbal sign and its significate, for a word or sound being a quality cannot possess any quality nor is it to be replied that there exists not between them any conjunction for were that the case there might result from such a verbal sign as water pot the verbal apprehension of a piece of cloth there being no speciality of connection . The term denotative being a quality there can exist therein no conjunction with the object denoted that is with the water pot, &c. V

गुणो ऽपि विभाव्यते ॥ १५ ॥

Apl 15 A quality also is implied

¹ ननु शब्दार्थयो कथं संयोगः सम्भवति शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन गुणवत्त्वासम्भवात् न च नास्त्येव तयो संयोग इति वाच्यं सम्बन्धत्वाप्रियेण घटादिशब्दात् पटादिशब्दयो धापत्तित्यतः पदपदार्थयो शक्तिसम्बन्धव्यवस्थापयित्वा पूर्वपदवर्ति । प्रतिपादकस्य शब्दस्य गुणत्वात् तत्र प्रतिपादकस्य घटादे संयोगो न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

Moreover the object is sometimes characterised as as a colour, taste, &c., and with this conjunction is not possible, no quality being allowed to exist in a quality. Hence it is said that a quality also is an object—these words having to be supplied—, a quality, as colour &c may be the object of a word, but with this there can be no conjunction or connection. Or the sense may be that a quality also is implied or denoted by a word, and that the word can have no conjunction or connection with this quality. U

निष्क्रियत्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

Aph 16 Inasmuch as there is no action [in the term and the object denoted by it there exists no conjunction between them]

Similarly connection by conjunction cannot exist in substances such as ether denoted by such words as *sky*, for conjunction which is produced by action is impossible in the term designating and the object designated these being void of action. V

असति नास्तीति च प्रयोगात् ॥ १७ ॥

Aph 17 Inasmuch also as the expression *is not* is used of the non existent

Conjunction is impossible inasmuch as the object designated may not exist. It is therefore said Inasmuch also as it is observed that the expression *is not*—and in virtue of the particle *also* is to be understood *will be*—is used of the non existence, of that which

१ किञ्च विषयोऽपि क्वचिदुपरसादितव्यमस्तेन संयोगो न सम्भवति गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारादित्याह । गुणोऽपि विषय इति शेषः । गुणोऽपि कथादि शब्दस्य विषयो ननु तेन संयोगः सम्भवत्युक्त्यर्थं यद्वा गुणोऽपि शब्देन विभाव्यते प्रतिपाद्यते तेन च शब्दस्य न संयोगः सम्भवत्युक्त्यर्थः ॥

२ यय गगनादिशब्दप्रतिपाद्ये आकाशादिदृष्ट्येषां संयोगस्य सम्भव्यता न सम्भवति प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकयोः कर्मशून्यत्वेन क्रियाजनकस्य संयोगस्यासम्भवादित्यर्थः । गगनादिशब्दस्य गगनादेश्च निष्क्रियत्वात् संयोगो न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

३ प्रतिपाद्यस्यायतमानत्वादपि संयोगो न सम्भवतीत्याह । असति अद्यत्माने नास्तीति चकाराभविष्यतीति च प्रयोगदर्शनात् सद्याच्चातीतघट इदानीं नास्ति परदिने घटो भविष्यतीत्यादिप्रयोगेण अतीतानागतघटयोर्बाधो भवति नच ताभ्यां शब्दस्य संयोगादि सम्भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

is not known to be . Thus by reason of the expressions, The past water-pot does not now exist, Tomorrow the water-pot will exist, there results = cognition of a past and a future water-pot, and there can be no conjunction &c between them and words. V.

शब्दार्थोवसम्बन्धो ॥ १८ ॥

Aph 18 The word and its meaning are without connection

1 If there be conjunction between the word and its meaning it follows that the word and its meaning are without connection U.

संयोगिनो दण्डात् समवायिनो विशेषाच्च ॥ १९ ॥

Aph 19 [The cognition] of that which possesses conjunction [results from knowledge of the conjunct as] from a staff, and [the cognition] of that which possesses co-inhesion [results] from the particular.

1 It is stated that there is no cognition conversant about conjunction and other connections between a word and its meaning. From a staff—being conversant about a staff—results a cognition (for these words are to be supplied) of that which possesses conjunction—of a man possessing conjunction with the staff, and from the particular—being conversant about a particular constituent element—results a cognition of that which possesses co-inherence—of a constituted whole . There is, then, no cognition of the term water-pot as possessing a water-pot, or of a water-pot as possessing the word water-pot, as there is a cognition, conversant about connec-

1 शब्दार्थयोः संयोगश्चेकास्ति तदेतदापातं शब्दार्थोवसम्बन्धादित्यर्थः ॥

2 शब्दार्थयोः संयोगादिसंस्पर्शावगाहो प्रत्ययोरपि नास्तीत्याह । दण्डात् दण्डमयगात्र संयोगिनः दण्डसंयोगिनः पुरुषस्य विशेषादययप्रविशेषमयगात्र समवायिनोऽप्यप्ययिनः प्रतीतिर्भवतीतिशेषः तथाच यथा संयोगसम्बन्धावगाहो दण्डो पुरुष इति प्रत्ययः समवायमस्यन्धावगाहो करो कुञ्ज इति प्रत्ययश्च स्थारमिको नोक्तानां तथा घटवान् घटशब्दः घटशब्दवान् घटइत्यादिप्रत्ययो नास्तीति षट्पदार्थयोगेन संयोगो नत्रा समवायः सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थः । करो कुञ्जर इत्यादौ तु स्यानुपेयमिकसमवायः संस्पर्शतया भासते कपालं घटयदित्यादौ तु समवाय एवेत्यादिरूपदानीयम् ॥

tion by conjunction of a man with a staff, and a cognition conversant about connection by co-inherence, of an elephant with a trunk, current among men : Therefore there is no connection of conjunction or of co-inherence between the denotative term and the object denoted V

सामयिकः शब्दादर्थप्रत्यय ॥ २० ॥

Aph 20 The recognition of a meaning from a word is conventional

1 It may be asked, If there be neither conjunction nor co-inherence between a word and its meaning, by what connection does a term convey a determinate sense? To this the reply is furnished It is conventional Convention is the arbitrary dispensation of the Deity, that by such and such a word such and such a sense is to be understood Whatever word was arbitrarily assigned by the Supreme Being to any meaning conveys that meaning it is the

1 ननु यदि न संयोगो नवा समवायः शब्दार्थयोस्तर्हि केन सम्यग्नेन शब्दो नियतमर्थे प्रतिपादयतीत्यत आह । सामयिक इति समय ईश्वरसङ्केत आस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थोदाहृत्य इत्याकारेण यः शब्दोवास्मिन्नर्थे भगवता सङ्केतितः स तमर्थे प्रतिपादयति तच्चात्र शब्दार्थयोरोग्ररेच्छेत् सम्यग्नेन स एव समस्तदधीन इत्यर्थं यथा ननुनदद्यात्स्य द्या या काचिदोपधि सा सर्वार्थि संप्रतिव दन्ति सच समय वज्रचिह्नयद्वारादयद्वते यथा प्रयोजनेन घटमानवस्तुक्ति प्रयोज्यस्य कम्बुयोवायान्तमर्थमानयतीतिज्ञान तादनुमिनोति तदस्यात्तात्त्विकस्य प्रवृत्तिज्ञानजन्या प्रवृत्तित्वात् मत्प्रवृत्तिवत् तच्च ज्ञानमेतद्वाक्यजन्यमेतदनन्तरभावितात् एतज्ज्ञानविषयो एव कम्बुयोवायानर्थो घटपटयाच्च इत्याद्यायोद्वाद्वाप्रक्रियया यावत्स्य घटपटादायर्थं ध्युत्यति क्वचिच्च साक्षादाक्षयाख्या द्रष्टव्यं यथाऽयं कम्बुयोवायानर्थो घटपटयाच्च इति क्वचिदुपमानात् यथा गोसदृशोऽग्नयः यथा सुदृस्तया सुदृषर्षी यथा माणस्यमापयणात्यादि साधर्म्यापमानात् क्वचिच्चिन्दाकारादपि यावत्तात् यथा धिक् करभमतिलम्योष्ट दीर्घयोश्च कटोरखटकाग्निमपसदं पशूनामिति निन्दायाक्षय्यग्रहानन्तर तादृशपिण्डमुपलभ्यायमसौ करभ इति ध्युत्यति क्वचित् प्रसिद्धपदसमानाधिकरणत्वात् यथा प्रमिचक्रमलोदरे मधूनि मधुकर पित्रताति याक्षय्यग्रहानन्तर भयत्ययमसौ मधुकरपदयाच्च प्रमिचक्रमलोदरे मधुपानकर्तृत्वात् यथा वा सद्यकारतरी मधुर पित्रो रीताति । तदेतदनुमानं वा शब्द एव या प्रसिद्धपदसमानाधिकरणपदमाप्योद्वात्वादक उपमानोपग्रेय एव या मधुपानकर्तृत्वस्य भ्रमरादिव्यत्यन्तरसाधर्म्यस्थोपनयात् । समयश्च जातिमात्रे व्यक्तराक्षेपत एवोपस्थितइति तातातिरका जाते व्यक्तेः बोधमयशक्तिः किन्तु जात्यग्रे ज्ञाता व्यत्यग्रे स्वरूपसतो प्रयोजनेति प्राभाकराः । समय शक्तिरेव व्यक्ताकृतिज्ञातय पदार्था इति शब्दाः । गवादिपदानामिदं गति गुणवर्मादियाचरूपदानान्तु जातिव्यक्ती एवार्थं इति मयूरे विपश्चितम् ॥

will of God that is the connection between term and its signification. This connection is a convention, that is, it is dependent upon convention, as whatever plant the ichneumon touches with his teeth is an antidote to poison. This convention is sometimes derived from common usage, as for instance when any one gives the order Bring the water-pot, and a child standing by infers the cognition of another who receives the order and brings an object possessing a tubular neck, the child inferring that this activity of the bringer is produced by knowledge, inasmuch as it is an activity like its own activity, and that this knowledge is produced by the words of the person who gives the order, because it is brought into being subsequently to those words. The child's knowledge of the meaning of water pot, piece of cloth, is by the process of insertion and elimination of words, in that the object of this knowledge is an object possessing a tubular neck denoted by the word water pot. At other times this convention results from direct testimony, as that this tubular-necked object is designated by the term water pot. At other times it results from comparison or recognition of similarity, as through the judgment of similarity that a greyal is like a cow, mudga parni (a kind of bean) is like mudga, misha-parul (a leguminous plant) is like a bean. At other times it results from opprobrious language as when after hearing, O the camel with pendulous upper lip and long neck the enter of hard thorns the wish of animals,—on seeing such an object there ensues the verbal knowledge that it is a camel. At other times it results from collocation with terms of known import, as when after hearing the proposition, The bee is sipping sweets in the cloven lotus blossom, it is inferred that this must be that which is denoted by the word bee inasmuch as this is the agent in the drinking of nectar in the cleft hollow of the lotus, or as in the common example, The cuckoo sings sweetly in the mango tree. This is therefore, an inference or even a mere sound producing etymological knowledge, through the force of collocation with words known import. Or it is a kind

of knowledge by comparison, through subsumption of similarity to other individual bees &c, viz agency in the drinking of nectar. The convention, according to the followers of Tutata has reference only to the universal, being applied to the individual only by a transference. According to the Prabhākara the denotative capacity is expressive of both the class and the individual, but in cognised relation to the universal, and by its essential form determines the cognition of the individual. The ancients teach that the convention is the verbal power, and that objects are universals which are the forms of the individuals. This is the case with terms like cow &c, but the object of words expressive of qualities, actions &c., is both the universal and the particular, as is detailed in the Mayukha. U

That connection between words and objects which produces verbal knowledge, is now pointed out. The knowledge of the

१ इदानीं शाब्दबोधोपायिक पदपदार्थयोः सम्यग्बोध प्रदर्शयति । शब्दादर्थप्रत्यय सामयिक समयरूपसम्यग्बोधप्रयोज्यस्तथाच पदपदार्थयोः समयबोध सम्यग्बोध एव शाब्द बोधनिवामक समयश्च सङ्केत सच द्विविधो नित्य आधुनिकश्च तत्र नित्यसङ्केत शक्ति आधुनिकश्चेत परिभाषा सकलशब्दास्माच्छब्दादवमथाद्यैः प्रत्ययव्याकारक शब्द शब्द इममय बोधव्यवस्थाकारको या तदुक्तम् । आञ्जानिकश्चाधुनिक सङ्केताद्विविध स्मृतः । नित्य आञ्जानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते । कादाचित्कस्याधुनिक शास्त्र कारादिभिः कृतः । इति शक्तिपदस्य व्यग्रहारादितो भवति तदुक्तम् शक्तिपदे व्या करणापमानात् कोपापवाक्याद्व्यग्रहारात्तच्च । साविध्यत सिद्धपदस्य दृष्टा यावत्स्य शेषाद्विदुतर्थादन्ति इति । धातुप्रकृतिप्रत्ययादीना शक्तिपदे व्याकरणाभ्यसि यथा कर्मणि द्वितीया कर्तरि परस्मैपदम् इत्याद्यनुशासनात् कर्मत्यादि द्वितीयादेः उपमा नाद गथादिसादृश्यज्ञानात् गद्यपद्यादिजात्यवच्छिन्ने गद्यथादिपदाना शक्तिपदे काशान् गुणे शुक्रादय पुंसि गुणिलिङ्गान्तु तद्वृत्ति । शीते गुण तद्वदर्थं सुशीते शिशिराज्ज । घूर्णे वाद समुत्तिज्जपिज्जने भगवान्कुने । इत्यदिभूत श्वेतादि शुक्रादिशब्दाना शक्तिपदे कौकिलि परुषपदश्चाद्य इत्याद्याप्तशब्दात् कौकिल्यादेः विकारादिपदाना शक्ति पद प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकव्यग्रहारात् गौरत्वादिप्रशिष्टे गथादिपदाना शक्तिपद तथाहि यत्र प्रयोजकशब्देन गामानयेत्युक्तम् तच्छ्रुत्वा प्रयोज्यशब्देन गौरानोत् तदवधार्य पार्श्वस्थो खालो गद्यानयन गामानयति शब्दप्रयोज्यमश्रधारयति ततश्च वा यधान अश्वमानये त्यावापाद्वापाभ्या गथादिपदाना साक्षादिप्रशिष्टमप्रादे शक्ति यत्प्रति प्रतिमिडार्थकपद सामानाधिकरण्यान् नीदय स्वर्णवान् वायु सत्त्वत्यानङ्गता कन्या ददान कुरुद स्मत् इत्यादि रूपगुण्यवर्गशब्दादेः याव्यादिशब्दस्य कन्यादात्रादेः कुरुदादिशब्दस्य च शक्ति पद सय याव्याशेषादपि यथा यद्यपदस्य कद्रुप्रभती ध्वेच्छाना दीर्घगुके ॥ शिष्टाना व्यग्रहारात् व्यग्रहारादेरुमात्रशक्त परिच्छेत्तुमशक्यत्वात् नानार्थत्वस्य धान्याप्यत्वात्

meaning of words is conventional, or determined by the connection of convention. It is, therefore, a connection of convention between the term and the object, that determines verbal knowledge. Convention is arbitrary arrangement. This is of two kinds, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrary arrangement is verbal power; modern arbitrary symbolism is terminology. The arbitrary symbolism takes for its form, that such and such a sense is to be understood by such and such a word, or such and such a term shall convey such and such a signification. It has therefore been said. Arbitrary symbolism has been declared twofold, original and modern. The original is eternal, herein is that which is called power, but the modern is occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others. The apprehension of power is from common usage, &c. It has, therefore, been said. The ancients have declared the apprehension of power to be from grammatical analysis, from knowledge of comparison, from lexicography, from testimony, and from usage, from contiguity to a term of known import, from the context, and from explication. The apprehension of the power of roots, crude forms, and affixes, results from grammatical

यद्यप्यवचरुर्भवति इति युक्तौ मध्यपदस्यार्थसन्देहे यस्यन्ते सत्रयस्यानां जायते पञ्चशतनम् । मोदमानाश्च तिष्ठन्ति यथाः करिष्यशालिनः ॥ इति विध्यर्थीकाद्वया प्रवर्तमानाद्वा-
च्यशेषात्तीर्थशूक एव यद्यपदस्य शक्तिग्रहः यथा वा स्वाराज्यकामोऽग्निष्टोमेन यजेत
इत्यादिविधिषेपीभूतेभ्यः । यच्च दुर्लेन सम्भिद्य न च दस्तमनन्तरम् । अभिलाषोपनी-
तश्च तत् मुख्यं ह्य.पदास्पदम् ॥ इत्यादिव्याख्येभ्यः स्वरादिपदस्य विजातीयमुष्पादौ
शक्तिग्रहः । अत्रिद्विवरणादपि यथा पचति पाके करोतीति तुल्यार्थकत्वात् कृत्यादौ
तिदादेः शक्तिग्रह इति । तत्र जातार्थेय शक्तिर्न तु व्यक्तेः व्यभिचारादानन्त्याच्चेति मी-
मांसकाः तत्रापि प्राभाकरमते व्यक्तं विना जातिभानस्यासम्भवात्तुल्यवित्तियेद्यत्वादेव
गामानयेत्यादौ व्यक्तेर्भानम् भट्टमते च सामानाधिकरण्यासम्बन्धेन कर्मत्यादौ गोत्यादेः
प्रथममन्यययोः पञ्चानु कर्मताया गोवृत्तित्वस्यानुमानं भवतीति । मयडनाचार्यमते
व्यक्तेर्लक्षणं भाषनं भवतीति । तदेतज्जातिशक्तिमतं न समीचीनं गामानयेत्यादौ
व्यक्तेः शाब्दबोधविषयत्वस्यानुभ्रसिद्धस्य विना शक्तिमनुपपत्तेः न च स्रजण्या व्यक्ते-
र्भानम् मुख्यप्रयोगस्यासत्त्वे सात्त्विकप्रयोगस्यमवगात् न च तुल्यवित्तियेद्यत्वात्पि व्यक्ते-
र्भानं सम्भवति कार्यभूतशब्दबोधोर्ध्वविषयतायाः कारणप्रयोज्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वेन नियम-
रूपस्य तुल्यवित्तियेद्यत्वन्य तत्राप्रयोजकत्वादिति तस्माज्जात्याकृतिविशिष्टव्यक्तायेव
गयादिपदानां शक्तिर्यतमतमेवादरणीयम् तदुक्तं गौतमीये जात्याकृत्यव्यक्तपस्तु पदाद्यं
इति ॥

analysis, as the knowledge from such rules as, The second case is used of the object, The transitive verb is of the agent, or that the accusative case &c is used of the object of the action &c From knowledge of comparison there results from knowledge of similarity to a cow &c the apprehension of the power of the terms *gayal* &c in restriction to the classes *gayal* &c According to such lexicographical information as White and other terms connecting qualities, in the masculine denote the subject of the attribute, Cold is a quality, The words chill cool, and benumbed imply possession of that quality, and Powder is that which is triturated, Routed and panic stricken denote extreme confusion,—according to such information there results apprehension of the power of the words white &c in reference to the white, &c Apprehension of the power of the terms *pika* &c in reference to a cuckoo &c, results from testimony such as A cuckoo is signified by the word *pika* From the practical relation of one who gives and one who receives an order, results apprehension of the power of the terms cow &c in reference to objects possessing the essential characters of a cow, &c For instance when an adult giving an order says Bring the cow, and another adult receiving the order brings the cow, a child standing by observing this, reflects that the bringing of a cow is implied by the words Bring the cow, and afterwards by substitution of one word and elimination of the other in the phrase, Tie up the cow, Bring the horse he apprehends the power of the terms cow &c in reference to cows characterised by a dewlap &c From collocation with words of known import in such propositions as Air is colourless and tactile He who gives a girl in marriage with due ceremony and fittingly adorned is called *kukuda*, there results apprehension of the power of the terms air &c in reference to objects colourless tangible &c, and of the terms *kukuda* &c in relation to those who give girls in marriage &c Similarly also apprehension of verbal power results from the context of words Thus since

the term barley is employed in the common usage of barbarians to denote panic seed and in that of civilized men to denote the long awned cereal if a doubt arise, in regard to the word barley in such sacred texts as *Uharu* (a kind of oblation) is made of barley, it being impossible to restrict it to one meaning and illogical to understand it equivocally, apprehension that the power of the term barley is to denote the long awned cereal only, arises from the sequel of the the sentence which supplies the full sense of the injunction, viz In spring the leaves of all kinds of grain wither away, and the pleasant bearded barley still remains Or for example apprehension of the power of the terms elysium &c to designate a particular kind of bliss results from such words as That bliss which is not interrupted by pain which is not forthwith destroyed and which is obtained by desire is the object of the term elysium according to the sense of the context Let him that desires the lordship of heaven sacrifice an agni shtoma Apprehension of the power of terms sometimes also results from explication, as that of the personal terminations of the verb to designate action, as from He performs culinary operations as a proposition identical with He cooks According to the *Mimamsakas* verbal power conveys the universal only and not the individual for did it apply to the individual it would be either unduly restricted or infinite in extension According to the doctrine of the *Prābhākaras* on this point in such sentences as Bring the cow there is a knowledge of the individual a knowledge of the universal apart from the particular being impossible the act and object of cognition being equal According to the doctrine of *Bhāṭṭa* there is first a knowledge of construction of the cow &c as the object of the verb by means of the connection of verbal collocation and afterwards an inference that it is the cow that is the object of the verb According to the doctrine of *Māṇḍanacharya* the individual is designated by implication This doctrine of these authorities that verbal power designates the universal is not

correct, for unless in such instances as Bring the cow, the power had reference to the individual, the fact that the individual is the object of verbal knowledge could not be established as it is by experience. Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise from implication, for if the word be not used in its denotative function to use it in its implicative function is impossible. Nor is a knowledge of the individual possible by equality of the act and the object of knowledge, for while the being an object of verbal knowledge which is an effect, must have a cause the equality of the act and object of cognition which is a necessary condition cannot be the cause. We must therefore acquiesce in the doctrine that the power of the terms cow &c. is denotative of an individual characterised by the form of the universal. It has therefore been laid down in the aphorism of Gautama that particulars characterised by the form of the universal, are the object of the term V

Priority and posteriority

एकदिक्काभ्यामेककालाभ्या सचिह्नद्विविह्नद्व्याभ्या
परमपरञ्च ॥ २१ ॥

Aph 21 The prior and posterior [are produced] by two objects occupying the same space and time and near and remote.

¹ The term prior and posterior is used in an abstract sense. The words are produced are to be supplied, also the prior and

¹ परमपरञ्चेति भावप्रधानो निर्देश उत्पद्यत इति शेषः यद्वा परमपरञ्चेति व्यवहार इति शेषः इतिरध्याहार्यं एकादिमं ययोस्तायेकदिक्को ताभ्यामेकदिक्काभ्या विपदाभ्यामित्यर्थः तुल्यदेशाद्यप्येकदिक्को भवतः नतु ताभ्या परत्यापरत्वे उत्पद्यते एव द्विपदेते वीत्यत उक्तं सचिह्नद्विविह्नद्व्याभ्यामिति सचिह्नं सयुक्तसंयोगात्पत्यम् विपक्षं पर्यस्तभूयस्त्यम् तद्वदभ्यामित्यर्थः एतेन समवायिकारणमुक्तम् द्विरपिपदसंयोगस्त्यसमवायिकारणम् तथाहि प्रादुर्भावस्य पुरुषस्वप्नाद्यवस्थितयोः विपक्षयोरेकस्मिन् सयुक्तसंयोगभूयस्त्यमपरस्मिन् सयुक्तसंयोगात्पत्यत्वापेक्षया परत्यमपरत्वञ्चोत्पद्यते असमवायिकारणमुक्तम् सचिह्नद्विविह्नद्व्याभ्यामिति विपक्षेण विपक्षिण प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति तथावापेक्षाद्युद्धे निमित्तकारणत्वमुक्तम् एकदिगवस्थितयोरेवपरत्यापरत्वे उत्पद्यते इति न सर्वत्रोत्पत्तिरिति एकस्यैव द्रष्टुरपेक्षाद्युद्धे समुत्पद्यत इति न सर्वत्रोत्पत्तिरिति अपेक्षाद्युद्धे नियमाच्च सर्वत्रोत्पत्तिरिति कारणयत्नस्तत्त्वयोः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाच्च परस्परान्यत्वम् अन्यथापि नात्यर्थे

posterior may be an elliptical expression for the convention of the prior and posterior, the particle *ita* having to be supplied. By two objects occupying the same space, that is of which there is the same space, and occupying the same time, that is, synchronous,—by these priority and posteriority are produced, or are cognised and named. It is therefore stated that they are produced by two objects near and remote, that is possessed of contiguity or proximity of conjunctions with the conjunct, and of remoteness, that is of plurality of conjunctions with the conjunct. Hereby the co-inherent cause is stated. The non-coherent cause is the con-

यातां नद्या प्रतीयेयातां परस्परपेक्षायां हि द्वयोरनुत्पत्तिरप्रतीतिश्च स्यात् प्रतीयेते च पर
त्वापरत्वे प्रतीतिश्च तयोर्नोत्पत्तिमन्तरेणेति एककालाभ्यामिति कालिकपरत्वापरत्वे
अभिप्रेत्य तत्रैककालाभ्यामिति यत्रो धर्तमानः कालो ययोर्युक्त्वस्मिद्विरपिपद्येः तादृशकालो
तदभ्यामेककालाभ्यामित्यर्थे अत्रिक्तयोः स्वतन्त्रतत्पनपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्यत्वं विप्रकर्षश्च
बहुतरतत्पनपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्यत्वं अत्रापि विपक्षेण विप्रपिपद्यां युद्धिमुपलक्षयति
तेन युवस्मिद्विरपिपद्येः समवायिकारणे कालपिपदसंयोगागममवायिकारणम् अल्प
तरतत्पनपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्यत्वं युद्धिरपरत्वे बहुतरतत्पनपरिस्पन्दान्तरितजन्यत्वं युद्धिः
परत्वे निमित्तकारणम् एतेषु परत्वापरत्वे अनियतद्वन्द्वेयोरपि पिपिडयोक्तव्येति
तत्र द्वैशिकपरत्वापरत्वयोः कृत्या विनाशः उत्पादस्तु युगपदेव द्वयोरन्यथान्वो
प्याश्रयः स्यात् अपेक्षायुद्धिनाशात् संयोगस्यासमवायिकारणस्य नाशात् द्वयस्य च
समवायिकारणस्य नाशात् निमित्तसमवायिकारणयोर्नाशात् निमित्तसमवायिकारण-
योर्नाशात् निमित्तनाशासमवायिकारणनाशासमवायिकारणनाशेभ्यः । तत्रापेक्षायुद्धि-
नाशात् नाशत् परत्वात्पत्तिः परत्वसामान्यज्ञानं ततोऽपेक्षायुद्धिनिनाशस्तद्विनाशात्
परत्वादिशब्दद्वयज्ञानकाले परत्यनाशः द्वित्वनाशप्रदेव सर्वमूहनीयम् । असमवायि-
कारणनाशादपि तदपथा यदेवापेक्षायुद्धिस्तदेव परत्वाधारे पिपद्ये कर्म ततो यदेव
परत्वे त्यतिस्तदेव द्विर्पिपदविभागस्ततो यदा परत्वसामान्यज्ञानं तदा द्विर्पिपद-
संयोगनाशः ततः सामान्यज्ञानापेक्षायुद्धिनाशस्तदेव द्विर्पिपदसंयोगनाशात् पर-
त्वापरत्वयोर्नाशः तत्र चापेक्षायुद्धिनाशस्य परत्यनाशसमकारित्वाच्च तत्राशक्त्यम् नन्व
समवायिकारणनाशादपि गुणनाशे आत्मजन-संयोगनाशादपि सस्कारादृष्टादोनां विनाशे
बहु व्याकुपं स्पष्टिदिति चेत् विप्रकृत्येन परत्वस्य व्यापनात् परत्वाधारस्यान्वय-
गमने विप्रकर्षाभावात् परत्यनिश्चिन्तारवश्यको नच तदा नाशकान्तरमस्तीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या
संयोगनाश एव नाशकः कल्प्यते सस्कारादृष्टादेः कार्यस्य स्मृतिमुद्रादेशिचरेणापि दर्श-
नाच्च तद्व्याशक्त्यना उच्यतेष्वन्येन श्रव्येर्दृष्टुश्च तद्वेशसंयोगनाशादपि परत्वापरत्वे
विनाशप्रतः युक्तेस्तुल्यत्वात् समवायिकारणनाशादपि क्वचित् परत्यनाशः तथैहि यदा
पिपडावयवे समुत्पन्नेन कर्मणाश्रयान्तरादिभावास्तदेवापेक्षायुद्धिः विभागात् पिपडावयवा-
कसंयोगनाशः परत्वसामान्यज्ञानं द्वयनाशात् परत्यनाशापेक्षायुद्धिनाशश्च सामान्यज्ञा-
नात् तयाच योगपद्यावापेक्षायुद्धिनाशात् परत्यनाशदतिव्यभिचद्वयनाशापेक्षायुद्धि-
नाश्या परत्यनाशः तत्रापि पिपडावयवे कर्मापेक्षायुद्धेः उत्पादस्ततोऽश्रयान्तरविभागः प-

junction of the object with space. For example, there are produced in a man standing with his face to the east priority and posteriority in relation to the plurality of conjunct conjunctions in one of two bodies situated in the east, and to paucity of conjunct conjunctions in another. The non coinherent cause has thus been stated. In the worlds near and remote, there is by the object an indication of the subjective cognition. It is accordingly stated that the efficient cause is the cognition of relative. Priority and posteriority are produced only between objects situated in the same space, they do not therefore arise everywhere. The relative conception belongs to only one observer, therefore they do not appear everywhere, for as determined by relative conception they are not everywhere produced. It being evinced by perception that they are produced in consequence of the power of their causes, they are not reciprocally dependent otherwise they would not be produced or would not appear for there could be no genesis or cognition of two objects each supposing the other as a pre-requisite whereas priority and posteriority do appear and thus appearative without their production would be impossible. The worlds by two objects occupying the same time have reference to priority and posteriority in time. This priority and posteriority is produced by two objects one young and the other old in which there is exist-

रस्योत्पत्तिं तस्य व्यापकमपेक्षनाश्रमाभ्याम्युक्ताने तस्य दृष्ट्यानाश्रयितायुक्तानां तत्तद्वत्
परत्वनानां कश्चिद्विद्वत्स्य संयोगस्य च व्यापकमपेक्षनाश्रमं तदवयवा यदा दृष्ट्यायवत्
विभागस्तदेव विपक्षकर्मपेक्षायुक्त्याख्यादन्तदन्तरमप्यवयवसंयोगनाश्रयिकविपक्षविभागवत्
रस्योत्पन्नवत् ततो दृष्ट्यानाश्रयिकविपक्षमपेक्षनाश्रयपरत्वनामाभ्याम्युक्तं ततो दृष्ट्यानाश्रयिक
विपक्षमपेक्षनाश्रया परत्वनानां मामान्यपुटारपेक्षायुक्तानां हति कश्चित् संयोगनाश्रय
पेक्षायुक्तानां परत्वनानां तदवयवा परत्वात्पनिविपक्षकर्मणां मामान्यनाश्रयिभागा
अपेक्षायुक्तानाश्रयिकविपक्षमपेक्षनाश्रयं तत् परत्वनानां कश्चित् समवायसमवायिनि
मित्तनाश्रयं तदवयवा परत्वात्पनिविपक्षवयवनाश्रयविपक्षकर्मणां पुनस्तत् तदनन्तरं पर
त्वनामाभ्याम्युक्तानां वयवमपेक्षनाश्रयिकविपक्षविभागं तदनन्तरमप्युक्तानां दृष्ट्यानाश्रय
विपक्षमपेक्षनाश्रयं पुनस्तत् परत्वनानां परत्वात्पनिविपक्षकर्मणां कालकृतयोगानु
पात्यापरत्वापरममपेक्षाविपक्षकर्मणां व्यापकमपेक्षनाश्रयं ततो दृष्ट्यानाश्रयिकविपक्षमपेक्षनाश्रय
मपेक्षाविपक्षकर्मणां यदा न यदा कालिकयोगे तत्ततो समवायविपक्षकर्मणां व्यापकमपेक्षाविपक्ष
नाश्रयं व्यापकमपेक्षाविपक्षकर्मणां यदा न यदा कालिकयोगे तत्ततो समवायविपक्षकर्मणां व्यापकमपेक्षाविपक्ष

tence at the same time. Their contiguity is the being born at an interval of fewer revolutions of the sun, their remoteness is the being born at an interval of more revolutions of the sun. There is in this case also indicated by the object a subjective intellection. The two objects young and old are therefore, the co-inherent cause. The conjunction between time and these objects is the non-coherent cause. The conception of the being born at an interval of fewer revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause of priority, and the conception of the being born at an interval of more revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause of posteriority. This priority and this posteriority arise also in objects of determinate position in space. Of these there is a seven fold destruction of priority and posteriority in space but the production of the two is simultaneous, else there would be a regress to infinity. Their destruction results from destruction of the relative conception from destruction of the non-coherent cause of the conjunction, from destruction of the substance which is the co-inherent cause from destruction of the efficient, and non-coherent causes, from destruction of the efficient and co-inherent causes and from the destructions of the efficient non-coherent and co-inherent causes. From destruction of the relative conception thus —the destruction of the cognition of relativity is from the production of posteriority that is from the general knowledge of posteriority: from the destruction of the relative conception there results destruction of the priority in cognising a substance qualified by posteriority and the whole process may be inferred according to the analogy of the destruction of durability. From destruction of the non-coherent cause as when first there is a cognition of relativity, then action in the object which is the substratum of posteriority, thence disjunction of the object and space when posteriority is produced, thence destruction of the conjunction between space and the object, thence in consequence of the single cognition destruction of the cognition of relativity, then from the destruction of the conjunction of

the object with space, destruction of the priority and posteriority. In this instance the conception of relativity, though synchronous with the destruction of posteriority, is not destructive of it. If it be urged that there is much confusion involved in the supposition of the destruction of reproduction, necessity &c consequent on destruction of the conjunction of the soul and the internal organ in the destruction of qualities resulting from the destruction of the non-coherent cause we reply that it is not so, for inasmuch as posteriority is pervaded by remoteness there must needs be a cessation of posteriority consequent on non existence of remoteness on the removal of the substratum of posteriority. Nor is there at that time another agent of destruction, for it is the destruction of conjunction which is conceived as the agent of destruction such destruction being otherwise impossible. Inasmuch as we observe long afterwards memory pleasure &c the effect of reproduction necessity &c we cannot suppose these to be destroyed. This also implies the percipient as a limit and posteriority and priority are destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction between the percipient and space: this being equally efficient. Destruction of posteriority sometimes also results from destruction of the co inherent cause as for instance when by action produced in a portion of a body there is produced disjunction from another portion then a conception of relativity from this disjunction results destruction of the conjunction originative of the body and production of posteriority, in the succeeding moment from destruction of the conjunction there results destruction of the substance and the universal conception of posteriority, from the destruction of the substance there results destruction of posteriority and destruction of the cognition of relativity results from the simple cognition. Destruction of posteriority therefore does not result from destruction of the cognition of relativity for they are simultaneous. Destruction of posteriority is sometimes by destruction of the substance and of the cognition of relativity, as for in

stance when there arises in the portion of a body a relative cognition of action, thence disjunction from other constituent parts and production of posteriority, thence destruction of the originative conjunction and a simple cognition, thence destruction of the substance and of the relative cognition, thence destruction of posteriority. Sometimes destruction of posteriority is by destruction of the substance and of conjunction, as when there arises disjunction of the constituent parts of a substance; then production of action in the body and of a relative cognition, next the production of destruction of the conjunction of the parts, of disjunction between the body and space, and of posteriority, thence destruction of the substance, destruction of the conjunction of the body, a universal cognition of posteriority, thence destruction of posteriority by destruction of the cognition of the body and space and destruction of the substance, according to the rule that a simple cognition destroys a relative cognition. Destruction of posteriority is sometimes by destruction of conjunction and of the relative cognition, as when there successively ensue production of posteriority and action in the body, a simple cognition and disjunction destruction of the relative cognition and of the conjunction of the body with space, and thence destruction of posteriority. Destruction of posteriority at other times results from destruction of the co-inherent, non-co-inherent, and efficient causes, as when there simultaneously arise production of posteriority, disjunction of the parts of the body, and action in the body, next a universal cognition of posteriority, destruction of the conjunction of constituent parts, and disjunction of the body from space, next from simultaneously produced destruction of the relative cognition of the substance, and of the conjunction of the body with space, there results destruction of priority or posteriority in space. Of priority and posteriority in time there is no destruction dependent upon destruction of the non-co-inherent cause nor is there destruction of contiguity and remoteness in temporal priority and posteriority, as there is destruc-

tion of contiguity and remoteness in priority and posteriority in space, where there is destruction of the conjunction of the body with space. The three cases therefore of destruction of temporal priority and posteriority, from destruction of the co-inherent cause, from destruction of the relative cognition and by both conjointly, are to be inferred according to the analogy of the preceding. U

1 The notion and expression of prior and posterior is produced by two bodies occupying the same space, that is, having the same space as their site and contiguous or remote that is objects of a

1 एका दिक् आधारतया ययोस्तायेकदिक्को मूर्तो ताभ्या मूर्ताभ्या सचिद्वद्वि प्रकृष्टाभ्या यदुत्तरमूर्धसयोगाद्यप्यन्तरमूर्धसयोगाद्यप्यन्तर्ज्ञानविषयाभ्या परमपरश्चेति व्यवहारो जायते इत्यर्थः । तथाच दैशिकपरत्व प्रति यदुत्तरमूर्धसयोगाद्यप्यन्तर्ज्ञान निमित्तकारण तदाद्यपि मूर्तं दिक्सयोगोऽसमवायिकारण तादृशज्ञानविषयो मूर्तं समवायिकारणम दैशिकापरत्वस्यान्तरमूर्धसयोगाद्यप्यन्तर्ज्ञान निमित्तकारण तद्विषयो मूर्तं समवायिकारण तादृशमूर्तं दिक्सयोगोऽसमवायिकारणमिति भवति हि पाटलिपुत्रस्थस्य का शीमपेक्ष प्रमाण परं प्रमाणमपेक्ष काशपरैतिव्यवहारं तद्विषय परत्व प्रमाणे उत्पद्यते तत्र यदुत्तरमूर्धसयोगाद्यप्यन्तेन तस्य ज्ञातव्यता । काश्याञ्चापरत्व जायते अल्पतरमूर्धस योगाद्यप्यन्तेन तस्या ज्ञातव्यता एककालाभ्यामिति एक कालं सयोगितया ययो पिण्डयो स्ताभ्यामेककालाभ्या पिण्डाभ्या सचिद्वद्विप्रकृष्टाभ्याम् । अन्यतरतपनपरिस्पन्दयदुत्तरत पनपरिस्पन्दाद्यप्यन्ता ज्ञातव्यता परमपरश्चेति व्यवहारो भवति भवति हि युवानमपत्यस्य स्थिरं परं स्थिरमपत्य पुत्रापर इत्यादिको व्यवहारस्तद्विषय परत्वस्य समवायिकारण स्थिरं तत्र मृदाकालस्य सयोगाऽसमवायिकारणम् । यदुत्तरमूर्धसक्रियाप्यन्तर्ज्ञान निमित्त कारणम् अपरत्वस्य च पुत्रा समवायिकारणम् पुत्रशरीरमहाकालयो सयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम स्थिरादिततपनस्पन्दाद्यप्यन्तर्ज्ञानपरत्वस्येव मूर्तो ज्ञान निमित्तकारणम यद्यपि शरीराणां वास्तव्यायनवाट्व्यभेदेन भिन्नत्वात् पुत्रस्थिरगततपनपरिस्पन्दानां वैपरीत्यमपि सम्भवति तथापि यदुत्तरतपनपरिस्पन्दसमानाधिकरणत्रैजात्यज्ञानमेव स्थिरं कालिकपरत्वस्य कारणम् अन्यतरतपनस्पन्दसमानाधिकरणत्रैजात्यज्ञानमेव मूर्त परत्वस्य कारणमिति नच घटाद्यपेक्षया परमाख्यार्षि यदुत्तरमूर्धसक्रियासमानाधिकरणप विधीत्यादिजातिमत्यज्ञानात् परत्व कथं नोत्पद्यते इति याच्य यदुत्तरमूर्धसक्रियासमाना धिकरणैककालीनद्वयात् ज्ञातिमत्यस्य विशिष्टतत्वात् तादृशज्ञातिश्च चैत्रत्यादि मूर् यक्रियापि तत्कालान्तरफालोनान्यत्वेन विशेषणीया नातोऽप्योतिवर्जोऽस्त्यथैत्राये चयो शतवर्षजोऽप्युद्यमेनै परत्योत्पत्ति अवयवा मूर्धपरिस्पन्दपूर्वात्पत्त्यत्प्रिकर्षं तदनन्तरोत्पत्त्य सचिकर्षं पुत्रचैत्राद्युत्पत्त्यधिकरणं यं मूर्धस्पन्दस्तत्पूर्वोत्पत्त्यस्य स्थिरमेवादेता वर्तते इति स्थिरं परत्वम स्थिरमेवाद्युत्पत्त्यधिकरणमूर्धस्पन्दानन्तरोत्पत्त्यस्य पुत्रचैत्रादाद्यस्ताति तत्रापरत्व जायते अचेतने कालिकपरत्वपरत्वव्यवहाराभावे तु पा णित्ये सतीति विशेषणं देयम् तत्तच्छरीरमादायातिप्रसङ्गस्तु ज्ञातिविशेषनिवेशेन धारणीय इति सत्वे । द्विविधयो परत्यापत्ययोर्नाशकोऽप्यज्ञातुद्विनाश इति मुक्तायलीकार उपस्कारे तु त्रिविधकारणनाशस्यैव परत्यापत्यनाशकत्वमुक्तमिति ॥

cognition of inherence in a substratum of more or less conjunction with the sun. The efficient cause, therefore, of posteriority in space is the cognition of the substratum of more numerous conjunctions with the sun, the non-coherent cause is conjunction of space in the body which is the substratum of this quality of posteriority, and the co-inherent cause is the matter which is the object of such cognition. The efficient cause of priority in space is the cognition of a substratum of fewer conjunctions of the sun, its co-inherent cause is the body which is the object of such cognition, the non-coherent cause is conjunction of space in such matter. For there is such a practical assurance as that to one living at Pataliputra, Kāśī is nearer than Prayāga, and Prayāga further than Kāśī. The object of this cognition, posteriority, arises in reference to Prayāga, because Prayāga is there cognised as the site of more numerous conjunctions with the sun, and the priority in reference to Kāśī arises from its being known that Kāśī is the site of less numerous conjunctions with the sun. The notion and expression of prior and posterior is produced by two bodies occupying the same time, that is by two bodies which have one time to conjoin them; contiguous and remote, that is cognised as substrata of more or less numerous revolutions of the sun. For there arise such cognitions and expressions as that an old man is posterior in relation to a young man and a young man prior in relation to an old man. The old man is the co-inherent cause of the posteriority which is the object of this cognition, the non-coherent cause is conjunction with a greater time, the efficient cause is the cognition of the substratum of more numerous revolutions of the sun. The young man is the co-inherent cause of priority, the non-coherent cause is the conjunction of the body of the young man with a great time. The efficient cause is the cognition of the young man as the substratum of less numerous revolutions of the sun than those inherent in the old man. Although bodies differ according to childhood, youth, and

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cognition of inherence in a substratum of more or less conjunction with the sun. The efficient cause therefore of posteriority in space is the cognition of the substratum of more numerous conjunctions with the sun, the non co-inherent cause is conjunction of space in the body which is the substratum of this quality of posteriority, and the co-inherent cause is the matter which is the object of such cognition. The efficient cause of priority in space is the cognition of a substratum of fewer conjunctions of the sun, its co-inherent cause is the body which is the object of such a cognition, the non co-inherent cause is conjunction of space in such matter. For there is such a practical assurance as that to one living at Pataliputra Kāśi is nearer than Prayāga and Prayāga further than Kāśi. The object of this cognition, posteriority, arises in reference to Prayāga because Prayāga is there cognised as the site of more numerous conjunctions with the sun, and the priority in reference to Kāśi arises from its being known that Kāśi is the site of less numerous conjunctions with the sun. The notion and expression of prior and posterior is produced by two bodies occupying the same time that is by two bodies which have one time to conjoin them contiguous and remote that is cognised as substratum of more or less numerous revolutions of the sun. For there arise such cognitions and expressions as that an old man is posterior in relation to a young man and a young man prior in relation to an old man. The old man is the co-inherent cause of the posteriority which is the object of this cognition, the non-co-inherent cause is conjunction with a greater time, the efficient cause is the cognition of the substratum of more numerous revolutions of the sun. The young man is the co-inherent cause of priority, the non co-inherent cause is the conjunction of the body of the young man with a great time the efficient cause is the cognition of the young man as the substratum of less numerous revolutions of the sun than those inherent in the old man. Although bodies differ according to childhood, youth and

old age and there is consequently possible therein the contrariety of the revolutions of the sun existent in the old man and the young, yet it is the *cognition of heterogeneity in the common substratum of more numerous conjunctions with the sun* that is the cause of temporal posteriority in the old man, and the cognition of heterogeneity in the substratum of less numerous conjunctions with the sun that is the cause of priority in the youth. It cannot therefore be asked in objection, why posteriority is not produced in an atom as compared with a water pot &c. inasmuch as there is cognised in the atom the possession of the universal nature terrestriality &c. the common substratum of more numerous movements of the sun. For by this is meant possession of a universal nature non-existent in two contemporaneous common substrata of more numerous movements of the sun. Such a universal nature is the being Chaitra &c. The solar motion is also to be characterised as other than that which is subsequent to that time. Hence it is that there is not produced posteriority in Maitra the youth a hundred years old as compared with Chaitra an old man of eighty. Or remoteness may be defined as production prior to revolutions of the sun, and contiguity as production subsequent thereto. Production prior to the revolution of the sun which was the substratum of the production (i. e. year of the birth) of Chaitra the young man &c. exists in the old man Maitra &c. and therefore there is priority in the senior. Production subsequent to the revolution of the sun which was the substratum of the production of Maitra the senior exists in Chaitra the junior &c., and posteriority is therefore produced in him. Inasmuch as there is in the unsentient non-existence of the cognition of priority and posteriority in time we must add to the definition the condition of there being sentiency. Undue width in the definition when we consider such and such a particular body is to be prevented by the addition of a certain universality. It is to be observed that the author of the *Muktāvali* states that the de-

struction of the cognition of relativity is destructive of priority and posteriority in both their forms that is of both local and temporal priority and posteriority : while in the Upaskara it is laid down that it is the destruction of their three-fold causes that is destructive of priority and posteriority V

कारणपरत्वात् कारणपरत्वाच्च ॥ २२ ॥

Aph 22 [Priority and posteriority result] from posteriority of the cause and from priority of the cause

' Time is the cause of priority and posteriority There is here stated by indication conjunction with time as the non coherent cause of posteriority and conjunction with time as the non-coherent cause of priority in relation to the priority and posteriority of the time Otherwise there would be no connection between the words of the aphorism, for priority and posteriority could not be produced merely by priority and posteriority : The terms priority and posteriority have therefore by implication the meaning of conjunction with time productive thereof U

**परत्वापरत्वयोः परत्वापरत्वाभावाद् अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्या व्या-
प्यात ॥ २३ ॥**

Aph 23 The non existence of priority and posteriority in priority and posteriority, is explained by minuteness and greatness

कर्मभिः कर्मणि ॥ २४ ॥

Aph 24 Actions [are void] of actions

गुणैर्गुणा ॥ २५ ॥

Aph 25 Qualities [are void] of qualities

' परत्वापरत्वयोः कारण कालस्तस्य परत्वापरत्वे परत्वापरमदाधिकारकालस-
योगोपरत्वापरमदाधिकारकालसयोगश्च लक्षणयोक्त अन्यथाऽनन्यपापत्ते नहि परत्वा
परत्वाभ्यामेव परत्वापरत्व उत्पद्यत तस्मात् परत्वापरत्वपदयोस्तदुत्पादककालसयोगा
च्च ॥ लक्षणया ॥

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गुणैर्गुणाः ॥ २५ ॥

Aph 25 Qualities [are void] of qualities

¹ परत्वापरत्वयोः कारण कालस्तस्य परत्वापरत्ये परत्वासमयाधिकारणकालस्य योगोपरत्वासमयाधिकारणकालस्ययोगश्च लक्षणयोक्त अन्यथाऽनन्त्रयापत्ते नहि परत्वा परत्वाभ्यामेव परत्वापरत्व उच्येत तस्मात् परत्वापरत्वपदयोस्तदुत्पादककालसयोगा यच्च लक्षणया ॥

इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः ॥ २६ ॥

Aph 26 That is co-inherence by virtue of which it may be said of cause and effect that the one is in the other.

¹ The investigation of co-inherence is described, though to the neg.

परत्यापत्त्यादीनां पूर्वमात्रमप्येतत्प्रमुक्तं ज्ञानमुपादीनाञ्चात्मसमयेतत्त्वै तत्र
समयाय एव कर्तुं शिष्याज्ज्ञानामनुकूलं युद्धेच्छेदकमप्राप्ताया अपि नष्टप्राप्तौ
समयापरोक्षतामाह । कार्यकारणपरित्युपनयनम् अकार्यकारणपरित्युपि दृष्टव्यं तदुक्तं
पदार्थप्रदेशाख्ये प्रकरणे अयुतसिद्धान्तमाध्यायधर्मतानां यः सम्बन्ध इति प्रत्यक्षतः
स समयाय इति अमम्युपयोगविद्यमानत्वमुक्तमितिः इह कुण्डे दधि इह कुण्डे धनु-
राणीति यत् इह तन्नुपु पट इह शीरेषु कट इह द्रव्ये द्रव्यगुणकर्मणि इह गवि गो-
स्थम् इहात्मनि ज्ञानम् इहाकार्ये शब्द इतीदमुपदिक्त्वप्रमाना न विना सम्बन्धमुत्पनु-
मर्हति तेनानुमोदतेति किञ्चित् सम्बन्धः अविचारो संयोग एव अन्यतरमादीनां तदु-
त्पादकानामभावात् ग्रिभामपदप्रदानाभावाच्च सम्बन्धनामनुत्पत्तिरित्याह निवृत्ता
धिकरणतयैवैषेयस्यात् अतस्तत्त्वादेरित्याचित्याह । ननु कश्चेत्तत्समयापत्तया द्रव्य
स्यादीनां सङ्करप्रसङ्गः कर्मत्यादिसमयापत्त्य द्रव्ये सम्भवात् मैत्रम आधाराधेयनिश्चया-
देयाम्भूरो पक्षेपि य एव द्रव्यत्वसमयायः स एव गुणत्वकर्मत्वादीनामपि तथापि तेषां
द्रव्यमाधारस्तत्र तेषामप्रतीतेः द्रव्येष्वेव सादृश्यं प्रतीयते गुणेष्वेव गुणस्य कर्मस्यैव
कर्मस्यैव नित्यत्वचेत्यन्यदर्थान्तरिकमतदर्शनादेव निवमः अन्यथा कुण्डदधेः संयोगादिशेषे
ऽपि कुण्डमैत्राधारो न दधीत्याशयापि भागनिवमस्तथा व्यङ्ग्यपञ्चकशक्तिभेदादेशात्
पि निवम उपपत्त्यते नहि द्रव्येण द्रव्यत्वयत्नं कर्मत्वाद्यप्यभिधायते तदुक्तम् संविदेव
हि भगवती वस्तुवगमे नः ज्ञानम् इति नद्याधारत्वे इति शिष्यरीता तस्यिदस्ति नहि
भगति द्रव्ये कर्मति नद्या भगति पटे तत्त्व इति तेन दायो कथममयापेयि दायो कथ
नित्याधारता न दायोः प्रतीयते यस्मात्त्वभावात्कर्तव्यं सर्वत्र निवामिका न चापे
नित्यवकारागत्यात् समवायिकाराणादुत्पत्तिनिवमः तदनुकूलं च निमित्तसमया
पिनां तथाच समवायस्य समवायिकारो यत् स्यात् तत् समवायात्तरैव तेनैव ताम
दायेन वा न तावदाद्याः समवायापातात् न द्वितीयः नहि स कथं त समयायः स्पेक्ष
समयायः सम्भवंतीत्यात्मपणात् तन्नुपु पटसमयायः पटे कथममयापत्तिरिति कथ
मिति तेन इत्यपसम्यग्भवेन समवायात्तराङ्गीकारेण तस्यापातात् तर्हि पटकथममयापि
इत्यस्य इत्यपसम्यग्भवेन स्यात् किं समवायेनेति चेत् तत्त्वतिरितिसम्यग्भवे आधका
भावात् तर्हि भूतत्वं पटाभाय इत्यत्रापि समवायः अम्यग्यात्तरं वा स्यादिति चेत्
इत्यपसम्यग्भवेन तदुपपत्तेः अन्यथा पटावन्नाभावात्त्याभावापेनित्येवोपनेकममयतयोः
सामान्यत्वापत्तेः प्रष्टव्यं य समयेतकादेत्येव विनाशित्वापत्तेः प्राप्तभावाय च समये
तामुत्पत्त्येव विनाशित्वापत्तेश्च नच भावत्वं तत्र सन्तम् भावत्वम्यादादित्यात्
शमायःस्येव विशिष्टायां सम्बन्धान्तरमिति भाट्टः तत्र यदि भयोभावप्रत्यक्षागमेकाग्र
निश्चितं तदा दृष्टव्यं दृष्टभावात्तदप्यसङ्गं दृष्टभावात्तदप्यसङ्गं दृष्टभावात्तदप्यसङ्गं
पत्यात् पट इव तत्र पटाभावात्तदप्यसङ्गं इति चेत् विशिष्टत्वमम्यग्भवेन इतिव्यवका-
भावात्तत्र तत्र सत्यात् नचापदम्यग्भवात् कथं तादृशो येन न तत्र पटाभावात्तदप्यसङ्गं पटा
पसारदानान्नरं तत्रैव पटाभावात्तदप्यसङ्गं तत्रादिकथनाज्ञानान्नरं कथं न कथयनाप्यव-
समयापत्त्य नित्यत्वादेकत्वाध्वेति चेत् कथनाज्ञानेन तदप्यसङ्गं कथयते. समवायविनिश्चयः ॥

lect of thought which is the next subject in order, in favour of the desire of the student to know what co inherence is it having been stated that priority and posteriority co inhere in objects only and that knowledge pleasure &c co inhere in the soul. The words cause and effect have an implicative force and are to be considered to apply also to non cause and non effect, as it has been stated in the section entitled the Locality of the Categories that the relation of unconjoined objects subsistent and inherent is co inherence. The cause of the cognition of the here non unconnectedness is the non existence of two unconjoined objects. Inasmuch as the thought of clarified butter here present in the bowl, as that of juyubes here present in the bowl of cloth here present in the threads, of grass here in the blades, of substance quality and action here in substance of the essence of a cow here in the cow, of cognition here in the soul of sound here in the ether,—this thought of the here which is thus produced cannot be produced without some connection it is inferred that there is some connection. This connection is not mere conjunction for the actions &c of one only of the two objects cannot produce it its existence does not terminate in disjunction. Connected objects may be non conjunctly effected they must be conceived to have a determinate substratum, it is not perceptible and it is one and eternal. If it be objected that if co inherence be one it follows that there is a confusion with regard to substantiality inasmuch as the essence of action &c may co inhere as well as the essence of substance in substance, we reply that it is not so. According to the relation of subsistence and inherence there can be no confusion. For though that co inherence which is the co inherence of the essence of substance, be the co inherence of the essences of quality, action &c yet substance is not the substratum of these latter essences inasmuch as they are not manifested in substance. The essence of substances or substantiality appears only in substances, the essence of qualities only in qualities, the essence of actions only in ac-

इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः ॥ २६ ॥

Aph 26 That is to inference by virtue of which it may be said of cause and effect that the one is in the other.

¹ The investigation of co-inherence is described, though to the neg-

¹ परस्वापरस्यादौनां मूर्तेमात्रसमवेनत्यमुक्तं ज्ञानमुखादौनाश्वत्सममवेनत्वं तत्र समवाय एव कइति शिष्यादिज्ञानामनुसृत्य सुदृष्टेः श्रेयश्चमवाप्ताया अपि नदृष्टान्त समवायपरिज्ञानाद् । कार्यकारणयोरित्युपपत्तयम् अकार्यकारणयोरित्यपि दृष्टव्यं तदुक्तं घटाद्यंशदेहाद्ये प्रकरणे अयुतमित्थानामाधाराधारभूतानां यः सम्बन्ध इहेति पत्युदहेतुः स समवायः इति समस्यउपारयिद्यमानत्वमयुतमितिः इह कुपडे दाधि इह कुपडे शत्रु रायांतिदन्त इह तन्नुषु घट इह वीरयेषु कट इह द्रव्यं द्रव्यगुणरूपाणि इह तत्रि गो- त्यम इहात्यनि ज्ञानम इहाकाये शब्द इहाद्वयुक्तिरूपद्रव्यानां न शिना सम्बन्धसुत्पन्- महेति तेनानुमोदतेः इति काश्चित् सम्बन्धः अविद्यानां मयौग एव अन्यतररूपादौनां तदु- स्याद्विज्ञानाभावात् शिभादयद्विज्ञानाभावाच्च सम्बन्धनामपुनर्मिद्वत्याच्च निवृत्ता धिरवतयेप्राद्वेपत्यात् अस्त्यवत्यादेस्त्याद्विद्वत्याच्च । अन्यैकैकैकसमवायस्यैव द्रव्य- स्यादौनां मूर्तप्रमदः कर्मत्यादिममवायस्य द्रव्ये सम्मवात् मयम् आधाराधेयनिश्चय- देयासद्विज्ञाने घटपि य एव द्रव्यत्वसमवायः स एव गुणत्वकर्मस्यादौनामपि तद्यापि तेषां द्रव्यमाधारस्तत्र तेषामप्रतीतिः द्रव्येष्वेव सादृश्यं प्रतीयते गुणेष्वेव गुणस्य कर्मस्य एव कर्मस्य नित्यत्ववैतन्यव्यतिरेकमतदर्शनादेव निवृत्तः अन्यथा कुपडरूपेणमयोमितिरेव पि कुपडमवाधारी न दर्शित्वावधारयिभावनिवृत्तस्तथा व्युत्पत्त्युक्तकर्मतिमिदोद्वेगाच्च पि निवृत्त उपपत्त्यते नहि द्रव्येव द्रव्यत्वजन कर्मत्वाद्यप्यभिप्रेयते तदुक्तम् अत्रिदेव हि भाग्यनी घन्तुपामं नः शशगम् इति नद्याधारत्यै प्रति विपरीता सौम्यदर्शित नहि भवति द्रव्यं कर्मति नद्या भवति घटे तन्नात्र इति तेन वाया रूपसमवायैपि वाया रूप- मित्वाधारता न वायोः प्रतीयते इतस्मात्प्रभावशक्तिरेव सर्वत्र निरागमिका स एव नित्यवकारकत्वात् समवायिस्वरूपादुत्पत्तिनिवृत्तः तदनुसृते च निमिनासमवा यिनां तद्याच समवायस्य समवायिस्वरूपा दन्तु स्यात् तत् समवायान्तरेण तेनैव सम वायेन वा न तावदाद्यः अनवस्थापातात् न द्वितीयः नहि स एव स समवायः स्येनैव समवायः सम्मप्रतीत्यात्माश्रयत तन्नुषु घटसमवायः घटे रूपसमवायइति प्रतीतिः कथ मिति चेत् एकरूपसम्वन्धेन समवायात्मनरादौशारेणवस्थापातात् तर्हि घटरूपमित्यपी दृष्टव्यं स्यैकरूपसम्वन्धेनैव स्यात् किं समवायेनेति चेन्न तत्रातिरिक्तसम्वन्धे आधका भावात् तर्हि मूर्तने घटाभाज इत्यत्रापि समवायः सम्बन्धान्तरं वा स्यादिति चेन्न स्यैकरूपसम्वन्धेनैव तदुत्पत्तेः अन्यथा घटात्यन्ताभावात्नान्याभावायोर्नित्यशारेनसमवेनयोः सामान्यत्वापत्तेः प्रकृत्य च समवेतकार्यत्वेन विनाशित्वापत्तेः घागभाजस्य च समवे तानुत्पन्नत्वेनाविनाशित्वापत्तेश्च नच भाजस्यं तत्र तन्त्रम् भाजस्यत्वाश्रयत्वात् अभावेस्त्येव वैशिष्ट्यायं सम्बन्धान्तरमिति भाट्टाः तत्र यदि स्यात्भाजशक्तौनामेकमेव वैशिष्ट्यं तदा घटयस्यपि घटाभाजत्यवयवद्वयः घटाभाजयैवियन्नैव घटाभाजयैवियन्नैव यत्वात् घट एव तत्र घटाभाजयैवियन्नैव इति चेत् वैशिष्ट्यसम्वन्धेन प्रतिव्यवहा- भाजस्य तत्र सत्यात् नद्यावदस्यभाज एव सादृश्यं येन न तत्र घटाभाजयैवियन्नैव घटा पमारणानन्तरं तत्रैव घटाभाजप्रतीतिः तद्याधिरूपनाशानन्तरं कथं न रूपवत्ताप्रत्ययः समवायस्य नित्यत्वादेकत्वाच्चेतिचत् रूपनाशदेव तदप्रतीतिरूपवत्ते. समवायप्रतिव्यवहाः ॥

lect of thought which is the next subject in order, in favour of the desire of the student to know what co-inherence is it having been stated that priority and posteriority co-inhere in objects only, and that knowledge, pleasure &c co-inhere in the soul. The words cause and effect have an implicative force, and are to be considered to apply also to non-cause and non-effect, as it has been stated in the section entitled the *Locality of the Categories*, that the relation of unconjoined objects subsistent and inherent is co-inherence. The cause of the cognition of the here non-unconnectedness, is the non-existence of two unconjoined objects. Inasmuch as the thought of clarified butter here present in the bowl, as that of jujubes here present in the bowl, of cloth here present in the threads, of grass here in the blades, of substance, quality, and action here in substance, of the essence of a cow here in the cow, of cognition here in the soul, of sound here in the ether,—this thought of the here which is thus produced, cannot be produced without some connection, it is inferred that there is some connection. This connection is not mere conjunction: for the actions &c of one only of the two objects cannot produce it, its existence does not terminate in disjunction, connected objects may be non-conjunctly effected they must be conceived to have a determinate substratum, it is not perceptible, and it is one, and eternal. If it be objected that if co-inherence be one it follows that there is a confusion with regard to substantiality inasmuch as the essence of action &c may co-inhere as well as the essence of substance in substance, we reply that it is not so. According to the relation of subsistence and inherence, there can be no confusion. For though that co-inherence which is the co-inherence of the essence of substance, be the co-inherence of the essences of quality, action &c, yet substance is not the substratum of these latter essences inasmuch as they are not manifested in substance. The essence of substances or substantiality, appears only in substances, the essence of qualities, only in qualities, the essence of actions only in ac-

tions, and nowhere else, accordingly from the observation of this concomitance and its negation, there results a determination of the relation of subsistence and inherence. As there being an ordinary conjunction between a vessel and clarified butter, it is the vessel which is the substratum or receptacle not the clarified butter, and therefore there is a determination the relation of containing and contained, so this limitation is here possible only as a consequence of the difference of the power of manifesting and of being manifested. For the essence of action &c is not manifested by substance as the essence of substance is. Hence it has been said, All powerful consciousness is our resource in the apprehension of things. For there is no contradictory intuition in relation to the nature of substrata, since there arises no intuition that substance becomes action, or that the threads are in the cloth, nor in the case of air does there appear the nature of a substratum because in the co-inherence with colour, colour is in air. It is therefore natural power which in every instance determines the relation between the substratum and that which inheres in it. This same co-inherence is, eternal since it has no cause, for the co-inherent cause is the condition of the production of existences and the non-co-inherent and efficient causes are subsidiary thereto. If, moreover there were a co-inherent cause of co-inherence this must exist in virtue of another co-inherence or of same co-inherence. It is not the former for there would thus emerge a regress to infinity. It is not the latter, for this same co-inherence could not co-inhere with itself, for thus there would be constantly recurring co-inherence.

If we be asked how there arises the cognition of the co-inherence of the cloth in the threads and of the colour in the cloth, we reply that it is by an essential connection, for on the hypothesis of a second co-inherence there would be a regress to infinity. If it be objected. In that case the cognition of the locally present also, as that there is here the colour of the cloth, must also be by essential connection --we reply that it is not so, there being a non-exis-

tence which renders a further connection impossible. If then, it be objected: In the cognition that there is here on this spot non-existence of a water pot there is a co-inherence or other connection—we reply that it is not so for this may be produced by essential connection, for on the contrary supposition there would follow a universality of the absolute and reciprocal non-existences of the water pot, eternal, and co-inherent in a plurality of objects and emergent non-existence might be destructive as being a co-inherent effect, and antecedent non-existence might be destructive as being not produced by the co-inherent. The nature of existence is not in this case the condition for possibility belongs to the nature of existence.

The Bhāṭṭas maintain that there is in non-existence another connection called possession of attributes or predicates. On this hypothesis did possession of attributes belong to all individual non-existences it would follow that we should cognise non-existence of a water pot even where a water pot existed, and the possession of the character of non-existence as a water pot might exist merely in virtue of the possession of the character of non-existence as a piece of cloth. If it be replied that the water pot in this case prevents the thought of the non-existence of the water pot, it may be replied that there is in this case non-existence of the preventive by reason of the connection of possession of the attributes. Nor is the nature of the substratum such that there should not be there a manifestation of the non-existence of the water pot, for after the water pot has been removed there appears in this substratum that is in the place where the water pot had stood, the non-existence of the water pot.

If it be objected: How is it that after the destruction of colour, on your hypothesis there is not a cognition of the coloured inasmuch as co-inherence is eternal and one?—we reply that the non-appearance of the coloured is possible in consequence of the destruction of colour only. U

1 The connection of cause and effect, of part and whole, wherefrom there results the cognition that such a thing is in such a place, is co-inherence. For a cognition such as those of the cloth in the threads, the water pot in its halves, the grass in its blades, has for its object the existence of the threads &c. in the cloth &c. This existence is determined by a special kind of connection, for else it would follow that there might be such cognitions as of the water pot in the threads, the existence of the threads &c., residing by a temporal connection in the water-pot, &c. Connection, therefore, determining existence in a given mode, is co-inherence, for between whole and part conjunction is impossible. The words cause and effect have an implicative power, and it is therefore to be held that, that also which determines the relation of action and agent, of essence and individual, of eternal substance and particular object, and of containing and contained is co-inherence. The proof of co-inherence is determinate cognition the object of which is the relation of character and characterised or predicate and subject. From determinate cognition such as of a man with a staff there results an inference. In this inference conjunction &c., being

1 कार्यकारणयोरपराधपरिहारोऽयं सम्यग्भावेऽद्वैतमिति प्रत्यक्षं समवायं तन्नुपपत्तौ कपालेषु घटं घोरणेषु कटइत्यादिप्रत्ययोऽपि घटादौ तत्त्वादित्युक्तं त्रिषु करोति तच्च इतित्य सम्यग्भाव्येणैव निश्चितमेवान्यथा तन्नुपपत्तौ घट इत्यादिप्रतीतिं प्रसङ्गात् कालिकेन तत्त्वादित्युक्तस्य घटादौ सत्यात् इत्यञ्च तादृशप्रतीतिनियामकं सम्यग्भावसमवायं इयं श्रवणपराधपरिहारोऽयं सयोगासम्भवात् कार्यकारणयोरित्युपलक्षणं गुणगुणिना क्रियाक्रियाप्रतीतिर्जातित्युक्तोऽनित्यद्वयविशेषपदार्थयोरवाधाराधेयभाप्रतिषेधं कार्यसमवायं एवेति मन्तव्यम् : समवाये प्रमाणानुगुणक्रियादिप्रतिश्रुतिविशेषं श्रवणसम्यग्भाव्येणैव विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात्प्रवृत्तेः पुरुष इति विशिष्टबुद्धिप्रदित्यनुमानं तत्र च सयोगादिवाधात् समवायसिद्धिं न च स्वल्पसम्यग्भावेनान्तरमनन्तरस्य कपालात् सम्यग्भावस्याभ्युपगमे गौरवात् न चैवमभावात्स्याप्यनया रीत्या सम्यग्भावान्तरं सिद्धेदिति वाच्यं यतोऽभायसम्यग्भावस्य न नित्यत्वसम्भवस्तथा सति भूतत्वे घटानयनानन्तरमपि घटाभावबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात् घटाभावस्य तत्त्वसम्यग्भावस्य च नित्यत्वात् नाप्यभावस्य सम्यग्भावान्तरमनित्यमङ्गीकर्तुं शक्यते एकस्मिन्नेव भूतत्वे सदस्यथा घटानयनापसराणादौ सम्यग्भावसद्वत्त्वस्य नापत्तेस्तस्मादपसराणकालेन भूतत्वादित्युक्तं एव घटाभावात् सम्यग्भावस्य स्वीकारणाय घटकालस्य सम्यग्भावघटकृता घटकाले न घटात्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिः इत्यञ्च भूतत्वादौ घटाभावात् स्वल्पसम्यग्भावस्वीकारस्याप्युक्तत्वेनाभावात्तरस्यत्वेऽपि स्वल्पस्यैव सम्यग्भावस्य मभावप्रत्ययानामेकत्रिषु सम्यग्भावमात्रादित्यस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वादिति ।

impossible, there is given a proof of co-inherence. It cannot be maintained that by essential connection we are to understand a distinct entity there being a complexity involved in the conception of a connection of endless essential forms, and that according to this method there could not be proved a distinct connection of non-existence. For it is impossible that the connection of non-existence should be eternal, as that of co-inherence is for were this the case, it would follow that after a water pot had been brought to a spot where one had not previously stood there would be the cognition of the non-existence of the water pot in consequence of the eternity of the non-existence of the water pot and of its connection. Nor can it be admitted that there belongs another non-eternal connection to non-existence, for we should then have to imagine, in the case of a water pot being brought and taken away a thousand times to and from a spot, a thousand connections. We must therefore maintain that the connection of non-existence of the water pot belongs to the essential form of the spot at the time the water pot is removed. Inasmuch as the time when the water pot is there does not effect this connection at the time the water pot is there there is no cognition of the absolute non-existence of the water pot. Thus it being necessary to allow an essential connection of non-existence of the water pot on the ground &c. there must in the case of other non-existence be a connection with the essential form, for it is evinced by experience that the cognitions of non-existences are conversant about one uniform kind of connection. V

द्रव्यस्वगुणत्वप्रतिषेधो भावेन व्याख्यातः ॥ २७ ॥

Aph 27 The negation of the essence of substance and quality is explained by existence

¹ It may be urged Let co-inherence be included in substance,

¹ ननु समवायो द्रव्ये गुणान्तिष्ठे वास्तविकं किन्तु स्यात्तिरिक्तपदार्थस्य न तस्य सत्ता । भावेन सत्तया द्रव्यस्वगुणत्वप्रतिषेधो द्रव्यस्वगुणत्वभावा व्याख्यातः उक्तं तद्यथा सत्ता यदा द्रव्यस्वगुणत्वगुण्यो विनियोगाद्विपर्ययस्यात् समयं येषां विनियोगाद्विपर्ययात् द्रव्यस्यादभिमित्यर्थः इदमुपलक्षणं कर्मत्वादिति प्रतिषेधोऽपि ज्ञेयः ॥

or in quality &c., why should it be assumed to be an additional category? In reply it is stated that the negation, that is, the non-existence of the essence of substance and quality is explained, that is, is declared by existence or being. As, therefore, existence is void of the essence of substance and of quality as being the object of a differently characterised cognition, so also co-inherence, as being the object of a differently characterised cognition does not possess the character of substance, &c. There is here an indication, the negation of the essence of action &c. requiring to be understood. V

तत्त्वं भावेन ॥ २८ ॥

Aph 28 Its reality [is explained] by existence

' The words are to be supplied. Its reality, that is its unity, is explained by existence, that is by being. For as it is one existence that in all cases excites the cognition of the existent, so is there one co-inherence that in all cases excites the cognition of the co-inherent, inasmuch as there is no difference in the marks or characters by which its existence is inferred, and there is non existence of a particular mark. For we reckon no particular mark or differentiating character, by which we should apprehend variety of co-inherences. Hence it is eternal, inasmuch as non eternity is inapplicable to that which is indivisible, though there be a division according to space, time &c., as is the case with existence. It may be objected that if this co-inherence be merely a conjunction, there may be disjunction of threads and cloth or of the cloth and its colour. This is not the case, since in the absence of

१ व्याख्यासमिति शेषः तत्त्वमेकत्वं भावेन भूतत्वा व्याख्यातम् यद्येका भूता सर्वत्र सद्बुद्धिप्रयत्निका तथैव स्य समवायः सर्वत्र समवेतबुद्धिप्रयत्नैकः स्य निहाविशेषाद्विशेष निहाभावाच्च न हि समवायस्य विशेषेत्तद्धं भेदकं निहमाकृतवासो येन नानात्वमभ्युपगच्छामः अतएव नित्यकामादिभेदेऽप्यभिप्रायः सत्तावदेवानित्यस्यापेक्षया ननु समवाये यथायं सम्यग्य स्य तदा तन्नुपपत्तौ पटरूपयोर्वा विभवेन स्यादिति चेन्न पुनरित्यभावादिज्ञेयानुपपत्तौ न हि रूपरूपयोरित्येव यथावर्थाभावात् सत्तावदेवातिशयमानस्यमस्ति येन विषयत्वं स्यात् पुनरिति शेषोपायः इति चेन्न कदाचिदपि तस्यानुभवाभावात्तदभावात्

previous unconjoinedness-disunion is impossible, for colour and the object coloured or the parts and the whole do not exist out of mutual connection, that there should be a disunion between them. If it be replied that such unconjoinedness is possible, we deny this for its possibility is absurd inasmuch as it has never been experienced. U

EIGHTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON

द्वय्येषु ज्ञान व्याख्यतम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph. 1 Cognition was explained among substances.

1 The foregoing digression was intended to gratify the curiosity of the learner. The order of enunciation is again embraced

1 शिष्यजिज्ञासानुरोधतः कमलदुर्गमिदानीमुच्छेद्यक्रममात्मन्यते तत्र बुद्धिपरीक्षा
अष्टमाध्यायाय आत्मसाधनाय पूर्वे बुद्धिरुक्ता सा स्मारयन्नाह । द्वय्येषामिति विषयेषु
विशेषिण्युक्तोवाध्यायमुपलक्षयति । इन्द्रियाद्यैर्गतिरिन्द्रियाद्यैर्भाषायां नंतरस्य हेतुः आ
त्मैन्द्रियाद्यैर्गतिरिन्द्रियाद्यैर्गतिरिति तदन्वयः इत्येताभ्यां सूत्राभ्यां ज्ञान व्याख्यातमित्यर्थः ।
तत्र बुद्धिरूपनिरूपणं प्रत्ययवृत्तिः पर्याया इति समानतन्त्रे बुद्धिरुपलक्षणं सादृश्यमसनि
रासाय पर्यायाभिधानम् । सादृश्यादि बुद्ध्यादिशब्दानामयनदमाद्यवृत्ते तस्याहि इत्वर
जस्तमसा साम्यावस्था प्रकृति सा चैकैयं गुरुयास्तुपर भिद्यन्ते तेव कूटस्था नित्या अ
परिमाणामिनो नित्यचेतन्यस्वभावा तेषु गुरुयोऽपराणामित्वात् प्रकृतिस्त्वन्वा जडत्वात्
यदा विषयभोगेच्छा प्रकृतिपुरुषभेदविद्वत्ता च प्रकृतभवेति तदा सा पुरुषोपरागवयान्
परिणमते तस्याश्चाद्यः पराणामोबुद्धिरन्तःकरणविशेषः बुद्धिरेव महत्तत्त्व तदुक्तम्
प्रकृतेर्महान् इति साच बुद्धिद्वैतव्यञ्ज्य चर्मसा तस्याश्च बाहिरिन्द्रियप्रणादिक्रिया विषयाकारो
य परिणतिभेदो घट इति घट इत्याद्याकारस्तज्ज्ञानं वृत्तिरिति व्याख्यात स्यच्छाया
बुद्धौ वर्तमानेन ज्ञानेन चेतन्यस्य पुरुषस्य भेदापह्लादहं जानामाति धोभिमानविशेष
संघापनश्च सखचन्दनादिविषयसचिद्रूपोदिन्द्रियप्रणादिक्रियैश्च सुखदुःखाद्याकारो बुद्धिरेव
यः परिणामविशेषः स प्रत्ययः अतएव ज्ञानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नस्कारधर्माधमाः सर्व
एव बुद्धेः परिणामविशेषाः सूक्ष्मात्रया प्रकृतायेव वर्तमाना अत्रस्याभेदादाविर्भवन्ति
तिरोभवन्ति च पुरुषस्तु पुष्करपलाशश्चित्रलेपः प्रतिविद्यन्ते पर बुद्ध्यादिति यन्मन्यन्ते तद
नेन पर्यायाभिधानमूचितप्रमाणेन निराकृत्यते तथाहि बुद्धिशब्दा यदि बुध्यतेऽनयेति कर
णव्युत्पन्नस्तदा मन एव तत्पर्यवस्यति नच मनः प्रत्यक्षम् बुद्धिस्त्वहं बुध्ये इति प्रत्यक्षेऽप्येव
नवान्तःकरणस्य ज्ञानादयोधर्माः कर्तृधर्मत्वेनैव तथा विद्वे भवति हि अहं ज्ञाने अहं
प्रत्यमि अहमुपलभे इत्यहन्त्वसामानाधिकरण्यात् प्रतिभासः अभिमानोऽसाविति चेत्
तान्त्वित्येव बाधकभावात् पुरुषस्यागन्तुकधर्मानाधारत्वं कूटस्थत्वं तदेव बाधकमिति
संवागन्तुकधर्माधारत्वेऽपि नित्यत्वसम्भवात् नहि धर्माधर्मवैयर्थ्ये तत्त्व येन धर्मात्मा
दधिनाशायेव धर्मात्वादधिनाशो स्यात् तथाच एव चेतयते स एव बुध्यत ज्ञानात्पु
नभत प्रत्यति चेति नार्थान्तरकल्पना युक्तेतिदिकः ॥

According to this the examination of intellection is the object of the eighth book. Intellection has been previously described. The present aphorism is stated with the purpose of recalling this. By the words Among substances through the object, the third book which treats of that object, i. e. of substances, is implied. The meaning is that cognition has been explained by the two aphorisms. The universal notion of organs and their objects is a mark of an entity other than organs and objects, and, That which is brought into being from contiguity of soul, organ and object, is other than they. In the common declaration of intellection that intellection, apprehension, cognition and affection, are synonyms, the equivalent terms are enumerated in order to contravene the Sāṅkhya doctrine. For the Sāṅkhyas maintain a distinction of meaning in the terms intelligence &c. Thus the plastic principle is a state of equipoise between purity, passion, and darkness. This is one, and one only, while spirits are divided to infinity. These spirits are uniform, constant, unchangeable, characterised by eternal consciousness. These moreover are lame, being incapable of modification, while the plastic principle is blind, being unsentient. When there arises in the plastic principle a desire of the fruition of sense-objects, or the wish to see the difference between the plastic principle and spirit, the plastic principle is modified in virtue of throwing as it were a tint of colour upon spirit. The first modification of the plastic principle is intellection, a kind of internal sense. Intellection it is that is the great principle, wherefore it has been said, From the plastic principle the great. This intelligence is like a clear mirror, and the particular modification in the form of an object such as a water pot, a piece of cloth &c., by the channel of the external organs of intelligence, is called the cognition, the function of intelligence. Apprehension is according to them that particular concept, whereby, in consequence of the non discrimination of spirit or consciousness by reason of the cognition existing in pure intelligence it is affirmed I know. Affection is the par-

ticular modification of intelligence, in the form of pleasure, pain &c., by the channel of the sense-organs, in consequence of the presence of objects of sense such as garlands, sandal wood, and the like. Hence it is that all the particular modifications of intelligence, *cognit on, pleasure pain, desire, aversion, volition, reminiscence, merit, and demerit* existing only in the plastic principle in their minute proportions according to diversity of conditions, appear and disappear, while spirit, like a lotus leaf free from stain, reflects them externally in intelligence. This doctrine which they hold, is rejected by the evidence indicated in the enumeration of the convertible terms. If, then, the word intelligence be derived from agency, inasmuch as it is the instrument of understanding it may be concluded that it is identical with the internal sense, and the internal sense is not perceptible. But intelligence is known by the internal perception I understand. Moreover the qualities cognition &c., do not belong to the internal organ for they are proved to exist only as being qualities of an agent. For the phenomena of personal knowledge, personal sensation personal apprehension, are manifested only as having personality or egoity as their common substratum. If they reply that this phenomenon is conceit, we rejoin that there is nothing to prove the impossibility of the reality. If they say that spirit is unsusceptible of adventitious modes, and unmodified, and that this shews the impossibility of their reality, we deny this, eternity being compatible with the nature of a substratum of adventitious modes. For substance and attribute are not one single principle, that production and destruction of the attribute should be production and destruction of the subject. He then who is conscious, understands, knows, apprehends, and conceits. The hypothesis, therefore of a distinct entity is not allowable. U

तत्रात्मा मनश्चाप्रत्यक्षे ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2. Therein soul and the internal sense are imperceptible

This cognition moreover is twofold—science and nescience. Science is of four kinds, viz perception, inference, memory and testimony. Nescience likewise is of four kinds, viz doubt, uncertainty, sleep, and inattention. Of these kinds of science that which is inferential is not produced by the sense organs. Why this is so, is stated in the text *The soul is here either the soul of another or one's own*. The imperceptibility of one's own soul has been already declared, inasmuch as such occasional personal cognitions as that of one's own paleness, attenuation, length of arm &c have been rejected in relation to the soul. The particle *and* implies the applicability of the predicate to ether, time, space, air, and atoms. Sensible

१ तच्च ज्ञानं द्विविधं त्रिविधं च विद्या चतुर्विधा प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकसाम्यार्थ
सङ्गणा अविद्याऽपि चतुर्विधा सम्यग्निर्णयस्यमानाध्यसात्मसङ्गणा तत्र प्रलैङ्गिक तत्र
निन्दियज्ञम कुत यतदित्याह । आत्माऽत्र परात्मा स्यात्मा वा स्यात्मानि मानसस्य क्वा
चित्प्राकाशमस्यस्याह गौर कस्यो महायादुरित्यादिप्रत्यक्षतिरस्कृतत्वात् स्यात्मानौप्यप्र
त्यक्षतात्का चकारादाकाशकालदिशा याया परमाणुनाञ्च द्वय्याणामुपपद्यते । इन्द्रि
यज्ञमपि द्विविधं सर्वज्ञीयमसर्वज्ञीयञ्च सर्वज्ञीयं योगजधर्मलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्त्या तस्य
दार्थसार्थज्ञानं तर्थाह परमाणय प्रसक्ता प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वात् सत्त्वात् साम
प्रोचिरक्षात् कथमेव महत्त्वस्यापि प्रत्यक्ष प्रति कारणत्वात् नच परमाणयो महान्त
रुपपत्त्यस्यापि चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षकारणत्वात् नच दिगादयोऽरुपयन्त इति चेन्न योगजधर्मसह
कारिणो मनसैव तत्सम्भवात् तदुपपत्ताच्छुरादेना वा अचिन्त्यप्रभावोऽसि योगज्ञाधर्मा
न सहकार्यन्तरमपेक्षते । विद्यादाध्यासितं पुरुषो न सर्वज्ञं पुरुषत्वादहमित्येत्यादि तु
प्राभाकरो न मीमासाभिन्नं पुरुषत्वादहमित्येत्यादिसिद्धिपदवाधकतर्कानुपपत्त्यादप्रयोजकम्
असर्वज्ञीयञ्च प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं सविक्लपकं निर्विकल्पकञ्च सविक्लपकं ज्ञानं न प्रमाणमिति ।
कीर्तिदिङ्गादयं तर्थाह अभिलाषसमर्पणोपप्रतिभास्य हि तत् मह्यभिलाषेन नाम्ना
सम्भवत्यर्थस्य सम्बन्धा येन घट इति घट इति वा नामानुरञ्जितं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात् नच
ज्ञात्यादि परमार्थसत्त्वं येन तद्विशिष्ट्य विषयेषु ईन्द्रियेण यद्यत नच सत् स्वलक्षणस्यासत्ता
सम्बन्ध सम्भति नचासत् इन्द्रियगात्र तस्मादिन्द्रियेणालोचनं जन्यते आलाचनमदि
माद्यं सविक्लपकमुत्पद्यमानं तत्रार्थं प्रथतंयत् प्रत्यक्षमिति प्रमाणमिति सोऽद्यत इति
तत्त्वैसदनुपपत्तमभिलाषसमर्पणोपप्रतिभास्य भवत प्रमाणज्जन्दिपेयैसविकर्षजस्य स्या
दिति सन्दिधयतिरिक्त्य नामयैशिशिष्ट्यञ्च चाक्षुषज्ञाने सम्भवत्यथ मुरभिचन्दनमिति
यदुपनीतभानसम्भवात् यद्वा सञ्चार्यैशिशिष्ट्यप्रत्यक्षज्ञाने न भासते सञ्चार्या स्मरणमात्रम
स्मर्तव्य स्मर्यप्यावर्तिका अभावज्ञाने प्रतियोगिस्मरणयत् लास्यादिकञ्च वस्तुभूतं साधि
तमेवात् सविक्लपकमपीन्द्रियार्थसविकर्षजस्यात् प्रत्यक्षम् । ननु निर्विकल्पकं न व्यपहर
रप्रथतं नवा व्यपहराविषय इति किन्तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेत् सविक्लपकमयं तर्हि वि
शिष्टज्ञानम् नच विशेषज्ञानमन्तरेण तदुत्पद्यतं विशिष्टज्ञाने हि विशेषज्ञानमिदमे
वोन्दिपसधिकर्षतदुभयाधेसर्गावयवस्य कारणत्वावधारणात् ॥

knowledge is of two degrees, omniscient, and non-omniscient. Omniscient is the knowledge of such and such complements of objects, by presentation determined by the merit springing from devotion. Thus atoms fall within its sphere, as demonstrable, nameable, and existent. If it be objected — Since there is no apparatus of such unbounded sense knowledge, how can this be the case ? and whereas magnitude is the cause of perception, and atoms possess no magnitude, and whereas possession of colour is the cause of common perception, and space &c have no colour, — how can this be so ? We reply that this objection is invalid, this omniscience being possible by means of the internal sense auxiliary to the merit produced by devotion ; or by means of the eye &c in consequence of the acquisition thereof, for the merit engendered by devotion being of inconceivable efficacy, requires no other auxiliary. The man in question is not omniscient, being a man like myself — this and similar propositions are not to the point, there being no argument which would render contrary instances impossible, as is the case with the proposition A follower of Prabhākara is not designated a Mīmāṃsaka being a man like myself &c. Non-omniscient presentation is of two kinds, discriminative and non-discriminative. Kīrti-dīpnāga and others maintain that discriminative cognition conveys no evidence, for it is manifested as apparent through connection with names. But there can be no connection of the meaning with the designation or name, that a cognition should be coloured, as it were, by the name water-pot or piece of cloth. Moreover the universal or essential &c. is not really existent, that the being characterised by it should be apprehended in objects by the sense organ, and the self characterised existent can have no connection with the non-existent, and the non-existent is no object of sense. Sight therefore is produced by the organs of sense, and the discriminative cognition (which recognises the class of its object) while in process of being produced by magnitude of vision, is said to be perceptible, and to convey assurance. This is impos-

sible, the phenomenon must be cognisable by connection with its designation, and the condition that evidence be produced by continuity of organ and object is doubtful. The being characterised by a name is a possible object of (acquired) visual perception being possible in the same manner as such a presented cognition as that of cool sandal wood. Or it may be maintained that the being characterised by a term does not appear in perceptive knowledge and that there is only recollection of the name the distinctive appellation being recalled only in like manner as there is recollection of the absent object in the cognition of non existence. Also it may be maintained the universal &c has a real existence and that there is therefore a discriminative perception produced by apposition of object and organ. It may be objected —Non discriminative cognition neither excites to activity nor is an object of activity? what proof therefore is there that it exists? We reply that its proof is found in discriminative cognition for this is a determinate cognition and this is not produced without a knowledge of predicates for it is observed that knowledge of the predicates apposition to the modified sense organ and the non apprehension of non-connection of such knowledge and such apposition is the cause of determinate cognition. U

ज्ञाननिर्देशे ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिविधिरुक्तः ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 The mode in wh ch cognition is originated has been stated in the enunciation of cognition

. ' The mode in which cognition is originated ; that is the process by which knowledge is produced, has been explained in the enunciation of cognition that is in the third book where the statement of knowledge was made. The causes of knowledge were

१ ज्ञाननिर्देशे सृष्टीयाध्याये यत्र ज्ञानस्य निर्देशः कृतस्तत्रैव सत्त्वियतिविधिस्तत्
त्यतिविधान उक्त आत्मनिष्ठापदसचक्रकुर्याद्विषयव्यति तदन्यत्र इति सूत्रे ज्ञानस्य कार
णान्युक्तानोक्त्यर्थं तथावात्मा ज्ञानस्य समग्रविष्कारणम् आत्ममनःसंयोगात्समग्रविष्का
रणम् विषयसंनिधौ निमित्तकारणमिति तस्मिन् सूत्रव्याख्यामिति प्रत्यक्षमधिकृत्य सचि
करस्य हेतुता कथयति यदित्यर्थम् ॥

stated in the aphorism That which is produced by contiguity of soul, sense organ, and object, is other than those. The soul, then, is the co-inherent or material cause of cognition, conjunction of the soul and the internal sense is the non-co-inherent cause, apposition of the object is the occasional or efficient cause. This was declared in that aphorism. It is therefore, to be understood that the causality of contacts in relation to perception has already been laid down. V

गुणसुर्मसु सवितृष्टेषु ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेर्द्रव्य कारणम् ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 Qualities and actions being brought into contact (with the organs of sense), substance is the cause of production of cognition

* Substance is the cause of the cognition which is produced of qualities, as colour &c, and of actions as uprearing &c. These are both apprehended only as situate in present substance, the presence therefore of the substance is a requisite of cognition. It is by substance, moreover that their contact is constituted, they being apprehended as conjunctly co-inherent. Although there is apprehended the odour of dispersed particles of the champaka flower, and of portions of camphor which are imperceptible, yet it is substance, imperceptible though it be which effects their contact. Although perceptibility of substance is not a requisite of the apprehension of sound yet sound is only* apprehended as inherent in substance and this is the requisite. If it be asked Why assume a contact which is invisible? we reply that the production of knowledge, being an effect necessitates the hypothesis of a cause. U

* गुणेषु रूपादिषु कर्मसु धातुत्वेष्वनादिषु यज्ज्ञानं निष्पद्यते तत्र द्रव्य कारणं यो गृह्यन्निष्ठस्य तदुभयं मध्यत इति द्रव्ययोग्यतेः तत्र तन्त्रम सचिरूपेण तेषां द्रव्यघटितं द्रव्यं सद्रूपसमवायेन तेषां गृह्यतां यद्यपि विवक्तव्यमप्यजायते रूपादिभिरभासानामयोग्यता गन्धो गृह्यते तथापि सचिरूपेण तत्रायोग्यमपि द्रव्यमेव यद्यपि शब्दघटे द्रव्ययोग्यता न तन्त्र तथापि तत्रैव समयेत* शब्दो गृह्यत इति तदेव तन्त्रम् नन्वेष्टसचिरूपेण कल्पना कुत क्रियते इति चेन्न ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेः कार्येण हि कारणमवश्यं कल्पनीयमिति भावः ॥

सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावात्तत एव ज्ञानम् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Inasmuch as in universals and particulars there exist not universals and particulars cognition of general and special essences results thence [from contact effected by substance]

¹ Another mode is stated in which cognition originates. The universal is existence the particulars or species are the essences of substance quality, and action. Similarly these being also universals or subaltern genera their particulars or species are the essences of earth &c. of colour &c. and of upheaving &c. Of these essences residing in substances there results perception common to all the senses thence that is, from the particular perceptible substratum, from their cause, from conjunct co inherence, from co inherence in the conjunctly co inherent, and from co inherence in the co inherent. Knowledge common to all the senses of the essence of qualities, arises from co inherence in the conjunctly co-inherent, of the essence of sound and of heat and other particular sounds from co inherence in the co inherent of existence from conjunct co inherence from co inherence in the conjunctly co-inherent and from co inherence in the co inherent. Conjunct co inherence and co inherence are not presentative of the essence of quality. It may therefore be urged that the knowledge of it is impossible through contact with its substratum since in the universal or highest essence existence and in the particulars or sub-

¹ अपरं ज्ञाननिर्णयविधिमाह । सामान्यं सत्ता तस्य विशेषा द्रव्यगुणत्वकर्मस्थानि एवमतपामपि सामान्यानि विशेषा भूविश्रोत्यादिरूपत्वाद्युत्प्रेषणत्वादीनि सत्र द्रव्यगताना सामान्याना तत एव योग्याथविशेषादेश तच्चिद्यन्मान्त्र सयुक्तसमवायात् सयुक्तसमवेतसमवायात् समयतसमवायाच्च सार्धेन्द्रिय ज्ञान गुणत्वे च संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायात् शब्दत्वकत्वादि समवेतसमवायात् सत्ताया सयुक्तसमवायात् सयुक्तसमवेतसमवायात् समयतसमवायाच्च सार्धेन्द्रिय ज्ञानम् गुणत्वे च सयुक्तसमवायसमवायाच्च न प्रत्यामतिरिति ननु तत एव स्थाययसचिक्रवाद्येत्यवधारणानुपपत्तिरिति यत सामान्ये विशेषेषु च एषिष्रोत्यादिषु सामान्याविशेषान्तरमस्त्यस्य तत्सचिक्रवापि कारणमेवात आह । सामान्यविशेषाभावादिति नहि सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषा सतस्ते अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् तदा परस्परभेदप्रतीतिरिति स्वरूपत एव भवेत्तदादृशित्ये सति सकलमादृशित्यसदस्यापार पि रभेदाद्वा एव घटत्वादावपीति ॥

altern genera, the essence of substance, quality, and action, and in the essences of earth &c there are universals and particulars. In anticipation of this objection the words Inasmuch as there exist not therein universals and particulars, have been added For there exist not in universals and particulars other universals and particulars essences that is of the essence of objects, for thus there would result a regression to infinity The appearance of mutual difference between these essences proceeds from their proper form, or from difference of essential attributes existing for instance, in all cows, there being non existence of such attributes in objects other than cows, and similarly with the essence of water pots and other objects U

सामान्यविशेषापेक्ष द्वयगुणकर्मसु अ द अ

Aph 6 [Cognition] of substances, qualities, and actions supposes the universal and particular

‘ It may be asked whether the cognition of substances, qualities and actions is also absolute in the same manner as the knowledge of universals and particulars is absolute inasmuch as there exist not in them universality and particularity It is stated that it is not. Cognition is produced —these words are to be supplied Of substances qualities and actions there is an apprehension determined by the natures of substances, qualities, and actions. Now, a determinate cognition is produced by contact of subject, attribute, and sense-organ, the universal and particular are therefore necessarily supposed in it. For there exists such determinate cognition as This is a substance, This is a quality, This is an action U

‘ ननु सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावाद्याया तद्विशेषमेव ज्ञान तथा द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्यपि नि तद्विशेषमेव नेत्याह । ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति प्रकृतम द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्यविशिष्टसुष्ठुतिस्तावदस्ति विशिष्टज्ञानञ्च विशेषविशेषेणैन्द्रियमपि कर्षादुत्पद्यते इति सामान्यविशेषापेक्षा तत्रावश्यको भवति हि द्रव्यमिदं गुणोऽयं कर्म इति विशिष्टज्ञानमिति भावः ॥

द्रव्ये द्रव्यगुणकर्मोपेतम् ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 [Cognition] of substance supposes substance, quality and action

¹ In the cognition, The white cow with bells is walking, the bell = substance is an attribution, white = a quality, is walking is an action There is, therefore, no determinate cognition without a determination apprehended, nor can such exist without connection with a determination Substances, qualities and actions, are therefore supposed in the cognition of a substance. U

गुणकर्मसु गुणकर्मभावाद्गुणकर्मोपेत न विद्यते ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 Inasmuch as there exist no qualities and actions in qualities and actions, there is no cognition thereof which supposes qualities and actions

² The aphorism is given in reply to the question Why therefore do not quality and actions suppose quality and action? There = an ellipsis of the word cognition Inasmuch as of quality there is no conception determined by quality, and of action no conception determined by action there is no conception thereof which supposes qualities and actions For quality does not exist in quality, or action in action that it should appear therein as a predicate or determination. U

समवायिन श्रुत्याकृत्यबुद्धेश्च श्रुते बुद्धिस्ते एते कार्यकारण-
भूते ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 9 The cognition of a white object results from the whiteness of the substratum and from the cognition of whiteness, and these same stand in a relation of cause and effect.

¹ ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते इति प्रकृते घटाद्यान् गुणैर्मोर्गच्छतीति ज्ञानम् तत्र द्रव्य घटा विशेषणम् गुण इति गुण गच्छतीति कर्म तथाच नादृशेति विशेषणाद्विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्न वा विशेषणसम्बन्धमन्तरेणेति भवति द्रव्यज्ञाने द्रव्यगुणकर्मोपेतेति भावः ॥

² अतः किं गुणकर्मणोरपि गुणकर्मोपेता नोपपद्यते । ज्ञानमिति शब्दः । गुणे गुणविशिष्टबुद्धे कर्मसु कर्मविशिष्टबुद्धेरभावात् गुणकर्मोपेता न तद्वत्बुद्धिर्न हि गुणसु गुणो न वा कर्मसु कर्म येन तत्र विशेषणत्वेन भावेति भावः ॥

' From the whiteness or white colour of the substratum, and from the cognition of whiteness or the cognition of an attribute consisting of white colour, there results in relation to a white object, a conch-shell &c. possessed of white colour, a cognition that it is white, that is, a sense-given certainty determined by white colour. The possession, therefore, of white colour, and the cognition of white colour are the causes of an effect, viz of sense given certainty the form of which is white colour. The relation, then, of co inherence affords no conditions of sense given assurance in the form of white colour, viz possession of white colour, and cognition of white colour. There is, therefore, in consequence of the absence from qualities and actions of qualities and actions as determinations, no perceptive assurance in the form of qualities and actions V

द्वयेष्वनितरकारणाः ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 [Cognitions] of substances are not causes one of the other

' It might be urged that in cases where after the perception, This is a water pot, there arises the perception, This is a piece of cloth, the knowledge of the water pot is a cause of the knowledge of the piece of cloth, inasmuch as it is antecedent to it and that consequently there could be no knowledge of the piece of cloth without a knowledge of the water pot. This collateral objection

^१ समवायिन इत्यभिधानात् सम्बन्धस्य कारणतामाह । तत्राद्यं गुणं गुणसमवायाभावात् कर्मसु धर्मसमवायाभावाच्च न तत्तज्ज्ञाने गुणकर्मोपेक्षा त्रियेषणत्वेन त्रियेष्यत्वेन त्वत्त्वेय एतच्च त्रयेत शब्दश्च इत्यादिप्रतीतिः त्रयेत्यगुणस्य त्रयेत्यविशेषणज्ञानस्य च कारणत्वमित्युक्तं तत्राद्यं त्रियेषणसम्बन्धत्रियेषणतज्ज्ञानानां त्रिशिष्टप्रत्यक्षप्रमा प्रति कारणत्वमिति तेन पूर्वोक्तं सत्यं सिध्यति ॥

^२ समवायिन त्रयेत्यसमवायिन त्रयेत्यात गुणरूपात् त्रयेत्यनुदे गुणरूपात्मकविशेषणयुद्धेश्च त्रयेते गुणरूपप्रति शब्दादौ युद्धे गुणोऽर्थमिति गुणरूपत्रियेषणिका प्रत्यक्षप्रमितिर्भवति असत्ते गुणरूपयत्तुगुणरूपयुद्धी कार्यस्य गुणरूपप्रकारकप्रत्यक्षप्रमात्मकस्य कारणभूते इत्यर्थे तत्राद्यं समवायसम्बन्धेन गुणरूपप्रकारकप्रत्यक्षप्रमा प्रति गुणरूपयत्तु गुणरूपज्ञानञ्च द्वयमेव सन्धिमिति गुणकर्मसु गुणकर्मरूपविशेषणयिरिहाह तत्प्रकारकप्रत्यक्षप्रमितिर्ति भाष ॥

is denied Cognitions—for this word is to be supplied—are not the causes one of the other, that is, the mutual causes, in the case of cognitions of substances not determinant of substances fixed in the relation of prior and posterior among substances : Though, therefore, the knowledge of the water pot be antecedent to the knowledge of the piece of cloth, it is not its cause, inasmuch as it is not its invariable antecedent V

कारणैषपश्चात् कारणक्रमाच्च घटपटाद्विधुट्टीना क्रमो न हेतु-
फलभावात् ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 The sequence of the cognitions of the water pot, piece of cloth &c. resulting from non simultaneity of the causes [of the cognitions] and from the sequence of their causes, does not result from a relation of cause and effect

¹ The sequence constituted by priority and posteriority, of the cognitions of the water pot piece of cloth &c., does not result from the relation of reason and consequent or of cause and effect but from the sequence that is from the priority and posteriority of the

'घटपटादियुद्धीना क्रम' पार्थापर्यंत न हेतुकलभावात् न कार्यकारणभावात् किन्तु तादृशयुद्धिकारणानां घटपटादिमच्चिरप्रादीनां क्रमात् पार्थापर्याप्त शकरोऽनुक्त मयोगपद्य समुच्चिनेति अथर्वकारः क्रम इत्यनन्तरं योजनीय इत्यत्र घटपटादियुद्धी नामयोगपद्य सत्कारणानां सर्वाङ्गप्रादीनामयोगपद्यादित्यर्थं यत्र ॥ घटपटमचिरप्रा दीनामस्ति योगपद्यम् तत्र युगपदेव सर्विकष्टपायातृपदाथविषयिणी सम्हालयन्तीति का पुच्छरूपेणैव इति कारणयोगपद्यात् कारणाक्रमान्न पार्थाक्रमश्चेत्यपि ध्यातव्यम् । युद्धि प्रथमतो द्विविधा अनुभूति स्मृतिश्च अनुभूतिरपि कथाद्वये द्विवि धा प्रत्यक्षानुमितमेवात् प्रत्यक्षमपि प्राञ्जलादिभेदेन धर्म्मसंज्ञकत्वकर्निधिकत्वप्रभेदेन च द्विविध लौकिकालौकिकभेदेन द्विविधस्त अनुमितिरपि केवलसाध्यविक्रमन्यतिरेकन्यय व्यतिरेककर्षत्रिविधानुमानजन्यत्वान् त्रिविधा तच्चेदं वा ज्ञेयस्यादित्यादर्कं केवलान् न्ययनुमानम् एवमितिरेक्ये भिद्यते गन्धवत्यादिस्यादिक केवलव्यतिरेकनुमानम् अन्य व्यतिरेकनुमानन्तु पर्यतो धर्महान् धर्मादित्यादिकमिति । स्मृत्येषामेवमात्मकनि र्वधयाधीनसमानाकारकभावनाख्यस्फाराधीना एवविधेय प्रकारान्तरेणापि शुद्धिद्विवि धा प्रमाः प्रमाश्चेति तद्वृत्ति सत्प्रकारिका शुद्धिस्तत्प्रमा सदभावयति सत्प्रकारिका शुद्धि सादप्रमा संग्रहनिष्पन्नप्रभेदेनापि शुद्धिद्विविधा तत्रैकर्षाणि विरुद्धभावाभावाप्रकारक ज्ञान संग्रह तदभावाप्रकारक सत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं तच्चित्रण इत्यन्यत् तादृशज्ञानस्थले प दज्ञानस्थले च तदुत्तरं निरूपणमशातृत्वेवानुमितमप्यति प्रमाणं द्विविधं प्रत्यक्षमनुमा नश्चेति यदाचार्यमुच्यते प्रमा इत्युक्तायै तत्रकृदेवदस्यतीति संक्षेपः ॥

contacts &c. of the water pot, piece of cloth &c, which are the causes of such cognitions. The particle and implies the addition of an unmentioned non simultaneity, and this word is to be construed after the term sequence. The meaning is therefore that the non simultaneity of the cognitions of the water pot piece of cloth &c results from the non simultaneity of the contacts &c with these that are the causes of those cognitions. But where there is a simultaneity of contacts &c of water pots pieces of cloth &c, there is produced simultaneously a cognition which is a support or basis of an aggregate and which has for its objects the things in contact so many as they may be. It is therefore to be understood that there results from simultaneity of cause simultaneity of effect, and from non sequence of cause non sequence of effect. Intelligence is primarily divided into experience, and memory. Experience according to the doctrine of Kanāda is of two kinds being divided into perception and inference. Perception is of six kinds, as derived from smelling &c. [from the five external and from the internal sense], and is twofold as discriminative and non-discriminative, and twofold as divided into physical and hyperphysical. Inference is threefold as produced by illation from only positive conditions from only negative conditions and from both positive and negative conditions. For example. This is a proposition inasmuch as it is knowable &c, is an illation from only positive conditions, Earth differs from other substances inasmuch as it is possessed of odours, &c. is an illation from only negative conditions, The mountain is fiery inasmuch as it smokes &c, is an illation from both positive and negative conditions. Memory is uniform dependent on the reproduction called permanent mental impression the universal form whereof is dependent on assurance not characterised by inattention. In another point of view also intelligence is twofold science and nescience. Science is a cognition in a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience is a cognition in a certain form of that in which there is non existence of that

form Intelligence is also twofold, accordingly as it is divided into certainty and uncertainty. Uncertainty is a cognition whereof the form is mutually repugnant existence and non-existence in one and the same subject of attributes, certainty in regard to a thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the non existence thereof. According to this doctrine in the case of cognition of similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an inference takes place by the production of a judgment respecting a mark or middle term, subsequently thereto. Evidence is of two kinds, perception and inference, and accordingly science is correct experience, as will be explained by the author of the aphorisms himself in the sequel. V

SECOND DAILY LESSON

अयमेव स्वयामृतं भोजयेनमिति बुद्धिपेक्षम् ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 This, That, Done by thee, Feed him,—such expressions are relative to cognition

¹ It is stated that certain cognitions are determinant of other cognitions. The cognition This is a water pot, This is a piece of cloth, is relative to cognition, that is determinant of a cognition. This and that being capable of being made objects of perception, cognition in the form of perception, is a determination of such a cognition. The word Thou being capable of being made the object of the speaker's intention, inasmuch as it is the substratum of a self manifested knowledge, the cognition produced by the expression Done by thee, is determinant of a cognition. In the hehest Feed him, also, the cognition produced by the word him, which has the sense of this one, is determinant of a cognition which is a perception. V

¹ बुद्धिविशेषणिका अपि कारितद्वयस्य भवन्तीत्याह। अयमेव इति अयं घटः अयं घट इतिज्ञान बुद्धिपेक्ष बुद्धिविशेषणकम् इदमेतदेव प्रत्यक्षविषये शक्तत्वात् प्रत्यक्षरूपा बुद्धिस्तादृशज्ञान विशेषणम् युष्मच्छब्दस्य स्वजन्यवैधावयतया यत्तुभिप्रायविषये शक्तत्वात् स्वयामृतमितिवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञान बुद्धिविशेषणकं भोजयेनमिति इदमर्थजनगच्छजन्यज्ञानमपि प्रत्यक्षात्मकबुद्धिविशेषणकम् ॥

दृष्टेषु भावाददृष्टेष्वभावात् ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Inasmuch as [such expressions] exist in reference to objects seen, and do not exist in reference to objects unseen

¹ It is shown that this is inductively proved by concomitance and exclusion. When there exists the contiguous object of the cognition This, and the remote object of the cognition That, when there exists the contiguous agent, the object of the cognition By thee, and the object of the action, the object of the notion, Done, and when there exist the giver and the receiver of the order, the objects of the notion Feed, in contiguity, then a cognition of this kind (i. e. one determined by another cognition) is produced. But in the case of unseen objects these cognitions are not manifested. This therefore may be inferred by the methods of agreement and disagreement. U

² That these terms are applicable to an object differentiated by a mode constituted by cognition may be inferred by the methods of agreement and disagreement. These expressions have applicability to an object differentiated by modes constituted by cognition, inasmuch as the use of the words This &c. exists in relation to objects seen or known that is essentially determined by modes consisting of cognition and inasmuch as such use does not exist in relation to objects unseen or unknown that is not essentially determined by modes consisting of cognition. V

¹ अन्यव्यतिरेकपरिच्छेदमेवेतदित्याह । यदाप्रमितिबुद्धेः सन्निकृष्टो विषय एव इति बुद्धेर्विप्रकृष्टाणि सुज्याकृष्टो विषय त्वयेति बुद्धेः सन्निकृष्ट कर्ता विषय कृतमिति बुद्धेः कर्म विषय भोजयेति बुद्धेर्नियोज्यनियोक्तारो विषयो एवमिति बुद्धेस्तदुभयव्याख्यारो विषय सन्निकृष्टो भवति तदेतादृशा बुद्धिजन्यत्वे अदृष्टेषु तु विषयेषु नेता बुद्धयः प्रादुर्भवन्तीत्यव्यतिरेकगम्यमेवेतदित्यर्थः ॥

² तत्रेता यदाना ज्ञानघटितधर्मावच्छिन्ने शक्तिरन्वयव्यतिरेकगम्येत्याह । दृष्टेषु ज्ञानेषु ज्ञानघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नेष्वित्याद्यत भावात् इदमादिशब्दप्रयोगस्य सत्त्वात् अदृष्टेषु अज्ञानेषु ज्ञानघटितधर्मानपरिच्छिन्नेष्वित्याद्यत अभावात् तादृशप्रयोगस्यासत्त्वात् बुद्धिघटितधर्मावच्छिन्न एव तेषा शक्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

अये इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु ॥ ३ ॥

Aph. 3 The term object applies to substances, qualities and actions

The senses and their objects द्रव्येषु प्रज्वात्मकत्व प्रतिषिद्धम् ॥ ४ ॥

Aph. 4 Under substances identity with the five elements was denied.

¹ This aphorism is stated as the basis of a treatment of the sense-organs, their nature, and the nature of the objects which they apprehend Under substances, that is, in the aphorisms describing substances, identity with the five elements possession of the matter of the five elements, was denied or impugned No substance then whether the body or any other, has the nature of the five elements but all bodies and organs of sense have the nature of some one or other single element V

भूयस्त्वाद्गन्धजत्वाच्च एषिवी गन्धज्ञाने प्रकृतिः ॥ ५ ॥

Aph. 5 In the cognition of odour earth is the matter, inas much as it possesses plurality and odour

¹ Accordingly it is stated that the organ of smell apprehends only smell among the qualities, and has the nature of earth only The cognition of odour means that from which the cognition or sensation, of smell is derived that is the organ of smell Earth the subtle element is the nature or material cause inasmuch as it

¹ किमिन्द्रियं किमप्रकृतिकं किमर्थपादकमित्यभिधानु पीठं रचयति । द्रव्येषु द्रव्य निरूपणभूतेषु घञ्वात्मकस्य घञ्जभूतप्रकृतिकस्य प्रतिषिद्ध निराकृतं तथाच शरीरादिकं किञ्चिदपि द्रव्यं न घञ्जभूतप्रकृतिकं किंत्वकीकभूतप्रकृतिकान्येयं सर्वानि शरीराणीन्द्रियाणि चेति भावः ॥

² अथ घ्राणेन्द्रियं गुणेषु गन्धमात्रपादक एषिविमानप्रकृतिकश्चेत्याह । गन्धस्य ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं यस्मात् तद्गन्धज्ञानं घ्राणेन्द्रियं तत्र एषिवी तन्मात्रं प्रकृतिः समवायिकारणमभूयस्त्वात् जलाद्यनभिभूतभागादर्थत्वात् गन्धवत्त्वाच्च रसाद्यपादकत्वात् घ्राणेन्द्रियं न जलाद्यारब्धमगन्धवत्त्वज्ञानं पादकतासम्बन्धेन गन्धपादकत्वादिति कति सारं तथाच घ्राणेन्द्रियं पारिवं रूपादिषु मध्ये गन्धस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वात् कुङ्कुमगन्धाभिव्यञ्जकतादिवदित्यनुमानेन घ्राणस्य एषिव्युपादानकस्य सिध्यतीति भावः ॥

has plurality, or is originated by particles not overpowered by water &c., and possesses odour. The olfactory organ is not originated by water &c., inasmuch as it does not apprehend taste &c. Possession of odour exists therein inasmuch as, in its relation as percipient, it apprehends odours. In like manner the organ of smell is terrestrial, inasmuch as it reveals odour only among colour and the other qualities, just as clarified butter, &c. manifests the odour of saffron. By this inference it is established that earth is the material cause of the organ of smell. V

तथापस्तेजोवायुश्च रसरूपस्पर्शसिधेवात् ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 In like manner water, light and air, are [the material causes of the organs of taste sight, and touch] inasmuch as they have no difference from taste, colour, and touch

1 The words Are the material causes of the organs of taste, sight, and touch, are to be supplied. Water &c are respectively the material causes of the organs of taste &c inasmuch as they respectively apprehend those determinate objects. In these plurality is the condition of the determination. It has been declared that it is determination by possession of the particular qualities of apprehensible kind that is the proof of the possession of taste &c by the organs of taste &c. In like manner the organ of hearing is a part of ether essentially determined by the outer ear influenced by particular destiny. U

NINTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON

क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् प्रागस्तु ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 [An effect] is antecedently non-existent inasmuch as there is non-existence of assertion of actions and qualities

1 रसनक्षुप्टाग्निन्दियाद्या प्रकृतिरित्येव तेन यथासंख्य रसनादीनामथादय प्रकृतयः सत्प्रतिनिपतादृष्टादन्वात् अत्रापि नियमे भूयस्त्वमेव तन्मम रसादिमत्वे च रसनादीनां यादृज्जातीयविशेषगुणवत्यनियम इत्यत्र प्रमाद्यमित्युक्तम् इत्यत्र प्रिमिष्टादृष्टोपपत्तीतिरुक्तं प्रकृत्यधिकृतो नभोदेव इत्यत्रोक्तम् ॥

1 The words an effect are to be supplied. Antecedently, that is before the production of an effect, an effect or product, such as a water pot or piece of cloth, is non-existent, that is non-existent by self-determined negation during that time. The reason assigned is the absence of predication of actions and qualities. If the effect, the water pot &c., were existent during that time, it would be affirmed to possess actions and qualities, as in the case of a water pot already produced such affirmations are made as that the water pot is at rest, or in motion or seen to be coloured. There is no such assertion antecedent to its production. It is therefore inferred that it is during that time non-existent. While straws are in course of weaving or threads of joining or when clay is placed on the potter's wheel, while the work of the potter &c. is yet going on, there is a universally experienced sensitive cognition that there will be in that place a mat, or a piece of cloth or a water jar inasmuch as it is producing during the tension of the eyes. Herein a cognition constituted either by conjunction or by co-inherence could not be efficient, the presentation is therefore a possession of determinate-

1 कार्यमितिशेषः प्राप्तिरिति कार्यत्वत्वेन प्राप्त्यर्थे घटपटादि असत् तत्कालीनस्यैव नकाभायप्रतियोगीत्यर्थः अत्र हेतुक्रियामुक्त्यपदेशमावाप्त्यर्थे यदि तदानीमपि कार्यं घटादि सदैव स्यात् तदा क्रियावत्त्वेन गुणवत्त्वेन च व्यपदिश्येत घटोत्पत्तेः घटे तदस्ति पृथक् घटश्चलति रूपग्रानयं दृश्यत घट इत्यादिप्रकारेण व्यपदिश्यते न तद्योत्पत्तौ प्राप्तिरिति कार्यवत्त्वपदेशोक्तिः तेन गम्यत तदानीमसत्त्विति सच व्युत्पत्तमानेषु धोरणानु योज्यमानेषु तन्तुषु चाकटाया मटि कुन्तादिद्विधापारुषु अनुवर्तमानेषु भविष्यत्यत्र कट पटोघटायां च कार्यकारिका प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिः चतुर्विधकारणानन्तरं जायमानत्वात् नच सर्वो त्तममशयान्वतरादिता प्रत्यासक्तिरत्र प्रभवति तस्मादिदन्तिवसम्यक्प्रतिशेषणता प्रत्यास क्तिरत्र तत्त्वम मनु चान्वेन्याय्य सत्त्वा विशेषणताया तत्त्वतीति प्रतीतिः च विशेषण तां च विशेषणता हि तदुभयव्यक्तरूपमर्थ उपलब्धप्रत्ययजननयोग्यं तत्त्व प्रतीतिः पूर्वं मपि सदैव तदुक्त व्याख्यातिक समवायेभावाच्च विशेषणप्रतिशेष्यभावाच्च इति सत्तायां प्रा गभावाच्च प्रतियोगिजनक नहि घटे जात स एव घटस्तदानीमेवोत्पद्यते तत्र कारणान्तरस त्येव कारणवन्त्यमनुमिष्यमाण स्वप्रागभावाच्चैकत्वमंत्रानुमर्तुमर्हति तद्वदोत्पत्तेः स एव घट प्रतिग्रन्थक इति चर्त्तादि प्रतिग्रन्थकाभावात्त्वेन तस्य कारणवत्त्वमवर्जनोपपन्नं ननु यदि घट एव तस्याभावात्तदा घट नष्टे तदुभयजननापत्तिरिति चेन्न घटनाशस्यापि तद्विराधि स्वात् नहि विराधित्वकान्तापि विरोधनन्तरादुभावाच्च इति नवतन्वयोद्वेगकता विराधो येन मोत्याश्वत्ययम समानकालीनत्व म्यात् तर्हि कासकृतसत्तायाच कथमेककाभावास्यापि त्य भवेत् ॥

tions related to the sense organs. Such is the condition of such a cognitive act. If it be objected that we are arguing in a circle inasmuch as the cognition thereof depends on the determination and the determination on the cognition, we reply that such is not the case for the determination is the proper form of both the cognition and its object and is capable of producing a proximate assurance and this proper form has an existence antecedent to the cognition. It has accordingly been stated in the *Nyāya-vārtika* that in co-inherence, and in non-existence, there is a relation of cause and effect. This antecedent non-existence produces a non-existent, for when a water pot has been produced, that self same water pot is not then brought into existence for even if there exist therein another cause, an ensuing defect of the cause must follow the defect of its own anterior non-existence. If this self same water-pot is what prevents the production of that water pot, then its causality is inevitable by reason of the non-existence of anything which prevents. It may be urged that if there be in the water pot non-existence of the same then it follows that it will emerge when the water pot is destroyed. This we deny inasmuch as the very destruction of the water pot is repugnant thereto. For one of two contradictories cannot be manifested during the existence of the other contradictory. For between these two there is no repugnance effected by space : i.e. no exclusion that as in the case of the real natures of the cow and the horse there could be a simultaneity. How then could there be a repugnance effected by time and how could there be a synchronous existence? U

¹ This aphorism is stated as a basis for a description of perception of non-existence. An effect as a water pot and the like

¹ अभावाप्रत्यक्षमभिहितसुभूमिकामाह । घटादिकायै स्थित्यन्ते प्रागुक्त क्रियाया गुणस्य च व्यपदेशस्य व्यवहारस्याभावात् घटे जाते यथा घटस्तिष्ठति घटश्चलति घटश्चाम इत्यादिक्रियागुणव्यवहारो भवति पूर्वन्तु न तथा व्यवहार इत्यर्थः अतः सत्त्वा यथादे निरस्त इति घटात्यन्ते कृष्यै घटप्रागभावास्तिष्ठतीति सच्च प्रतिपोगिजनः कथं मन्यथा कारणान्तरमन्वे उत्पत्तय न पुनस्त्यादः इति दानो घटो भाव्यतीत्यादि प्रत्यक्षमपि प्रागभावे मानमिति ॥

non-existent previous to its production, inasmuch as there is non-existence of the assertion or expression of action and quality. There is antecedently no such expression of qualities and action, as there is after the pot is produced, as that the jar is at rest, or in motion, or that it is dark. Thus the doctrine of the pre-existence of effects in their causes is rejected. Previous, therefore, to the production of the water-jar, there is antecedent non-existence thereof and this produces a non-existent. Else how, when there exists another cause could there not be reproduction of the produced? A perception such as that there will presently exist a water-pot in this place, is a proof of antecedent non-existence. V

सदसत् ॥ २ ॥ *

Aph 2 The existent [becomes] non-existent

¹ It is stated that another non-existence is established by the force of perception. It is proved by perception and inference that an existent product such as a water-pot after the operation of a hammer &c. which destroys it, is now non-existent, in like manner as it is proved by perception and inference that an effect is, previous to the operation of its cause, non-existent. This mode of non-existence is commonly called destruction (or subsequent or emergent non-existence), for there are such cognitions as that a water-pot is destroyed, or that the letter ga previously heard is now no more. U

असत्तः क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादर्थान्तरम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 [Existence] is a thing distinct from non-existence, inasmuch as actions and qualities are not ascribed [to the non-existent]

¹ अथाकारणव्यापारान् पूर्वमेव सत्त्वानुमानाभ्यां कार्यस्यास्तत्त्वमभिधीते, तथा, किंन शक्यं मुद्रादेरव्यापारानन्तरं सदेव कार्यं घटादिं हृदानीमसदिति प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामेव प्रतीयते सत्त्वाप्रमाणां ध्वंस इति गीयते भवति हि घटो नष्टो ध्वस्त हृदानीं युतपूर्वा न कारो नास्तीत्यादिधीरिति भावः ॥

It may be objected that it is the water pot that under particular conditions produces the conventional notion of destruction but the destruction of the water pot is nothing else than the water-pot itself. The aphorism is therefore laid down. The word Existence is to be supplied. Existence then is a thing distinct from non-existence. If it be asked why it is stated that it is so because actions and qualities are not ascribed to the non-existent. For there are not employed during subsequent non-existence such phrases as The water pot exists. There is a water pot, The water pot is now possessed of colour. Bring the water pot. In consequence of this difference the existent is a thing different from the non-existent. U

सच्चासत् ॥ ४ ॥

Aph 4 The existent also is non-existent

Antecedent and subsequent non-existence being vindicated the present aphorism is laid down with the purpose of evincing reciprocal non-existence. When the words Is not are asserted of an existent water pot, there appears an absence of identity. For there are such cognitions as that a horse is not identical with a cow a cow is non-existent as a horse a piece of cloth is non-existent as a water pot a piece of cloth is not a water pot a cow is not a horse a horse is not a cow. There appears then in such a

ननु घट इत्याद्यस्याविद्येये ध्वस्यग्रहणं करोति ननु घटादन्यस्तस्य ध्वस इत्यत आह । सदिति सूत्रग्रथ असत् सत् अणान्तरं कुत इत्यत आह क्रियानुषण्यपदेशभावादिति नहि प्रध्वसभावोऽपि घतते घटः अस्ति घटः इदानीं कथं न घटः घटमानवेत्यादिव्यपदेशस्तदित्ता वैधर्म्यादसत् सदर्थान्तरमिति ॥

प्रागभावप्रत्यक्षे साधयित्वा न्यायान्याभाव साधयितुमाह । यत्र सदेव घटादि कदाचित् कदाचित्पि सत् कदाचित्पि अस्त्येति प्रतीकते भवति हि असत्प्रत्यक्षे कदाचित्पि असत्पि गौरवात्मना असत् घटो घटात्मना अघटः घटः अनश्यो गो अगौरवश्च इत्यादिप्रतीतिरिति तदस्यामश्वान्यायान्याभाववान् गो घटान्योन्याभाववान् घट इत्यन्यायान्याभाव एव तादात्म्याभावापरनामा भावते तदत्र तादात्म्यं प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकम् प्रतियोगिसमाना धिरुत्पाद्यावयवमात्रं भवति हि घटा न भूतत्वमिति प्रतीतिरिति नित्यञ्च कदाचिदपि घटपटयोस्तादात्म्यासम्भवात् ॥

cognition the fact that a cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse a water pot is reciprocally non-existent with a piece of cloth, and this reciprocal non-existence is otherwise designated absence of identity. The identity then in this case is essentially non-existent and this non-existence is in co-existent with the non-existent object, for there are such cognitions as that the water pot is not the ground on which it is placed. This non-existence is eternal for it is impossible that there could ever be identity between a water pot and a piece of cloth. U

प्रञ्चान्यदसदस्तदसत् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Whatever else, moreover, than these is non-existent in [absolutely] non-existent.

The fourth non-existence called absolute non-existence is here described. Whatever else than these that is than the three fore-mentioned non-existences is non-existent, that is in absolutely non-existent. The final and complete sense of the aphorism, therefore, is that the non-existence which is distinct from these three non-existences is absolute non-existence. Of these antecedent non-existence has a subsequent limit, subsequent non-existence has an anterior limit reciprocal non-existence in co-exists with that which is non-existent, but absolute non-existence differs from all the three and is therefore a fourth non-existence. U

That which is non-existent repugnant to existence, other than the three fore-mentioned non-existences is non-existent also

इदानीं चतुर्थमभायमत्यन्ताभावाख्यमाह । अतः पुनोक्तादभावाख्यादयदन्वदसत् तदसत् तदत्यन्तासत्त्वम् असदित्युभयत्र भावप्रधानानिर्देशं तत्रैकमसत्तदसत्त्वमसद्विधेयम् तथाचोक्ताभावात्रयमिदं योऽभावात् सोऽत्यन्ताभाव इति पर्यवस्येति तत्र प्रागभायस्य उच्यते प्रागभायस्य प्रथमस्य पूर्वार्थप्रथमस्य अन्वोन्वाभायस्य प्रतियोगित्तमानाधिकरणस्यमत्यन्ताभायस्य तु त्रितयप्रथमस्यचतुर्थार्थमभायम् ॥

अतः उक्तादभावत्रयादन्वदयत असत् भावमिदम् तदसत् अत्यन्तासत्त्व भावप्रधाननिर्देशोऽयम् अत्यन्ताभावाख्यमिति तु फलितार्थं अथवात्यन्ताभावस्तुरीयोऽभावः सनातनश्च प्रतियोगित्तत्वागभावात्तद्व्यासास्त्वय एवात्यन्ताभावस्य विराधिन रक्तघटे श्याम रूप नास्ति श्यामघटे र रूप नास्तीतिप्रतीतिश्च ध्वजश्यामभावाद्ययमा

lutely non-existent. That usually refers to the existent. The complete sense is that it is technically designated absolute non-existence. This absolute non-existence is the fourth non-existence and is eternal. There are three things repugnant to absolute non-existence: the object non-existent and its prior and posterior non-existences. According to the ancients the cognitions that dark colour does not exist in a red water pot and that red colour does not exist in a dark water pot are conversant about the subsequent and antecedent non-existences while the moderns have maintained that the subsequent and antecedent non-existences are not repugnant to absolute non-existence, and that consequently there may be absolute non-existence even during the time of subsequent non-existence. They (the moderns) hold that when a water pot &c previously removed is brought back to a place there is during the existence there of the water pot no notion of absolute non-existence of the water pot inasmuch as the time during which the water pot is there constitutes no connection with non-existence. Some have taught that when there has formerly stood in any place a water pot &c and this has been removed and brought back again there appears in this case a fourth kind of universal non-existence characterised by production and destruction and designated temporary non-existence and not absolute non-existence. V

असदिति भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावात् भूतस्मृतेर्विरोधिप्रत्यक्षवत् ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 [Perception] that a thing is non-existent results from non-existence of a past perception and reminiscence of the past like the perception of a repugnant object

हेते नान्यन्ताभावमिति प्राञ्च नान्यस्तु ध्यसप्रागभावेनान्यन्ताभावविरोधित्वमते
ध्यसादिकालाद्यच्छेदेनाप्यन्यन्ताभावा यतत एव यत्र भूतले पूर्वमपसरिते घटादिक पुन
रानोत तत्र घटकालस्याभावसम्यग्धाघटस्त्याद्धटसत्त्वकाल न घटात्यन्ताभावबुद्धिरि
त्याहु कश्चित् यत्र भूतले पूर्वे घटादिक स्थितमपसरिते पुनरानोतञ्च तत्रोत्पादवि
नाशशाली सामयिकनामा चतुर्थ ससर्गाभाव एव प्रतीयत नान्यन्ताभाव इत्याहु ॥

1 Another section is here commenced in which this aphorism is stated enouncing the apparatus of the perception* of emergent non existence. Cognition in the form of perception is implied by the particle *iti*. There is therefore a perceptive cognition that a water pot for instance is non-existent that a water pot has been destroyed or that a water pot is subsequently non-existent. This is exemplified by perception of the repugnant, there being as clear and distinct a perception of a repugnant (or at present non existent) water pot &c as of its subsequent non existence. The reason of this is non-existence of a past perception the absence that is to say of a past produced and destroyed water pot and the like. The experience is thus accounted for. The following hypothetical argument is confirmatory of this. If there were a water pot here it would be seen as the place is seen but it is not seen and consequently there is none. Another subsidiary is stated to be reminiscence of the past by which is meant recollection of a past and now non-existent water pot and the like the recollection of a thing non-existent. U

* The four kinds of non existence being analysed the perception of subsequent non-existence is analysed. Such percep

1 इदानीं प्रकरणान्तरमारभते तत्र प्रथमे सायत प्रत्यक्षसामयिमाह । असदितो तिकारेण प्रत्यक्षाकार ज्ञानमाह तत्रासन् घट नष्टो घट ध्वस्त इदानीं घट इति प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिरस्ति तत्र दृष्टान्ता विरोधिप्रत्यक्षवदिति विरोधिना घटादेर्यथा स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्ष तथा तत्प्रत्यक्षस्यापि तत्र कारणमाह भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावादिति भूतस्य उत्पन्नविनाशस्य घटादे प्रत्यक्षाभावात् एतन् दाय्यानुपसंख्यमाह तत्र चापि तर्कं सृष्टकारी यद्यत्र घटा अभिष्यत् भूतलमियादस्य न च दृश्यते तस्मादास्तीति सहकार्यन्तरमाह भूतस्मरतिरिति भूतस्य प्रातर्वागिष्यागिनाघटादे स्मृतेरिति प्रातर्वागस्मरणमुक्तम् ॥

2 अभावचतुष्टयं व्युत्पाद्य ध्वंसप्रत्यक्षं व्युत्पादयति । असदात्तं असन् घटं नष्टो घट ध्वस्ता घट इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं विरोधिप्रत्यक्षवत् प्रतिपाद्यघटप्रत्यक्षवत् अनुभवासिद्धं सौमिकसंचिक्रपञ्चमञ्चेत्यर्थं तत्र च प्रतिपाद्यप्रत्यक्षं चतुरादिसंयोगजन्यं ध्वंसप्रत्यक्षं चतुरादिसंयुक्तविशेषणज्ञानमिति विशेषः अपरमपि विशेषमाह भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावादिति भूतस्य अतीतस्य प्रतिपाद्यिना घटादे प्रत्यक्षस्याभावादाय्यानुपसंख्यमाह कारणात् भूतस्य अतीतघटादे स्मृत स्मरणरूपकानि प्रतिपाद्यिज्ञानाच्च व्यापमानमिति पूरणीयम् तथाच ध्वंसप्रत्यक्षं प्रतिपाद्यनुपसंख्यजन्यं प्रतिपाद्यिज्ञानजन्यञ्च प्रतिपाद्यप्रत्यक्षं न तथा इत्यादि विशेष इतिभावः अत्र स्मृतिस्वभावविकल्पितं ज्ञानमज्ञानं विपर्ययमिति मन्तव्यम् । एतच्च घटादया यथा प्रत्यक्षसिद्धास्तथा तत्त्वस्य अपोति भावः ॥

tions as that a thing is non-existent, a water-pot is non-existent, a water pot is destroyed & a water-pot has ceased to be, are like the perception of the repugnant, that is like the perception of a not now existing water-pot given by experience or produced by ordinary contact (of subject and object). Of these, perception of an object non-existent is produced by conjunction with the eye &c., while perception of emergent non-existence is produced by determination related to the eye &c. Such is one difference, another is stated to be that the perception of subsequent non-existence results from non-existence of past perception that is from a cause in the form of possible non-apprehension consequent on non-existence of perception of a past foregone now non-existent water-pot, and also from a reminiscence of a past water-pot &c. that is from a cognition, which is a recollection, of a non-existent object. The perception, therefore, of subsequent non-existence is produced by non-apprehension of a non-existent object and by knowledge of a non-existent object, but the perception of a non-existent object is not so, there being a difference V

तथा ऽभावे भावप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 Likewise also from perception of existence in non-existence.

The word non-existence, through expressive of non-existence in general is ascertained from the context to denote antecedent non-existence or potential existence. There is then a perceptive knowledge of antecedent non-existence as there is of emergent non-existence. Why? Because there is a perception of existence, a perception of the straws in course of weaving (into a mat,

१ सामान्यद्वयार्थमभायशब्दः प्रकरणात् प्रागभायपरं यथा प्रथमे प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने तथा प्रागभायेऽपि कृतं भावप्रत्यक्षत्वात् भावस्य व्युत्पत्त्यमानयोक्त्यादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण विषयोक्तियमाणत्वात् यद्वा भावस्याधिवरणस्य प्रतिषेधिनश्च प्रत्यक्षत्वात् योग्यस्यादित्यर्थः संसर्गाभायप्रदेशिकरणयोग्यतायाः प्रतिषेधिनोऽप्युक्त्यायाश्च तन्त्रत्यातः चकारात् प्रतिषेधिस्मरणमुक्तञ्च तत्रैव समुच्चिनोति अनादेरेऽपि प्रागभायस्यानन्तत्वापि प्रथमस्यावस्थाविशेषमात्रे प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ॥

which is potentially existent in them) these being made the object of perception Or it may mean that the perception of antecedent non existence results from the perception or perceptibility of existence that is of the substratum and the object therein non existent since perceptibility of the substratum and of the object non existent is the condition of apprehension of general non-existence The particle also implies recollection of the absent non existent object and the hypothetical reasoning aforesaid Antecedent non existence without beginning also and emergent non existence without end are perceptible only under particular circumstances U

¹ There being a restriction of the general term non existence to antecedent non existence so is there also of perception There is a perceptive knowledge of antecedent as of subsequent non-existence by means of experience rendered possible by apposition of the sense-organ and its object and of knowledge of the non-existent It may be asked Inasmuch as antecedent non existence has no beginning how is it that there is no perception of it long before the production of conjunction of the two halves of a water jar &c. the forementioned causes of such perception being possible at that time also ? It is therefore stated that such perception results from perception of existence The affix *ghan* (in the word *bhava*, 'existence') denotes the material cause the source of being Existence is the ultimate sum of conditions or causal apparatus and that only is perceptible which is perceptible thereby, inasmuch as it must be manifested by the ultimate causal apparatus Such is the resultant meaning of the aphorism It is to be considered that

¹ अभावे प्रागभावे सामान्यवचनशब्दस्य विशेषणत्वात् तथा प्रत्यक्षं यथा ध्वनि इन्द्रियसचिर्कर्मयोग्यनुपलब्धिप्रतियोगिज्ञाने प्रत्यक्ष जायते तथा प्रागभावेऽपीत्यर्थः । ननु प्रागभावास्यानादित्यात् कषासादिसंयोगजननादतिपूर्वमपि कथं न प्रागभावास्य प्रत्यक्षमुक्तानां कारणानां तदानीमपि सम्मत्वादित्यत आह । भावप्रत्यक्षत्वादिति भवत्यस्मादित्युपादाने यत्र भावप्रत्यक्षत्वात्कालावस्थां तेन प्रवृत्तं सत्यं तत्त्वज्ञानं कारणकारणानुपपत्तिरिति ह्येत्यादिति फलितार्थः तथाचोक्तस्यल्लक्षणकारणसामान्यभावाच्चप्रागभावाप्रत्यक्षमिति भावः अतीन्द्रियस्य चाप्यादि प्रागभावास्य प्रत्यक्षकारणत्वाच्चकारस्तत्र च प्रतियोगियोग्यस्य सुविज्ञतमिति मन्तव्यम् ॥

the particle also is added to prevent the supposition of perception of supersensible antecedent non-existence of air &c , and that perceptibility as an absent object is thereby additionally implied V.

एतेनाद्यदोऽ गौरधर्मश्च व्याख्यातः ॥ ८ ॥

-Aph 8 Hereby are explained the negations not a water-pot, not a cow, and demerit

1 The perceptibility of reciprocal non-existence, is declared The word Hereby suggests recollection of the absent object, apprehension of the substratum (or site of the absent object), and the forementioned hypothetical reasoning : Non-observation of the perceptible is common to all these cases, the particle and implying the aforesaid addition By the word demerit, while the perceptibility of reciprocal non existence of merit, though supersensible, in its substratum or site, knowledge, pleasure &c is affirmed, it is at the same time declared that perceptibility of the absent object ■ not a condition of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence, and thus it is suggested that the perceptibility of the substratum (or site of the absent object) is the only requisite of such apprehension How else could there be apprehended reci-

1 अन्योन्याभासस्य प्रत्यक्षतामाह । एतेनेति प्रतियोगिस्मरणाधिकरणायवहणप्रागुक्त तर्कानतिदिशति योग्यानुपलम्भः सर्वत्र समानं चकार उक्तसमुच्चयार्थः अधर्म इत्यतीन्द्रियस्यापि धर्मस्य सुखज्ञानादायधिकरणेन्योन्याभासस्य प्रत्यक्षता घटन अन्योन्याभासस्य प्रतियोगियोग्यता न तन्त्र किन्त्वधिकरणयोग्यतामात्रं तन्त्रमित्युपदर्शयति कथमन्यथा स्तम्भः पिशाचो न भवतीति पिशाचान्योन्याभावः स्तम्भे दृश्यते स्तम्भात्मतया पिशाचानुपलम्भस्य तदन्योन्याभासप्राप्तकत्वात् तस्याप्यनुपलम्भस्य प्रतियोगिसत्यविरोधित्वात् स्तम्भे पिशाचतादात्म्ये सत्यनुपलम्भानुपपत्तेः । ननु पिशाचतादात्म्यमिदं न प्रतियोगि किन्त्विति पिशाचः नृच स्तम्भे वर्तमानोऽपि मुख्यप्रचोपनभ्यते इति तदनुपलम्भः प्रति योगिसत्यविरोधी न भवतीति चेन्न प्रतियोग्यनुपलम्भस्य प्रतियोगिताप्रच्छेदकानुपलम्भस्याप्यभासपदकारणत्वात् ननु प्रतियोगित्वग्रहाधीनान्योन्याभासपदः प्रतियोगित्वस्यान्योन्याभासविरहात्मत्वं तत्रान्योन्याभासपदग्रहाधीनं स्थान्योन्याभासपद इति चेदाधिकरणादुक्तित्वेन ज्ञापमानो धर्मः यद्यप्रतियोगिताप्रच्छेदको ननु प्रतियोगिताप्रच्छेदकस्य नापि तदपहस्तन्त्रमित्युक्तत्वात् ॥

procal negation of a fiend in a post, when it is recognised that that a post is not a fiend? For since non-apprehension of the fiend as identical with the post, causes apprehension of their reciprocal non existence and since that same non-apprehension is repugnant to the existence of the absent object it would be impossible were the post identical with a fiend, that there should be such non-apprehension. It may be argued Identity with a fiend is not in this instance the absent object, may it then be the fiend? and supposing him though being in the post, to be, like its gravity, not apprehended, then the non apprehension of him will not be repugnant to the existence of the absent object. We reply that this argument is invalid, for non perception of that of which the essential characteristic is the being an absent object is like non observation of the absent object, a cause of apprehension of non existence. If it be urged that reciprocal non-existence depends on the apprehension of the absence of an object, that absence of an object (or the state of an object which is non-existent) is identity with exemption from reciprocal non existence, we reply that this is not the case for it is an attribute which is cognised as non-existent in any given substratum that has for its essential characteristic the nature of being an absent object but the condition of the perception of that attribute is not the having for its essential characteristic the nature of being an absent object. U

¹ The recognition of reciprocal non existence the form of

¹ अथ च घट शरीरस्य च धर्मं मुख्यमित्याद्याकारकैरन्योन्याभावाप्रत्ययैर्विधत्ते न प्रत्ययसागभावाप्रत्ययरूपेणैव व्याख्यातं कथितं इति समुदितार्थं तथाचान्योन्याभावस्य स्वत्वेऽपि इन्द्रियसम्यग्दिविषयवृत्ता प्रतियोगिव्यनुपपन्नस्य प्रतियोगिज्ञानभ्रमेतानि कारणानि इवानु परं विधेयो यत् ससर्गाभावस्य प्रतियोगिविषयत्व सन्धस्य चान्योन्याभावस्य स्वधि कारणवैयर्थ्यमिति धर्मस्यातोन्द्रियस्त्वेऽपि मुखादि योग्याधिकरणे तदन्योन्याभावस्य प्रत्यय निरावाधमेवेति यत् ससर्गाभावस्य प्रतियोग्याधिकरणोभयवैयर्थ्यत्व सन्धमिति किञ्चिदुक्तं तच्च समीचीनं तथा सति पादाद्ये शरीरभावाप्रत्ययगुहे तिक्ताभावस्य चाप्ये क्यभावाप्रत्यय आकाशे स्वर्गभावस्य शब्दाभावस्य च प्रत्ययानुपपत्तेस्तत्तदधिकरणानां तत्तदिन्द्रियावैयर्थ्यात् यतएव स्वकर्तव्यकालविशेषवत्तया चायुस्वर्गनाशप्रत्ययस्य प्रत्ययधर्मिणो स्वीकृतमिति संक्षेपः ॥

which recognition is such as that a piece of cloth is not a water-pot, a horse is not a cow, pleasure is not demerit has been already explained by the description of the perception of emergent and of antecedent non existence. Such is the sense of the aphorism as a whole. The causes then of the apprehension of reciprocal non existence are possession of characters in relation with the sense organs, non observation of the absent object and cognition of the absent object. The greatest difference is that the perceptibility of the absent object is the condition of apprehension of general non existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non existence. Thus though merit be a supersensible thing there is no impossibility in perceiving its reciprocal non existence in pleasure &c its sensible substratum. Whereas some have taught that perceptibility of both the absent object and its substratum or site is requisite to the apprehension of general non existence this is untrue inasmuch as were this the case the perception of non existence of fragrance in a stone of non existence of bitterness in treacle of non existence of colour in air and of non existence of touch and sound in ether would be impossible since the respective substrata are not perceptible to the several sense-organs. It was from this consideration that Paksha dhara Misra maintained the perception of the destruction or cessation of the touch of the air characterised by time conjunct with the skin (the organ of touch) V

अभूत नास्तीत्यनघान्तरम ॥ ६ ॥

Aph D [The negation] Is not designates nought else than that which has not been

1 The recognition that what has been no longer is reposes upon emergent non-existence and is not conversant about the

1 भूतमिदानीं नास्तीति प्रतीतिरधोऽसमाप्तमयते भूतस्य नान्तिरिति निन्दते नास्तीतिमात्रेणैव निन्दितो प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिरत्यन्ताभायमानमयते अभूतमित्युत्पादयिनाशानामयनस्य द्योतयति अनघान्तरमपि तदभिप्रायकमेव यथा जन एवियेत्येव नास्ति एषि

having been, while the recognition by perception simply that such and such a thing is not, rests upon absolute non existence. The expression that which has not been points out independence of production and destruction. Designating nought else means purporting that only. For example There exists not in water terrestriality. There exists not in earth aqueousness for if there existed terrestriality in that whereof the particles are aqueous it would be observed, whereas it is not observed, wherefore it is not,—a reference to such arguments is to be observed in this aphorism. Thus we must hold that there is non existence of an object where such object will never be and has never been. The recognition that an object is not relates to the substratum and is the support of emergent and antecedent non-existence, of that which has been and will be therein. Hence it is that this absolute non-existence is designated as of eternal time U

नास्ति घटो गेहे इति सतो घटस्य गेहसमर्पणप्रतिषेध ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 [The proposition] that there is not a water pot in a house is a negation of connection between an existent water-pot and the house

1 It may be urged that non-existence of a water pot, in any given house is not absolute non existence inasmuch as a water pot exists sometimes there, nor is it antecedent or emergent non-existence, inasmuch as these reside only in material causes, nor is it absolute non existence characterised as production and destruction,

एषा ॥ अस्तित्वमिति यदि हि कलावर्णविनि एवित्येत्य स्यात् उपलभ्येत न चोपलभ्येत तस्माच्चास्तीति तर्कपुरस्काराच्चापि द्रष्टव्यम् । एवञ्च यद्वस्तु यत्र ॥ कदाचित् भविष्यति न च कदाचित् भूतं तस्य वस्तुनस्तत्रास्त्यन्ताभावो भवत्य । भूतभविष्यतोश्च तत्र प्रथम प्रागभावसम्बन्धेन एव तत्राधिकरणे नास्तीति प्रत्ययः । अतएवायमात्यन्तिकस्त्वैकालिक इत्यभिधीयते ॥

1 ननु गेहे घटाभावो नात्यन्ताभावः कदाचित् तत्र घटसत्त्वात् नापि प्रागभावश्च स तयोः समवायिकारणमात्रवृत्तित्वात् नाप्युत्पादविनाशश्रीलाभ्यन्ताभाव एव आत्यन्तिकश्चात्पादविनाशश्रीलाभेति विरोधात् नापि चतुर्थे ह्ययं सतर्गाभावः तस्य त्रैविध्यविभागाद्यापातादित्यत आह ॥

since there is a contradiction between the absolute and that which comes into being and ceases to be, nor is this the fourth kind of non existence general non existence inasmuch as that is repugnant to the threefold division Accordingly this aphorism is stated U

आत्मन्यात्ममनसोः सयोगविशेषादात्मप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 Perception of the soul [results] from a particular conjunction between the soul and the internal organ in the soul

1 Common perception of existence and non existence having been described, another section is commenced with the purpose of describing the perception of ascetics The words cognition as produced, are to be supplied. Ascetics are of two kinds, those who have meditated on the internal organ and are called united and those who have not meditated on the internal organ and are called disunited Of these the united having reverently fixed their mind on the object to be presented to it are engaged in meditation, and in them cognition of soul whether of their own soul or of that of others, is produced Perception of soul is that cognition wherein the soul is the percept or object of presentation Although there is in ourselves and others occasionally a cognition of spirit, this being obscured by nescience has been declared to be virtually non existent From a particular conjunction between the soul and the internal organ means from that particular contiguity between the soul and the internal organ which is the mental state produced by union [with infinite spirit] U

1 तदेव भावाभाप्रतिषेधं सौमिकप्रत्यक्षं निरूप्य योगिप्रत्यक्षं निरूपयितुं प्रकरणा-
नारमारभते । ज्ञानमुपपद्यते इति शेषः द्विविधास्तत्र योगिनः समाहितान्तराणां ये युक्ता
इत्यभिधीयन्ते अगमाहितान्तराणाञ्च ये वियुक्ता इत्यभिधीयन्ते तत्र युक्ता साक्षात्
कर्तव्ये यन्मुन्यादरेण मनो निधाय निदिध्यासनयन्त तेषामात्मनि स्यात्समि परात्मनि
य ज्ञानमुपपद्यते आत्मप्रत्यक्षमिति आत्मा प्रत्यक्षं साक्षात्कारविशेषो तत्र ज्ञाने तत्तथा
यद्यप्यस्मदादीनामपि कदाचिदात्मज्ञानमस्ति तथाप्यविद्यातिरस्कृतत्वात् तदसत्त्वस्य
मित्युक्तमात्रमात्रं सचिद्विद्येशादिति योगप्रधानमुपपद्यते आत्ममनसोः सविन्द्वे वि-
शेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥

तथा द्रव्यान्तरेषु प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Lakewise perception of other substances

' It might be asked how, if the knowledge of those who are united be of the soul only, they can possess omniscience. Accordingly the aphorism is stated The words Cognition produced are implied by the nature of the topic. There is, therefore, by means of the internal organ accompanied with the merit acquired by asceticism perception of other substances, that is, of the four atomic substances, of the internal organ air, space, time and ether. The term substance comprehends the qualities, actions, and universal entities residing in substance, the category of particularity, co inherence, gravity, elasticity &c residing in perception, and spontaneous activity, indiscriminative mental retenta, merit and demerit residing in the soul. For the possession of the merit produced by asceticism is equivalent to a perceptive apparatus, otherwise omniscience would not be affirmed of those ascetics who are said to be united. U

असमाहितान्त करणा उपपन्नसमाधयस्तेषाञ्च ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 In those also whose internal organ is not meditative, and in those whose meditation is consummated [there is perception of soul &c.]

* Those whose internal organ is not meditative, are those whose inner sense is destitute of meditation, and they whose me-

१ तत किमात्मन्येव युक्तानां ज्ञानं तत् कुत सार्वज्ञ्यमित्यत आह । ज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति प्रकरणायातमं तर्चेति योगजधर्मानुग्रहीनेव मनसा द्रव्यान्तरेषु चतुष्टयगुणेषु मनसि दायुदिककालाकाशेषु द्रव्यपदेन तद्गतगुणकर्मसामान्यानां विशेषपदार्थस्य समवायस्य प्रत्यक्षगतस्यापि गुरुत्वस्थितिसंज्ञादेरात्मगतस्यापि जीवन्वयोनिरवधिनिर्विकल्पकभावना धर्माधर्मादेः सप्रदं सामग्री योगजधर्माप्यग्रहस्य तुल्यत्वं च न्यया सार्वज्ञ्यमुक्तं न भवेत् ॥

२ असमाहितान्त करणा असमाहितं समाधिरहितं अन्त करणं येषां ते तथा उपपन्नं समापितं सफलकृतं समाधिर्यस्ते समाधेः फलवियिधां सिद्धयस्तां येषामुत्पन्नास्तादृशा ये युक्तास्तेषामपि आत्मनाम अन्येषां द्रव्याणाञ्च प्रत्यक्षं भवतीति स मुदितार्थं युज्ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षे ध्यानापेक्षा युक्तस्य प्रत्यक्षे तु ध्यानात्मकसमाधयेषां नास्तीति भावः ॥

ditation is consummated, perfected or rendered fruitful, in whom are produced the various perfections which are the fruit of meditation attain perception of souls and other substances. Such is the sense to be gathered from the aphorism. In fine the ascetic who is in course of union requires contemplation, while he who is united has no need of meditation which is identical with contemplation. V

तत्समग्रायात् कर्मगुणेषु ॥ १४ ॥

Aph 14 [Perception] of actions and qualities [arises] from co-inherence therein

It might be urged that omniscience is not possible in an ascetic for though there be perception of substances there is no such cognition of qualities and actions. To this the reply is furnished. From co-inherence therein, that is in conjunction with the internal organ assisted by merit acquired by asceticism there is produced in the ascetic, whether in course of union or united the perception of qualities and actions. For the efficacy of the merit acquired by asceticism is inconceivable. By the power thereof the sage Agastya drank up the ocean, Surabhi assumed a multitude of bodies and Vasistha discovered the curse of Dilipa by Surabhi. The production therefore by merit acquired by asceticism, of presentation of all the categories is not impossible. The term actions and qualities involves more and universality &c. is to be understood. In a like manner we are to understand perception effected by supersensual cognition in the form of general implication, and implication of cognition. V

ननु द्रव्य सा प्रत्यक्षस्यैवेति सर्वज्ञस्य योगिनोऽनुपपन्नमेव गुणादीनामज्ञानादत आह । तस्य योगजधर्मसद्वृत्तमनस्येव योगस्य समवायात् पुनरुपज्ज्ञानयोः कर्मसु गुणेषु च प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते इत्यर्थः अचिन्त्यादिह योगजधर्मप्रभावः यद्वृत्तेनागस्त्यमुनिः पारायार पयो सोमरिषच कापय्यहं परिग्रहीतवान् यजिष्ठश्च दिलोपस्य सुरभिषा च ज्ञातवान् तस्य योगजधर्मस्य यदीयसायंसाक्षात्कारसम्पादने नामभायनीयमिति कर्मगुणेत्युपलक्ष्य सा मान्यादिकमपि बोध्यम् एव सामान्यतत्त्वज्ञानतत्त्वज्ञानरूपानौकिकप्रत्यासत्तिजन्य प्रत्यक्षमप्युचनीयम् ॥

आत्मसमवायादात्मगुणेषु ॥ १५ ॥

Aph 15 [Perception] of the attributes of the soul [arises] from co inherence in soul

' This aphorism is stated inasmuch as it might be asked whether ascetics have not also the common perception. The conclusion gathered is that there arises in ascetics also the common perception of the attributes of the soul that is, of pleasure and the other attributes which reside in the soul from co inherence in soul that is from co inherence in the soul conjoined with the internal organ, being accomplished by that as its instrument. V

SECOND DAILY LESSON

अस्येद कार्ये कारण सयोगि त्रिरधि समवायि चेति लैङ्गिकम् ॥ १७ ॥

Aph 1 Inferential cognition is that one thing is the effect or cause of conjunct with repugnant to or co inherent in another

' In the preceding daily lesson the perception of ascetics and of non ascetics was described according to its cause its nature and its characteristic. Assurance having been formerly divided into perceptive and inferential the description of inferential assurance is here commenced. The term cognition is to be supplied, being the subject treated of. Inferential knowledge is that which is produced from a mark or middle term. The mark is that attribute of the subject of the conclusion which is characterised by pervasion. Pervasion is said to exist therein. The subject is that wherein there is non existence of assurance repugnant to that which there is desire to prove. Such a surance is proof and disproof for the minor term is that wherein there is non existence of both proof and

१ तम् किं योगिना लैङ्गिकप्रत्यक्षं न भवतीत्यत आह । आत्मसमवायात् मन संयुक्तात्मसमवायान् आत्मगुणेषु स्वात्मवृत्तिमुखादिगुणेषु योगिना लैङ्गिकमपि प्रत्यक्षं भवति तन्मामया धृतत्वादिति समुदितनिष्कर्षः ॥

२ तदेव पूर्वाह्निके योगिप्रत्यक्षमयोगिप्रत्यक्षञ्च कारणतः स्वरूपतो लवणतश्च निरूपितम् प्रमाणा द्वितीयं प्रत्यक्षं लैङ्गिकञ्चेति यद्विभक्तं तत्र लैङ्गिकमिदानीं निरूपयितुं प्रक्रमते । ज्ञानमिति प्रकृतम् निष्ठाज्जातं लैङ्गिकं व्याप्तिविशिष्टं पक्षधर्मा लिङ्गम् तत्र

disproof For where there exists probative or disprobative assurance, no one feels uncertainty or desire of demonstration The ancients therefore defined the subject of the question to be an object possessing the attributes of the predicate uncertainly, or an object the possession whereby of the attributes of the major is required to be proved According to Jivanātha Miśra the subject is that wherein there is non-existence of probation obstructive to the genesis of doubt terminable by decision of the possible comprehension of the major Some hold that the subject is that wherein there is non-existence of demonstrative evidence backed by absence of desire of proof According to this doctrine the nature of a subject would exist even in the case of repugnancy This then may be seen in

व्यातिरक्ता यत्सिद्धाधिपियाविरोधिप्रमाणभाजो यत्र स त प्रति पक्षं तद्वय प्रमाण
साधक साधकश्च तदुभयाभावयत पक्षत्वात् नहि साधके बाधके वा प्रमाणे सति क
सचित् सद्यः सिद्धाधिपिया वा अतएव सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्मा धर्मा सिद्धाधिपियाध्यधर्मा
धर्मा वा पक्ष इति प्राञ्च उपाद्यसाध्यवतानिर्णयनिवृत्त्यसंशयोत्पत्तिप्रतिषेधकमानस्या
पक्षिवाभायो यत्र स पक्ष इति ज्ञेयनायमिषा सिद्धाधिपियाविरुद्धसंशङ्कतसाधकमाना
भावो यत्र स पक्ष इति केचित् इतन्मते बाधस्थलेऽपि यवता तदेतदनुमानमपूर्वे दृष्ट
व्यम तदेतस्य पक्षस्य धर्मानिर्द्भमित्युक्त भवति लिङ्गञ्च दृष्टमनुमित भुत वा यदनुमय
रूप ज्ञान जनयति तल्लिङ्गक तदुक्तम् अनुमेयेन सम्यक् प्रसिद्धञ्च तदन्विते । तदभावे
तु नास्त्येव तल्लिङ्गमनुमायकम् । इति यत्नेन लिङ्गमेवानुमितिकरणं भुत तस्य परामर्शं
तस्य निर्व्यापारत्येनाकरणात्वात् लिङ्गस्य तु एव व्यापार यत्र भूमादेरतीतत्यमनागतत्व
या तत्र कथमनुमितिरिति चेन्न साध्यस्याप्यतीतानागतत्वगोस्तत्रानुमानात् तत्रैव प्रति
बन्धात् अतीतत्वमनागतत्व वर्तमानत्वञ्च भूमादेर्वै न निश्चित तत्र कथमनुमिति
रिति चेत् न कथञ्चित् तत्र साध्येस्यापि सन्देहात् पूर्वापरदिनयो सत्यनिश्चये मध्य
दिने तु सन्देहे कथमनुमितिरिति चेत् तद्विनाशच्छिन्नभूमादिना तद्विनाशच्छिन्नव्यापारे
नुमानात् तथैव व्याप्त कारणात्वावधारणात् भूतोपलब्धत्वात् कथं भूमभमादनुमितिरिति
चेत् व्याप्तत्वेन सातत्येन लिङ्गत्वात् ज्ञानस्य च याथाव्यायाचार्याभ्यामनुमितस्तद्रूप्यात्
अन्यथा तथापि कथं तत्र परामर्शं करणं स्यात् अतीन्द्रियलिङ्गस्यैव परामर्शस्य तदजन्य
तथा कथं तद्रूपारत्यमिति चेत् तत्सन्तानिर्द्भकत्वरूपमिच्छाधनतायास्तत्र व्यापा
रत्वघटकत्वात् अन्यथा समवायस्य यथाव्यापारत्वानुपपत्तेरिति कार्योल्लिङ्गात् भूमा
लोकादेरन्यादनुमानं कारणादपि यथा व्योमरस्य भेरीदयस्संयोगविशेषात् शब्दानुमा
नम् यथा वा धर्मिणस्य यथाविधियागसानाद्यनुष्ठानात्तदर्थसंयोगादनुमानम् यथाविधिका
रीयाद्यनुष्ठानाद्वा यथानुमानम् यथा पुष्पनद्यादौ खन्यमानप्रवाहाद्वा जलनिःसरणानु
मानम् उपरि दृष्टिदर्शनाद्वा नदीव्यूहानुमानम् सचाप कार्यकारणभाजनक्षय एकसम्यन्ध
प्रकारद्वयेनाक्त सयोगिन शरीरस्य दर्शनात्यगिन्द्रियानुमानम् विरोधिने यिस्फूर्जता चंदे
शंशाज्जाटाद्यन्तरितानुकुलानुमानम् समवायिना जलोपस्थेन तत्सम्यद्वर्ततेजोऽन्यात् ॥

the Anumāna-mayūkha. The attribute of this subject is called the mark or argument. The mark is that which being seen, inferred, or heard, produces cognition, other than memory, and this cognition is inferential. Hence it has been said : That which is connected with the inferrible, and which is generally known as in the concomitant, but in the absence thereof, there is no illative argument. It is, therefore the mark which is the instrument of illation, not the sumption, inasmuch as that not having the function, cannot be an instrument, whereas this function belongs to the mark or argument.

If it be asked how, where smoke &c. the argument is past or future, there can be illation; we reply that this is no valid objection as in this case we infer that the designate of the predicate of the conclusion also as past or future. If it be asked how there can be illation where, in consequence of an impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke &c., be past, future or present, we admit that there can in no wise be such illation inasmuch as there is uncertainty in such an instance also as to the major. If it be asked how an illation can take place where there is certainty as to a previous and a following day, and uncertainty as to the intermediate day, we reply, that it results from inferring the existence of fire &c., limited to those days from smoke &c. limited to those days in consequence of observing such causality in the pervasion or invariable concomitance asserted in the sumption. If it be asked how illation results from a column of dust mistaken for smoke, we reply that it is because that which is understood to be pervaded (i. e. the column of dust supposed to be smoke and therefore pervaded by fire), is the mark or middle term, and because the inference is correct or incorrect according to the correctness or incorrectness of such experience (the logical, not involving the material, truth), else how should your own sumption be the instrument in such a case? If it be asked how in the case of a supersensible mark, the sumption not being pro-

ducible thereby the mark can have such a function, we reply that it is because the existence of a practical argument demonstrative of the reality thereof effects the function in such an instance, else it would not be possible that there should exist in hearing &c, the function of co-inherence.

Inference results from a mark which is an effect as the inference of fire &c from smoke light &c, also from a mark which is a cause as where a deaf man infers a sound from a particular conjunction of a drum with the drumstick, or where a righteous man infers merit paradise &c from the due performance of sacrifice, ablution &c, or where rain is inferred from the due performance of a sacrifice in which the fruit of the *Cipparis Aphylla* is employed, or where the efflux of water is inferred from a channel which men are digging out from a river full of water or the inference of the rising of a stream from the observation of rain overhead. This single connection then characterised as the relation of cause and effect has been stated in two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as inference of the organ of touch from observation of an animal body. Inference from a repugnant object is such as inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes &c from observation of an excited snake. Inference from a co-inferent object is such as the inference of fire connected with water from the heat of the water. U

अस्यैव कार्यकारणमन्यथावायथाद्वयमिति ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 That one thing belongs to another the connection of cause and effect arises from a portion

¹ This aphorism is stated to meet the objection that this distribution of millie terms is inexhaustive, since it does not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of the moon the rise of Canopus from the tranquillity of the waters the

¹ अन्यथापकारमिदं परिगृह्यमाणं नहि चन्द्रोदयेन समुद्रवृद्धेः लवणसादेनाप्यस्योदयाय समुद्रवृद्ध्यामेव चन्द्रोदयस्य समुद्रवृद्धयस्योदयनापरसमुद्रवृद्धयस्यैव लवणसादस्यैव

rising of the moon from the expansion of the Nymphs the setting of fourteen of the lunar mansions from the rising of the other fourteen, of colour from taste or of a particular taste from a particular colour The words That one thing belongs to another express the cause, the meaning being that this fire &c. to be inferred, belongs to this smoke &c the inferential mark, or that this pervaded smoke &c belongs to this pervading fire &c It is therefore, the observation of pervasion generally that is the condition of illation, not the relation of cause and effect &c The words The connection of cause and effect are added lest it might be objected that the enumeration in the preceding aphorism is consequently irregular, and by these the other connections also are implied The term connection has a subjective implication, and therefore

रूपस्य रूपविशेषेण वा रसत्रिगुणेष्वनुमानमनेन सद्यदते इत्यत आह । अस्वेष्टमित्येता-
 द्देव प्रयोजक भवतीति अस्य साधनस्य धूमादेरिदं साध्यं यद्वादि यद्वाऽस्य व्यापकस्य
 धूमादेरिदं व्याप्य धूमादि तथाच व्याप्यत्वपदमात्रं तन्त्र ननु कार्यकारणभावादिरपि
 ननु पूर्वसूत्रे तर्हि परिसङ्ख्यानमतन्त्रमत आह कार्यकारणसम्यग् इति अनेन चेत्त
 सम्यग्ध्यानारम्भपुनस्तद्वति सम्यग्व्यवदे च विवक्षितवशा तेन सम्यग् इति सम्यग्व्योप
 न्यास इत्यर्थः । कुनस्तदुपन्यासइत्यत आह अथप्रात एकदेशात् उदाहरणमात्रात् इय
 दलोपे पञ्चमी तेनोदाहरणमनुकथ्य कार्यकारणभावादे सम्यग्व्यवस्थोपन्यास इह दर्शने
 साङ्ख्यादिदर्शने च भवतीत्यर्थः । एवञ्च स्वाभाविकसम्यग्ध्यानासित्य व्याप्यत्वम स्वा
 भाविकत्वञ्चानोपादिकत्वम तस्य प्रत्यक्षाया केषाञ्चित् साध्याव्यापकत्वनिरूपकत्वे के
 प्राप्तिवत् साधनव्यापकत्वनिश्चयादेवानुपाधित्य हेतुम् अतीन्द्रियायाञ्च प्रमायसिद्धाना
 केषाञ्चिदुभयव्यापकत्वम उभयव्यापकत्व साधनमात्रव्यापकत्व साध्यमात्रव्यापकत्वं वा
 तत्राद्ये साधनव्यापकत्वात् द्वितीये साध्याव्यापकत्वात् चतुर्थेऽपि साधनव्यापकत्वादेवा
 नुपाधित्य निश्चेष्टम् । तच्चानुमान द्वित्रिध स्वापे परार्थञ्च तत्र इयं च स्वयमेव व्याप्तिप
 क्षधर्मतापारनुसर्णात् परार्थञ्च परादीरितन्यापकत्वव्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानात् न्यायश्च
 तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्शप्रयोजकशब्दज्ञानजनकशब्दज्ञानजनकश्च अस्त्वम तानि च वाक्यानि प्रति
 ज्ञानहेतुतादृशोपनयनिगममानि तत्र प्रतिज्ञा उच्छेद्यानुमित्यन्यूनानतिरिक्तविषयकया
 द्यज्ञानजनक न्यायावयववाक्यम् हेतुश्च प्रकृतसाधनगतपञ्चम्यन्ता न्यायावयव उदाह
 रणान्तु प्रकृतसाध्यासाधनाधिनाभावप्रतिपादका न्यायावयव उदनयश्चाधिनाभाववि
 शिष्टस्य हेतो यत्तैरिष्टवतिपादको न्यायावयव निगमनन्तु यत्ते प्रकृतसाध्याविशि
 ष्टप्रतिपादको न्यायावयव एवञ्च प्रयतते न्याय शब्देनित्य कृतकत्वात् यद यत्
 कृतक तदनित्यम् अनित्यत्वव्याप्यकृतकत्ववाञ्छायम तस्मादनित्य । एतणामप्य प्रति
 ज्ञापदेशनिर्दर्शनानुसन्धानप्रत्याख्या इत्यस्यैवा धर्मोपेक्षाया मज्ञा अत्र च यादजल्प
 वितपठाना प्रवृत्तिप्रकारश्चलज्जातिविषयान्वयानि च याद्विधिनेदे न्येष्टव्यानि ॥

means the suggestion of connection. It will be asked whence this suggestion arises. It is therefore stated that it arises from a portion, that is from a particular instance or mere example.

According, then both to this system and those of the Sāṅkhya and others the suggestion of connection whether the relation of cause and effect or other, arises in conformity with the example. Thus then pervasion (or the being pervaded, as the mark by that of which it is the mark) is the possession of a natural connection, the natural being that which is not accidental. This intrinsic nature is known from its being ascertained that certain perceptible objects do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant with) that which is to be proved (or that which is denoted by the major term), while it is ascertained that certain perceptible objects do pervade the inferential mark. Of supersensible objects established by evidence some are pervasive of both non-pervasive of both pervasive only of the inferential mark, or non-pervasive only of that which is to be inferred. Among these the non-accidental nature of the first is to be ascertained from their pervading the inferential mark, of the second from their not pervading that which is to be inferred, and of the fourth also from their pervading the inferential mark. This inference is of two kinds, for the sake of oneself (or logical) and for the sake of another (or rhetorical). Of these inference for the sake of oneself arises from investigating for oneself the pervasion or sumption and the determination of the minor by the middle, and inference for the sake of another results from knowledge of the pervasion, and of the qualification of the minor, derived from a syllogism enunciated by another.

A syllogism is a sentence which conveys verbal knowledge which is the cause of the third recognition of the inferential mark. The members thereof are five, viz, the question, argument, instance, application, and conclusion. Of these the question is a proposition a member of the syllogism, conveying verbal know-

ledge the object whereof is neither less nor more than the conclusion to be afforded, the argument is a member of the syllogism ending in the fifth or ablative case of the middle term under consideration; the instance or example is a member of the syllogism declaratory that the given major is not absent from the middle, the application or subsumption is a member of the syllogism declaratory that the minor is characterised by the middle thus characterised by non absence of the major, and the conclusion is that member of the syllogism which declares the minor to be characterised by the given major. The syllogism proceeds as follows: Sound is non-eternal (the question), because it is producible (the argument), whatever is producible is non eternal (the instance), and sound is characterised by producibleness pervaded by non-eternity (the application), therefore it is non eternal (the conclusion). The descriptive appellations given by the Vaiśeṣikas to these five members, are the question (*pratyañā*), reason (*apadeśa*), example (*nīdaśana*), application (*anusandhāna*), and conclusion (*pratyakṣānyā*). The mode of procedure in colloquy, disputation, and controversy, and the definitions of misconstruction, futile reply, and failure in argumentation, may be sought in the *Vādi-vinoda*. U

इति शब्द व्याख्यातम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 By this verbal knowledge is explained

Another section is commenced with the view of including under inferential knowledge other forms of evidence. That knowledge which under the name of verbal knowledge, knowledge whereof words are the instrument, is approved by the Naiyāyikas and

प्रमाणान्तराणि तैर्हि केन तर्भाषयितुं प्रकरणात्तरमारभते । शब्द शब्दकरणात् ज्ञानमिदमिति यत्प्राप्तिकादौ नामभिमतं तदप्येतेन तैर्हि कल्पेन सिद्धप्रभवत्वेनेव व्याख्यातं यथा व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताप्रतिसन्धानापेक्षं तैर्हि कल्पेन यथा शब्दमपि तथाहि इति पदार्था मिथः ससर्गवन्त आकाङ्क्षादिमिथः स्मारितत्वात् सामभ्याजैति पदार्थसाधेयत्वं तत्राहि आकाङ्क्षादिमत्यदकदम्यस्मारितत्वं पदार्थाणां मिथः ससर्गवत्त्वव्याप्यं गृहीत्येव ससर्गवत्त्वमनुमिनोति ॥

others, ■ explained by this, by the nature of relation, that is, as derived from an inferential mark. Verbal knowledge, like inferential, requires consideration of pervasion or invariable concomitance and of the nature of the attributes of the subject of the question. For example, such and such verbal meanings are mutually connected, inasmuch as they are recalled by terms involving an ellipse &c. as in the aggregate of verbal meaning, Drive the cow hither. In this instance a man infers the mutual connection on recognising that there is something recalled by a plurality of terms requiring others to complete the sense, pervaded by mutual connection of the meaning of the terms. U

By this by the explanation of inferential knowledge, verbal knowledge or cognition produced by knowledge of words, is explained. The Naiyayikas and others hold that there is a kind of experiential cognition termed apprehension of construction, differing both from perception and inference. In the teaching of the Vaiśhīshikas this is not admitted. In the case of verbal knowledge they hold that what takes place is inference regarding contiguity of the senses of terms. For instance upon hearing the proposition The cow exists it is inferred that the cow is characterised by existence, inasmuch as this is recalled by the term wherein resides implication of words to be supplied favourable to apprehension of construction characterised by the notion of existence in the proper object qualified, as in the familiar instance of a water pot, or the inference results from what is recalled by the term cow this term being uttered together with exists as in the case of the eye, but there is no peculiar kind of cognition produced by words. For

इतेन सैद्धन्तज्ञानकथनेन शब्द शब्दज्ञानजन्यज्ञानमपि व्याख्यात कथितमित्यर्थः. नैवापिकप्रभृतिभिरन्यपरोधानामक प्रत्यक्षानुमितिभिश्चमनुभिरूप ज्ञान मन्यते धैरेयिक मते न तदङ्गीकारः पदज्ञानस्थले पदार्थसमर्पस्यानुमतिरिव भवति तथाहि गौरस्तीति वाक्यप्रवणान्तरं गौरस्तितावान् स्वार्थमिकास्तित्वान्वयपरोधानुपलब्धत्वाद्वाक्यपदस्मारित-त्वात् घटवत् अस्तिपदसमभिध्यादृत्योऽपदस्मारितत्वाद्वा चतुर्थदित्यनुमानमेव ननु शब्दजन्यो विलक्षणोऽपि यदानामेकवाक्यतापक्षवत्त्वसमभिध्यादृत्यनिश्चयं दिना न्यायनपेक्ष्यन्वशोधस्यानुत्पत्त्या पूर्वं तस्याप्यवकाशः ॥

gayal, occasions a sense of the nature of a gayal it having no other function since it has been applied to that object by the ancients just as the term cow is the occasion of a sense of the nature of a cow. Or it may be that the occasion of the sense of the nature of a gayal appears from the force of the attribution concerning the subject of the question by means of the inference that the term gayal is an occasion of a practical acceptance inasmuch as it is a legitimate term.

The Mimāṃsakas hold that disjunctive reasoning is another form of evidence. For instance when it has been ascertained from astrology that Deva-datta is to live for a hundred years and from observation that he has no house to live in it is next presumed that inasmuch as his living a hundred years is otherwise impossible he must live in the open air. This as being a fact of implication is not accepted by them as an inference. In this example inasmuch as the notion of living involves the notion of living either in a house or in the open air and inasmuch as it is impossible that he should live in a house the other alternative being established his living in the open air appears in the process of illation. In like manner in the familiar example Deva-datta is stout but does not eat by day (therefore he eats at night), if being settled that he must eat since stoutness is observed to be pervaded or universally accompanied by eating and it being con-

धीनस्यैव भोजनव्याप्यत्वाद्यगमात्भोजनं सिध्यत द्विधाभोजनवाधे रात्रिभोजनं सिध्यति । अथ सम्मर्षितव्येषां प्रमाणांतरस्य मन्यन्ते पौराणिका तथाहि सम्मर्षो भूय सहचाराधीनज्ञानं यथा सम्मर्षति घ्राह्यं खिद्या सम्मर्षति सहचरे शतमत्र च व्याप्तिर्नार्पयतेति तथाभाष्ये एवमितिह्यमिति सौचुरित्यनेन प्रकारेण यदुच्यते तद्वि श्वेति द्विष्टप्रवक्तृक परस्परगतं वाक्यं यथा घटे घटे घट इत्यादि तस्यापेक्षित्यानिश्चयाच्च शब्देऽन्तर्भाव इति पौराणिकानभिप्रायः तदेतन्मतं न समीचीनम् ऐतिह्यस्य शब्दरूपतया अनुमानं यवान्तर्भावात् सम्मर्षाप्रियं व्याप्तिसापेक्षानुमानं यवान्तर्भवति तद्विरपेक्षस्तु प्रमाणमेव न तदुक्तं गीतामीये शब्दे ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावादनुमानेऽपार्थक्यसम्भवानामनर्थान्तरभावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः इति भट्टमते वेदान्तमते चानुपलब्धेरेषां प्रमाणांतरत्वमस्ति तथाचाभावाद्यदो भवतीति तन्मतमपि न मनोरमम् अनुपलब्धस्थाने इतिप्रसङ्गार्थापेक्षे यथाप्रत्याक्ष्या प्रत्यक्षमेव भवतीति तत्र चानुपलब्धेः कारणस्य न विप्रतिपद्यामरे प्रमाणांतरात्पन्तु तस्या न युक्तिपदवीं स्पृशतीति सचेष्टम् ॥

trary to the hypothesis that he should eat by day it follows that he eats at night. Similarly the Paurāṇikas hold probability and traditional teaching to be other forms of evidence. Probability is a cognition dependent on a plurality of concomitances as for instance learning is probable in a Brahmin and a hundred instances are probable among a thousand while there is no pervasion or universal concomitance necessitated. Such is their view. In like manner traditional teaching which is delivered in the form 'Thus' indeed they have declared for this is a proposition derived through a succession of witnesses and having no determinate author. For instance In every sacred fig tree a Yaksha dwells &c. This in the view of the Paurāṇikas being ascertained as having been declared by competent authority is not included under verbal knowledge.

This doctrine of theirs is not correct for traditional teaching being a kind of verbal knowledge is included under inference. Probability also, so far as it involves a pervasion is included under inference, and so far as it is irrespective of universal concomitance is not a form of evidence at all. Accordingly it is declared in the aphorisms of Gāṇṇīśa. Inasmuch as traditional teaching is not a different thing it is not leaved of verbal knowledge and inasmuch as disjunctive argumentation probability and impossibility are not different things they are not denied of inference.

According to the doctrine of Bhāṭṭa and that of the Veśāṇṭa non observation is also another form of evidence and apprehension of non existence takes place thereby. This doctrine also can not be accepted. In the case of non observation it is perception that arises by means of a presentation of attribution connected with the organs of sense. We do not controvert the fact that this is the cause of non-observation but to maintain that non observation is an independent form of evidence does not belong to the course of propriety. V

Aph 6 Reminiscence results from a particular conjunction of the soul with the internal organ, and from reproduction

¹ The word results is to be supplied. The particular conjunction is reflection and other attention. From this, as the non-coherent cause reminiscence, a kind of knowledge, is produced in the soul as the co-inherent cause. The instrumental cause is stated in the words from reproduction and by the particle and 'the active element of former experience is involved. This recollection or reminiscence simulates the correctness or incorrectness of the previous experience, such being the recollection of one who mistakes a rope for a snake and flees from it. Reminiscence does not take place always in every case, since it depends on the resuscitation of a mental retentum. The knowledge of inspired sages is not separately defined by the author of the aphorisms, being included in the perception of ascetics but it is stated in the section intitled Enunciation of the categories, that the presentative cognition which is declared to belong to inspired sages the promulgators of revelation resulting from particular merit, from conjunction of the soul and the internal organ irrespective of inferential marks &c, and conversant about supervenable objects past present, and to come, about merit &c; and about the contents of books, is called the knowledge of inspired sages. This belongs also at times to ordinary people as when a young maiden says. My heart assures me that my brother will depart tomorrow. U

¹ उत्पद्यते इति शेषे सयोगविशेषे प्रतिष्ठानादिशेषविधानम् एतस्मादभिमत्यादिका रणादात्मनि समवायिनि स्मृतिविद्याविशेषे उत्पद्यते निमित्तकारणमाह सस्कारादिति चकारेण व्यापारी पूर्वानुभव समुच्चयिते अनुभवशाय्यायव्यायव्यनियमनुविधत्ते रज्जुभुज द्गतपोषणभ्य पलायितस्य तथैव स्मृते नच सतत स्मृतिप्रसङ्ग सस्काराद्वाधार्यान्त्वात् आर्यं ज्ञान मूत्रकृता एषां लोहितं योगिप्रत्ययान्तर्भाषितं यदार्थप्रदेशाख्ये तु प्रकरणे तदुक्तं तद्व्याप्त्यान्नाप्यधिधातुशामवीणामतोतानागतजर्तमानेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु धर्मादिषु द्रव्येषु निधत्तेषु वा लिङ्गाद्यनपेक्षादात्ममनसो सयोगाद्धर्मविशेषाच्च प्रतिभ ज्ञानं पदुत्पद्यते इ दाप्यं इति तत्त्व कदाचिस्त्वैकिकानामपि भवति यथा कन्यका खदति यथा मे माता गन्तेति दृढय मे कथयतीति ॥

Reminiscence arises from a particular conjunction of the soul and the internal organ, that is, from a conjunction of the soul and the internal organ accompanied with a desire of recollection, from reproduction in its common form called resuscitation, and from an excitant implied by the particle and. The instrument therein is purpose, not identical with disregard, the operation is reproduction, the excitants are the concomitants (or associated ideas), the non-coincident cause is conjunction of the soul and the internal organ, and the instrumental cause is reflection &c, consisting of the desire of recollection V

तथा स्वप्नः ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 So also dreaming

As reminiscence results from a particular conjunction of the soul and the internal organ so also does cognition in dreaming. Dreaming consciousness is the intellect on of the internal organ, which arises by means of the organs of sense in one whose senses are at rest, and whose internal organ is absorbed. This is of three kinds. It arises partly from intensity of reproduction whatever

१ आत्ममनसो सयोगविशेषात् सुस्मृतिरिति तादात्म्यमनसयोगात् सत्कारात् समानाकारकात् भावनाख्यात् चकारादुद्वाधाच्छ स्मृतिर्भवति तत्र च उपेक्षानात्मन निश्चय करण सत्कारो व्यापार उद्वाधकास्तत एतदकारिण आत्ममन सयोगोऽसमया विकारण सुस्मृतिरूपशानिधानादिक निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

२ यदात्ममनसो सयोगविशेषात् सत्काराच्च स्मृतिस्तथास्यद्विज्ञानमपीत्यर्थः । उपरते स्मिपयामस्य प्रतीकमनसस्य इन्द्रियद्वारा यदनुभूयमानम तत् स्मृतिज्ञानम तच्च त्रिविधं किञ्चित् सत्कारपाट्यात् कामी क्रुद्धो वा धर्म्यमादृतत्रिचनपनु स्याति तस्य तस्यामश्रयावा प्रत्यक्षाकारं ज्ञान पुराणादिश्रययज्ञानतमेस्कारयया ज्ञायत कर्माज्जनीदे युद्धमिदमित्याकारम किञ्चिदातुना यातपितृव्यमगा द्यात तत्र यातदोषादाकारं गमनयमुत्तरापयदनयाप्रादिभयवचनादादि यथति विनोदययदोषमदिष्टा यद्भिदये यद्भिदज्ञानातिज्ञान कनकपत्रं त्रिधुन्यतार्थिस्फुरादिगदादादिक यथति ज्ञेयमदोषश यन्यात् समुद्रमन्तराग्नदीमज्जनभागाभारयगरनतयतादि यथति अदृश्यमादपि तज्जन्मानुभूतेषु धन्मानुभूतेषु वा मिदोऽप्युत्तान करणस्य यत्तानमुत्पन्न तत्र तु भायेदक धर्मात् गगरोददयतादोददज्जनाभयायमभतगराजमन्दर्जना दीप्रयकम य धर्मात् तनाभयज्जनाभयपतनोद्वातात्तदुद्वाज्जनाभयविदारदनादिप्रियकम स्य ज्ञानमुपपन्न तत्र ता मानवातामयत्र कारेत्य युद्धयधानभायमाचित्यादे विभागे दृश्यः ॥

object one in love or anger thinks of intently when he goes to sleep, taking with him in that state the form of perceptive cognition through the influence of mental reproductive power produced by previous hearing of the legends (*Purānas*) &c, in the form This is the contest between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna and the like. It arises partly from derangement of the bodily affections wind, bile and phlegm. Of these, one under disorder of flatulency experiences transit through the air, wandering about on the earth, fleeing with fear from tigers &c, another by the excess of the derangement caused by inordinate secretion of bile experiences entrance into fire, the embracing of flames of fire, and sees golden mountains, the corruscations of flashing lightning, the configuration of the spheres &c, another through predominance of phlegmatic disorder experiences passages through the sea, immersions in rivers and sprinklings with showers of rain, and sees mountains of silver and the like. Through the influence of merits also, in the cognition which is produced in the internal organ immersed in the experiences of this or former states of being arises auspicious imagination, due to merit, and having as its objects the riding upon elephants ascent of mountains, assumption of the princely umbrella, feasting upon rice and milk, interviews with the sovereign, and the like, while through demerit arises dreaming imagination of unction with oil, the falling through blindness into a well, riding upon camels, immersion in mire, the sight of one's own nuptials and the like. Herein the three are conjointly causes and this division is to be considered as reposing on the relation of predominance among the qualities. U

स्वप्नान्तिक्म् ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 [So also] consciousness in dreaming

Some one may say The cognition which arises during a dream, in the form of recollection of that which is experienced

ननु वनज्ञानं स्वप्नमध्ये स्वप्नज्ञानानुभूतस्यैवार्थस्य स्मृतिरूपं कावर्ते तत्र स्वप्नस्य न वर्तते स्वप्नस्यानुभवरूपत्वात् तथाच कस्मात् कारणात्तदुत्पत्तिरित्यत आह । तथेति

ed in dreaming cognition has not the nature of dreaming inas-
much as it is an experience of dreaming whence then does it
arise? The answer is furnished in the aphorism : The words *So*
also are to be taken in from the preceding aphorism : The mean-
ing therefore is that as dreaming so also the consciousness in
dreaming arises from a particular conjunction of the soul with the
internal organ and from reproduction : The difference extends
thus far that cognition in dreaming results from reproduction pro-
duced by former experience while consciousness in dreaming re-
sults from reproduction produced by experience arising at the very
time It has therefore been stated by *Parīkṣita* *deśicharya* that
from looking back upon past cognitions recollection only results,
and the author of the *Vṛtti* says that cognition in dreaming be-
ing a flash of experienced object is not a different thing from re-
miniscence : Some teach that consciousness in dreaming is know-
ledge amounting to certitude during dreams such as that one is
lying in bed U

धर्माच्च ॥ ९ ॥

Aph 9 Also from merit

A cause of dreams and of consciousness in dreaming is ad-
ded The particle *also* implies the addition of demerit The ex-
planation of this has already been given

इन्द्रियदोषात् संस्कारदोषाच्चाविद्या ॥ १० ॥

Aph 10 : Nescience results from derangement of the organs
of sense and from imperfection in reproduction

पूर्वमूषादनुवर्तते तनात्ममनसोः सयोगविशेषात् संस्काराच्च यथा स्यदस्तथा स्यदन्ति
कर्मणोत्पद्य । एतावानेव विशेषो यत् स्यदज्ञानं यथानुभवज्ञस्यन्तितात् संस्कारात् स्यदन्ति
कन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानात्पदानुभवज्ञानेन संस्कारादेः तदुक्तं प्रसन्नदोषाचार्ये अतोऽज्ञानप्रत्यक्ष-
ज्ञानं स्मृतं इति । उक्तञ्च एतन्कारि अनुभूयन्तु स्फुरन्त्यायेतया न स्मरणादयान्तरं
स्यदज्ञानम् इति । स्यदमध्ये प्रमादूतं यदज्ञानं तत् स्यदन्तिकर्मिति कश्चित् यथा श-
ब्दाया प्रयानोऽस्मीत्यादि ॥

स्यदस्यदन्तिकर्मो कारणं समुज्ज्वनेति । अधर्मसमुच्चयार्थवत्कारं कृतस्याप्या-
नमतत् ।

1 Intelligence according to another mode is divided into two kinds, certitude and incertitude. Of these, the cause of incertitude is stated. Derangements of the organs of sense are ophthalmia &c. Imperfection in reproduction is the resulting from erroneous experience. The particle *and* implies the addition of such imperfections as remoteness &c, and as assumptions of which the inferential mark is illegitimate. The cause then of nescience or incertitude is imperfection, and imperfection, as consisting of biliousness, remoteness &c, is of various kinds. V

तदुदज्ञानम् ॥ ११ ॥

Aph 11 This is imperfect cognition

1 This, an unreflected word, employed pronominally refers to nescience. This nescience is defective cognition cognition unduly extended or restricted, cognition determined by a form of which it is not susceptible and asserting that this is in that, a cognition the determination of which does not reside in the thing to be determined. Imperfection is defined as being uncertainty of cognition. Suspense, therefore, though admitting of one valid alternative, is vicious, being identical with inattention. The four forms of nescience, therefore known as suspense, erroneous assurance, dreaming, and non apprehension are hereby implied. U

अदुष्ट विद्या ॥ १२ ॥

Aph 12 Free from imperfection it is science

1 प्रकारान्तरेणापि युक्तिर्द्विविधा प्रमाप्रमाचेति तत्रापमाया कारणमाह । इन्द्रियदोष काचादि सत्कारदोषो भवानुभयजातत्वादि चकारादूरत्यादिरूपाणामस्ति द्वयपरामर्शादिरूपाणाञ्च दोषाणो बहुलः तथाचाद्यद्वयाणामप्रमाया दोष कारण दोषमुपि सत्कारत्यादिरूपा नानाविध इत्यर्थः ॥

1 तदित्यश्रयपद मर्त्यनामसमानार्थकमश्रित्या परामशति माश्रित्या दुष्टज्ञान व्यभिचारिज्ञानमेतस्मिन्तदितिज्ञान व्यधिकरणप्रकाराद्यच्च विशेष्यगृतिप्रकारकमिति यावत् । दोषश्च ज्ञानस्यानिश्चयरूपत्वमपि तन्नेकगोठिसत्त्वेऽपि मशयेऽदुष्ट ग्यानवधारणा स्मकत्यात् । तदनेन मशयविषयस्य प्राप्त्यवसायानाञ्चनुर्णामप्युपसृष्टः ॥

'The word cognition is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. Science is experience of that whereof there is cognition free from imperfection, that is produced by organs of sense which are not deranged, recognition of a character in its proper subject, or experience the form of which resides in a common substratum, or experience such that that which is not its form does not reside in its subject, and this is of two kinds intuitive and inferential. U

आपे सिद्धदर्शनञ्च धर्मेभ्यः ॥ १३ ॥

Aph 13 The knowledge of inspired sages, and perfect vision result from merits

'Some might ask wherefore the knowledge of ascetics is not science since imperfection of the objects, as remoteness &c is possible in such cognition. To this the answer is furnished in the aphorism. The knowledge of inspired sages which is produced by merit acquired by asceticism the perfect vision, the vision of all objects perfect or real arises from merits. If it be suggested that demerit may be the cause thereof we deny this for such knowledge is never erroneous and demerit is the cause of error. But the knowledge of ascetics depending solely upon merit arises solely in the form of certitude inasmuch as remoteness and the like the defects of the object cannot effect errorneousness therein, and we

१ ज्ञानमित्यनुग्रहेते बहुलमदुष्टान्निवृत्त्ययं यत्र यदस्ति तत्र तदनुभयो वा समाना धिक्तराप्रकारानुभवा वा विज्ञेयानुभवाप्रकारानुभवा वा द्विद्वैतस्य तस्माच्च ज्ञेयं कस्य द्वयमेव ॥

२ ननु योगिना ज्ञान कथमपिदा न भवति दूरत्यादिरूपधियवदोपस्य तत्रापि सम्भवादत्त आह । आर्यमणोपा योगनधर्मेण ज्ञानितं यत् सिद्धदर्शनं सिद्धानां मता सर्वेषां यस्मिन् दार्शनं तदर्थमेव आदत्तं ननु ब्रह्मधर्मकारणमिति न तत् कदाचिदपि भयरूपं भवति अधर्मस्य हेतुत्वात् योगिना ज्ञानानु धर्ममात्राधेन प्रमादपमेव भवति दूर स्यादेतिवदोपस्य तत्र भवत्यात्म्यादकृत्या दोगाद्या भवजनकस्यधर्ममकारणवति दृश्यम केदितु सिद्धेन सन्त्याद्यभिमानित्वा गुटिकाजनविशेषादिना यदर्थं भवति तदपि आर्यत धर्मेव एव भवति अतएव अनुग्रहे अतीन्द्रियेष्वप्यवदार्थेना यभूय भाषेयु द्वितीयमन्तरं इत्यादिकमपि मभु न्द्वयते तथाच तादृशज्ञानमपि धर्ममात्रा धनतया प्रमादपमेव भवतीति भाव एति व्याचक्षत ॥

feel assured that defects beget error only by the assistance of de-
merit. Some maintain that the vision which results by means of a
spell, as by means of a particular kind of ball of collyrium over
which a sacred text has been recited results only from merits like
the knowledge of inspired sages. The verse of the Raghuvansa
[ch. 3 : 41] The son of Dilipa acquired the vision of supersensible
objects &c, well accords with this exposition. Hence they explain
the meaning to be that such knowledge also is depending only
upon merit arises solely in the form of certitude. V

TENTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON

इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषाद्विरोधाच्च मिथ. सुखदुःखयोरर्थान्तरभावः ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 : Inasmuch as causes desirable and undesirable are
different and opposed the relation of pleasure and pain is that of
reciprocally different objects

1 The object of the tenth book is the exposition of the divi-
sion of the attributes of the soul according to their cause. "The
division of pleasure and pain is first stated among these with the
purpose of rejecting the error that pleasure differs not from pain
which error might arise from the omission of pleasure in the apho-"

1 आत्मगुणानां कारणतो भेदव्युत्पादनं दशमाध्यायार्थं तत्र आत्मशरीरनिष्ठवार्थं
सुष्टिभन प्रवृत्तिदोष प्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम इति गीतमीये प्रमेयविभागसूत्रे
सुखस्थानभिधानात् दुःखमिच्छमेव सुखमिति भवतिरासाये सुखदुःखयोरर्थे प्रथमं भेद-
माह । सुखदुःखयोरमिथ परस्परमयान्तरभावो भेदो वैजात्यमितिवाच्यत् कृत इत्यत
आह इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषात् इष्ट इष्टमात्रं सकृच्चन्दनवनितादि अनिष्टमनिष्टमात्रं
मदिरूपकदि तद्वयं यत्कारणं तस्य विशेषात्भेदात् कारणेनात्याधीनं कार्यवैजात्य-
मात्रशक्यं यत् भेदकान्तरमाह विरोधात् सदानवस्थानलक्षणत् नष्टोक्तस्मिन्वात्मन्येकदा
सुखदुःखयोरनुभवः । चकारादनयो कार्यभेदं भेदकं समुच्चिनोति तथाहि अनुवहामि
प्यङ्गनयनप्रसादादिमुखस्य देव्यमुखमालिन्यादितुं यस्य कार्यमिति ततोऽप्यनयोभेदः ।
तदुक्तं प्रशस्ताचार्ये अनुवहलक्षणं सुखं सगताभिप्रेतिविषयसाक्षिभ्यो सति इष्टोत्पद्यधी-
न्दिपार्थसन्निकर्षार्थमात्राप्रवादात्मनसो सयोगादाद्यदनुवहामिष्यङ्गनयनादिप्रसादज-
नरुमुत्पद्यते तत् सुखम इति तदिदमतीतेषु सकृच्चन्दनार्दिषु स्मृतिजमनागतेषु सङ्कल्प-
जम गीतमीये सूत्रे सुखापरिगणनं योराप्यायं सुखमपि दुःखत्वेन भावयता योराप्य स्यादे-
तदर्थमिति ॥

ism of Gautama which enumerates the objects of certitude Soul body organ of sense object of sense intelligence internal organ activity fault transmigration recompense pain and emancipation are the objects of certitude . There exists between pleasure and pain the mutual relation of different objects difference or variety . Should it be asked why it is so it is stated that it is because there is a difference in causes desirable and undesirable that is, because there is a distinction between a desirable cause such as garlands sandal-wood women &c and an undesirable cause such as snakes thorns &c . Difference of effect necessarily depends upon difference of cause . Another ground of the distinction is laid down in the opposition for pleasure and pain are never experienced simultaneously in one and the same soul . By the particle *and* the difference of the effects of pleasure and pain is implied also as a ground for distinguishing between them . For instance, complaisance the embrace clearness of the eyes &c are the effects of pleasure while despondency and a sullied countenance are the effects of pain . wherefore pleasure, and pain must differ . It has therefore been stated by Prasasta devacharya . Pleasure has complaisance as its characteristic , and is that which is produced through conjunction of the soul and internal organ supposing merit &c or through the contiguity of the organ and the object of sense in the recognition of something desirable produced where garlands and other desirable objects are at hand and is productive of complaisance embraces clearness of the eyes &c . In the case of past objects such as garlands sandal wood and the like pleasure arises from reminiscence in the case of future objects from purpose or resolution . The non enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of Gautama is to promote indifference since indifference would arise in one who should account even pleasure as pain . U

समयनिर्णयान्तरभावश्च ज्ञानान्तरत्ये हेतु ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Non inclusion in doubt and assurance is a mark that [pleasure and pain] are different from cognition

feel assured that defects beget error only by the assistance of de merit. Some maintain that the vision which results by means of a spell, as by means of a particular kind of ball of collyrium over which a sacred text has been recited, results only from merits, like the knowledge of inspired sages. The verse of the Raghu vamsa, [ch ■ 41] The son of Dilipa acquired the vision of supersensible objects &c, well accords with this exposition. Hence they explain the meaning to be that such knowledge also, is depending only upon merit, arises solely in the form of certitude V

TENTH BOOK, FIRST DAILY LESSON

इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषाद्विरोधाच्च मिथः सुखदुःखयोरर्थान्तरभावः ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 Inasmuch as causes desirable and undesirable are different and opposed the relation of pleasure and pain is that of reciprocally different objects.

1 The object of the tenth book ■ the exposition of the division of the attributes of the soul according to their cause. The division of pleasure and pain is first stated among these, with the purpose of rejecting the error that pleasure differs not from pain, which error might arise from the omission of pleasure in the apho-*

1 आत्मगुणानां कारणतो भेदव्युत्पादनं दशमाध्यायार्थं तत्र आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थं बुद्धिर्मनः प्रवृत्तिदोष, प्रेत्यभाशकनदुःखापघर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् इति गीतमीये प्रमेयविभागसूत्रे सुखस्थानभिधानात् दुःखाभिन्नमेव सुप्रमिति भ्रमनिरासार्थं सुखदुःखयोरर्थं प्रथमं भेदमाह । सुखदुःखयोरर्थमिव परस्परमर्थान्तरभावो भेदो वैजात्यमितियाद्यतं कृत इत्यत आह इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषात् इष्ट इष्टमात्रं सकृच्चन्दनार्जुनादि अनिष्टमनिष्टमात्रं मद्दिगुष्टकादि तदुप यत्कारणं तस्य विशेषात्प्रेक्षात् कारणवैजात्याधीनं कार्यवैजात्यमायवयव यतः भेदकान्तरमाह विरोधात् सद्दानयस्थानलक्षणात् नह्येकस्मिन्नात्मन्येकदा सुप्रदुःखयोरनुभवः । चकारादनयो कार्यभेदं भेदकं समुच्चिनोति तयाहि अनुपदर्शमप्यङ्गनयनप्रसादादिसुखस्य द्वैत्यमुखमालिन्यादिदुःखस्य कार्यमिति ततोऽप्यनर्थभेदः । तदुक्तं प्रशस्ताचार्ये अनुपह्वनचणं सुखं सद्भावमिदं प्रेतिविषयसर्वाच्चये सति इष्टोत्पत्तयोऽन्दिपार्थसिद्धिकर्पादमाद्यपेक्षादात्ममनसोऽस्योपायदुष्टदुष्टदुष्टानिष्टद्वयनयनादिप्रसादकं नरुमुत्पद्यते तत् सुखम् इति तदिदमतीतेषु सकृच्चन्दनार्जुनादिषु मूर्तिजप्रभवागतेषु मङ्गल्यं जम् गीतमीये सूत्रे सुखापरिणयनं धैराण्यात् सुखमपि दुःखस्यैव भावयता धैराग्य स्यादेतदर्थमिति ॥

nism of Gautama which enumerate the objects of certitude Soul, body, organ of sense, object of sense intelligence, internal organ, activity, fault transmigration, recompense pain, and emancipation are the objects of certitude There exists between pleasure and pain the mutual relation of different objects difference or variety Should it be asked why it is so, it is stated that it is because there is a difference in causes desirable and undesirable, that is, because there is a distinction between a desirable cause such as garlands sandal-wood, women &c, and an undesirable cause such as snakes, thorns &c Difference of effect necessarily depends upon difference of cause Another ground of the distinction is laid down in the opposition for pleasure and pain are never experienced simultaneously in one and the same soul By the particle *and* the difference of the effects of pleasure and pain is implied also as a ground for distinguishing between them For instance complaisance the embrace, clearness of the eyes &c are the effects of pleasure while despondency and a sullied countenance are the effects of pain wherefore pleasure and pain must differ It has therefore been stated by Prasasta-devacharya Pleasure has complaisance as its characteristic, and is that which is produced through conjunction of the soul and internal organ supposing merit &c or through the contiguity of the organ and the object of sense in the recognition of something desirable produced where garlands and other desirable objects are at hand, and is productive of complaisance embraces, clearness of the eyes &c In the case of past objects such as garlands, sandal wood and the like pleasure arises from reminiscence, in the case of future objects from purpose or resolution The non enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of Gautama is to promote indifference, since indifference would arise in one who should account even pleasure as pain U

सशयनिश्चयान्तरभावश्च ज्ञानान्तरत्वे हेतुः ॥ २ ॥

Aph ॥ Non inclusion in doubt and assurance is a mark that [pleasure and pain] are different from cognition

1 The mark that pleasure and pain are different from cognition, distinct from the attribute knowledge, is that they are not included under doubt and assurance that is, that they do not fall under either certainty or uncertainty For the attribute knowledge is of two kinds doubt and assurance, and neither pleasure nor pain can be included under either of those kinds For neither pleasure nor pain has the form of two repugnant alternatives that it should be probable that they have the nature of doubt nor has either possession of a given form together with absence of the negation of that form that it should be likely that they have the nature of assurance or certainty The supposition of a third form of cognition is chimerical and consequently neither pleasure nor pain can come under knowledge V

तयोर्निष्पत्तिं प्रत्यक्षलौकिकाभ्याम् ॥ ३ ॥

Aph 3 The production thereof [i e of doubt and assurance] is by means of perception and inference

1 The production thereof that is of doubt and assurance results from perception, and from an inferential mark Neither plea-

1 मुख्यदुःखयोर्ज्ञानान्तरत्ये ज्ञानगुणभिरत्ये सशयनिर्णयान्तराभाससशयनिर्णयान्तरगतत्वाभावा ऐतु । ज्ञानगुणोद्दिष्टिद्विधा मन्वेष्टे निश्चयश्चेति नहि तयोरेवतर निश्चयि मुख्य दुःख व्याप्तर्भ यतुमर्हति नहि मुख्य दुःख वा विरुद्धकाटिद्वयप्रकारक येन तयोः सन्देहत्य सम्भाष्येत नापि तदभावाप्रकारक सत्तत प्रकारक येन निर्णयत्य सम्भाष्येतिमिति ज्ञानस्य तृतीयप्रकारस्तु शययिषाणावमान आतस्तत्र मुख्य दुःख वा प्रवेष्टुमीष्टे इति ॥

1 तयोः सशयनिर्णययोर्निष्पत्तिरूपति प्रत्यक्षलौकिकाभ्यां मुख्य दुःखे वा न प्रत्यक्ष सामयोजन्य ॥ या लिङ्गजन्यम चतुर्विधे हि मुख्य वैषयिक मानार्थिकम आभिमानीक माभ्यासिकञ्च तत्र त्रयाणामिन्द्रियसंस्पर्शप्रभृत्य नास्त्येव प्रथममिन्द्रियार्थसंस्पर्शप्रभृत्य ज्ञान स्यादिति चेव न मध्येकदेशस्य कार्यस्य साक्षात्प्राप्तापादकत्वात् अन्यथा दिग्गालसाधारण्येन सकलकार्यकत्वात्पत्ते किञ्च इन्द्रियार्थसंस्पर्शानुत्पद्यमान मुख्य निर्दिक्त्यक या स्यात् सविकल्पक या नाद्या अतीन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥ द्वितीय विज्ञेय विज्ञेयमायेन द्वयोरानाकलनरूपत्वात् किञ्च मुख्यदुःखयोरानुत्पद्यमानत्वात् ज्ञानस्या यद्यमत्रात्वेनयस्याप्रसङ्गात् लौकिकमिति लिङ्गमेव वैषयिकयत् । एतदुक्तम् तयोर्ज्ञानमुपयोर्निष्पत्तिं प्रत्यक्षलौकिकाभ्यां प्रत्यक्षलौकिकज्ञानव्याख्यानाभ्यां व्याख्याता प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञानमिन्द्रियज्ञम् लौकिकम् लिङ्गजम् सुखादिरन्तु वेतादृशमिति व्याचष्ट ॥

sure nor pain is produced by the presentative or inferential apparatus. For pleasure is of four kinds, sensuous accompanying desire, relating to self esteem, or resulting from consuetude. Of the last three of these origination from juxtaposition of the object to the organ of sense cannot be predicated. And should it be contended that the first is cognition inasmuch as it is generated by contiguity of the organ and object of sense, we reply that it is not so, for part only of the causal apparatus cannot prove homogeneity in the product, else all products would be uniform as having time and space as their common antecedents. Moreover, if pleasure were cognition the pleasure which is not produced through contiguity of the organ and object of sense, would be either non-discriminative or discriminative, but it cannot be the former, for then it would be supersensible nor can it be the latter, inasmuch as it does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in the relation of subject and predicate. Again as pleasure and pain are necessarily accompanied with sensibility were they forms of cognition there would be involved in the notion of a sensibility of cognition a regression to infinity. The inferential means an argument as the objective means an object. The author of the Vritti explains the aphorism thus that the origin of these that is of cognition and pleasure is explained by perception and inference that is by perceptive and inferential cognition, and that whereas perceptive cognition is produced by the senses, and inferential by arguments it is otherwise with pleasure, &c. U

अभूदित्यपि ॥ ४ ॥

Apl. 4 The notion of the past also [is a difference between cognition and pleasure and pain]

1 A difference depending upon a difference of form in pleasure

1 निद्रिक्तानामसुखादेः प्रकारभेदाधीनं भेदमाह । इतिराज्ये प्रकारे अपिवाच्ये भविष्यतीत्याकाशान्तमसुखे च तथा धर्मते चन्द्रभूतं प्रयति धर्मि निद्रिक्ते ज्ञानेनो तादि प्रकारे दृश्यते न चैवमकारे सुख व्याप्तिना उत्पद्यमानमुपनयनम् ॥

&c, is compared with inferential knowledge is here stated. The word *iti* means the form, and the word also adds another form, that of the future. A form, therefore, past &c, is observed in inferential knowledge, as that fire has been or will be in the mountain, but pleasure or pain produced under this form has never been observed. U

सति च कार्योद्दर्शनात् ॥ ५ ॥

Aph 5 Also [pleasure and pain are not forms of cognition] inasmuch as the effect is not [always] observed, where [the antecedents] are

Another difference is added. Pleasure and pain are not merely perception or merely inference, since the effect, pleasure or pain, is not always observed where the antecedent, contiguity of organ and object of sense, or attention to the universal concomitance and the attribution respecting the subject of the question, exists. The meaning, therefore, is as follows. Pleasure and pain are not cognition in general, while particular cognition is either perceptive knowledge, or knowledge, in the form of inference. Pleasure and pain are not the former, inasmuch as there is sometimes no experience of the pleasurable, where there is contiguity of the object and organ of sense as where there is perception of garlands, sandal-wood &c, nor are they the latter since there is sometimes no experience of either the pleasurable or the painful, where there exists an inference respecting sandal wood &c or an inference, respecting fire &c. Since, therefore pleasure and pain are not always experienced in the particular perception or in the particular inference, they are not those particular perceptions and inferences. U.

भेदज्ञानं न समुच्चिनोति । सति इन्द्रियार्थसत्त्वरूपे सति च न प्रत्यक्षपक्षधर्म तादृशप्रतिष्ठान्धने कार्यस्य सुखस्य दुःखस्य यादृशनात् न प्रत्यक्षमात्रं सुखं दुःखं वा न लेङ्गिकमात्रं वा तदधर्म्यं ज्ञानसामान्यं तावत् सुखदुःखे न भवत इत्युक्तं ज्ञानविशेष प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं वा भयेदनुमितिर्ह्य वा इन्द्रियार्थसत्त्वरूपं सत्त्वचन्दनादिप्रत्यक्षे सुखस्यानु भयाभावात् न द्वितीयं. चन्दनाद्यनुमितौ छायाद्यनुमितौ वा सुखत्वदुःखत्वान्यतरान नुभवात् अथ प्रत्यक्षविशेषेऽनुमितिर्विशेषे वा सुखदुःखयोरननुभवाच्च तद्विशेषोऽपीति ॥

cognition inasmuch as they are derived from a peculiar cause of its own kind having its own common substratum as is the case with reminiscence, with the first sound in a series of sounds and the like U

एकदेशे इत्येकस्मिन् शिरः पृष्ठमुदर मर्माणि तद्विशेषस्तद्विशेषेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 The head the back, the stomach and the vitals are in one part in one [body] their difference results from the difference thereof [that is from the difference of their causes]

¹ It may be urged that if the difference between pleasure and pain and cognition depend on a difference in the causes and if the difference between pleasure and pain be like that between a post and a water pot and the like there can be no mutual difference between the body and its parts as the head feet back, stomach &c there being in regard to these no difference in the ultimate particles binary atomic aggregates &c or the causes of blood and semen. Accordingly the statement of the aphorism In one part means in one constituent portion, in one in one body. The head is one part the stomach the back and the vitals imply the muscles &c. The difference of these that is their heterogeneity, results from the difference thereof that is from the difference of their causes. For the co-inherent cause of the stomach the back &c, is not of the same kind as that of the head, just as the heterogeneity of a piece of cloth a water pot &c results from hete-

¹ ननु यदि कारणभेदाधीनो ज्ञानात् सुखदुःखयोः सुखाद्य दुःखस्य स्तम्भकुम्भादिवदेव परस्पर भेदः तदा शरीरस्य तदवयवज्ञानाच्च शिरःपादपृष्ठादिरादीनां न परस्पर भेदः स्यात् तत्र हि परमाणुद्वयमुक्तादीनां लोहितैतलसौधोज्ञानाणां भविष्येद्यदित्यत आह । एकदेश इति अथप्ये इत्यर्थे एकस्मिन्निर्गतं शरीरे इत्यर्थे शिर इत्येकदेश उदरं पृष्ठं मर्माणि च स्यादुपभूतानि तेषां विशेषोपेक्षात्मकं तद्विशेषेभ्यस्तत्कारणविशेषेभ्यः तत्रापि कारणधेजात्यादेव धेजात्य नहि लज्जातीयं शिरःसमवायिकारणं तज्जातीयमेघादरपृष्ठादिरपि तन्तुः कपालादुपादानधेजात्यात् घटघटादीं धेजात्ययत् तत्रापि धेजात्यसम्भवात् तन्तुकपालादिरपि अगुणकंरुदिवेजात्यात् एवं तत्र तत्राप्यप्यदर्थं परमा रूपा साधारण्येति स्वस्योपादानधेजात्यस्य सर्वत्र धेजात्यप्रयोजकत्वात् द्रव्यत्वेन तृणादानमाजात्य न धेजात्यप्रयोजकमिति तदिक ॥

rogenity in the threads, the half jars &c, which are their co inherent causes, the heterogeneity of which threads, half jars, &c, results again from heterogeneity in the fibres, lime &c, of which they are composed. Heterogeneity is thus to be sought in the successive material causes, for while the atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the respective material causes invariably gives rise to heterogeneity in the material effects, but homogeneity in respect of substance in the material causes does not cause such heterogeneity U

SECOND DAILY LESSON

कारणमिति द्रव्ये कार्यसमवायात् ॥ १ ॥

Aph 1 The position, with regard to a substance, that it is a cause results from the co inherence of its effects

1 The discrimination of the three kinds of cause is here collaterally instituted. The cognition and expression, as applicable to a substance, that it is a cause, that is, that it is a co-inherent cause,—whence, it may be asked are these derived? It is therefore stated that they are derived from the co inherence of the effect, inasmuch as there co-inhere therein substances, qualities and actions U

संयोगाद्वा ॥ २ ॥

Aph 2 Or from conjunction

1 It might be asked whether only co inherent causality pertains to substances. The reply is furnished in the aphorism. As

1 इदानीं प्रसङ्गतसूत्राणां कारणानां विशेषविवेचनमारभते । कारण समवायिकारणमिति प्रतीतिप्रयोगेन द्रव्ये द्रष्टव्ये कुत एवमत आह कार्यसमवायात् कार्येषां द्रव्यगुणकर्माणि तत्रैव समवयन्ति यत् ॥

2 तत् किं समवायिकारणस्यमात्रं द्रव्याणामत आह । पटोत्पत्तेौ तन्मूला समवायिकारणत्ववत् निमित्तकारणत्वमपि तुरीतन्नुसयोगस्यापि घटकारणत्वात् तत्संयोग द्वारा सुषोस्तन्मूलं च घटनिमित्तकारणत्वमपि याकार समुच्चये तुरीतन्नुसयोग प्रति तन्मूलं समवायिकारणत्वेऽपि घट प्रति तद्वारा निमित्तकारणत्वात् ॥

co inherent causality, so also operative causality, belongs to the threads in the production of a piece of cloth. Inasmuch as conjunction of the shuttle and the thread is also a cause of the cloth the shuttle and the thread are mediately through the conjunction operatively causative of the piece of cloth. The particle *or* is used conjunctively. Through the thread i.e. the co inherent cause of the conjunction of the shuttle and the thread it is an operative cause of the piece of cloth mediately through such conjunction. U

कारणे समवायात् कर्मणि ॥ ३ ॥

Aph. 3. Through co inherence in the cause actions [are non coinherent causes]

It is explained that causality resides in action. The words Are non coinherent causes are to be supplied. Non coinherent causality is causality co inherent in one object connected with the relation of cause and effect. Such causality results either from co inherence in the same object with the effect, or from co inherence in the same object with the cause. Of these the former is called in the terminology of the Vaiseshikas the lesser the latter the greater. If it be asked how the non coinherent causality of action in regard to conjunction, disjunction and reproduction is recognised, it is here replied that it is through co inherence in the cause that is through co-inherence in the co inherent cause of conjunction &c. Non coinherent causality therefore resides in action with respect to conjunction &c. by the lesser relation characterised as co inherence in the same object with the effect. U

तथा रूपे कारणैकार्यसमवायाच्च ॥ ३ ॥

कर्मणि घटुशकारणत्वे तदाह : असमवायिकारणत्वमिति चेन्न असमवायिकारणत्वञ्च कार्यकारणभावसम्यग्कार्यसमवयतकारणत्वस्य च कार्यैकार्यसमवायात् कारणैकार्यसमवायाद्वा तथाद्या सध्यो द्वितीयो महतीति सेव्यैविकरणरिभाषा तत्र कया प्रत्यासत्या सद्यो भविभागसस्कारान् प्रति कर्मणा असमवायिकारणत्वमित्यत आह : कारणे समवायात् कारणे सयोगादिसमवायिकारणे समवायात् तथाच कार्यैकार्यसमवायत्वस्य सध्यो प्रत्यासत्या सयोगादौ कर्मणा असमवायिकारणत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

Aph 4 Also likewise through co inherence in the same object with the cause in regard to colour

* This aphorism is stated in anticipation of the questions as to what causality pertains to colour and other qualities residing in the parts in relation to the qualities &c of the wholes By the words *In regard to to colour, taste smell, touch number, extent, separateness gravity, fluidity, viscosity and the like* are also indicated The word *likewise* extends the application of non coincherent causality Colour and the rest in the whole commence by the greater relation by co inherence in one object together with that whole which is the co inherent cause of the colour &c of the whole, as for instance the colour &c of the half jar originates the colour &c in the jar and similarly in all other cases The word *also* adds to these occasionally operative causality U

* कारणासमवायस्य संयोगः परस्य ॥ ५ ॥

* Aph 5 Conjunction through co inherence in the cause [is the non-coinherent cause] of a piece of cloth

* It is stated that the lesser relation belongs to conjunction which is the non coincherent cause in the origination of a substance
* Conjunction through co inherence in the cause that is in the co inherent cause is the non coincherent cause of the effect or product by the relation characterised as co inherence in a same object with the effect By the term piece of cloth product substance

१ रूपादीनां गुणानामवयववर्तिनामवयवविगुणादिषु कीदृशो कारणतैत्त्यपेक्षायामाह । रूप इति रूपसंगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वगुणत्वद्वयत्वसंज्ञाद्युपलक्षणतः तथैत्यसमवायिकारणत्वमिति दिशति कारणैकार्यसमवायादिति अवयविरूपादीनां समवायिकारणं पटवयवि तेन सट्टैकार्यसमवायेन मटत्या प्रत्यासृत्याऽवयविरूपादिकमारभते तद्वया फणलरूपादिघटे रूपादिकमारभते इति सर्वत्र दृष्टव्यम चकारादमोदा क्वचित्त्वमि सत्यमपि समुच्चिनोति ॥

२ द्रव्यान्मो संयोगस्यासमवायिकारणस्य लघ्वी प्रत्यासत्तिमाह । कारणे समवायि कारणे समवायात् संयोगोऽपि पटादौ कार्ये कार्यैकार्यसमवायलक्षणया प्रत्यासृत्याऽसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थं पटपटेन कार्यद्रव्यमात्रमुपलक्षयति पटितवयवभावप्रसंगेनापि पटा देरसमवायिकारणं तदा कारणैकार्यसमवायोऽप्येति कश्चित्त ॥

generally is indicated A certain author maintains that if conjunction of part with part be a non coinherent cause of the cloth &c, then co inherence in the same object with the cause is also a non coinherent cause U

कारणकारणसमवायाच्च ॥ ६ ॥

Aph 6 Also through co-inherence with the cause of the cause

¹ It is stated that causality by the greater relation sometimes pertains to conjunction The conjunction technically termed co-alition and residing in the constituent portions of a ball of cotton, originates magnitude in the ball of cotton, and there is therein the relation of co inherence in the same object as the cause U

सयुक्तसमवायादग्ने वैशेषिकम् ॥ ७ ॥

Aph 7 The differentiating character of fire [is an operative or efficient cause] through co inherence with the conjunct

² Operative causality is described The differentiating character of fire that is heat which is its peculiar attribute is through co inherence with the conjunct the efficient cause of colour &c produced by baking Hot touch then is the operative cause of qualities produced by baking 1; the relation of conjunction with its own substratum The general definition of an efficient cause is to be understood to be a cause other than the co inherent and non coinherent causes V

दृष्टानां दृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्टाभावे प्रयोगो ऽभ्युदयाय ॥ ८ ॥

Aph 8 The employment of visible observances the uses

¹ सयोगस्य कश्चित् महत्या प्रत्यासत्त्या कारणत्वमित्याह । तूलपिण्डाद्यवय्वेषु यत्मानं प्रचयाख्यं सयोगस्तूलकपिण्डे महत्यमारभते तत्र कारणकार्यसमवायं प्रत्यासत्तिरित्यर्थः ॥

² निमित्तकारणता निरूपयति । अग्नेर्वैशेषिकं विग्रहगुणात्मकमाख्यं सयुक्तसमवायात् पाकज्वलादौ निमित्तकारणम् तथाच पाकज्ने प्रति स्वाश्रयसयोगसम्यग्भेदेन उल्लस्यमानं निमित्तकारणम् समवायिकारणासमवायिकारणमिदं कारणं निमित्तकारणमिति सामान्यलक्षणं बोध्यम् ॥

whereof are visible in the absence of visible results tends to exaltation

1 The employment, or performance of observances such as sacrifice almsgiving, penance &c. which are visible that is which are duly celebrated and the uses whereof are visible that is the utility of which is known by imperative precepts in the absence of visible results of these respective observances where such results are impossible in consequence of absence of desire for such and such consequences tends to exaltation that is to a resultant desire of knowledge induced by purity of intellect Observances therefore whose utility is determined as elysian bliss &c enjoined by such precepts as Let him who desires paradise offer the sacrifice of horses when performed disinterestedly do not produce elysian bliss &c as their fruit but produce as their result purity of intellect and the like according to the Vedic text They desire knowledge and the traditional text When worldly attachment has by observances born its fruits knowledge is afterwards produced V

तद्वचनादासायस्य प्रामाण्यमिति ॥ ९ ॥

Apb 9 [It has been stated that] authoritativeness pertains to revelation because declared by Him

1 The word *eti* indicates the conclusion of the system Authoritativeness pertains to revelation that is to the Veda because

1 वृष्टानां विधिदृष्टानां दृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्ट विध्यर्थादादिना ज्ञात प्रयोजनं येषां तथाविधानां कर्मणा वृष्टदानतय प्रयतीना प्रयोगोऽनुष्ठानं दृष्टानां तत्तत्कर्मफलानामभावे तत्तत् फलकामनाविरदादसम्भवे अभ्युदयाय क्षित्युद्धिप्रयुक्तविविदिद्यात्मक कलाय भवति तथाच स्वर्गकामोऽश्वमेधेन यजेत इत्यादिविविधिविहितानां स्वर्गोऽद्यात्मकप्रतिनिपतप्रयोजनानां कर्मणा निष्क्रमेण कृतानां न स्वर्गादिकलजनकत्वं किन्तु वि सगुह्याद्यात्मकफलजनकत्वमेव विविदिषन्ति इत्यादिपुते कथायै कर्मभिः पश्ये ततो ज्ञानं प्रजायत इत्यादिस्मृतश्चेति भावः ॥

1 इति शास्त्रपरिसमाप्ती तद्वचनात्तनेश्वरेण वचनात् प्रणयनादासायस्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं तथादि वेदास्तायन् पारुषेया वाक्यादितिसाधितं नचास्मदादयस्तथा सह मशाखायविक्षाना यकारः सम्भाव्यन्ते अतीन्द्रियार्थत्वात् नचातीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनाः स्म दादयः किञ्चाप्तोक्तायेदा महाजनपरिगृहीतत्वात् यथाप्तोक्तं न तन्महाजनपरिगृहीतं महाजनपरिगृहीतत्वे तस्मादाप्तोक्तं स्यतन्वरूपप्रणीतत्वञ्चाप्तोक्तत्वम् महाजनप

declared, that is promulgated, by Him, the divine being. It is proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuch as they are an enunciation. Nor can beings like us be the enunciators of these, appropriated to a thousand branches. Moreover, their objects transcend the senses, and beings of our nature cannot behold objects that transcend the senses. The Vedas, again, are rightly affirmed, inasmuch as they are received by the highest authorities. That which is not rightly affirmed is not received by the highest authorities, but these being received by such, are rightly affirmed. To be rightly affirmed is to be promulgated by an independent personal author, and to be received by the highest authorities is to be an object in course of performance by persons attached to all the systems. It has been stated that non-existence of result sometimes accrues from the disparity of the action the agent and the means. If it be denied that this is so, the agent not being remembered, we refuse such denial it having been already proved that the agent is remembered. The promulgation thereof by him is proved inasmuch as it could be promulgated only by an intelligent personal author while such independent power to promulgate the Vedas in their thousand branches, is, as has been said, impossible for beings of our nature. Inasmuch, moreover, as certitude has excellence for its condition the certitude of the Veda must have excellence for its condition and the excellence must in this case be pronounced to be the enunciator's right knowledge of the matter of the enunciation. The enunciator of the Veda must be one who has an intuition of elysium, reformatory efficacy, and the like, and there is none such but God alone. U

रिग्वेदीनस्त्वञ्च सर्वदृशेनान्तं पातिपुण्यानुष्ठीयमानार्थत्वम् कश्चित् कनाभाय कर्मकं
संसाधनं गुणपादित्युक्तम् कर्तृस्मरणभावाच्चेति चेन्न कर्तृस्मरणस्य पूर्वमेव साधितं
त्वात् तत्प्रतीतित्वञ्च स्वतन्त्रपुरुषप्रणीतत्वादेव सिद्धम् न त्वस्मदादीनां महत्प्रमाणं
चेदप्रमाणं स्यात्तर्ह्यसंभवतीत्युक्तत्वात् । किञ्च प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वेन वैदिकप्रमाया अपि
गुणजन्यत्वमापन्नकं तत्र च गुणा यत्कृत्यार्थशास्त्रार्थज्ञानमेव ध्याद्यस्तथा च तादृगं यद्य
चदे यत्ता च स्वर्गापूर्वादिदिव्यकसाक्षात्कारवान् तादृगञ्च नेत्ररादन्य इति सुष्टु ॥